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Two projects are documented within this MEM Report:  
I. The first project examined what was learnt involving the critical 
infrastructure in the aftermath of natural disasters in the Canterbury 
region of New Zealand – the most prominent being the series of 
earthquakes between 2010 and 2011. The project identified several 
learning gaps, leading to recommendations for further investigations 
that could add significant value for the lifeline infrastructure 
community.  
II. Following the Lifeline Lesson Learnt Project, the Disaster Mitigation 
Guideline series was initiated with two booklets, one on Emergency 
Potable Water and a second on Emergency Sanitation.  
The key message from both projects is that we can and must learn from 
disasters. The projects described are part of the emergency management, and 
critical infrastructure learning cycles – presenting knowledge captured by 
others in a digestible format, enabling the lessons to be reapplied.  
Without these kinds of projects, there will be fewer opportunities to learn 
from other’s successes and failures when it comes to preparing for natural 
disasters. 
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1 Executive Summary 
In 2010 / 2011, the Canterbury region of New Zealand experienced several significant earthquakes. 
The most tragic occurred on the 22nd of February 2011 with 185 fatalities, thousands of buildings 
destroyed and damaged to significant parts of the region’s critical infrastructure (known as lifelines).  
In June 2012, a Lifeline Lesson Learnt study commenced to examine lifeline infrastructure lessons in 
Canterbury. Lifelines are systems that provide critical services to a community to function such as 
electricity, potable water, wastewater, telecommunications, and the transportation infrastructure. 
Following the lifeline investigation, a series was proposed to help convey the lessons from 
emergency management in Canterbury, New Zealand. I researched Emergency Potable Water to 
launch the Disaster Mitigation Guideline series. 
1.1 Lifeline Lesson Learnt Project 
The project follows the Risk and Realities report in 1995, which investigated multi-hazard risks to 
lifelines in Christchurch. The objective of the Lifeline Lesson Learnt Project is to collect and 
consolidate relevant lifeline lessons from natural disasters since Risk and Realities, specifically those 
following the 2010 / 2011 earthquakes. The project would provide a single source of infrastructure 
lessons from Canterbury for the regional, national and international lifeline communities. The study 
utilized documents from lifeline organisations, academic researchers and industry commentators to 
produce two documents:  
 Individual lessons from each of the investigations, in summary form. 
 Analysis of those lessons, including the theme, gaps in the lessons and recommendations for 
further investigations.   
The project found 86 documents containing quality lessons, covering all key lifeline disciplines. These 
documents contributed to the production of 96 separate summaries which can be found in Appendix 
III – Lifeline Lesson Learnt – Compendium document. 
The analysis identified 5 key themes with several subsets. The key themes are: 
 Pre-Event Resilience Decision-Making – how decisions are applied to building resilient 
infrastructure – e.g. maintenance plans utilising information from multi-hazard risks studies. 
 
 Asset Performance – the physical impact on assets – e.g. the performance in liquefied soil, 
the value of redundancies within a network, and the degraded performance from extended 
use of temporary mitigation measures (such as batteries and overland piping).  
 
 Organisational Performance – the effectiveness / importance of preparedness measures – 
e.g. understanding the emergency management structure, collaborating with other 
organisations before an event strikes, and ensuring the necessary equipment is available. 
 
 Regulatory Environment – e.g. the disposal of solid waste, emergency demolitions and the 
use of emergency powers.  
 
 Outage Consequences – Social and economic effects on the community when services are 
disrupted - e.g. the difficulty some people had with chemical toilets.  
A serious limitation was testing whether a lesson had actually been learnt or merely documented. 
There was no reliable way to judge whether the learning base is comprehensive, due to the subject 
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nature of the documents used.  There were limited lessons provided for non-earthquake related 
events.   
The key recommendations include: 
1. Making all summaries and source documents available online. This is of the highest priority. 
2. Investigate the possibility of extending Dr Craig Davis’s restoration water model to other 
disciplines. 
3. Commencing a literature review on consistently making resilient building infrastructure 
decisions. 
4. Investigate the effects of the changing exposure to costal hazards within Christchurch. 
5. Develop national guidelines on disaster demolition and debris management. 
6. Investigate post-event, data gathering techniques that can be applied across disciplines. 
This Lifeline Lesson Learnt Project is only a stepping stone in the learning process and is not the end 
of the learning cycle. The Lifeline Lesson Learnt Project provides the lifeline community with an 
excellent reference point as it brings together dozens of separate investigations. It is an excellent 
basis of knowledge, which will encourage further infrastructure learning based initiatives. 
Further work is required to develop a website that makes the analysis, summaries and matching 
source documents available electronically and a summary booklet highlighting the key findings is to 
be initiated. Both work streams will continue into 2013. My role included the analysis of the original 
documents, extracting the lessons; assisting with the data management and contributing to the 
themes analysis.  
1.2 Disaster Mitigation Guidelines – Emergency Potable Water  
The Disaster Mitigation Guidelines followed the Lifeline Lesson Learnt Project. Using the lessons 
from Canterbury as a foundation, the series would provide a means to convey guidance on 
emergency preparation topics in short digestible booklets. From the proposed topics, I have chosen 
to write the booklet on Emergency Potable Water. The target audience is the organisations involved 
in preparing and planning the emergency response when the water infrastructure is disrupted. 
There is substantial research available on emergency potable water, but most of the publications 
focus on repairing the network or physical mitigation measures. Few documents explain entire the 
temporary potable water solutions from sourcing alternative water, to its distribution. There are 
some relevant publications, but each took a slightly different perspective. None covered just 
temporary emergency potable water solutions. For example, a World Health Organisation document 
covered preparation, but missed an opportunity to match this with describing how to respond. The 
documents that were applicable were often quite verbose, in some cases exceeding of 200 pages. 
When researching this topic, a mixture of academic research, existing emergency response plans and 
interviews with those who were part of the emergency response in Christchurch were used. The 
people interviewed were from a variety of organisations including the local public health unit, Civil 
Defence, CERA, the Institute of Environmental Science and Research and other related parties. These 
people kindly offered to review the booklet’s contents once completed.   
The booklets in the Disaster Mitigation Guideline series will be short and understandable, in a user 
friendly format with a vibrant graphic design. The 4Rs, (reduction, readiness, response and recovery) 
used in emergency planning are used as a common content structure throughout the series because 
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of their familiarity throughout the emergency management community. The 4Rs would be feasible 
to practically any relevant emergency situation. 
The findings include a mixture of readiness preparations and emergency response approach stages.  
Key Readiness Measures: 
 All of the organisations that will be part of an emergency response must know how to work 
together in a coordinated manner. 
 The vulnerabilities to the local water infrastructure should be understood before tailoring 
alternative temporary potable water solutions for the region. 
 The water network operator must know where the critical customers are on the network 
and their level of preparedness. 
 Establishing relationships with suppliers and neighbouring water utilities can improve the 
ability to quickly source equipment and other resources such as personnel. 
 A clear and prominent hygiene message is tremendously beneficial in minimizing the 
potential for a waterborne disaster outbreak.  
 Long-term efforts must be made to educate the community on the basics of storing water, 
boiling water sufficiently and adding disinfectant such as bleach to their own water supplies. 
 Readiness preparation for the infirm population is crucial in ensuring they receive adequate 
provisions such as water during an emergency.  
Emergency Response to a Water Crisis: 
While it is essential to know about one’s own role in an emergency response, there must also exist 
an understanding on how other people and organisations fit during the same emergency situation. 
To achieve this, a timeline of an emergency response, using a targeted restoration curve concept is 
outlined. Within the restoration curve, there is a compounding level of service, highlighted by four 
stages. These stages will each involve different agencies, skills and resources. 
The four stages used are: 
 Temporary Critical Services: sufficient access to potable water for drinking and cooking. 
 Temporary Essential Services: sufficient access potable water for cooking, cleaning, washing 
clothes, brushing teeth and personal hygiene, as well as drinking. 
 Temporary Important Services: all properties have access to pressurized water (the water 
quality may not be up to standard). 
 Temporary Standard Services: all properties have access to pressurized potable water. 
When the level of services meets the temporary standard services definition, the emergency 
response would end. The water utility’s focus will turn to the system’s recovery with permanent 
solutions. The emergency should be followed by an in-depth review with all personnel involved. 
The A5 booklet on Emergency Potable Water will be published professionally and can be found in 
Appendix VI.  Initially, the publication will be distributed to lifeline organisations, emergency 
responders and water utility providers around New Zealand and also made accessible online.  
I have found mapping resources to a response timeline to be particularly insightful. I would 
recommend that future emergency planning and other guidelines utilise a similar methodology. Each 
guide or plan should provide their own definitions of the stages within the emergency response.  
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2 Introduction 
Starting on the 4th of September 2010, the Canterbury region, New Zealand, experienced several 
significant earthquakes. The most catastrophic of these was on the 22nd of February 2011; centred 
south-east of Christchurch with a magnitude of 6.3 (GNS Science, 2011). The earthquake resulted in 
185 fatalities. It severely damaged many critical pieces of infrastructure, rendered many commercial 
and residential properties inoperable and displaced a significant portion of the population. 
By June 2012, an investigation commenced to examine the lessons by the critical infrastructure 
operators (known as lifelines). This project follows a comprehensive study in the 1990s which looked 
at the multi-hazard risks lifelines faced in Christchurch. The findings were published in ‘Risk and 
Realities’ (Christchurch Engineering Lifelines Group, 1998). The investigation undertaken during this 
new project would identify the all of the accessible lessons following the original study. The project 
became known as the Lifeline Lesson Learnt Project and was the first part of this MEM Project. 
Following the Lifeline Lesson Learnt Project, Courteney Johnston (another student in the 2012 MEM 
programme) and I proposed the developed of a Disaster Mitigation Guideline series to the 
Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority (CERA). Each guide would cover one emergency 
management topic. I elected to write the guideline on ‘Emergency Potable Water’.  
3 Lifeline Lessons Learnt Project 
 
 
Lifeline Lessons Learnt Project Deliverables: 
 
1. Compendium Document (Appendix III) – Individual lessons from each investigation, in 
summary form. 
 
2. Analysis Report (Appendix IV) – Analysis of those lessons including the themes, gaps in 
the lessons and recommendations for further investigations. 
 
3.1 Project Outline  
As briefly discussed in the introduction, the Lifeline Lessons Learnt Project was to develop an 
addendum to the ‘Risk and Realities’ publication, documenting the lessons following natural 
disasters over the last 15 years.  An important distinction between the original publication and this 
project is the geographic boundaries. ‘Risk and Realities’ focused on hazards in Christchurch, 
whereas this project covers the entire Canterbury region. CERA is the primary sponsor of the project 
and the Canterbury Lifelines Utilities Group operated in an advisory role.  
The New Zealand Centre for Advanced Engineering (CAENZ) is responsible for the project, with Tony 
Fenwick (an independent lifelines consultant) as the principal project advisor. CERA asked Courteney 
Johnston, and I to support Tony’s effort. 
Parties identified as relevant stakeholders included: 
 CERA and their employees 
 Members of the Christchurch Lifelines Utilities Group 
 Research Institutions, e.g. University of Canterbury 
 National Infrastructure Unit, The Treasury 
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 Christchurch City Council, Waimakariri District Council and Selwyn District Council  
 Regional, national and international lifelines groups 
 Lifeline infrastructure owners 
The objective of the Lifeline Lesson Learnt Project is to collect and consolidate lessons relevant to 
lifelines, providing them with a single source of lessons to identifying future infrastructure 
investigations that would add significant benefit. Themes would be extracted from the consolidated 
material, highlighting gaps in the lessons. The gaps will allow recommendations to be made on how 
future work could commence. 
3.2 Definitions 
It quickly became apparent that common definitions would be critical in undertaking this project; 
this would ensure everyone had a mutual understanding. The main areas where clarification is 
required were lifelines, lessons and hazards.  
3.2.1 Lifelines 
Lifelines are systems and facilities that provide critical services that are vital to the function of a 
community, and their functionality is essential to an emergency response and recovery after a 
natural disaster (Multidisciplinary Center for Earthquake Engineering Research).  It was agreed that 
the New Zealand definition of ‘Lifelines’ in the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002 – 
Schedule 1 was too restrictive.  Based on the Canterbury Lifelines Utilities Group’s members, the 
steering committee1 expanded the definition to include: 
 Electricity 
 Potable Water, Stormwater and Wastewater 
 Telecommunications 
 Transportation (including roads, bridges, the port and the airport) 
 Gas and Liquid Fuel Pipelines 
 Solid Waste  
 Fast Moving Consumer Goods (supermarkets selling essentials such as milk and bread) 
 Banks (in particular their ATMs services) 
 Hospitals 
Lessons learnt by normal commercial businesses, non-lifeline government entities and residential 
homes were out of scope.  
3.2.2 Lessons 
It is one thing to say we intended to summarise lifeline lessons following natural disasters; but what 
represents a credible learning? The solution was to build a hierarchy representing the nature of the 
data as well as the available information formats, classifying each as either representing a learning 
or not: 
 Raw Data – products of observations. They are not particularly useful as they are not 
presented in a usable format or available in a functional manner (Rowley, 2007)  – e.g. A 
statistic or repair location. 
                                                          
1
 The project’s steering committee includes Steve Clarke, CEO of CAENZ, Tony Fenwick, lead advisor and 
Joanne Golden, Canterbury Lifelines Co-ordinator (later replaced by George JasonSmith). 
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 Information – processed data organised into a digestible format that is yet to be interpreted 
to determine the potential ramifications or effects. Normally descriptions that start with 
who, what when and how many. (Rowley, 2007) 
 Opinions – a comment that is generally based on assumptions and uncertain facts; not yet 
proven to be a credible learning.  
 Lesson – information that can be used to modify behaviour or knowing how to repeat a task 
and achieve the same result (Deverell, 2009). 
 Knowledge – information structured in such a way that it can be re-applied outside of its 
original context. It can be obtained by teaching another, instructing or extracting from 
experience. (Rowley, 2007) 
  Wisdom – often described as know-why, i.e. Knowing why the information is the way it is, 
not just knowing how to re-apply the information to a variety of situations. (Zeleny, 2005) 
It was agreed that raw data, information and opinions were not lessons; therefore, they were 
avoided when writing the summaries. Establishing these definitions provided consistency amongst 
the various personnel. 
3.2.3 Hazardous Events 
In Canterbury, there were a limited number of hazardous events over the past 15 years; 
nonetheless, it was necessary to define what kinds of events were within the scope of the project. 
Man-made events were not the focus (although lessons from these events could still be applicable), 
and there were doubts on whether enough material existed from non-earthquake related 
investigations in the region. The steering committee decided all natural events were within the 
project's scope. As such, efforts have been made to find lessons from snowstorms and significant 
floods within Canterbury. 
3.3 Methodology 
3.3.1 The Project 
One of the most common practices after any disaster is the commissioning of investigations to learn 
why expectations were not met, and while learning from the occurrence of failures is critical, it is 
essential to keep in mind that the lessons from the successes is just as beneficial.  
Learning investigations are normally commissioned to take advantage of the “window of 
opportunity” (Kingdon, 1984) when it is possible to change existing policies and procedures. But the 
underlying lessons of a ‘lesson learnt’ investigation form the basis of the projects credibility. It is 
important that the lessons represent what truly changed or was done better because of the 
circumstances. The learning should not simply be used to make it look like something was learnt to 
satisfy the demand for lessons to occur. (Birkland, 2009). 
The benefits of this learning project will materialize if it is a valuable foundation for other lifeline 
organisations to initiate their own investigations into: 
A. How lessons from other organisations can be incorporated into their own business, and  
B. Areas where further work would add benefit to this emergency readiness, resilience or the 
emergency response.  
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If it is presented as the ‘Here are the lessons for lifelines in Canterbury’, then the project is being 
misused or misrepresented. It should not be considered the final word on what lifeline lessons have 
occurred. 
3.3.2 Lifeline Engineering 
Lifeline Engineering is an emerging discipline which has existed in New Zealand since the late 1980s, 
making it a relatively young skill (NZSEE, 1998). The foundations are from other engineering 
practices such as civil and structural engineering which enhance the availability of expertise. Lifeline 
Engineering focuses on minimising the vulnerability to infrastructure by: 
 Identifying the hazards which could affect the network. 
 Assessing the networks vulnerability. 
 Assessing the potential damage to the network. 
 Identifying practical measures which are feasible to implement. 
 Building response plans to mitigate these risks. 
As part of the lifeline learning process, it would be reasonable to expect a significant number of 
lessons around these five key topics. The discipline is strongly embraced by the lifeline engineering 
community – as evident by ‘Risk and Realities’, and the adoption of lessons from natural events such 
as the lessons from the 1987 Edgecumbe earthquake by utilities such as Transpower. It should be 
noted that while lessons specially tailored to lifeline engineering may be considered quite new, 
learning from disasters is not. An example is the infrastructure dedicated to fighting fires in San 
Francisco, which is based on the lessons from the 1906 San Francisco Earthquake and Great Fire. 
Over a dozen lifeline groups now exist throughout New Zealand (Ministry of Civil Defence & 
Emergency Management). Each group undertakes new research, assists each other to improve 
resilience and share knowledge across disciplines. This collaboration occurred well before the 
Canterbury earthquakes. The two most prominent collaborations are the Wellington Case Study 
published in 1991 (Centre for Advanced Engineering, 1991) and the Risk and Realities report. These 
studies and many others have shown lifelines are capable of learning without the reminder of a 
disaster. Therefore it is reasonable to assume that this learning process will continue after a large 
natural disaster has occurred.  
The most prominent example of lifeline lessons investigations is by the American Society of Civil 
Engineering (ASCE) ‘Technical Council on Lifeline Earthquake Engineering’ (TCLEE) who travel the 
world, documenting and publishing lessons from disasters. Their focus is on how assets perform 
after a natural disaster, and what can be learned. Many other lessons do not usually become 
apparent in a disaster’s immediate aftermath, which is when TCLEE’s assessments usually take place. 
These lessons come to light as a result of on-going investigations.  
3.3.3 The Learning Cycle 
The learning cycle is a theory developed by David Klob (Kolb, 1984). The theory primarily has four 













Figure 1: The Learning Cycle stages based on David Klob's thesis 
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 Active Experimentation: Plan for behavioural changes to improve the potential outcomes. 
 Concrete Experience: The 'doing' component of learning process; derived from undertaking 
a practical exercise which results in knowledge that can be re-applied to other situations. 
 Reflection and Observation: The analysis from discussions and events, normally in 
participation with others; usually occur in new situations or when one is less confident. 
 Abstract Conceptualisation: Planning how to do an activity differently next time - usually 
based on informal and unproven theories (Daives & Lowe). 
The learning cycle can be initiated at any of the four stages, but must then follow the stages in 
sequence for a successful lesson to occur. It is insufficient to only understand a lesson exists, but it 
must be able to be re-applied to a new situation for an entire learning to have occurred. 
Unfortunately, given the nature of this project, it was not possible to test whether each 'stage' had 
occurred. Instead, relying on evidence of at least two stages of the learning cycle, in an attempt to 
ensure both the theoretical and practical application of the lesson had been met.  
3.4 Implementation Process 
The implementation process is broken down into several steps with the intention of producing two 
documents. One is a compendium of summaries, and the other an analysis on those summaries. 
Who took responsibility for each task is shown in Appendix I. 
3.4.1 Compendium Document 
In producing the compendium document, several stages ran concurrently until the final production.  
The main steps through the project were: 
 A workshop launched the project where definitions were established, and an action plan was 
discussed for the upcoming months. 
 Lifeline utilities, academic researchers and industry commentators were invited to 
participate. This was followed by an informal discussion with the various parties explaining 
the project’s objectives and how their information would be used: 
o Confidentiality possibilities were explained as necessary. The parties had the 
opportunity to be referenced directly or have their identity suppressed, to enabliog 
their confidentiality to be maintained. 
o Some parties were yet to document their lessons at the start of the project. 
Gratefully, some documents were drafted especially for this project. Others chose 
not to participate. 
o Dialogue was held with some of relevant academics to assess whether their current 
work would meet the time limits of the project. 
o Documents were accepted between July 2012 and early October 2012.  
 
 The documents received were processed to form summaries: 
 
o Each document was analysed against the ‘learning’ definition, with the lessons 
extracted into a summary form. Direct quotes were avoided to ensure conciseness. 
No qualification was made on how valuable each summary was during drafting. It 
was essential to observe the summaries in the context of others from the same 
discipline. 
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o The initial batch of draft summaries (82 in total) were assembled to enable an 
assessment of the overall quality, and demonstrate progress to the steering 
committee (known as the Interim Summaries Document). 
o Each summary was peer reviewed to ensure the quality was consistent.  
o Once the summaries were finalised, the original authors were asked for permission 
to publish summaries of their work and make their documents available online. 
o The last step was assembling the approved summaries. This included building a 
bibliography and naming the source documents consistently in preparation for 
online hosting. The format used is Publisher – Condensed Title. 
As there was a considerable number of source documents, a robust data management processes 
was needed to ensure: 
 No documents were forgotten or missed. 
 The final versions of each summary were used, rather than earlier versions. 
 Excluded documents and summaries were not later re-added. 
 Everyone had access to the documents, summaries and log data to reduce duplication and 
increase efficiency. 
This issue was solved by developing a Google spreadsheet to log data for each document and 
matching summary. A shared folder was used to give everyone access to every document or file ever 
received or produced. This reduced the need to email hundreds of documents. 
3.4.2 Analysis Report 
The analysis report highlights the key findings in the compendium document by matching common 
lessons together to form themes, allowing for gaps in the material to be identified. 
1. Key Themes 
The initial themes came from identifying commonalities within the summaries. Individual lessons 
were then tested against the themes to ensure the themes were a true representation of the 
findings, with no obvious areas missing. Debate was held between the team members and the 
steering committee on which proposed themes were applicable.  
Debate was also had on what the themes should represent. Lessons can be distinguished as either 
soft lessons (e.g. how organisations worked together, prepare etc.), or hard lessons (how to make 
assets more resilience, physical engineering knowledge etc.). The argument was made that the 
analogy was outside of the scope of the project and the ‘analysis’ should be free of any bias. 
Therefore, the themes represent what was found, not what the stakeholders wanted to find. 
2. Gap Identification 
The methodology for finding gaps was a challenging task. Some areas looked like gaps, but this 
appearance may have been through either a lack of accessible information, or because everything 
worked as designed, and therefore not documented as a consequence. Because of this, the 
approach taken was to generalised topics that may be worthy of further investigations, rather than 
categorically stating that a gap existed. Current investigations that are taking place show potential 
solutions to some of the gaps identified. 
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3. Limitations 
There are limitations noted for both the process itself and individual themes.  These acknowledge 
the limits in obtaining a broad base of knowledge, as some of the information was commercially 
sensitive, ensuring that when people rely on the findings, they are aware of the constraints.  
The most significant limitation with a project of this nature is the use of secondary information, 
especially with a variety of different authors with differing skills. All of the authors are 
knowledgeable in their field; but how they interpret their data and stated the lessons was certain to 
vary. The testing of individual theories and lessons was outside the project’s scope; however, many 
of the individual lessons were supported by multiple parties, enhancing the credibility of the various 
findings. 
4. Recommendations 
The recommendations primarily expanded on the gaps identified and indicate how the material 
could be used in the future. The highlighted gaps showed suggestions for further investigations while 
the recommendations focused on how such investigations could feasibly be commenced. 
3.5 Findings 
There is little value in duplicating the entire Lifeline Lesson Learnt – Analysis Report (in Appendix IV), 
but it is necessary to understand the key findings to recognise the value of this project. 
3.5.1 Documents and Summaries 
Over 120 investigations were reviewed. Each document was summarised and evaluated for its 
contribution to the project. In total, 96 summaries made it to the final compendium (192 pages) 
from 86 separate investigations. Each summary is from one source apart from: 
 The chapters within the Technical Council for Lifeline Earthquake Engineering report are 
divided into 10 separate summaries. 
 A conference submission by two Transpower employees with a presentation that followed 
was combined into one summary. 
Overall 7 sectors contributed, with separate chapters for multi-discipline reports and coordination. 
1. Electricity – 17 summaries 
2. Telecommunications – 9 summaries 
3. Potable Water and Wastewater (most relevant documents covered both) – 18 summaries 
4. Transportation (including highways, roads, bridges, port, airport and rail) – 19 summaries 
5. Liquid Fuels and Gas – 4 summaries 
6. Hospitals – 3 summaries 
7. Solid Waste Management -  3 summaries 
8. Multi-Sector Reports – 15 summaries 
9. Coordination – 8 summaries 
The entirety of this document can be found in Appendix III – Lifeline Lesson Learnt Compendium 
3.5.2 Lifeline Lesson Learnt Analysis 
As described in 3.3.3.2 (The process), the analysis is based on the compendium document.  
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3.5.2.1 Themes 
The key themes found in the Lifeline Lesson Learnt Project are: 




How decisions are made and 
consistency applied to building 
resilient infrastructure using previous 
lessons and risk mitigation techniques 
Orion used Risk and Realities to 
design a long-term maintenance 
schedule to increase the resilience of 
their network 
Asset Performance How assets performed and withstood 
the forces inflicted by natural disasters 
How pipes performed in liquefied soil 
and the degrading effect on assets 
from mitigation measures such as 
batteries and overland piping 
Organisation 
Performance 
Pre-planning and preparedness, 
including how people and 
organisations worked together and 
the timeliness of the response 
The relationship between CDEM 
responders and asset owners, 




What laws restricted the emergency 
response and caused undesirable 
effects 
The disposal of solid waste, 
emergency demolitions and the use 
of emergency powers 
Outage 
Consequences 
How the communities were affected 
both socially and economically due to 
the cascading impact of lifeline 
failures 
Some people struggled with the 
chemical toilets or had difficulty in 
accessing potable water due to their 
immobility 
Table 3-1: Key Themes Analysis 
Each theme is fully explored with lessons from the compendium document in the analysis report 
which can be found in Appendix IV.  
As evident from the themes analysis, a good understanding of how outage consequences affect 
communities leads to better decision making for building resilient infrastructure. Thus, the themes 
demonstrate the circle of learning within lifeline organisations. 
3.5.2.2 Gaps 
One theme with a potentially prominent gap is ‘Pre-Event Resilience Decision-Making’. There was 
little consistently applied methodologies for determining how to enhance assets resilience. Decisions 
were made to enhance infrastructure resilience by incorporating lessons from previous disasters 
(e.g. Edgecumbe) and utilising comprehensive multi-hazard risk studies (e.g. Orion with Risk and 
Realities). However, there was no consistently applied metric for measuring the decisions. Following 
the lead of the infrastructure owners in Christchurch, the Strong Canterbury Infrastructure Rebuild 
Team (SCRIT) has done some work in standardising a net present value methodology.  There are also 
other models, such as Dr Craig Davis service restoration and asset capability model for the Los 
Angeles Water Department following the 1994 Northridge earthquake.  
Gaps within other themes include: 
 A lack of solid lessons on how agencies and organisations work together. This may be filled 
by a current study by the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment investigating 
organisation resilience.  
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 The complexities of how the emergency laws operate when a large disaster occurs; in 
particular considerations are needed for emergency waste management.  
 Little attention has been given to outage consequences due the current focus on rebuilding 
the Canterbury region. Further work is necessary on modelling the consequences of 
significant events on the entire community. 
Lessons regarding assets performance had quite good coverage; most noteworthy was the work 
done by TCLEE.  
3.5.2.3 Limitations 
The majority of the limitations are similar to any other investigations based on secondary 
information. It can be difficult to obtain sensitive information and considerations must be made for 
the subjective perspective and methodology from various original authors. 
One limitation identified, was testing whether the lesson had actually been learnt or merely 
documented. In some cases, (such as Orion building resilience into their infrastructure through a 
comprehensive maintenance programme based on Risk and Realities) a proven lesson that netted 
significant value had occurred; whereas for others (e.g. agencies who do not often participate in 
emergencies require further training to understand the emergency command structure) it was 
difficult to determine whether the lesson had been internalised. There are many examples on both 
sides of the ledger; all of which is incorporate them all into this project. 
 Two additional noteworthy limitations include: 
 There are a number of investigations yet to be completed. The final date that documents 
were accepted was a little over 2 years after the first earthquake. This Lifeline Lesson Learnt 
Project attempted to capture fresh lessons, ensuring they were not forgotten. There are 
many investigations still taking place or yet to be started. These are likely to have further 
insights into what has been learnt by lifelines following the Canterbury earthquake series.  
 The lack of non-earthquake documentation available. Because of the scale of these events, 
it is likely that there were limited number of lifelines organisations affected.  
3.6 Conclusion 
The project clearly highlights the number of lessons that have occurred in each lifeline sector, but it 
goes beyond just the sheer number of lessons. By combining the lessons from multiple investigations 
over several disciplines, this project is in a unique position to highlight lessons that may not have 
occurred to some sectors. An electricity provider is unlikely to read a paper on telecommunications, 
whereas some of their lessons may be applicable. The nature of the lessons are a real mixture, and 
not solely asset or organisation focused, which increases their relevance to other lifelines. When 
lifelines read and understand the lessons described, they will be more likely to find applicable cross-
discipline lessons that they otherwise may not have found. While the goal at the start was to build a 
single source of infrastructure lessons and identify gaps, it has gone beyond this scope. It now has 
the potential facilitate learning in a unique, cross discipline manner, which is an opportunity to 
enhance the resilience of the most vital pieces of infrastructure further. 
The project seems to fit naturally into the various stages of the learning cycle as there is a variety of 
lessons found. Some lessons are more premature than others but are no less applicable. How they 
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are adopted depends on the individual lifelines, but the ramifications are not just applicable to 
Canterbury, but affect Wellington, New Zealand and the entire international lifeline community. 
3.7 Recommendations 
The recommendations play a pivotal role in this project as they highlight what can be done next to 
advance the learning process. The project is designed to represent a single source of lessons from a 
wide range of investigations, which normally would not be incorporated together. It brings together 
86 separate investigations, but to keep the lessons relevant and accurate, the compendium should 
continue to be updated with the latest publications.  
Key Recommendations: 
1. Develop Online Storage Document Facilities: All summaries and source documents with 
the corresponding analysis should be available online. It is recommended that procedures 
be developed for adding new publications. All of the material must be searchable with the 
use of keywords. Developing a website is the highest priority recommendation. 
2. Infrastructure Resilience Models: Based on Dr Craig Davis’s unique water model; funding 
should be allocated to extending the model for use in other disciplines and effort should be 
focused on increasing the models usability by asset owners. 
3. Further Investigations Include: 
a. A literature review on how decisions are made to build resilient building 
infrastructure, presented in a user-friendly format. 
b. The short-term and long-term effects of the changing exposure to coastal hazards 
within Christchurch (and Canterbury). 
c. National guidelines on disaster demolition and debris management. 
d. Data gathering techniques after natural events across lifeline disciplines.  
The complete set of recommendations can be found in the analysis report (Appendix IV). 
3.8 Further Work 
This project was an exceptionally large undertaking. It could not be completed within the MEM 
timeframe, but due to the involvement of several people, the Lifeline Lesson Learnt Project will 
continue after this MEM Project is completed.  
Further tasks outside of the compendium document and analysis reports included: 
 Website development – A mock website was used to enable a discussion for the online 
storage requirements. This is not the final version (to be developed and operated by the 
CAENZ), but was used to understand what functionality would be required.  
 
The mock-up website was successful in stimulating discussion, but the development of the 
final version is yet to commence. 
 
 Content for a summary booklet – An A5 glossy brochure is planned with the key findings. 
The analysis report was primarily for CERA and the Canterbury Lifeline Utilities Group. When 
the material is approved, the plan is to write a short, sharp, readable summary with only the 
key findings. The intended audience of this brochure is the entire local, national and 
international lifeline communities. 
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The publication of this booklet was in a mere conceptual form at the time of this report. 
The second part of this MEM project involved initiating a Disaster Mitigation Guideline series. This is 
a personal undertaking following the Lifeline Lesson Learnt Project. It is explained in Section 4.  
3.9 Personal Lessons 
From undertaking a broad-discipline ‘lesson learnt’ investigation with multiple people, I have learnt 
several practices that should be incorporated into future projects of a similar ilk. These have a 
variety of applications; some are more applicable to other engineering based learning projects, 
whereas others are relevant to all types of secondary learning investigations: 
 For all projects that involve summarising multiple documents with different people, it is 
imperative everyone shares an understanding of the definitions of common words and 
techniques in use. This ranges from everyone being able to interpret the same piece of 
information consistently, to using the same presentation formats and data storage 
techniques. 
o A common knowledge of words used to describe parts of the project, especially 
when communicating via email is essential. I suggest taking time and determine 
what those words mean at the start of the project. We had issues with the words 
summary, source, document and report. Once identified as a problem, each word 
was defined, and the level of confusion decreased. 
 
 For projects that require the description of lessons for the performance of an asset, the 
context in which that asset failed or satisfied the expectations is extremely beneficial. For 
example, the context of why a bridge sustained damage on one side but not the other is 
necessary. It provides the reader with the information needed to reapply the knowledge to 
their own assets. Without that additional context, many lessons may not have been 
apparent. 
 
 As the project evolved, the standard of work increased as everyone became more proficient 
with certain techniques. It is important not to become too attached to a piece of writing as it 
goes through the peer review process. 
o Because of the sheer volume of analysed information, the first drafts will 
significantly improve over time. The number of people who work on each summary 
makes achieving consistency a constant problem. Plan for this and allow extra time. 
 
 Data Management practices became the most powerful tool throughout this project, and it 
is a good practice establish at the start. For example: 
o When receiving documents from dozens of sources, they are going to be named 
differently. If each document is to be used by different people; hours can be wasted 
if the names are inconsistent. Name each document on receipt using an agreed-
upon convention. 
o Using a shared log between all of the parties is invaluable. This was fundamentally 
the best tool we used in the entire project (described in 3.4.1). It enabled 
traceability of the information being produced and reduced the amount of 
duplication.  
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4 Disaster Mitigation Guidelines – Emergency Potable Water  
 
 
Disaster Mitigation Guidelines Deliverables: 
 
1. A5 booklet on Emergency Potable Water (Appendix VI) 
 
4.1 Guide Outline 
Using the lessons for the Lifeline Lesson Learnt Project, a guideline series has been initiated on 
emergency management topics. Each guide consists of a booklet with practical advice on one or 
more facets of disaster preparedness. Of the several topics that were initially proposed (Appendix V 
- Disaster Mitigation Guideline Topics), the first two guidelines are: 
 Emergency Sanitation  
 Emergency Potable Water 
I elected to write the booklet on Emergency Potable Water, with the focus on temporary solutions, 
pre-disaster preparations and emergency response considerations. Courteney Johnston is writing 
the Emergency Sanitation booklet. Each booklet will be applicable to a variety of agencies involved in 
planning the response, with suggestions that can be incorporated into their existing emergency 
response plans and preparations. 
The Emergency Potable Water booklet is focused towards civil defence, emergency management 
organisations, water utilities, and health authorities. This was not prepared for the general 
population.  
4.2 Background Research 
Emergency planning is an on-going process which requires the input and participation of multiple 
parties. The success of an emergency response in many respects hangs on inter-agency cooperation. 
Planning information can be sourced from local experts, previous emergency participation, academic 
journals and conference proceedings. There are also other books and academic papers with practical 
suggestions that cover a multitude of topic, including emergency potable water. 
The initial awareness of a need for a guideline on emergency potable water planning came from the 
Lifeline Lesson Learnt Project. It was discovered a lack of preparation in providing emergency 
potable water services. During the background research (Appendix VII - Background Research - 
Emergency Potable Water), the need of such a booklet became more apparent: 
 The World Health Organisation (WHO) and affiliated agencies have several relevant papers 
on emergency planning. These include plans for potable water and drinking water standards 
but are mixed with other emergency health advice. The majority were over 200 pages and 
tailored towards developing nations.  
 The Environment Protection Agency (EPA) in the United States has several relevant planning 
documents. These were too broad to be useful in a practical sense and contained a lot of 
information on communication between the county and city, as well as with state and 
federal agencies. 
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 Several studies and emergency plans are available from authorities within California.  Most 
glossed over temporary emergency water and focused on how to repair the broken 
infrastructure. These documents contained several useful suggestions. 
 Emergency plans specific to Florida and Washington State are readily available. These 
focused on what has been done in those states, rather than what should be done to 
prepare. 
 Conference papers and journal articles are available on the improvements Japan has made 
after the Kobe earthquake. These papers are quite specific on individual solutions and are 
only in some cases applicable outside of Japan. 
 Papers and original studies on the preparation in Wellington, New Zealand regarding 
emergency potable water were quite useful but are not guidelines themselves. 
 Journals such as American Water Works Association, Earthquake Spectra and Journal of 
Contingencies and Crisis Management contained good articles that provided advice on quite 
specific issues. They could not be used as standalone emergency response guidelines. 
The research highlighted a need for clean, straightforward guides, especially on emergency potable 
water, and it needs to be presented in a way which entices people to read it. This is the space where 
the Disaster Mitigation Guideline series, and this topic in-particular can add value. 
4.3  Methodology  
The Disaster Mitigation Guideline series is largely based on advice and lessons from the Canterbury 
earthquake sequence. This advice will include research, tips and know-how from academics and 
emergency responders within New Zealand and overseas. A combination of interviews, journal 
articles, emergency response plans, research papers, conference proceedings and international 
advice is used. 
The people selected for interviews were from a range of organisations. Each was chosen to give 
different perspectives on emergency response planning for temporary potable water. The interviews 
played a pivotal role in testing practical theories and identifying new areas to investigate. 
Suggestions made in the interviews are supported by either another professional or literature.  
Person Organisation Role / Background 
Baden Ewart CERA Served on the Canterbury District Health Board, and worked with 
Civil Defence. He is the current General Operations Manager at 
Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority. 
James 
Thompson 
CDEM Training Coordinator and Emergency Management Programme 




AECOM Lifeline Coordinator in Canterbury and Principal Assessment 
Management Consultant at AECOM NZ 
Jan Gregor ESR Science Leader of the Water Programme at the Institute of 
Environmental Science and Research Ltd 
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Denise Tully CPH Drinking Water Assessor / Technical Manager at Community & 
Public Health (Canterbury District Health Board agency) 
Table 4-1: Disaster Mitigation Guideline Interview Personnel 
James, George, Jan and Denise kindly offered to peer review the content before publishing to ensure 
the advice was both accurate and viable. Jan and Denise gave additional advice on whether, in their 
opinion, the health advice in the booklet was complete and accurate. 
All of the literature research used met one of three conditions: 
 Peer reviewed by someone with the relevant expertise (e.g. journals and conference 
proceedings). 
 Issued by a respected organisation such as the WHO, Environmental Protection Agency, 
Ministry of Health and Wellington Lifeline Group etc. 
 Be supported by other unrelated (but credible) sources. 
The best attempts were made to find all of the publicly available literature on emergency potable 
water. Techniques used included searching academic databases and asking librarians for advice, 
perusing various council and emergency management websites as well as following up on references 
provided in papers, articles and guides that appeared relevant. Several authors were contacted 
when reports were discovered that could not be accessed publicly. 
These steps were taken to ensure the advice provided in the booklet is accurate and practical. It was 
crucial to provide advice that can be practically implemented while maintaining credibility.  
4.4 Implementation Plan 
For the guidelines to be adopted, they had to be presented in a user-friendly format. The booklets 
were envisioned to be seen as a series. This meant two questions had to be answered: 
 How would the booklets be presented? – i.e. the font style and graphic design etc. 
 What content structure would be applicable to a range of emergency management topics? 
4.4.1 Content structure: 
From speaking with experts who participate in preparing and responding to a disaster, it became 
obvious that the 4R’s (reduction, readiness, response and recovery) are widely understood 
throughout the emergency management community. The 4R’s would be applicable to any 
emergency topic, although each topic may only cover 2 or 3 of the 4 subjects.  
Each guideline will include the key points, an introduction and background information (including an 
explanation of the disruption caused by the earthquakes in Canterbury) and a conclusion to tie the 
information together. These headings, combined with the 4R’s methodology, meant a feasible 
structure applicable to any relevant situation had been developed. 
4.4.2 Layout & Presentation: 
Many of the documents found were in an academic format. They were often exceedingly dry, with 
the potential to be unappealing to the reader. The booklets will be clear, concise and engaging that 
briefly outline the relevant advice, ensure they stand out from other, similar pieces of literature.  
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After looking at several ‘business help guides’ and other how-to guides, I found the most memorable 
utilized large fonts, bright colours and unique graphic designs. These characteristics are incorporated 
into the booklets design, which I feel make a noticeable difference in quality. 
Advice was sought from a graphic designer as it is not my field of expertise. They provided advice 
and ideas which I implemented in an iterative process. The final design can be seen in Appendix VI, 
where the entire guideline booklet can be found. 
4.4.3 Enhancing the Credibility 
To enhance the booklets credibility, Warren Ladbrook prepared a forward as the Technical 
Infrastructure Manager at CERA. Further endorsements were provided by the people that 
participated in the peer review process. These can be found on the back of the booklet. The people 
whom I interviewed and gave advice through peer reviews are gratefully acknowledged. 
The booklet does not constitute government policy and has not been endorsed by the New Zealand 
Government or the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority. Formal adoption was likely to be 
impossible to achieve and was never a realistic consideration. 
4.4.4 Publication 
For the booklet to be read, it needs to be published in colour on high-quality paper.  It is expected an 
initial run of 200 copies will be done by CERA. Copies will be distributed within New Zealand and 
potentially overseas. The guideline is also to be made accessible online; however, the location is yet 
to be determined. Permission has been granted by the World Health Organisation to reproduce a 
table on water topology in Environmental Health in Emergencies and Disasters. 
4.5 Findings 
During the investigations, a few central issues become obvious. These topics became the booklet’s 
main headings and can be broken down into two categories:  
1. Readiness measures for providing emergency potable water. 
2. Response to a disruption to the existing water infrastructure. 
4.5.1 Readiness 
The most prominent readiness tips that I found are: 
 How agencies work, planned and trained together was the number one issue. One of the 
most recent examples of a breakdown in this area was during Hurricane Katrina in 2005, 
where many agencies had little idea how others were responding (United States 
Environmental Protection Agency - Office of Inspector General, 2006).  Most countries use a 
structured approach i.e. New Zealand uses the Coordinated Incident Management System 
while the United States use the Incident Command System. There are different 
methodologies behind each one, but in practice it is an absolute necessity that every 
organisation who will participate in an emergency response understands: 
o What their role is. 
o How their role fits into the emergency response. 
o How to work with the other people participating as part of the response. 
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 The vulnerabilities with the local water system need to be understood before an emergency 
response plan can be designed. If the emergency response plan is not tailored to the local 
environment, then it will not be an effective tool during the response. By knowing which 
areas are most vulnerable and where the critical customers are on the network, 
contingencies can be developed for these vulnerabilities. This can dramatically improve the 
effectiveness of the emergency’s administration. 
 
 Only once the vulnerabilities are understood, plans can be made on the most appropriate 
sources for alternative potable water. Once water is sourced, it must be treated as required 
and subsequently distributed. Having a plan for each step can reduce problems with 
procurement, inadequate resources and personnel requirements. For example, pre-planning 
how to certify unregistered water tankers is a prime example of understanding local laws 
and regulations before an emergency response occurs. 
 
 A prominent hygiene message throughout the community, matched with sanitation 
provisions such as hand-gel, is effective in reducing the potential for waterborne illnesses. 
Encouraging the public to sanitise their hands regularly is considered one of the main 
reasons why there were no waterborne disease outbreaks in Christchurch following the 
earthquakes in 2010 / 2011. 
 
 Long-term efforts must be made to educate the community on the basics of storing water, 
boiling water sufficiently and adding a disinfecting agent such as bleach to their individual 
water supplies. 
 
 Readiness preparation for the elderly and the infirm population are indispensable for 
ensuring they receive adequate care. The most well-known recent failure is Hurricane 
Katrina due to the lack of consideration this portion of the population was given (Gibson & 
Hayunga, 2006). This kind of planning would also be just as valuable in other kinds of 
disasters such as floods and earthquakes. 
4.5.2 Emergency Response 
While it is essential to know your own role in an emergency response, there must also be an 
understanding of the expectations of others. To achieve this a restoration curve concept which 
follows a timeline has been expanded. Within the timeline, there are defined stages to facilitate 
planning for the relevant organisations and personnel. I found the concept in a paper led by Warren 
Ladbrook called Infrastructure Resilience, written in conjunction with other asset owners (Ladbrook, 
2012).  
It was found that remarkably few guides that defined the stages for providing emergency potable 
water. A Wellington planning document had defined stages for their region (Wellington 
Metropolitan Emergency Water Supply Planning Group, 2003) and a Kansas planning document gave 
reference to the amount of potable water that needs to be provided at each stage (Bureau of Water 
- Kansas Department of Health and Environment, 2005). Other documents merely commented on 
improving the availability of water to allow for personal hygiene and cooking etc. once establishing 
adequate drinking water. 
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Using the restoration timeline concept, I researched and developed generic definitions for each 
phase. These would be expanded by local authorities for aspects specific to their environment. 
Suggestions are made for what agencies would be involved when, the nature of water available and 
where the emergency response focus is, in each period. 
The four phases that are part of the response include: 




Everyone in the region has 
access to some form of 
potable water (minimum 
acceptable level is sufficient 
drinking water) 
 Initial impact assessments 
 Health advice / issuing notices 
 Logistics planning and distribution 




Everyone in the region has 
sufficient potable water for 
drinking, cooking, cleaning, 
personal hygiene. Critical 
customers have an 
adequate supply either 
through their own sources 
or emergency provisions 
 Logistics – transporting, distribution and 
monitoring availability of potable water 
 Health monitoring / public notices 
 Public communication 
 Asset damage assessments  
 Working with critical customers  




All of the properties in the 
region have access to 
pressurized water (quality 
not be up to standard) and 
some form of potable water 
available. Critical customers 
are fully operational 
 Overland and other temporary piping solutions. 
 Logistics – i.e. transporting, distribution and 
monitoring the availability of temporary potable 
water 
 Additional reticulated water treatment (if 
necessary) 




All of the properties have 
access to pressurized, 
potable water  
 Overland and temporary piping solutions / 
engineering  
 Additional reticulated water treatment (if 
necessary) 
 Health monitoring 
Table 4-2: Restoration Service Levels 
Once the services have met the temporary standard service level the emergency response would 
finish, and the focus would turn to the systems recovery with permanent solutions.  
The size, length and resources necessary at each stage is dependent on the size of the disaster. It 
may be possible all four definitions can be met within one or two days whereas other disasters may 
cause a disruption that lasts several weeks, if not months. Once the emergency response is 
complete, it is essential to establish a process for returning to normal. This includes a debriefing with 
all of the parties involved, which should be used to update the emergency response plan. 
4.6 Conclusion 
By undertaking this project, a new appreciate has grown for the benefits of emergency planning. 
This includes how to communicate with the various parties in an emergency and that it is good to 
David White - Thursday, February 07, 2013 
ENMG 608 Project Report 
 18 of 22 David White 
have a plan, but if no one knows or understands it, then it is not likely to be as effective. Additionally 
the importance of regularly training is paramount.  These kinds of conclusions are common 
throughout emergency planning documentation, but their importance cannot be understated.  
I believe the insight given by describing the emergency response as a timeline which follows the 
readiness preparation offers significant value. Merging these two concepts together provides a 
complete picture compared to simply suggesting how to prepare and what the emergency response 
may entail. With the booklet published in a bright, colourful manner, it stands out from other similar 
preparation guides. The entire Disaster Mitigation Guideline series needs to consistence, to enhance 
the credibility of the individual booklets and increase the knowledge of the series existence, 
therefore all future guides should have a similar design and take advantage of the 4R's. 
4.7 Recommendations 
Based on the findings, it is strongly recommended that future preparation advice, emergency 
response plans and other similar documents consider the response timeline – not just what 
resources and personnel are needed, i.e. not only what agencies will be involved – but when they 
will be involved in the emergency. 
For emergency response plans, different timelines need to be developed for different hazards – even 
hazards of the same kind. For example, a 1 in 100 year flood will most likely take less time to restore 
services than a 1 in 10,000 year flood. The same analogy exists for any other natural disaster.  
A subsequent recommendation is for asset owners who are currently involved in the rebuild to 
document what they learnt during the actual emergency response, not just how their assets 
performed during the 2010 / 2011 earthquakes. The focus has moved to the recovery stage, but the 
lessons from the Canterbury emergency response must not be forgotten. Whether these lessons and 
recommendations are incorporated into further booklets as part of this series, or in another public 
form is not of vital consequence. What is necessary is that resources are allocated to reveal and 
distribute the emergency knowledge which now exists within Canterbury. 
4.8 Further Work 
If suitable resources can be found, the series should be expanded to include other topics such as 
emergency demolition planning, cordon coordination, liquefaction clean-up and solid waste 
removal. More technical guides could also be included, e.g. a design guideline on reservoir tanks or 
advice on water / wastewater pipe usage. 
Further work that is part of this booklet includes publicising and prompting its existence. It should be 
circulated around Civil Defence offices in New Zealand, public health authorities and water 
infrastructure owners (primarily the various councils). It would be preferable to make arrangements 
to make the booklet available online. Attempts will be made to make the booklet available at 
relevant conferences such as the Emergency Management conference in Wellington in February 
2013. Efforts will continue to promote the series after the competition of the MEM programme.  
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5 MEM Project Evaluation 
When this project commenced in June 2012, it was a very exciting opportunity given the recent 
series of earthquakes in Canterbury. I was aware that the infrastructure in the region had been 
significantly damaged, but I did not have an appreciation for how well many of the lifeline utilities 
performed; I was not even aware the concept of lifelines existed. 
5.1 Lifeline Lesson Learnt Project 
As the project will not be complete after my role ends, it is difficult to evaluate the outcomes of the 
project, but there have been several achievements to date. Lessons that otherwise would have 
remained internal or never documented have been brought into the public arena. A compendium 
has been complied with thousands of lessons, and several prominent gaps identified.  
Initially, the project progressed in a timely manner. By the end of July, 80 documents had been 
received. On August 16th 2012, interim reports for the compendium document and analysis were 
written. Feedback was received in early September – highlighting the rapid progress being made. At 
the end of September, 120 documents had been processed. The analysis content was drafted by the 
end of October, but from this point forward, progress became more erratic as complications arose.  
There were difficulties getting the analysis peer reviewed, seeking permission from authors to 
publish summaries on their work, and developing the website. I continued work on these tasks until 
the end of the MEM project. The slow progress was frustrating at some points, but it appeared 
nothing could be done to speed it up.  
This project continues although my role is complete. The largest responsibility I took on was the 
compendium document, which is finished, but my preference would have been to see the website 
go live, the analysis ready to be published, and the glossy booklet finished. Unfortunately, this was 
not possible given the MEM time restraints. 
5.2 Disaster Mitigation Guidelines 
When I started the Lifeline Lesson Learnt Project in June 2012, no one had any idea what we were 
going to find or what phase two would be. In September, it became clear that there was a need for 
practical advice on emergency preparedness.  
The initial research looked at emergency preparedness in water – not exactly certain what I would 
find. It became clear over time that for the guideline to be useful it could not cater to both sourcing 
water for fighting fires and providing potable water in an emergency. Further research highlighted 
that emergency potable water planning was about establishing temporary solutions, a concept that 
was not readily adopted in many guides.  
The research progressed with only minor issues. While the Christchurch City Council (CCC) provided 
some excellent information, I had trouble scheduling an interview the CCC due to everyone being 
busy with the on-going rebuild. All of the other interviews went well, including offers to peer review 
the content, which I am immensely grateful for. Unfortunately, it became too difficult to get an 
organisation's endorsement; however the individual endorsements are tremendously beneficial.  
The key now is to promote the booklet, enabling individuals and organisations to better prepared for 
a future water emergency.  
David White - Thursday, February 07, 2013 
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6 Personal Reflection 
Throughout the duration of both the Lifeline Lesson Learnt Project and the development of the 
Disaster Mitigation Guideline series, I was presented with an excellent opportunity to use the skills 
taught within the Master in Engineering Management programme at the University of Canterbury. 
These key skills include: 
 Project Management. 
 Networking / Communication. 
 Risk Mitigation. 
 Incorporating academic rigor (peer reviews). 
 Processing vast quantities of information. 
To enhance my networking skills with likeminded academics and industry researchers in the field of 
emergency management, I attended two conferences. The first was the annual AGM for the 
Canterbury Lifeline Utilities Group in June 2012 and the second was a lifelines conference at the 
University of Canterbury in the middle of July 2012. Both of these conferences provided an 
opportunity to meet people who would provide guidance throughout the duration of both projects. 
I learnt to keep both my academic supervisor and industry sponsor informed of progress and 
potential problems through regular status reports. As part of this process I learnt how to develop 
and maintain a Gantt chart which reflected how the project was progressing. 
The Lifeline Lesson Learnt Project was an opportunity to work with people who had a background in 
comprehensive academic investigations. Tony Fenwick had worked for Treasury and the Reserve 
Bank of New Zealand; where he had obtained a vast amount of knowledge on how ‘Lesson Learnt’ 
projects could be undertaken. Working with someone like him, with his expertise, l grew an 
appreciation for detail, methodically checking off each piece of work through a vigorous peer review 
and author permission process. I feel this ensured the standard of work was as good as it could be 
within the given timeframes.  
Several of the experts who were interviewed or participated in some form with the development of 
the Disaster Mitigation Guidelines, were found as a result of the Lifeline Lesson Learnt Project - this 
highlights the value of participating in the conferences and other related networking events. I found 
that reading about a concept is one thing, but seeing someone explain how that concept was 
implemented in response to the earthquakes in Canterbury was extremely insightful. I found these 
exchanges put me in a better position to author the booklet on Emergency Potable Water. 
Finally, this project has involved working with many busy professionals who are strongly involved in 
the Christchurch rebuild. Learning how to schedule time and encourage them to give me feedback, 
when they have other significant priorities, have been a steep learning curve. I have learnt how to 
guide these professionals in the right direction and encourage them to meet deadlines that work 
with my schedule by being polite, but firm. I found the key was to show willingness to negotiate 
fixed deadlines in order to meet all of the criteria set for the completion of this project. 
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 Appendix I – Lifeline Lessons Learnt Responsibilities 
The personnel involved in the project are: 
 Warren Ladbrook – Technical Manager for Infrastructure at the Canterbury Earthquake 
Recovery Authority (CERA), acting on their behalf as the project’s primary client. 
 Steve Clarke – CEO for the New Zealand Centre for Advanced Engineering (CAENZ), was 
asked to commission the work. Steve’s principle role was quality control, ensuring adequate 
peer reviews were held on the projects analysis. 
 Tony Fenwick – An independent lifelines advisory, contracted by the CEANZ to undertake 
and overseeing the project from a technical perspective. 
 Joanne Golden – Lifeline Utility Coordinator for the Canterbury Lifeline Utilities Group 
(CLUG); a member of the projects steering committee, ensuring CLUG’s goals were satisfied.  
 George JasonSmith - Lifeline Utility Coordinator for the CLUG; took over Joanne’s role in 
September, when Joanne moved to a new job. 
 Courteney Johnston – a University of Canterbury Master Candidate in the 2012 Master in 
Engineering Management, supporting Tony’s efforts on behalf of CERA. 
 David White (the author of this report) – a University of Canterbury Master Candidate in the 
2012 Master in Engineering Management programme, supporting Tony’s efforts on behalf of 
CERA. 
 Charlotte Brown – University of Canterbury Ph.D Candidate in Environmental Systems 
Engineering, asked to summarise some of the initial documents during July / August 2012. 
1.1 Compendium Document 
A brief breakdown on who completed what tasks that are described in 3.4.1 (The Process - 
Compendium): 
Sources 
Formal Invitation to Participate Joanne Golden 
Informal Discussions with Lifelines and Industry Commentators Tony Fenwick 
Academic Timeframes David White 
Industry Author Approvals Tony Fenwick 




Writing the Compendium 
Draft Summaries Courteney Johnston, Charlotte Brown 
and David White 
Interim Compendium Publication David White 
Summaries Peer Review Tony Fenwick 
Editing Summaries Courteney Johnston and David White 
Final Summaries Assembly and Bibliography David White 
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Data Management 
Log Design and Administration David White 
Log Management Courteney Johnston, Charlotte 
Brown, Tony Fenwick and David 
White  
Source Document Management Tony Fenwick and David White 
 
1.2 Analysis Report 
A brief breakdown on who completed what tasks that are described in 3.4.1 (The Process): 
Analysis Report 
Interim Draft (August 16th) Tony Fenwick (with assistance from 
David White and Charlotte Brown) 
Peer Review of interim report Warren Ladbrook, Steve Clarke and 
Joanne Golden 
Matching learnings to themes Courteney Johnston and David White 
– used by Tony Fenwick 
Final analysis Tony Fenwick (with assistance from 
Courteney Johnston and David 
White) 
Final Report (before peer reviews, 16th of November) Tony Fenwick 
Peer Reviews Steve Clarke and external personnel 
commissioned by the CAENZ. 
 
1.3 Further Work 
Some of the tasks as part of the further work have commenced, others are waiting for the final 
feedback to the analysis report. 
Further Work 
Mock Website David White 
Official Website CAENZ  
Glossy Booklet Tony Fenwick and Steve Clarke 
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Lesson Learnt Literature Review 
One of the most common practices after any disaster is the commissioning of investigations to learn why expectations were not met, and while learning 
from the occurrence of failures is critical, it is essential to keep in mind that the lessons from the successes is just as beneficial.  
Disaster Learning Theory 
Many researchers have discussed how organisations and emergency responders learn from natural disasters. The following is a sample of that theory: 
Literature Theory Application 
(Birkland, 2009) Birkland describes five patterns under which lesson learnt projects are produced.  
Birkland shows that the only occurrence where genuine policy change can be 
linked directly to the ‘lesson learnt’ project is when there has been careful 
consideration of the investigation, and the policies are designed once the lesson 
learnt project is complete. 
Policy change must not dictate the outcomes of 
a lesson learnt project, instead the lesson learnt 
project should be used to influence future policy 
change, with the learnings are supported by 
factual evidence. 
(Deverell, 2009) There are four main attributes to crisis learnings. These are: 
1. Double or single-looped. 
2. Focused on prevention or the response. 
3. Learnt within an individual crisis or between separate incidents.   
4. Merely distilled or actually implemented. 
Different kinds of learnings exist. It is necessary 
to recognise their distinguishing characteristics 
when explaining the context of how a lesson was 
learnt. 
(Moynihan, 2009) Moynihan found the barriers to intra-crisis learning in the post-crisis phase were: 
 Lessons that were perceived to be learnt during the crisis did not 
representing a true learning during the post-disaster debriefs, as they 
were unable to be replicated.  
 Assuming the course of action taken was actually the most appropriate. 
Responders during a crisis are under extreme pressure and must make 
decisions quickly. This may be problematic if they are later spell-out as 
learnings. 
 Some actors post-crisis must make decisions for political reasons which fit 
within the broader political frame of accountability and oversight. 
Moynihan highlights the learning over time within the United States for their 
‘Incident Command Structure’. Each new crisis creates a situation where lessons 
can learnt on how the structure can be improved and how emergency responders 
A lesson learnt project following a crisis situation 
must be carefully considered ensuring the 
project will overcome the potential barriers to 
learning. Plans should be developed on how 
these barriers will be overcome and this need to 
be undertaken early in the project. 
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can be educated on its use. 
(Sutton & Tierney, 
2006) 
In explaining the key concepts of disaster preparedness, the authors highlight 
various dimensions which the agencies and organisations involved in an 
emergency response may learn from. These include: 
1. Hazard Knowledge. 
2. Management, Direction and Coordination. 
3. Formal and Informal Response Plans and Agreements. 
4. Supportive Resources. 
5. Life Safety Protection. 
6. Property Protection. 
7. Emergency Coping and Restoration of Key Functions. 
8. Initiation of Recovery. 
By understanding the key concepts from which 
emergency responders and lifeline organisations 
are most likely to advance their learnings, it can 
provides a starting point when documents are 
being reviewed for learnings. Knowing the types 
of learnings to look for, enhances the 





The article investigated how a variety of organisations process their lessons. It 
made a comparison between the learning processes within an organisation and 
incorporating learnings after a specific incident. Learning from serious accidents or 
large incidents proved difficult, because lessons extracted in after-action debriefs 
are not necessarily the lessons which the organisation recognise as having 
significant value for this business, and therefore may be ignored. “Time and again, 
a key lesson extracted with hindsight from accident histories is that the affected 
organization(s) failed to learn from previous accidents”. The authors show that an 
organisation is more likely to incorporate learnings from specific incidents when 
they have effective emergency preparedness response plans and procedures. This 
is because have already developed an understanding of WHAT must be done, and 
the learnings pose an opportunity to enhance HOW the activities can be done 
more effectively. 
In extracting learnings from third party 
investigations, effort should be made to look for 
comparisons between what planning existed 
before the disaster and how those plans can be 
built on post-disaster. Learnings that are based 
on a pre-existing framework are more likely to 
represent learnings that have been internalised 
rather than those that are superficial. 
(Voss & Wagner, 
2010) 
Voss and Wagner highlight the benefit of local authorities learning from small scale 
disasters, as there is less attention and political influence – leading to better 
learning outcomes. The more attention a lesson learnt project receives, the more 
care that needs to be taken when assessing the viability of the learnings found. 
The learnings must be carefully considered, ensuring they are not the result of 
undue influence from the demand for specific learnings to occur. 
The focus must be on the project and the 
learnings analysed, with little to no value given 
to what the project stakeholders want to find. A 
lesson learnt project must show what was 
actually learnt; within the context of the lesson 
learnt project. 
(Dantas & Erica, 
2006) 
The article develops a potential framework on how information / learnings can be 
shared between organisations within New Zealand. The authors focus on 6 core 
Understanding how some lifeline organisations 
intend to record their learnings provides clarify 
Appendix II –Lesson Learnt Literature Review 
 




2. Event observations 
3. Event Assessments 
4. Organisation Actions 
5. Organisation Reporting 
6. Organisation Re-evaluation 
The report highlights that NZ Transport Authority has started to develop these 6 
elements into a standardised form in which they record learnings. By using such a 
framework, the authority can make comparisons between their plans for each of 
the elements and what actually took place, which will form their future learnings. 
on what to look for, when analysing documents 
from these organisations.  
(Maricle, 2011) Maricle’s research has shown that a combination of ‘High Quality Science’ 
(advances the general state of knowledge using a scientific method) and ‘Useful 
Science’ (the scientific application of a theoretical ideal) is necessary for resilience 
enhancing learnings. High Quality Science feeds the useful science investigations 
through scientific experiments.  
The theory can be applied to learning from 
disasters, demonstrated by the variety of science 
necessary to initially theorise and then test 
‘infrastructure resilience’ learnings (i.e. the 
performance of physical assets). 
Previous ‘Lesson Learnt’ Projects 
Here are examples of lesson learnt projects that have followed large scale natural disasters: 









Dozens of studies by the National 
Research Council following the 
1989 Loma Prieta earthquake, 
California are incorporated into 
one book which covered lifelines, 
emergency preparedness, 
buildings, and the geotechnical 
effect on the land as well as future 
mitigation measures.  
The book is written 5 years after the initial 
natural disaster, with a different lead author 
dedicated to each chapter (with the 
assistance of multiple support authors). The 
majority of the lessons contained in this book 
are the result of actual investigations and 
interviews – supported by independent 
investigations. The project highlights 40 key 
lessons, each with a matching 
recommendation. The lessons are broken 
down into the key chapters / themes to 
highlight their relevance. 
The project highlights the benefit of using 
themes to discuss particularly lessons. It is 
a exceedingly broad study that includes 
lifelines and many other disciplines. As the 
lessons are primarily distilled from hands 
on investigations, it is quite different from 
the proposed Lifeline Lesson Learnt 
Project. 
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(O'Rourke, 1996) Engineering Lessons from the 
performance of lifelines from the 
1989 Loma Prieta earthquake, 1994 
Northridge earthquake and 1995 
Kobe earthquake 
O’Rourke looked at the interdependencies of 
lifelines as a result of each earthquake. 
O’Rourke focused on different parts of each 
disaster during his analysis, including the 
system’s ability to cope with fires, the effect 
of ground movement and liquefied ejecta. He 
proposed a model be developed on how the 
performance of lifelines can be measured. 
The study shows the areas which previous 
lesson learnt projects have examined, 
following a large earthquake disasters. The 
study can be used as a reference which the 
lessons for lifelines in Canterbury, New 
Zealand can build on. 
(Katayama, 1994) The paper provides a highlight of 
lifeline earthquake engineering 
learnings for a 20 year period (1974 
to 1994) following the 
establishment of the Technical 
Council on Lifeline Earthquake 
Engineer (TCLEE) (by ASCE) in 1974. 
The focus of the learnings was on the physical 
damage to infrastructure including the effects 
of soil movement on asset damage, and how 
liquefied soil affects buried pipes. Katayama 
pays some attention to the new focus lifelines 
have on seismic strengthening and pre-event 
preparedness. He highlights the use of a new 
tool (at the time) of GIS databases (which 
today is commonly used) to analysis networks 
vulnerability. 
In principle, the same areas that were 
being investigated during the 20 year 
period are the same as today – but the 
technology available, as well as the level of 
learnings documentation available, has 
rapidly increased. By looking back at how 
lifelines learnt between 1975 and 1994, it 
shows how the discipline has matured, 
using their early foundations as a base. 
(Perry, Jones, & Cox, 
2011) 
Discusses how lessons can be 
learnt from the ShakeOut scenario, 
originally developed in California in 
2008. The aim of the scenario is to 
encourage new learnings for a 
variety of organisations while not 
waiting for a larger scale natural 
disaster to occur. 
Based on the designed earthquake scenario, 
lifelines and emergency responders simulate 
how they would response to the crisis, with 
detailed notes taken. The results are 
dissected in after action reviews. They 
provide the basis of future literature studies 
on emergency preparedness in the region. 
Dozens of subsequent studies based on the 
ShakeOut scenario have already been 
published. 
While not strictly a lesson learnt project 
following a natural disaster, the learnings 
from a project of this type demonstrate 
how lifelines and emergency responders 
coordinate together to develop their 
‘lessons learnt’. The project has 
highlighted the unconventional approach 
to learning from “disaster scenarios” and 
shows the potential and multi-discipline 
investigations that enable the cross-
pollination of learnings. 
(Cooper, Fiedland, 
Buckle, Nimis, & Bobb, 
1994) 
Highlights how lessons from the 
1994 Northridge earthquake are 
now incorporated into the U.S. 
bridge design standards. 
By using physical bridges inspection, past 
research, and hypothesis testing –seismic 
resistance bridge designs have been 
recommended for a variety of bridge types. 
The project highlights how a lifeline 
discipline has translated their learnings 
into standards. The specific nature of the 
report demonstrates concrete learnings. 
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(Schiff, 1999) This report contains a hands on 
assessment by TCLEE on the 
performance of lifeline assets 
following the 1995 Kobe 
Earthquake. TCLEE is the world 
leaders in the assessment of 
lifelines post natural disasters. 
For each lifeline (and specific asset), the 
context of how the asset operates within the 
infrastructure network, and how the facility 
or asset was damaged and where available, 
the performance of the asset post-
earthquake is discussed 
 
Other TCLEE monographs read for the 1999 
Taiwan earthquake, 1994 Northridge 
earthquake, and 2010 / 2011 earthquake 
sequence in Christchurch were of a 
remarkably similar nature. 
The TCLEE monograph demonstrates how 
to convey the context of a specific asset’s 
performance, which is necessary  to 
replicate the same performance (or 
improve on it), is a necessary skill to 
understand the learnings and present 
them for future lifeline providers.  
 
Conclusion 
Lesson Learnt Projects following natural disasters are nothing new; however the contexts in which they take place seem to be tremendously valuable. 
TCLEE undertakes their assessments within months of the original natural disaster. Other projects seem to be based on several years of investigations 
(Loma Prieta), and the range of learnings conveyed in these later assessments seem to be broader. In comparison the earlier assessments focus on the 
physical performance of assets. 
It is necessary that the correct processes for the project are put in place at the start, with a clear definition of what actually represents a learning (given the 
context of the scenario). The clearer these definitions and processes can be, the lower the possibility is of undue influence by the stakeholders.   
In order to avoid superficial findings with the inability to effect policy change, the processes used must be vigorous. It would seem to be beneficial to have a 
clear starting point, with a detailed history of what was previously recommended and learnt. This history enables an evaluation to be made on whether the 
learning are actually a new insight or merely one that was not implemented when it was originally raised. The 1995 Risk and Realities report should assist 
with providing a broad, solid base of multi-hazard learnings. 
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Preface 
 
The Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority (CERA) and the Canterbury Lifeline Utilities 
Group are collaborating to assemble infrastructure-related “lessons learnt” from the recent 
Canterbury earthquakes and other natural hazard events over the last 15 years (i.e. since 
publication of Risks and Realities1).2   
 
This compendium contains 96 summaries from over 100 documents included in the Project 
up to the 12th of December 2012. The documents are from a variety of sources including 
lifeline utilities, international commentators and researchers.   
 
The scope of the project has not been limited to learnings from the recent Darfield and 
Christchurch earthquakes, but also includes other natural hazard events such as 
snowstorms. 
 
The summaries that follow include 
 Asset-related learnings; and 
 Learnings related to organisation performance 
o Intra-organisational performance 
o Inter-organisational performance including the relationship with CDEM 
 
The summaries in this compendium have provided source material for a separate “Overview 
Report”, providing an outline of the methodologies used, an overview of what was found and 
recommendations for the future. The Overview Report includes key themes in the 
summaries as well as some gaps that have been identified. 
 
The compendium is broken down into lifeline sectors, for example electricity, 
telecommunications and transportation. Each of these chapters includes a mixture of 
summaries from lifeline organisations, industry commentators and academic researchers. 
The majority are earthquake specific, with a limited number from non-earthquake related 
events.  
 
Each summary in this compendium have been checked with their original authors.  We are 
still awaiting approval for one summary (Davis and Eidinger – see page 107). This 
compendium in no way tries to duplicate authors’ efforts instead provides a reference to all 
of the learnings to date. 
 
                                               
1
 Lifeline vulnerability to natural hazards including earthquakes had been given prominence in a 
comprehensive project undertaken by the Christchurch Engineering Lifelines Group in the first half of the 
1990s.  The project report Risks and Realities records the processes, findings and mitigation steps (risk 
reduction and readiness) identified at the time.   
2
   In formal terms, the project is led by the Centre for Advanced Engineering (CAE) with CERA as their primary 
client.  There is also agreement that findings will be shared with the Canterbury Lifeline Utilities Group.  
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Acknowledgement must go to Tony Fenwick, Charlotte Brown, Courteney Johnston and 
David White for their effort in gathering the relevant documents and preparing the 








This report has been compiled from available documented information provided in response to 
enquiries made to lifeline utilities and other parties who seemed likely to have learnt from direct 
experience of natural hazards in Canterbury.   
 
Effort has been taken to summarise the source documents accurately.  However, the summary 
material in this report is not a substitute for the source documents.  Readers should review the 
source documents, consider other authoritative best-practice information, and take professional 
advice, before decisions are made.   The parties involved in preparing this report do not accept 
liability for losses arising from use of, or gaps in, the information it contains.  
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1. Electricity 










- Although Transpower was in a position to fully supply power within 4 hours of the 
event, restoration of power supply was constrained by the damage to the distribution 
networks. 
 
- Transpower sub-stations incurred minor non-structural damage (broken windows, 
fallen ceiling tiles etc) but this did not disrupt service. 
 
- Transmission lines are generally more resilient to seismic events than substation 
assets. 
 
Design and Installation Issues 
 
- Transpower needs to continue to reduce the risk by replacing or upgrading existing 
buildings or items of plant not complying with its seismic policy and by supporting the 
improvement of seismic design and construction standards in the electrical industry. 
 
- Failure of the surge arrester part of the SVC system at Islington (new substation 
designed to IEEE693 High performance level) was due to a poor detailing of its 
mounting arrangement. 
 
- A number of transformers tripped during the event mainly because of the malfunction 
of the mercury switches used in some of the on-load tap-changer (OLTC) oil relays, 
main Buchholz relay and temperature relays. This issue was identified by Transpower 
some years ago and a programme to replace these old relays with modern seismically 
rated models commenced prior the 4 September earthquake. 
 
- Mercury switches needs to be phased out. Continued seismic assessment of 
infrastructure should be carried out e.g. equipment restraint for in-service and stored 
equipment. 
 
- Except for the mercury switched type relays, all other relays, cabinets cabling, wiring, 
connections and terminations remained stable and secure as did the protection 
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signalling blocking, permissive and intertrip. 
 
- It is recommended that the integrity of oil containment systems of any substation 
likely to be affected by liquefaction be tested. 
 
Dependency on Telecommunications and Fuel 
 
-  Generally remote access technologies were also used to allow staff to deliver 
business services from non-office locations. 
 
- General comments suggested that more satellite phones were required across the 
industry, as should PSTN network have been affected, and power have remained out 
longer, then mobile phone network followed by radio phone network would have 
become non-operational.  There was limited access to a number of satellite phones, 
and poor knowledge of how to contact other satellite phone users. 
 
- It is noted that should radio phones have been required there is a dependency on 
radio repeater sites and therefore for radio repeater site batteries to hold up until 
power is restored. 
 
- While Transpower’s initial response was relatively unimpaired, the impact of damage 
to roading infrastructure and ability of Transpower contractors to source fuel when 
undertaking emergency inspections and repairs was a cause for concern and requires 




- Fine weather and low network loading post-earthquake helped power restoration. 
 
- Need improved paper management (to avoid paper mess in offices as a result of 
shaking). 
 
- There is limited flexibility in the law when an emergency occurs. The better 
alternative would be to amend the regulations to provide disaster safety management 




- Orion bridge strengthening programme significantly contributed to reduced level of 
damage to cable network. 
 
- MainPower’s seismic restraint programme over the past 15 years following 
Edgecumbe greatly contributed to lower damage levels. 
 
- MainPower’s mutual aid agreement - additional staff, fault location equipment and 
portable generators from Marlborough Lines and Electricity Ashburton facilitated quick 
power restoration to a large part of the Canterbury region. 
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Main Lessons Learnt 
 
- Transpower assets did not suffer serious damage and system interruption was 
minimal. 
 
- A number of interconnecting and feeder transformers tripped during the event due to 
the malfunction of protection switches. 
 
- Distribution infrastructure was affected more significantly than transmission as is 
consistent with experience overseas. 
 
- Although most Transpower buildings in the affected region were designed prior to 
Transpower’s current seismic policy, they met or exceeded the current performance 
criteria. 
 
- Only minor impediments to the response/recovery outside of Transpower’s control 
e.g. control of fuel supplies, but they did not seriously affect the response effort. 
 
- Contractors and staff need to consider the safety implications of mobilising in the 
dark to inspect substations (e.g. liquefaction-induced road hazards and risk of 
aftershocks). 
 
- High level of industry cooperation in response/recovery. 
 
- Participation in lifelines exercises was recognised as being extremely valuable in 
forming relationships that come to fruition in a disaster situation. 
 
- Had the event been during the day, the pressure on mobile phone services would 
have made mobile telecommunications essentially unavailable. Had the power 
outages lasted longer, back up batteries would have run out rendering mobile 
telecommunication service unavailable. 
 
- Fuel availability became a concern early on with no apparent prioritised access to 
fuel supplies for essential services – a protocol has to be developed. It was also noted 
that Transpower maintenance contractors do not usually have fuel stored at their 
facilities available for emergency use. 
 
- The seismic compliance of equipment against Transpower seismic policy should be 
thoroughly checked when purchasing new equipment or installing equipment in a new 
configuration, particularly for the equipment that is known to be prone to damage, e.g. 
cantilevered equipment, transformer mounted surge arresters or bushings. 
 
- Develop better understanding of seismic performance of base isolation devices for 
computer racks, through shake-table tests for instance. 
 
- Fuel supply for the vehicle fleet of the maintenance contractors should be ensured by 
having emergency fuel storage facilities at contractor’s sites. 
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- Regular assessment of individual ability to use fleet link radios and mobile phone 
should be made. 
 
- Review whether Transpower has a sufficient number of satellite phones. 
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 June 2011 
 





-This earthquake, as well the 4 September 2010 event, has highlighted the reliance of 
Transpower transmission network on aged infrastructures. 
 
- This event has also highlighted the potential issue of repairability of some aged 
equipment after an earthquake due to the lack of readily available spares (such was 
the case of the 66 kV transformer bushings that broke at Bromley substation). 
 
-The satisfactory performance of Transpower assets during this event does not provide 
certainty on how well equipment, systems and buildings would perform in another 
event of a similar or greater magnitude. 
 
Design and Installation Issues 
 
-The seismicity (the frequency or magnitude of earthquake activity) over a region can 
change following an earthquake.  As a result of the 4 September 2010 and 22 
February 2011 events, New Zealand structural design standards are likely to be 
amended to account for an increased seismic hazard in Christchurch region. 
 
- The very short straight connection between the CVT4 and rigid bus at Bromley 
substation was identified as a possible cause of the failure of the CVT. 
 
- As a general comment, the lack of standardised practice for the installation of flexible 
conductors and the amount of slack that should be provided was identified as an issue 
prior to the Darfield and Christchurch earthquakes. 
 
- The current level of specification allows satisfactory performance of aseismic 
Buchholz relay during aftershocks and lower magnitude earthquakes but may not 
prevent false operation during large earthquakes. 
 
- It is however understood that increasing the specified level of acceleration to ensure 
correct performance of Buchholz relays during rare and large earthquakes will have a 
detrimental effect on the sensitivity of the devices to actual internal transformer faults. 
 
- Buried cables are vulnerable to soil deformation and their failure significantly impedes 
prompt restoration of supply. Cable repair process usually requires skilled crews, 
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special equipment and is significantly longer than overhead lines repair works. 
Damaged cables may require construction of temporary overhead lines to reroute 
power supply during the repair works. 
 
- At present there is a lack of comprehensive design and installation practices in the 




- A variety of communication mechanisms need to be used to keep in touch with staff. 
In this event, text messaging was more effective than phone communication due to the 
phone network being congested. Other methods, such as 0800 What To Do and 
intranet page were also effective mechanisms, although not direct as text messaging. 
 
- A variety of communication mechanisms need to be used to keep in touch with field 
crews. There is limited use of radios at present but this will improve once it is made 
more explicit in the maintenance contractor’s agreements. In addition, an increase in 




General:   Transpower needs to continue to reduce the risk by removing or 
strengthening existing buildings or items of plant not complying with our seismic policy 
and to support the improvement of seismic design and construction standards in the 
electrical industry. 
 
Seismic risk assessment:  Transpower should ensure that the new values for 
seismic actions are used when designing future projects in the Christchurch region 
 
Flexible conductors:   Visual inspections should be carried out in all substations to 
identify any flexible connections between equipment that are obviously too tight.  (It is 
understood that these inspections are under way). 
 
- It is also recommended that flexible connection design and installation guidelines be 
completed to ensure appropriate slack is provided with consideration to seismic 
aspects and electrical clearances. A project has been set up to prepare these 
guidelines. 
 
Equipment replacement:  All instrument transformers with insulators held by “finger 
clamps” should  be replaced as this type of clamping is known to perform poorly during 
earthquakes. 
 
Buchholz relays:  Transpower should decide whether it is required for relays not to 
falsely operate during rare and large earthquake. If that is the case, the specified 
acceleration levels should be reviewed.  The performance of relays should be 
demonstrated by shake-table tests reproducing the as-installed arrangement of the 
device. 
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Transpower should continue to purchase the ETI model relays for new Buchholz relay 
installations, unless it is decided that relays should remain stable during rare and large 
earthquake. 
 
High voltage cables:  The following actions are recommended to improve 
Transpower understanding of the risks to its 220 kV underground cable circuits assets: 
 
1. Sponsor a study of the damaged 66 kV cables either uniquely or in conjunction 
with other utilities (NZ or overseas) or IEEE 693-Consortium. A suggested brief 
is given in Appendix C This was provided by Cable Consulting International Mr. 
Brian Gregory a pre-eminent EHV cable expert who is based in the UK. 
 
2. Leading from Item (1) above, develop technical standards that could be used to 
mitigate the probability of damage to underground cable circuits during a 
significant seismic event. Note: It is understood that PG&E and BC Hydro have 
put in place separate investigation initiatives in this field. We could benefit from 
coordinating our activities. 
 
3. Place a much greater emphasis on geotechnical studies during the 
development of 220 kV cable circuits and develop appropriate policies. 
 
4. All optical fibre cables should be installed within separate plastic ducting, i.e. 
not buried direct – in Christchurch all these cables have now had to be 
abandoned and alternative protection communication paths sought. 
  
Communications:  Staff contact lists should be regularly updated and should contain 
mobile phone numbers (company and personal phones) as text messaging was found 
to be the most effective way of communication. 
 
Transpower should  develop a coordinated approach on FleetLink radio and satellite 
phone for internal communication and communication with maintenance contractors 
after disruptive events. 
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1.3 4 September 2010 and 22 February 2011 Christchurch Earthquakes from a 
Transmission Grid Infrastructure Perspective  
 
Andrew Renton, Transpower 






- Because of previous resilience upgrades the overall transmission grid performed 
well. Transpower experienced only a small number of equipment breakages and 
transformer trips in these earthquakes. 
 
- Transpower’s network benefited from seismic restraint programme undertaken in the 
1990s following the Edgecumbe earthquake. 
 
- Transpower classes essential buildings and facilities as category 4 in terms of 
AS/NZS 1170.   
 
- The earthquakes were in the 500 to 2,500 year return period zone.  Moderate 
structural damage, repairable equipment failure and reduced security are expected in 
this zone.  The performance of aged infrastructure was above expectations and the 
grid was returned to service quickly (following safety inspections).   
 
- Transpower needs to continue to use and support the development of international 
seismic design standards for HV equipment. 
 
- Transpower needs to further identify and mitigate the risk of earthquakes on the 
transmission network to ensure resilience going forward.   
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1.4 4 September 2010 and 22 February 2011 Christchurch Earthquakes from a 
Transmission Infrastructure Perspective: Asset Structural Performance 
and Lessons Learned 
 
Craig McGhie and Christophe Tudo-Bornarel, Transpower 
EEA Conference and Exhibition 2011 
Report, 2011 
 
This is a combined summary of Transpower’s paper and PowerPoint presentation for 
the conference.   
 
(McGhie & Tudo-Bomarel, 4 September 2010 and 22 February 2011 Christchurch 
From a Tranmission Infrastructure Perspective: Asset Structual Performance and 
Lessons Learned, 2011) 
 
(McGhie & Tudo-Bomarel, [Presentation] 4 September 2010 and 22 February 2011 
Christchurch Earthquake from a Tranmission Infrastructure Perspective: Asset 
Structual Performance and Lessons Learned, 2011) 
 
 
- The CDEM Act and the Building Act (and related territorial authority policies) are 
legislative drivers for Transpower to seismically upgrade / maintain their structures / 
infrastructure. 
 
- Overall the transmission grid performed well.  Transpower experienced only a small 
number of equipment breakages and transformer trips in the September 2010 and 
February 2011 earthquakes.  System interruption was minimal.    
 
- Damage to Transpower substations included minor cracking of reinforced concrete 
buildings, non-structural building damage such as broken windows, fallen suspended 
ceiling tiles and light fittings and settlement damage due to liquefaction. Damage to 
primary plant included failure of candle-stick equipment (one 220 kV current voltage 
transformer), transformer mounted equipment (one 220 kV surge arrester and one 66 
kV bushing) and damage to an 11 kV switchboard.  
 
- A number of transmission towers were affected by surface rupture, liquefaction 
induced settlement and/or lateral spreading resulting in tilting towers; suspension 
insulators being pulled out of alignment; tension / slack in overhead lines; and bent 
earth peaks.  But this did not affect service/function. 
 
- Length of time taken to put grid back into service was the time taken to do safety 
inspections (compounded by traffic issues).   
 
- Transformers and heavy plant were restrained, following learnings from the 1987 
Edgecumbe earthquake. 
 
- These events highlighted the reliance on existing aged transmission infrastructures.. 
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- Transpower needs to continue to use and support the development of international 
seismic design standards for HV equipment. 
 
- Further identification and mitigation of earthquake risk to the transmission network is 
required to ensure resilience going forward. 
 
Summary of lessons learned  
 
- Overall Transpower assets did not suffer serious damage and system interruption 
was minimal.  
 
- The events highlighted the reliance on existing aged transmission infrastructures.  
Although most were designed and installed prior to Transpower’s current seismic 
policy, they met or exceeded the current performance criteria.  
 
- The implementation of the lessons learned following the 1987 Edgecumbe 
earthquake, the seismic restraint retrofit programme, was demonstrably worthwhile.  
 
- Transpower needs to continue to reduce the risk by removing or strengthening 
existing buildings or items of plant not complying with current seismic policy.  
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1.5 Orion - Network Asset Management Risk Control Summary  
 
John O’Donnell, Orion 
Presentation, March 2004 
 
(O'Donnell, [Presentation] Network Asset Management Risk Control Summary, 2004) 
 
 
- Orion worked to plan for and mitigate hazard events following their involvement in 
1999 Risks and Realities report.  
 
- Activities undertaken include network diversification, seismic upgrading.  
 
- Upgrades were based on risk profile, including: 
 
 risk rating - probability and consequence (MM scale used) 
 
 priorities assessed 
 
 action plan established 
 
- Action plan included attention to substations (including unreinforced masonry 
distribution substations), pole substations, oil-filled cables.   
 
-  Benefits of diversity, spares management and other risk mitigation steps noted.   
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1.6 Orion – Wind Storm April 2005  
 
John O’Donnell, Orion 
Presentation, 2005 
 
(O'Donnell, [Presentation] Orion - Wind Storm April 2005, 2005) 
 
 
Lessons from Storm April 2005 
 
- Key issue:  safety of the public and safety of staff and contractors. 
 
- Overall the event management and network repair went well.  Support obtained from 
another lines company and this also worked well.   
 
- The point at which the event is scaled up needs to be reviewed.   
 
- Contractor and operator hours need to be managed.  Adequate levels of food need to 
be provided. 
 
- Adequate levels of stock for repair work need to be established. 
 
- Development of text communication strategy would be useful. 
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1.7 Orion - Snow Storm 2005 Debrief  
 
John O’Donnell, Orion 
Internal Debrief Report 
 
This document records the outcome of an internal Orion debrief following the 
September 2005 snow storm. 
 
(O'Donnell, Snow Storm 19 - 20 September 2005, 2005) 
 
 
- Better communications with remote areas is necessary. 
 
- Manual job management system caused some mix-ups.  Need to better prioritise jobs 
and staff deployment.   
 
- Send advance parties to assess what is required for repair before sending operations 
parties (to ensure right personnel and equipment is sent first time). 
 
- Issues arose relating to coordination between Control and Call Centre - Call Centre 
staff did not always have the right information to pass out.  
 
- Need to develop an emergency dashboard to keep staff informed of developments. 
 
- Need more channels for communication (too much traffic just for one channel).  Need 
enough handheld radios in the event of cell phone network disruption. 
 
- Mobilise the Salvation Army kitchen if the event will run more than 2 days.  Different 
staff like different food options (e.g. linemen like food taken to them, operators like to 
come in for a hot meal).  
 
- Keep list of individuals requiring specialist equipment / medical requirements 
updated. Provide accommodation for out of town workers.   
 
- Need to ensure the appropriate people hold the necessary keys. 
 
- Need to communicate to stores / suppliers / warehouses likely material requirements. 
 
- Ensure there are enough vehicles for staff and equipment.  Ensure enough fuel 
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1.8 Orion - Infrastructure Snow Storm Report 2006  
 
John O’Donnell, Orion 
Report to Canterbury CDEM Group 28 July 2006 
 
(O'Donnell, CDEM Report on Infrastructure Snow Report 12 June 2006, 2006) 
 
 
- A severe snow storm impacted the South Island on 12 June 2006.  Electricity supply 
was lost to thousands of customers.  The depth of snow hampered restoration.   
 
- It took about 5 days to restore electricity supply and about 6 further weeks to get the 
electricity network back to its pre-storm condition.   
 
- Tree damage caused many or the outages, largely from trees outside the regulatory 
compliance zone. Locating poles on the roadside makes access for restoration easier 
but creates problems with shelter belts and trees. 
 
- Prior work to replace concrete poles with wooden poles (which are more resistant to 
snow and ice) and ensuring poles are placed so that the conductors act as mechanical 
fuses, likely reduced the number of damaged poles and thus restoration time. 
 
- Helicopter reconnaissance is OK for damage assessment but does not provide 
sufficient detail for restoration planning.  Need to allow storm to abate before 
commencing restoration.  Also need to assess damage before restoration starts in 
order to manage resources. 
 
- Central coordination is essential for setting priorities and managing resources. Repair 
on a rural feeder basis minimises the chance of missing damage. Good 
communication is essential to avoid wasted operational resources (e.g. isolated 
areas). 
 
- Mutual aid agreements within the electricity industry worked well. Need to brief staff 
before they go into the field. Manage work hours and worker fatigue. 
 
- Geographic maps online were beneficial for public. 
 
- Telecommunications were affected by loss of power to cell sites.   
 
- 4WD vehicles and chains are necessary for snowy conditions.  Need to consider and 
manage fuel supply in rural areas. 
 
- Workers must have resources to plan and manage own food supply 
 
- Retailer Call Centre needs to have information on damage.   
 
- Public and operators need to be vigilant and assume all wires are live.  Education on 
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how to avoid back feed from generators into line. 
 
- Improve job management systems and training for larger events.  
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1.9 Orion – Snow Storm June 2006  
 
John O’Donnell, Orion 
Presentation to Engineering Lifeline Workshop, March 2007 
 
(O'Donnell, [Presentation] Orion - Snow Storm 12 June 2006, 2007) 
 
 
- Need to filter early warning information from weather forecasters to avoid false 
warnings and complacency. 
 
- Three activities of restoration planning - gauge damage, set priorities and 
communicate (progress, priorities, and limitations) with CDEM, media and customers. 
Actual snow events are regular enough to not to need to practice.   
 
- Initial information transfer and priority setting was too detailed. High level information 
(constraints and limitations) and priority setting was important.  “Let operational people 
do what they do best.”   
 
- Maintaining lines assets up to building entry reduces conflict but is not the standard 
arrangement within electricity distribution. 
 
- Trees caused 59 per cent of the damage. 
 
- Response constrained by loss of cellphone communication.  Cell phones were best 
for point to point contact.  UHF best for global communication with operational and 
contract staff. Robust radio network is essential for repair and safety.   
 
- Summary daily update with regional CDEM groups worked well. 
 
- Best use of repair resources is when the storm subsides (H&S issues).  Joining 
broken lines together is faster and more cost effective than replacing poles. Make 
maximum use of daylight hours.  Adding manpower can slow things down temporarily.  
Access to 4WD vehicles was essential.   
 
- Public communication was managed through central control centre so that 
operational staff can get on with their work.  Providing internet map of damage 
reduced call centre numbers. Proactive media releases and internet based information 
is important (don’t underestimate restoration time, and emphasise safety issues).  
Daily communications with other lines companies and daily press release also 
assisted.  Communication lesson - keep it simple and focussed.   
 
- Managers should brief staff in future events (context, conditions, hours of work, PPE, 
communications, fuel supply etc). 
 
- On average snow storms affect twice as many customers as wind and take 50 per 
cent longer to restore (this equals three times more customer minutes lost). 




1.10 Orion Presentation - South Island Emergency Officers Conference 2009 
 
John O’Donnell, Orion 
Presentation to South Island Emergency Officers’ Conference, 2009 
 




Lessons following June 2006 Snowstorm 
 
- On average the snow storm affected twice as many customers and took twice as long 
to restore as a wind storm (which equates to three times more lost customer minutes). 
Restoration took 4-5 days but recovery took about 1 month for this event. 
 
- Company culture of emergency preparedness based on CDEM’s “4 R’s” works well.  
(The “4 R’s” are Risk Reduction, Readiness, Response and Recovery.)  Risk reduction 
commenced following Lifeline Group Risks and Realities report.   
 
- Centralised control and contractor management worked well, including resource 
planning, engineering assesses, work planning, stakeholder and public 
communications.   Allow operational staff to perform their normal roles.  Need a 
comprehensive event management system.  Keep communication simple and 
focussed, with regular updates. 
 
- Managers need to provide context to staff/contractors, including work conditions, 
work hours, PPE required, communications, fuel supply, maximising daylight hours, 
minimising travel between jobs, setting clear priorities and ensuring self-sufficiency for 
meals. 
 
- Mutual aid agreement between lines companies was in place (it’s a simple, 
agreement in principle form).  Adding manpower initially slows response down.  Daily 
communications needed between lines companies working under mutual aid 
agreements.   
 
- Cell phones best for point to point communication.  Minimal backup standards for 
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1.11 Orion - Christchurch Earthquake 2010, 2011  
 
John O’Donnell, Orion  
Presentation to Auckland Engineering Lifelines Group 
November, 2011 
 
This presentation summarises Orion’s learning’s from the September 2010 and 
February 2011 earthquakes.   
 
(O'Donnell, [Presentation] Orion - Christchurch Earthquake 2010,2011, 2011) 
 
 
- The seismic strengthening recommended in ‘Risks and Realities’ significantly paid off 
in reducing damage, repair times and costs. (Direct cost of $6 million with an estimated 
saving of $60 excluding indirect costs). 
 
- Having an interconnected network allowed options for power restoration and reduced 
the time needed for supply restoration. 
 
- Good communication with the public, staff, contractors and stakeholders is extremely 
important.  Strong liaison with CDEM and media was critical 
 
- Do not be pressured into accepting multiple offers especially of inappropriate 
resource (e.g. linemen verses cable technicians and repairers).  Let people perform 
their normal work where possible.   
 
- Plan for the absent of key personnel and to be able to operate the recovery plan 
without them. 
 
- Having a National Civil Defence Controller who can make decisive decisions is 
essential (Orion had to demolish buildings quickly for safety reasons and build 
temporary overhead power lines). 
 
- Lack of communication and continually changing of rules at cordon checkpoints 
adversely impacted the service Orion was able to provide. 
 




Post Script:  In June 2012, Orion advised those involved in developing commercial 
premises that electrical equipment, such as transformers, needs to be easily 
accessible for safety reasons and to ensure robust electrical supply.  Equipment 
located below ground level may flood during creating long delays for restoration of 
power.  Locating equipment at street level minimizes flooding risk and improves the 
ability to access the substation for switching the network to restore power.  Fire is a 
further risk is fire, and clear safe access is required for fire fighting.   
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Orion recommended that developers make contact at the start of design work, noting 
that Orion can assist with assessment and design of electricity requirements for new 
buildings.    
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1.12 Key Infrastructure Impacts of the Canterbury Earthquake Series – 
Electricity 
 
John O’Donnell, Orion 
Presentation, November 2011 
 
(O'Donnell, [Presentation] Orion - Key Infrastructure Impacts on the Canterbury 
Earthquake Series - Electricity, 2011) 
 
 
- Fifteen years of seismic mitigation measures paid off - minimal damage to 
substations, cables, poles, critical equipment and communication sites. 
 
- Orion’s large size helped in the scale-up of work (arrangements with suppliers, 
mutual aid etc).   
 
- “Plan to plan” (i.e. detailed advance planning to be avoided).  Don’t be pressured into 
accepting the wrong resources (this may slow things down).   
 
- Set high level focus/priorities (e.g. top priority is preservation of life, maximum 
contractor hours).   
 
- Let people perform their normal work.  
 
-  Communication was the key to rapid restoration of power. Need to communicate well 
with staff, public, contractors and stakeholders, including updating contractors on scale 
of event and resource impact.  By having just one point of contact between contractor 
and Orion worked best.   
 
 Need better job management system (to avoid duplication). 
 
- Determining competency of contractor staff was challenging (especially the different 
Australian system). 
 
- Radio channels worked well (especially when cell phone down).   
 
- Contractors were not recognised by Civil Defence as an essential service, leading to 
cordon access difficulties.   
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1.13 Resilience Lessons: Orion’s 2012 and 2011 Earthquake Experience 
 
Kestrel Group Report, 2011 
 
Orion commissioned this independent review of Orion’s earthquake performance 
following the February 2011 earthquake.   
 
(Kestrel Group, 2011) 
 
 
- Orion’s approach to emergency planning is to keep documents at a high, principle-
focused, level, relying on trained and motivated staff to make sound decisions once 
the nature and extent of the emergency is known.  
 
- Orion’s management approach based around CDEM’s “4 R’s” helps with role clarity 
in electricity distribution management.   
 
- Orion has undertaken a systematic seismic risk mitigation programme following the 
mid-1990s “Risk and Realities” report.  Systematic and sustained investment in 
seismic mitigation was central to rapid and effective electricity restoration.  It was also 
very cost-effective for Orion.   
 
- Orion’s emphasis on route diversity for underground cables was advantageous in 
areas of liquefaction.   
 
- Since the September earthquake, Orion has demonstrated an on-going willingness to 
seek self-improvement.   
 
- The earthquakes are likely to have shortened the life of some of the underground and 
(to a lesser extent) overhead services. 
 
- The question arises: how will earthquake impacts on Orion’s performance be 
accommodated under the Commerce Commission’s new price-quality regulatory 
regime?  Looking ahead, a balance will need to be found between longer-term 
reliability and expenditure on security. 
 
- Maintaining safety is a top priority despite the pressure of work.  Time-outs, pauses 
and regular meetings are valuable and need to be included in response arrangements.   
 
- The inter-dependency between power and telecommunications was highlighted in 
this event. 
 
- Assistance from CDEM was not required other than for approval of new lines.  
However, the working relationships around cordon management between CDEM, 
Police and Army personnel were unsatisfactory (inflexible) to the point that response 
and recovery objectives were compromised. 
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- Introduction of the Outage Management System (OMS) should recognise the needs 
or all Orion users. 
 
- Steps should be taken with contractors to facilitate identification and consideration of 
emergency response matters such as job referral processes. 
 
- Mutual aid agreements should be written up (including issues such as roles and 
responsibilities for food, accommodation, HSE etc) for the benefit of other electricity 
distributors in New Zealand. 
 
- HSE issues should be discussed with contractors with a view to improvements 
(improvements could be documented in Orion processes, the mutual aid agreement or 
referred to regulators if significant issues are identified). 
 
- Orion should reconsider aspects of its spare parts management taking into account 
location, likely timing of delivery of new supplies (both from alternative New Zealand 
sources and overseas suppliers) and storage rack design. 
 
- Orion should take into account the approaches set out in the National loading 
standard A/NZS 1170 Part O in considering future premises.    
 
- Orion should write to the Ministry of Civil Defence & Emergency Management to note 
its concerns about cordon and demolition management, so that cordon management 
takes the needs of infrastructure companies and their contractors more effectively into 
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1.14 MainPower Earthquake Recovery September 4th 2010  
 






- Eighteen known cable faults were the result of sideway forces and stretching - 
damage often over several meters around the ground rip. 
 
- Cables often pulled tight against their terminations due to insufficient slack. 
 
- Traditional cable fault finding and repairs proved to be fruitless.  3.5 km of new cabe 
was laid over 11 cable sections.   
 
- Two ground-level substations required rebuilding.   
 
- There was minimal damage to LV cable - problems may however be an issue later.  
 
- Overhead line network stood up well and was fast to repair. Some poles were leaning  
and a number of concrete poles sunk due to liquefaction. 
 
- MainPower’s seismic restraint programme over the past 15 years following 
Edgecumbe earthquake greatly contributed to lower damage levels. 
 
- Six portable generators were used for up to 12 days.   
 
- Mutual aid with Marlborough Lines and Electricity Ashburton also assisted. 
 
- Low network load post-earthquake helped reduce the restoration times. 
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1.15 Christchurch, New Zealand Earthquake Sequence of Mw 7.1 September 
04, 2010, Mw 6.3 February 22, 2011, Mw 6.0 June 13, 2011:  Lifeline 
Performance – Electric Power 
 
Technical Council on Lifeline Earthquake Engineering (TCLEE). American Society of 
Civil Engineers, Monograph 40, February 2012 – Revision O (February 2012) 
 
John Eidinger and Alex Tang eds 
 
(Eidinger & Tang, 2012) 
 
 




- Buried high-voltage distribution cables posed the biggest power outage challenge in 
Christchurch after the earthquakes due to difficult access and damage from 
liquefaction.  Damage to transmission assets was relatively minor.   
 
- Both Transpower (transmission) and Orion (distribution) had undertaken seismic 
mitigation prior to the earthquakes.  For example, retrofitted seismic upgrades to URM 
brick substations by Orion using steel supports worked well in both September 2010 
and February 2011.  Seismic mitigation relating to 66 kV cables across a footbridge 
proved effective in September but the cables failed in February.   
 
- Transmission towers which had their four foundations tied together experienced no 
lateral spreading, whereas towers within the same area that did not have their 
foundations tied suffered from spreading due to liquefaction and secondary member 
buckling. There was no loss of service but repairs will be necessary.  Transmission, 
conductor sags and misaligned insulators, and bent tower extensions were 
experienced, but no loss of supply occurred from these.  Damage at substations was 
minor.  Vibration of some mercury switches resulted in false readings, requiring switch 
resetting.   
 
- A few Orion substations were seriously damaged in February 2011 from liquefaction 
or rockfall.  The Orion headquarters was also damaged.   
 
- Damaged 66 kV and 11 kV Orion cables were the main cause of outages.  Damage 
was generally in areas with lateral spread and/or settlements. These were in areas of 
moderate liquefaction displacement for the 66 kV cables (one example: direct burial 
XLPE-type with thermal backfill and direct burial oil-type with thermal backfill), while 
the 11 kV (direct burial, both PILC and XLPE) cables mainly failed in areas of severe 
liquefaction. Six per cent of 11 kV failures occurred in areas where there was no 
liquefaction.  New temporary overhead lines and a new substation were quickly built.   
 
- For two of the 66 kV cables the lack of reinforcement allowed permanent ground 
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deformations to concentrate movement at a discontinuity of the thermal backfill, 




- Ensure that batteries within battery racks have spacers and are secured to reduce / 
eliminate the possibility of sliding - no significant adverse effects were recorded as the 
batteries remained operational, but the experience could have been worse. 
 
- Ensure when a circuit breaker is put into its “not-in-service” position, there is 
additional bracing to stop their heavy eccentric mass causing it to topple. As well as 
reducing the potential damage of the circuit breaker, this reduces the risk that 
movement will damage other nearby assets.   
 
- Ensure that ties to voltage transformers have sufficient slack to reduce the potential 
for a high “yanking” load to be put on the component. 
 
- Heavy liquefaction caused foundations of one substation to lose bearing capacity, 
with failure of the foundation and tilting of the building. When upgrading or building a 
substation the potential for liquefaction needs to be fully considered. 
 
- Rockfall needs to be fully considered as a potential hazard for infrastructure such as 
substations and placement of transmission towers. Adequate risk reductions should be 
put in place where rockfall could occur during a seismic event. 
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1.16 Impact of the Darfield Earthquake on the Electrical Power System 
Infrastructure 
 
Neville R. Watson, University of Canterbury, New Zealand 
 






- The seismic events caused the mercury in Buchholtz relays to move and trip the 
transformers which resulted in a partial loss of supply in Transpower’s network. The 
Buchholtz devices have now been updated to replace the mercury switches with reed 
switches as these are less sensitive to seismic events. 
 
- A lesson learnt from the Edgecumbe earthquake was the need to seismically restrain 
transformers. These were fitted prior to the earthquake and ensured no transformers 
toppled off their foundations. 
 
- The use of flexible cables rather than solid conductors to make connections between 
busbars and substation equipment also allows some flexing without breakage. 
 
- Clashing of conductors in both Transpower and lines companies’ overhead lines 
occurred which caused temporary faults. 
 
- Orion acted on many of the recommendations that came out of Risks and Realities 
and were prepared for an event like this. They have been actively pursuing a policy of 
earthquake (and storm) hardening in their electrical network. 
 
- Pole mounted structures and transformers (Orion) were strengthened to withstand 
earthquakes. The result was that only a few of Orion’s substations were affected by 
the earthquake. 
 
- MainPower have been working over the last 15 years to upgrade zone substation 
transformer seismic restraints as this was a lesson learnt from the Edgecumbe 
earthquake. This resulted in no real damage at zone substations. 
 
- Mutual aid agreements meant that MainPower were able to have access to aid from 
Marlborough Lines and Electricity Ashburton which allowed for access to equipment, 
staff and cable jointers. 
 
- Underground cables were damaged due to major ground movement but there is no 
easy way to prevent this apart from moving to overhead lines. However these are 
more prone to storm damage and being hit by vehicles. 
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1.17 Impact of the Christchurch Earthquakes on the Electrical Power System 
Infrastructure 
 
Andrew Massie, Christchurch Polytechnic Institute of Technology, New Zealand 
Neville Watson, University of Canterbury, New Zealand 
 
Bulletin of New Zealand Society for Earthquake Engineering Vol 44, No. 4 
December 2011 
 
(Massie & Neville, December 2011) 
 
 
- Most cable damage to paper-lead cables (PILCA).  
 
- Fracturing in hill slopes caused some cables to tear. 
 
- 66kV oil-filled cables deemed un-repairable (Bromley – Dallington and Bromley – 
New Brighto) and replaced with overhead lines as an emergency repair. 
 
- The cable repairs were undertaken with the support of local and overseas specialist 
cable jointers. 
 
- The low voltage network of predominantly polyethylene and polyvinyl chloride (PE 
and PVC) cables have performed well and suffered fewer faults when compared 
relative to the observed 11 kV cable networks. 
 
- The major fault with overhead lines were predominantly LV issues such as barge 
boards being ripped off houses and conductors being torn out of terminals due to the 
ground shaking. Liquefaction caused several poles to sink. 
 
- Head office was damaged but a hot standby control office had been set up pre-event. 
 
- The loss of chimneys potential would increase the winter electricity demand. 
 
-  The risk reduction action taken over the past 15 years reduced the network damage: 
 
 Seismic strengthening of substations 
 Improvement to key bridge approaches 
 Improvement in design standards 
 Establishment of a backup hot-site for Network Control & Call Centre 
- Other design features such as ringed 11 kV HV cable systems and interconnected 
Low Voltage network helped give flexibility in restoring loads. Use deterministic 
security standard and the policy of maintaining up to the customer building entry also 
were beneficial. 
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- Also helpful to mobilize staff and resources quickly: 
 
 Mutual aid arrangements in place with other lines companies 
 Arrangements with suppliers & contractors 
 Relationships established 
 
- Pre-event plans and disaster scenarios were beneficial.   
 
- Communication with public and media important.  Dallington Hub was set up for 
people to use telephones and computers if they couldn’t at home.   
 
- Looking after staff was critical – e.g. food, water, washing.   
 
- Bringing help from outside the region reduced the burden on local staff (and their 
families).  Similarly retaining local staff in normal functions helps to reduce the load. 
 
- Looking after medical needs (e.g. Hep A vaccinations for those working in / near 
ruptured sewer lines). 
 
- Impossible to carry enough spares for this event – good supply chains were 
imperative. 
 
- The optimal size of temporary generators was found to be 400 kVA – 500 kVA, 415 
V. As they: matched kiosk load; no transformation necessary; not dependent upon 
possible faulty 11 kV cable network. 
 
- Generators are expensive to run and require fuel supply but if fuel is available they 
are good to use and can enable the ability to expand resources.  
 
- More economically viable to buy rather than lease. 
 
- More redundancy needed between key substations and national grid. 
 
- Loads are changing and temporary overhead lines will have to be replaced. 
 
- Underground cables will need to find the shortest route in land least likely to deform 
(>500m from waterway to avoid lateral spreading).  Thus care is needed when 
crossing waterways. 
 
- Review required of the encasing cable practices in weak concrete or hardfill.  Ducting 
protects cable from damage during ground deformation or using extra cables with 
different cable routes to provide redundancy. 
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2 Telecommunications 
2.1 Earthquake Performance of Telecommunications Infrastructure in 
Christchurch 2010 / 2011 
 
Colin Foster, Chorus 
Report, 2011 
 
(Foster, Earthquake Performance of Telecommunication Infrastructure in Christchurch 
2010 / 2011, 2011) 
 
 
- The Telecom core network continued to operate both through and after each event 
and the many aftershocks. There was call overloading issues on both the PSTN and 
mobile networks, but much more significantly on the February 22 event. After the 
immediate aftermath panic, calling levels returned to manageable levels. 
 
- Many sites had been provisioned to be easily connected to portable engine 
alternators because it had been recognised from earlier events that the mobile network 
would be a prime mode of telecommunications for both restoration and normal 
communications. 
 
- All telephone exchanges have at least a battery back-up for reserve and the larger 
ones also have generator (engine) in case of mains failure. 
 
- Equipment in the Telecom buildings had been seismically supported and continued to 
operate because of this. 
 
- The main points of failure of buildings were connections, i.e. where they had been 
structurally extended since their original construction. 
 
- There were insufficient engines locally to support the continued operations of the field 
sites providing services (such as broadband) to customers. There were also logistical 
issues with keeping them operational (refuelling etc). 
 
- It was important that staff rostered to work following the earthquake were given days 
off to ensure they did not burn out during the highly stressful period. 
 
- Preplanning can only be effectively done to a certain level. It usually needs to include 
those issues that can take some time to put in place but have a considerable impact 
on being able to manage and mitigate the effects of the event. In this case having 
more of the most suitably sized generators would have been more effective in keeping 
mobile sites operational initially, especially when their nominal battery reserve is only 2 
hours. 
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- Use a mixture of local and distant people to manage and control the event. The 
distant management need to be willing to listen to the locals and the locals need to be 
aware that what might seem the most logical solution may not provide the most 
effective answer. The locals families came first. 
 
- Because so many of the basics (water, food, toilets etc) were not readily available, 
special supply arrangements were required often from outside the region. 
 
- A control bunker (or War Room) was set-up with basic computer and phone 
connection facilities, audio conferencing, whiteboards and controlled access. It is 
essential that generator power is available. 
 
- Early liaison is important with key people in support infrastructure especially power 
distribution and those that control physical access. 
 
- Be prepared to change at short notice the way events are being managed where 
critical success factors will be compromised if the present approach is continued. 
 
- Gel technology in roadside cabinets appears to be relatively resilient. The resilience 
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2.2 A Telecommunication Provider’s Response to the 2011 Christchurch 
Earthquake  
 
This summary is from an internal review conducted by a Telecommunication Service 
Provider following the February 2011 earthquake.   
 
Document withheld No reference 
 
 
Things that worked well: 
 
- The organisation’s efforts to put in place pro-active safeguards and establish a crisis 
management plan was very effective. 
 
- Very good internal and external corporate relations ensured the organisation’s brand 
was protected. The organisation pulled out all stops to assist its customers and 
emergency services. 
 
- Great staff commitment to the organisation’s survival and to its staff and contractors 
aided the response. 
 
- HR response was essential in supporting staff and helping them to return to work. 
 
- Crisis management teams were more effective since previous events (indicating 
good internal learnings processes, stemming from detailed, clear reporting to the 
senior management team). 
 
- Risk prevention measures applied to physical assets radically reduced damage and 
restoration time. 
 
Lessons Learnt:  
 
- Check assumptions made when preparing crisis management plans (e.g. having a 
strong building housing staff is not enough in itself if the event causes surrounding 
buildings and structures to be dangerous or damaged, thereby preventing access). 
 
- Further thought required into strategies needed where access to office building is 
impossible (e.g. working from home, implementing remote working technologies; 
relocation to Work Area Recovery sites; developing geographic diversity for key time-
critical functions; work load shedding to other teams).  Imposition of cordon required 
the company to completely change its operating model from centralised to 
decentralised in a very short time and its business continuity arrangements allowed 
this to happen and thus minimised the impact to the business.   
 
- Right at the start of the crisis event, set arrangements for crisis communication, set 
crisis management roles and responsibilities, and determine staff health and safety 
and welfare response. 
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- Need to develop relationships in “peace time”, including at senior management level, 
with local authorities, CDEM and power companies.   
 
- Need to pre-plan for crisis-centres and work area recovery sites - including back-up 
communications equipment and food and water. 
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2.3 Christchurch February 22 Earthquake - A Lifelines Presentation 
 





- Location of ‘War Room’ was in the process of being changed from September (inside 
central city) to February (Eastern suburbs) to avoid cordon. Focus on keeping mobile 
network operational.   
 
- Call centre activities moved to other national Telecom sites. 111 services moved (so 
outside cordon). 
 
- Staff put on ‘special leave’, but effort taken to get staff back into work place within a 
week. 
 
- Some staff brought in from other locations for specific tasks.  Contractors also 
brought in to increase resources. 
 
- Significant calling congestion, access faults four times greater than September, local 
cable damage in some areas, core network continued to operate.   
 
- Temporary working spaces for call centre staff difficult to find. 
 
- Power outage a significant concern.  Power outage affected rate of restoration - 
especially in east of city.  Approx 80 generators “imported” from other parts of New 
Zealand.  Improvements in availability of timetable information for power restoration 
compared to September earthquake noted.   
 
- Telecom had a priority Structural Aid contract for the use of structural engineers to 
check key sites - building checks initiated the following day.  
 
- Chorus had a staff presence in main civil defence EOC for first 2 weeks (12 hours per 
day). 
 
- Plastic and fibre cabling has had minimal damage.  Damage to lead cables (most 
with paper insulation) in some locations through sheaths cracking and letting in 
liquefaction water and being pulled apart. 
 
- Telephone exchange / Telecom House - in red zone, no power, no reticulated water 
for cooling towers (local bore set up as back-up proved very useful), significant cracks 
in telecommunications cable tunnel in the street, risk from neighbouring buildings. 
 
- Problems around disconnecting cables / protecting equipment from buildings being 
demolished. Those cables were often also providing services to other customers who 
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2.4 Earthquake Performance of Telecoms Infrastructure in Christchurch  
 
Colin Foster, Chorus  
Presentation to Auckland Engineering Lifelines Group 
November, 2011 
 




- Resilience in the network noted, i.e. duplicate sites, ring fibre networks, back-up 
generators and batteries in reserve 
 
- Immediate impacts arose from by power outages, traffic congestion and cable 
damage.   
 
Key points to managing disasters: 
 
- High level pre-planning essential.  Details can be adjusted during the event to 
account for specific circumstances.   
 
- Need a mixture of local and national resources, and to ensure that staff have water, 
food etc.   
 
- Relationships and liaison with CDEM and electricity suppliers early on are essential. 
 
- Be prepared to change approach at short notice.  Match the new situation with the 
required resources, rather than just assuming the current resources are appropriate. 
 
- Use robust technology, such as portable generators and Gel v AGM batteries. 
Minimise the reliance on plant that requires a water source. 
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2.5 Christchurch Earthquake Report 
 
This summary is from an internal review conducted by a Telecommunication Service 
Provider following the February 2011 earthquake.   
 
Document withheld No reference 
 
 
The majority of the lessons were taken direct from the report. 
 
Green: Observation relates to something that went well and should be repeated or 
built on in future 
 
Amber: Observation relates to something that should have been avoided or could be 
improved in future 
 
!: General observation on events    
 
 
Emergency Management Process and Preparedness 
 Observation Lesson 
Green Experience of September earthquake meant that 
many effective tactics learned in the previous 
event were very quickly implemented, e.g. 
 initial media releases 
 technical change blackout 
 minimum coverage modelling to prioritise 
generator deployment 
 deployment of dedicated H&S lead to CTP 
Ensure these lessons are 
incorporated as guidance in support 
documentation. 
Green Exec-level Crisis Management team provided 
effective governance at the strategic level, and the 
appropriate decisions were referred to CMT for 
approval. 
Process is well-practiced through 
annual exercise, good use of 
support materials such as template 
agenda. 
Green Engagement with Civil Defence worked well and 
proved useful to get priority access to transport, to 
get staff through cordons, and to get information 
about the activities and priorities of other utilities. 
Relationship with civil authorities as 
a “lifeline utility” is important to 
cultivate and engagement process 
needs to be ready. 
Amber Meetings between telco CEOs were useful, could 
have happened earlier. 
Include as guidance in support 
documentation. 
! A number of alarming and incorrect rumours 
emerged in the aftermath,  particularly during the 
Need to actively consider the 
source and the plausibility of 
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first week (e.g. Civil Defence had confiscated telco 
generators) 
information before acting on it or 
disseminating it.   
  
Health & Safety 
 Observation Lesson 
Green Checking in on affected staff was accomplished 
as a priority. 
Process and tools could be valuable 
here, e.g. capability to text staff 
based on place of work. 
Green Health & Safety rules were communicated to 
Christchurch staff on Day 1. 
Include as guidance in support 
documentation. 
Amber Some Health & Safety processes not standardized 
and documented e.g. instructions to staff entering 
the ‘quake zone, process to conduct checks of 
staff safety, tracking staff travel. 
Ensure these processes are 
documented and included in review 
and testing schedule. 
Amber Contractors were not always aware of the 
company’s health and safety requirements. 
H&S requirements need to be 




HR / People 
 Observation Lesson 
Green Extraordinary efforts and superb co-operation by 
staff across the business. Staff were motivated not 
only by loyalty to the company and each other, but 
also by the sense that they were working to 
provide an essential service and assist the people 
of Christchurch. 
Benefits of strong company culture 
and a focus on corporate 
responsibility. 
  
Formal acknowledgement and 
reward for extraordinary efforts is 
also important. 
Green Effective response from engineering vendors 
based on strong personal relationships with our 
staff. 
Benefit of fostering strong 
relationships and understanding the 
vendor’s capability to deliver 
beyond BAU supply arrangements. 
Amber Some contact details in the HR database were not 
up-to-date, which delayed contacting some staff. 
Incentives and ongoing effort 
required to keep staff database 
current. 
Amber Some out-of-town staff sent into Christchurch in 
the first week did not have a clear role. 
Some planning required before 
sending people in. Ensure that 
people entering the regions are 
adequately briefed on what they will 
be doing and the authority they 
have to make decisions. 
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Amber Some staff in Sales relief teams had a difficult 
time dealing with the heightened emotion and 
stress encountered when dealing with traumatised 
members of the public. 
Make sure this is better considered 
in future and all staff are prepared 
for the situation that they will 
encounter. May need expert advice 
in developing a plan here. 
  
  
Network and Technology Facilities 
 Observation Lesson 
Green Well-equipped workshop and spares storage at 
key facility was valuable e.g. in setting up 
microwave equipment before going to site. 
Should be considered in the design 
of key facilities. 
Green Impressive stability of core network infrastructure 
under high load – several units ran at 100% 
capacity in the first hours after the earthquake but 
remained stable. 
Stability under high load should be 
considered in the assessment of 
network hardware or configuration. 
Amber Some cellsite batteries did not perform to 
standard. 
 There were two issues: 
1)   battery life degraded due to age 
2)   battery spec no longer adequate for site 
following additional equipment installation 
1) Battery replacement program 
required as part of BAU (kicked off 
two years ago). 
  
2) Delivery process should evaluate 
whether battery upgrades are 
required when power load at site is 
increased (e.g. site expansions). 
Amber Portable generators with small fuel tanks (2 hour 
supply) were problematic when deployed in large 
numbers – refuelling rounds became 
burdensome. 
Recommend investment in modular 
fuel tanks to expand capacity. 
Amber Initial set of generators available to the region was 
not adequate to the scale of the power outages. 
We were fortunate to be able to procure additional 
generators reactively. 
Review number, location and type of 
portable generators available. 
Amber Difficulties encountered in deploying generators to 
rooftop sites. 
Consider including fixtures to install 
mobile generators at ground-level in 
standard design for rooftop sites. 
Amber The requirement from Civil Defence to send bulk 
SMS targeted to people in impacted areas was 
difficult and time-consuming to execute using 
existing capability. 
It is preferable to leverage cell 
broadcast or location-based SMS 
solution for this purpose if possible. 
  
The NZ Government is currently 
investigating a centralized solution 
for the “National Warning System” 
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Marketing & Public Communications 
  Observation Lesson 
Green Media releases aimed at controlling congestion 
were effective – messaging encouraged limiting 
use of data, voice for emergency use only, and 
use of  SMS. “Tips and tricks” were also useful, 
e.g. suggesting that people record a voicemail 
message before their batteries run down. 
Most of these messages are relevant 
to any major incident and if prepared 
in advance can be released very soon 
after the event. 
Green Pro-active media releases were effective once 
these began. Reporting of network impacts in 
terms of coverage areas affected rather than 
“number of cellsites down” was more 
meaningful. 
Incorporate as guidance in support 
documentation. 
Amber Some important local media were missed in 
press releases due to focus on national media. 
Feedback from local staff was useful in 
determining which media were most effective in 
communicating local messages (e.g. which 
stores are open). 
Incorporate as guidance in support 
documentation. 
Amber Relief offers to customers were well-received but  
could have been offered more quickly. 
Develop reference principles and 
procedure for domestic and 
international incidents, to allow a pick 
and choose of workable relief offers 
to affected customers, including 
roamers. 
Amber Descriptions of Network impacts were not clear 
and consistent at first.. 
The format of network status reports 
towards the end of the response 
phase was very good and should be 
used as a model for future incidents. 
  
  
Sales Regional HQ, Retail, and Dealer Channels 
  Observation Lesson 
Green Increased DLAs to staff to assist customers 
worked well and was appreciated by both staff 
and customers. 
Empower front-line staff to deal with 
issues immediately then tighten 
guidance as appropriate. 
Green Effective redeployment of Christchurch Sales 
staff from closed stores and HQ functions into 
retail. 
Consolidate staff who are available to 
work in the places they will be most 
effective. Roles can be flexible during 
emergency response. 
Amber We anticipated demand for cheaper devices and 
accessories. However there was unexpectedly 
Stock management strategy should 
take this into account. 
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high customer demand for smartphones as a 
means to get online. 
! Higher levels of demand for stock were 
experienced in surrounding regions such as 
Ashburton, Queenstown and Dunedin. This was 
driven by displaced people relocating to other 
centres. 
Stock management strategy should 
take this into account. 
  
 
Finance & Corporate Affairs 
  Observation Lesson 
Green Corporate Affairs team linkage into central 
government was effective and valuable, e.g. in 
securing fuel supply, and for escalation of issues 
with local authorities. 
Incorporate as guidance in support 
documentation. 
Green We designated a single liaison contact for aid 
agencies, emergency services and volunteer 
groups to ask for assistance (e.g. Prepay top-
ups for volunteer forces). 
Incorporate as guidance in support 
documentation. 
Amber Difficulties were experienced in pulling together 
insurance claim information. Costs and 
insurance claim information were not adequately 
tracked from the outset of the event. 
Include this as a formal role in the 
response framework. The person in 
this role needs to know the 
technology and understand insurance 
claim requirements, so ideally a staff 
member with appropriate training 
from Finance. 
Amber While new Collections activity was ceased on 
day 1, activity that was already underway 
continued.  
Need a procedure to pull back or 
undo Collections activity in progress 
as well as ceasing new activity. 
Amber An issue was encountered with standard Prepay 
top-up rules that are intended to prevent fraud 
(i.e. maximum daily top-up amounts). 
Emergency responders and aid agency staff 
using Prepay phones were hitting this limit a. 
Need to be aware of this in future 




  Observation Lesson 
Amber In the first days of response, a small number of 
external messages were not consistent between 
Service and media relations e.g. details of 
network impact. 
Co-ordinate and align all channels via 
the Comms Recovery Team 
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Amber Free diversions from fixed line to mobile were 
offered on Day 1, however in some early cases 
we were unable to deliver this as it depended on 
the availability of the wholesale operator and 
their ability to access exchanges in the region. 
Ensure the process is understood 
before making the offer. 
! Call volumes were manageable, they went up 
but were less than might be expected. The type 
of queries coming in from customers changed 
over time, e.g. requests for assistance were 
common at first, later we received increasing 
queries from customers anticipating bill shock. 
Incorporate in support 
documentation. 
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2.6 Emergency Telephone Call Services and the February 2011 Christchurch 
Earthquake 
 
Tony Fenwick, Secretary, Telecommunications Emergency Forum 
Ministry of Economic Development 
Review, August 2011 
 
(Fenwick, Emergency Telephone Call Services and the February 2011 Christchurch 
Earthquake, August 2011) 
 
 
The telecommunications sector generally performed well following the February 2011 
Christchurch earthquake.  Telecommunication service providers (TSPs) took strong 
steps to restore services, and most services were back (or close) to normal within a 
week or so (except in the CBD where immediate restoration was not possible – nor 
was it a priority given cessation of most CBD activity).  
 
The ability to make calls immediately after the earthquake, including 111 and other 
priority calls, was impacted by electricity outages, cable failures in liquefaction areas 
and congestion.  Cordless phones immediately ceased to work where electricity failed.  
Some physical damage to telecommunications assets also occurred but the effects 
were secondary – congestion largely resulted from the sudden substantial increase in 
call attempts rather than to equipment failure.  Battery life at cabinets and cell towers 
also quickly became a constraint on telecommunications performance and significant 
losses of cellular coverage arose.   
 
It is not possible to assess the extent to which calls may have failed due to impacts in 
the access networks.  Further, an unknown number of 111 calls failed to complete due 
to interconnection and exchange congestion in the immediate post-earthquake period 
despite buffer capacity and overflow arrangements.  This is not to say that the 
emergencies leading to these calls were not notified to emergency services.  Most of 
the callers would have succeeded with redialling / retries or by using other telephones 
(e.g. landlines), or the emergency could have been notified by another person at the 
site.    
Twenty further unsuccessful (abandoned) calls were followed up by 111 call centre 
operators and Police applying the standard failed-call process.   
 
ICAP3 call takers experienced a very sharp increase in 111 call volumes immediately 
following the earthquake (the Christchurch impact briefly took national volumes to a 
level approximately three times normal).  111 calls that would normally have been 
received in Christchurch were diverted Wellington.  The ICAP warm site at Palmerston 
North was opened the next day to reinstate diversity.   
 
                                               
3
   Initial Call Answering Platform, a Telecom operated facility for supplying emergency calling services to fulfil 
Telecommunications Service Obligations (TSO).     
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Emergency Service Providers (ESPs) considered that TSPs generally performed well 
following the earthquake.  Reports received noted that ICAP continued to perform its 
normal functions.  111 call retries due to congestion within telecommunications system 
and links prior to handover to Telecom were however not visible to the ESPs.   
The steps taken by TSPs to improve services in the immediate post-earthquake days 
included deployment of over 200 portable generators.  Significant logistical challenges 
arose in keeping generators refuelled.  Access restrictions and building demolition 
programmes also needed to be actively managed.  Special measures were required to 
keep key TSP assets at the badly damaged TVNZ building operational.   
 
The Christchurch experience is instructive but it is difficult to draw definitive 
conclusions from a single event.  Physical damage to telecommunications equipment 
(especially core infrastructure) was very light.  Although road conditions were 
challenging, roads generally remained open facilitating generator deployment and 
refuelling.  These favourable conditions might not be repeated in other emergencies.   
 
This and other comparable events demonstrate the very high reliance on cellular 
networks in emergencies.  Congestion may reach high levels as callers, including 
those involved in the emergency response, make coincident demands on suddenly 
fragile infrastructure. 
 
Telecommunications networks are typically designed to meet normal traffic demand 
with a surplus to deal with sudden peaks.  A totally fail-safe, unlimited capacity 111 
system is unattainable.  Judgements need to be made about cost-effectiveness, both 
of incremental improvements and of any more fundamental changes to the 111 system 
that might be suggested.  One ESP (the Fire Service) noted that, as businesses, TSPs 
cannot be expected to cover all contingencies.  Of course the same is true of the ESPs 
themselves (average wait times to Ambulance and Fire rose briefly immediately after 
the earthquake).   
 
Development of the emergency call system will always be a work in progress as 
technology opens new opportunities and challenges, and as community expectations 
change.  A broadening of the dialogue between TSPs and ESPs, and the community 
at large, is required.  The Fire Service, for example, noted that “if ESPs know what 
limits and risks TSP services have in CDEM events we can more effectively plan our 
own telecommunications processes”.   
 
Strong governance arrangements will be needed for improvements requiring 
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2.7 Christchurch, New Zealand Earthquake Sequence of Mw 7.1 September 
04, 2010, Mw 6.3 February 22, 2011, Mw 6.0 June 13, 2011:  Lifeline 
Performance – Telecommunications 
 
Technical Council on Lifeline Earthquake Engineering (TCLEE). American Society of 
Civil Engineers, Monograph 40, February 2012 – Revision O (February 2012) 
 
John Eidinger and Alex Tang eds 
 
Chapter 5:  Telecommunication 
 





- Customers have become more reliant on cellphones and wireless services compared 
to landlines. It is recommended that a stronger emphasis is placed on mobile network 
earthquake-resilience as a result.  
 
- Pre-event preparation reduced earthquake damage but outages occurred 
nevertheless.    
 
- Liquefaction extensively affected buried cables, especially near rivers. The damage  
included cracked sheaths, water leaking into cables and cables being pulled apart.  
However, the most common service outages arose from loss of battery power, 
antenna towers out of alignment and circuit congestion.   
 
- Sustained periods of battery use can degrade their capacity.  This can result in 
shorter up-times during the next event, especially for those batteries that have started 
to age.  Replacing old batteries after a disaster needs to be a priority to ensure 
sufficient battery uptime for a second event. 
 
- During the first event, initial priority access to generators proved difficult. It is 
recommended that there needs to be better planning around power generation needs.  
Quick connect boxes on the outside of facilities, Base Transmission Stations (BTSs) 
and cabinets helped with power generators being quickly connected once on site.  
 
- Repeat speed dialling by customers contributed to circuit congestion. 
 
- Old fashioned POTS phones proved useful to customers who did not have mains 
electricity, as these phones can operate using power provided via the POTS lines. 
 
- Coordinating BTS restoration with power restoration timetable proved challenging. 
Until general power was restored there was also no need to restore FTTN cabinets.   
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- FTTN broadband can be used as a substitute for POTS service when the damage 





- Service providers’ responses included switching off 3G while retaining 2G services 
(3G drains batteries more quickly).  Text messaging and voice communication were 
prioritised over data. 
 
- Cellsites on wheels proved to be a real asset in replacing BTSs that were out of 
service. 
 
- Contractors offering support were turned down due to difficulties in managing 
additional resources. Better planning around these resources would help to draw a 
better picture of potential resources needed. 
 
- A good working relationship with Civil Defence proved essential – especially when 
there were cordons are in place. It was however difficult to keep up with condemned 
buildings being demolished, in order to know what buildings needed their cables 
disconnected.  There is a need to ensure emergency procedures include plans to deal 
with cordons and that there are sufficient plans to quickly relocate essential functions 
(e.g. “war rooms”). 
 
- Power restoration timetables with local providers (electricity lines companies) can be 
difficult to ascertain.  Knowing what vulnerabilities exist in the power company’s 
networks would allow for more detailed planning in what facilities and BTSs are most 
at risk to power outages. This would allow better planning around batteries and back-




- It is recommended that BTSs should have sufficient batteries to cover the time 
estimated to be required to get a generator to that site while accounting for road 
congestion in the aftermath of a large event. 
 
- Storage facilities should be strategically located to ensure quick deployment of 
equipment (such as cabinets and BTSs). Storage facilities should include mobile 
power generators, fuel, Cellsites on Wheels, Switching on Wheels and spare parts for 
at least 75 – 80 per cent of the calculated damage in the area.  Plan alternative routes 
to BTSs and storage facilities in case primary routes are not available.   
 
- Quick access to structural engineers is needed to assess building safety. 
 
- Ensure any BTSs placed on top of buildings are seismically stable. Several stations 
were impacted due to either the building collapsing or needing to be demolished.  
BTSs on top of buildings that are dangerous to enter can result in access and 
electricity supply challenges.   
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- Ensure plans are in place if important sites are in vulnerable positions. Many phone 
companies needed to work quickly to transfer functionality to other facilities. 
- Ensure sufficient plans are in place to provide fuel to generators.  There also needs 
to be planning around refuelling schedules to ensure sufficient resources.  
 
- Have in place redundancies for loss of water to cooling towers. 
 
- Run tests including different scenarios covering the logistics of mobilizing large 
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2.8 Telecommunication: Promoting Awareness of the Implications of a 
Wellington Earthquake 
 
This report, prepared for the Wellington Lifelines Group by the Secretary of the 
Telecommunications Emergency Forum, includes a summary of learnings relating to 
telecommunication performance.   
 
(Wellington Lifelines Group, 2012) 
 
 
Immediately after the Christchurch earthquakes: 
 
-  Cellular performance suffered for some hours due to extreme congestion 
(exacerbated as batteries ran down after a few hours).  Congestion resulted from 
calling spikes (spikes also occurred following significant aftershocks).  Some cell 
towers and other assets were damaged but the service impact from damage was 
secondary (i.e. congestion was primarily due to increased calling rather than reduced 
capacity).  In urban and suburban areas, coverage from cell-sites generally overlaps 
reducing the impact of loss of individual sites.  Cellular providers took steps to stabilise 
networks and ration available bandwidth (e.g. curtailing data to protect voice and text 
communications).  
 
-  Cordless PSTN phones ceased to work where electricity failed.  Numerous faults 
occurred in the local access copper network.  Roadside cabinets were generally 
undamaged.   
 
-  Some microwave dishes were misaligned and many PSTN copper and lead-covered 
cables were damaged.  Fibre held up well.   
 
-  Main nodes / exchanges (where back-up electricity supplies are available) and 
connections to other parts of New Zealand held up well.   
 
-  Radio services held up well.  Radio services are used by the emergency services 
and many infrastructure providers and their contractors (radio links to the rest of New 
Zealand were also uninterrupted).     
 
In the hours / days following the February 22nd earthquake: 
 
- Cellular performance temporarily declined where electricity was unavailable as 
batteries at cell sites depleted (batteries generally last around 4 to 12 hours depending 
on the importance of the site and the volume of call traffic). 
 
- Cellular performance then improved to usable, and then to near-normal levels as 
generators and mobile sites were deployed (around 200 mobile generators were 
used). 
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- Generator refuelling presented major logistical challenges due to road conditions and 
congestion. 
 
- Landline availability declined a little (in areas without mains supply) as batteries at 
roadside cabinets depleted. 
 
- Performance then improved progressively as generators were deployed, numerous 
telephone cable faults were repaired (a slow, labour-intensive process) and electricity 
was restored at customer premises. 
 
- Systems in the core network also improved progressively. On-site generators at key 
nodes functioned as planned – these generally have fuel sufficient for many days. 
 
- TSPs collaborated to maintain services by sharing assets (including smaller 
generators), information and sites. TSPs kept each other informed as opportunities 
(access windows) arose to service, and progressively relocate equipment at the 
damaged (and now demolished) TVNZ Building in Gloucester Street where many 
TSPs had key communication links. More generally, building demolition and site 
access restrictions threatened fragile telecommunication services in the CBD and 
other areas where damage was widespread. 
 
- The main Telecom exchange in Hereford Street benefitted from back-up access to 
on-site artesian water for air conditioning.   
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2.9 Telecommunications Carriers Forum Annual Report 2011 
 
Telecommunications Carriers’ Forum 
Annual Report (extract, pages 14 to 17), 2011 
 
(Telecommunication Carriers Forum, 2011) 
 
 
- The Telecommunications Emergency Forum, convened directly after the February 
2011 earthquake, was successful in sharing information and resources between 
competitors.  Telecommunication companies worked collaboratively, including with 
Civil Defence, through the mechanisms that the Forum provides.  This helped rapid 
response and reduced customer outages. 
 
- Farmside’s mobile satellite platform supported Urban and Land Search and Rescue 
activities (independent of disruption of land-based systems). 
 
- Providing for staff was very important for telecommunications companies including: 
housing, counselling and support, safety, paid leave and home security.  Multiple 
modes of communication with staff were also important (text, email, Facebook, twitter, 
webpage). 
 
- Some companies also provided additional support services (e.g. bandwidth) to 
support key corporate and government organisations. 
 
- Working with businesses to provide backup services for their data was important.  
Many also offered free services, waived regular fees, provided free equipment, and 
worked with other industry providers to get their customers connected quickly. 
 
Telecommunication providers are thinking about 
 
- Satellite contingency planning for business reliant on broadband 
 
- Investing in additional core network infrastructure.   
 
- Monitoring staff working long hours under stressful conditions. 
 
- Appointing a dedicated recovery leader to align recovery needs with business 
strategy. 
 
- Back-up power supplies.   
 
- The need for preparedness across the country (e.g. re-routing through other centres).   
 
- The need for close personal and business relationships both inside and outside the 
affected area. 
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3 Potable Water and Wastewater 
3.1 WDC Earthquake Lessons Learned Workshop Outputs  
 
Waimakariri District Council 
Internal Workshop Report 
 
(Waimaakriri District Council, 2011) 
 
 
Waimakariri District Council (WDC) held a series of internal workshops to gather 
lessons from the September 2010 earthquake.  Sessions focussed on what went well 
and areas of improvement during the response phase, which was defined as the first 
2-4 weeks after the event.  The response from the February 2011 earthquake (which 
had a lesser impact in WDC’s area) provided a good comparison of suitable 
arrangements for less significant but more frequent events. 
 





- No repairs required on PE rider mains.  PE should be used for rider mains unless 
there is a good reason not to. 
 
- PVC was easier to lay in short lengths, particularly where there are many other 
services in the ground.  
 
- Performance of PVC laterals was OK, not many repairs required.  
 
- There was significant benefit of having headworks on either side of the river.  The 
river crossing is now valved resulting in increased resilience.   
 
- AC pipes did not perform well but no material would have withstood the earthquake.  
 
- PVC failures observed were only at joints.  PVC joints pulled apart and over-insertion. 
Recommend the use of restrained joints of extended push fit joints on critical mains. 
 
- PVC in Pines Kairaki may have performed better if it was D class.  No D class PVC 
was seen to pull apart however ground movement in Pines and Kairaki could have 
been the differentiating factor.   
 
- Eliminate the use of glued fittings in high seismic risk and liquefaction areas. 
 
- PE should be used for all riders and where possible directionality drilled. This may be 
difficult where there are a number of other services and it may be easier to lay short 
C52 | P a g e  
 
lengths of PVC. 
 
- Critical mains should be more uniform in diameter to ensure more resilience. Lead 
times for unusual diameter mains were too long. It is proposed that all critical mains 
are laid in PE. 
 
- When PVC riders were less resilient, however repairs on small diameter PVC were 
easier to perform than on large diameter PVC.   
 
- Experience has shown that PE can fail due to weld defects. Therefore performance is 
dependent on both the joints and the quality of the welds. Where welding repairs are 
necessary, the right conditions must exist such as dry uncontaminated surfaces. 
 
- PE will stretch and deform under earthquake stress. The longevity of the deformed 
PE is unknown and while service may continue, the damage may not be detected for 
some time. 
 
- When selecting what pipe diameter to use, ensure there are sufficient resources 
available to maintain and repair the pipe in the result of a disaster. 
 
- There were occurrences where unoccupied properties did not have water reinstated, 
but when the owners returned they wanted water. Further consideration needs to be 
given to the management of water supply to unoccupied properties. 
 
- While water was restored using patching, overland and relay methods, there was a 
view that the overlanding method could have been utilised much earlier and would 
have enabled quicker restoration times. 
 
- Main diameter pipes need to be larger in size than their rider main to assist in 
providing a quicker restoration of service. 
 
- Water valves need to be located on the main and not just on the rider.  Buried valves 
are of no benefit.  Valves in the road are a potential health and safety issue although 





- Sand as backfill for sewer works did not perform well, a heavier more granular 
material should be used.  
 
- Asking residents not to use toilets made CCTV work easier.  It would have been 
beneficial to prolong the period of no toilet use.   
 
- Need to develop and have a plan to co-ordinate mains cleaning to reduce the number 
of sites revisited. A lot of mains needed to be re-cleaned when laterals come back into 
service as more silt was flushed into them. 
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- Early work is necessary after an event to prevent silt from broken laterals (at 
significantly damaged properties) entering the system. It was difficult in determining 
what properties would not reoccupied which requires better coordination with 
insurance companies and EQC. 
 
- Marking lateral locations with Council pegs would have helped identify them. 
 
- There was a problem using penetrating radar as it was not accurate enough. The 
merits of using other unproven techniques during an earthquake response therefore 
needs to be seriously considered.  
 
- It is necessary to ensure that there are hard copies of plans available as back-ups. 
Services had moved due to ground shift and were not always the same location as 
shown on the plan. 
 
- Having access to laterals and mains on the road and not in back gardens makes 
access easier and allows sucker trucks to be utilised. 
 
- Sending manhole lifting crews through first and marking/spraying the lids of 





- Having the Council pay for materials and delivering them direct to contractors worked 
very well.  
 
- Having water staff make sure the contractors knew what needed to be done worked 
very well. It was felt that one Water Unit staff member to 3 gangs was a good ratio. 
 
- Water Unit management of Contractors worked really well, it meant that staff with 
local knowledge could remain fresher and continue to be involved for longer.   
 
- Outside contractors managed themselves and the response could not have been 
achieved without their contribution. 
 
- Difficult to secure good resource, not enough staff and too much work.  On the other 
hand, Council had more offers of help than they could take up but it was difficult to 
determine which resources was capable and competent.  Would have been beneficial 
to have a Resource Manager to control and manage the quality of contractors / gangs. 
 
- Needed to know the cost of emergency works to enable better asset management 
decisions to be made.  Step back to assess the pros and cons of different options 
(including total cost) before proceeding.   
 
- Maintain a list of equipment held by each potential supplier. This would allow access 
to quicker sourcing and relevant information to determine feasibility of certain jobs and 
the costs involved. 
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- There was difficulty in providing toilets for the disabled and elderly. Wooden platforms 
were produced to be used with portapotties. There needs to be documented 





- Leaflet deliveries informing the public of what was taking place worked well. 
 
- Ad hock break times were very useful in sharing informal ideas between parties and 
allowing crews to share and pick up lessons learnt - meant certain mistakes were not 
repeated. 
 
- Aerial reconnaissance worked well, helped to speed up communicate and develop 
the bigger picture. This reduced the amount of rumours and misinformation concerning 
the severity of damage. 
 
-. Need to ensure strong emergency relationships with other utilities in the area such 
as electricity. 
 
- Ensure a succession plan is in place for roles that are essential during an event, such 
as communications officer who was absent for WDC when the event occurred. 
 
- Door knocking by contractors worked well but was time consuming. It would have 
been better to have a dedicated council staff member undertaking this role. 
 
- The water unit need a dedicated emergency radio channel separate from Civil 
Defence. The channel was shared by all council units and some contractors. It is 
recommended to have a dedicated Civil Defence spectrum and then separate 
channels for each function.  
 
- Need to ensure that all council and contractor vehicles have radios. Those using the 
radios need to be provided with adequate training. 
 
- The utility managers had too many tasks to do at certain times but team leaders were 
not provided with adequate scope or authority to lighten the load. Potentially zone 
managers would lighten the load on key individuals. 
 
- Ensure only one point of entry exists for service requests for the call center, EOC and 
Water Unit combined. Two parallel systems were in play resulting in no central point 
for faults / breaks. 
 
- Public phone calls should not be transferred to EOC for specific answers - this ties up 
vital phone lines and is too time consuming. A more robust call handling process would 
have helped to resolve these issues. Need to involve Customer Services in the 
development of the job management process.   
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- It was useful to take down the public's details and then call them back later to ensure 
their issue had been resolved. Software may be able to assist further with this. 
 
- Better early communication is needed between the Water Unit and Roading 
Manager. It was felt roads needed to be closed earlier in the response to protect the 
health and safety of workers and this was not responded to quickly enough. 
 
- Improved communication was needed with the Planning and Intelligence team in the 
CDEM EOC.   
 
- The EOC structure was not well understood across the Council, there is a need to 
provide better training and information to all personnel involved (regarding both the 
structure and the processes inside). 
 
- Field managers should be assigned one EOC contact point to limit queries and time 
required. The contact point needs to be a role, not a person. This is to ensure effective 
handover within the EOC. 
 
- In previous years a duplicate EOC for utilities team staff was trialled.  This was found 





- Contractors liked returning to the hub for food.  If food and break times weren’t 
organised many contractors wouldn’t have stopped for food, which is a health and 
safety issue. 
 
- Providing contractors with geographical work areas worked well, not using existing 
service request system meant that contractors could be given dedicated areas and 
didn’t have to move around between jobs. Contractors got satisfaction in seeing one 
specific area improve. 
 
- Providing contractors with diversity in work was important to maintain morale.  
Worked really well with the sewer gangs where balance of the good and bad jobs was 
given.   
 
- Having a full set of plans was a real benefit.  Contractors were generally happy with 
the quality of the Plans (A3).  Being able to view the plans electronically was also very 
useful. Paper plans need to be laminated, with copies stored outside HQ. 
 
- Use of GIS in the EOC received good feedback.  GIS used as an electronic pin 
board, plotting data from phone calls, red and green properties. It was very useful to 
have access to recent aerials (within the last year).   
 
- WDC recommends moving towards a web-based GIS viewer that will allow all staff to 
access base network maps and print.  
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- Ensure any software used in mapping is not overly specialised and there is a pool of 
talent to call on for assistance to operate the software. 
 
- Not all contractors could break at the dedicated time.  Would have been good to 
ensure hot food is available at all times.   
 
- Time consuming for staff to remove work clothing so they could come in for food, 
drive through/soup kitchen concept.  Runners were used to take food out to gangs 
working further from the hub.   
 
- Contractors had difficulty obtaining fuel.  Large queues at fuel stations.  Dedicated 
lanes or stickers for priority service would have been beneficial.  It was found there 
were very short queues at stations where petrol had run out but diesel still existed. 
 
- Contractors had to leave jobs to get fuel when they could, there would be benefit in a 
fuel tanker supplying contractors. 
 
- Universal fuel cards would have added resilience as not reliant on one supplier. 
 
- Would have been beneficial to have a small number of gangs attending to reactive 
jobs, leaving the majority to focus on dedicated areas. 
 
- Use of GIS in the EOC could have been streamlined, linking incoming asset 
information with existing attribute data, e.g. rating database.  It would have been good 
to be able to interrogate attribute data particularly the valuation number as this is the 
only truly individual attribute per property.  Creating basemaps pre-event would have 
helped.  
 
- Ensure GPS units are tested pre-event to ensure they are accurate. Training is 
required on how to use these devices properly. 
 
- Review number of vehicles likely to be needed. Consider emergency hire agreement 
with Rental Company to provide suitable vehicles during an emergency (4x4 and 
trucks).  
 
- Ensure planning of spare computers and establishment of pre-agreements are in 
place to ensure suitable supply is on hand. 
 
- Keep better records of broken assets (photos etc.) to provide an audit trail for 
insurance purposes.  The photo bank for water was pretty good, less reliable for 
wastewater and storm water, needed particularly for rising mains.   
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3.2 Christchurch Earthquakes - Impact on Infrastructure & Services 
 
Peter McDonald and Mark Christison, Christchurch City Council  
Presentation to Auckland Engineering Lifelines Group 
November, 2011 
 
(Christchurch City Council, 2011) 
 
 
- In an emergency good information is rarely available.  Need to obtain information on 
the extent of the damage.   
 
- The road transport network is the most vital first response infrastructure.  Liquefaction 
cannot easily be prevented within the road corridor. 
 
- Have emergency service agreements and response plans in place and review them 
regularly.   
 
- Don’t underestimate the value of institutional knowledge. 
 
- Set key priorities with Civil Defence.  Think ahead and use all available resources - 
must be strategic from day 1 
 
- Communication is critical. 
 
- Analogue phones have the advantage that they are independent of mains power. 
 
 - While the Christchurch City Council being prepared helps a little, everyone being 
prepared can help a lot. 
 
- Plan and model worst case scenarios for major, acute network failures and have 
alternatives. 
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3.3 Canterbury Earthquakes - A Contractor’s Perspective 
 
Tim Gibson, City Care  






This presentation covers learnings from the earthquakes.   
 
- Need a detailed picture of the extent of damage.   
 
- Public health needs particular care and attention (water and sewerage).   
 
- Have an emergency management structure prepared and be well linked into the 
CDEM EOC. 
 
- Have alternative access to resources such as accommodation and management 
tools, i.e. computers, phones and maps.  
 
- Develop a planning culture within management to be able to deal with changing in 
events.  Planning must be flexible.   
 
- Look after staff outside of work and ensure that their basic needs are met.  Develop 
networks for staff support and replacement.  Maintenance of health and safety 
standards is challenging.   
 
- Access to the following is most helpful:  high pressure blasting trucks, combination 
sucker trucks, CCTV cameras, pipe welding equipment and pipe bursting equipment. 
 
- Maintaining information technology connections including GIS capabilities, 
communication links to providers and clients, access to satellite phones, radio phone 
and other equipment as well as the ability to store data.   
 
- Understand when a fix is not working - i.e. where permanent fixtures were not 
holding, temporary fixes were quite often the only course of action. It is important to 
determine this quickly.   
C59 | P a g e  
 
3.4 Water Lessons Learnt from the Christchurch Earthquakes  
 
Peter Free, GHD  





This presentation covers water-related learnings from arising from the emergency 
response.   
 
- Careful consideration is needed on the topographical location of settlement areas. 
Consideration must be given to flooding and liquefaction etc,  these have physiological 
impact, as well as a physical impact. Large emergencies are rarely single cause 
events, they have multiple other smaller emergencies clustered around the initial 
event, i.e. loss of power or fire, localised flooding, civil unrest etc   
 
- Backup needed for critical assets.  Supplies of spare parts, replacement pipe etc, not 
needed if robust arrangements with suppliers are in place. Some critical long lead 
items may be useful. Arranging or having access to engineering workshop facilities for 
running repairs is important. Develop closer ties with neighbouring authorities they will 
be some of your most useful contacts in an emergency. 
 
- A good accurate (and accessible) map of information is essential showing what's 
working, what has been assessed, what is at partial or low service and where there is 
no service. This type of information needs to be available to decision makers with 
regular updates, especially in the early days of an emergency. 
 
- Keep multiple hard copies of key operational plans in different locations. Also 
duplication equipment should be sourced and available early in an emergency.    
 
- Having a combination of 4WD  (and 2WD)vehicles in the fleet is essential. Often 
commercial decisions are made about the usefulness and need vs cost of 4WD 
vehicles but they give great flexibility in many types of emergencies  
 
- Keep priority messages simple. And keep the target goals changing to drive 
progress. Be careful to not change focus too regularly due to outside influences and if 
necessary create a separate team to deal with side-line issues, often politically or 
media driven.  
 
- Pre-agreed repair techniques are useful as they minimise rework at a later date, help 
with materials supply issues and give greater comfort to physical works staff and 
supervisors as they can get on with the job and not have to worry about misalignment 
with BAU repair techniques and procedures compared to emergency repairs 
Environment standards and some H&S normal standards may not be applicable during 
an emergency as they are designed for a totally different environment. 
 
C60 | P a g e  
 
- Valving control practices should be in place. This should include easy to understand 
positioning marking techniques to ensure workers are safe from accident opening 
when working on mains, pumps etc.  
 
- Emergency water sources need to be available quickly.  Need a lot of low volume 
distribution points for suburban areas that do not have mains water. However these 
sources should be made as safe as possible as there is huge reliance on these key 
facilities.  
 
- Adequate and accessible water storage is essential.   
 
- Identify and empower those who can make quick decisions. And allow for new 
management structures and personal to evolve, all people (for various reasons) aren’t 
necessarily able to lead teams in an emergency compared to normal times.  
 
- Availability of temporary / portable disinfection plants are essential. In an emergency 
extra care is required to ensure water is safe.  
 
Outside the area help (staff resources) is useful, these people don’t have the family 
issues that local staff will have and will be able to work longer hours due to lack of 
family commitments.   Also emergencies required a much large number of people due 
to the very nature being 24/7 events. Doubling (or more) of normal staff numbers may 
be necessary depending on the type and size of emergency.. 
 
- Make time to help/discuss or give time to team members who are struggling, sooner 
or later even the toughest people struggle in a large emergency. When all else fails, 
keep calm and carry on. 
 
 
C61 | P a g e  
 
3.5 Christchurch, New Zealand Earthquake Sequence of Mw 7.1 September 
04, 2010, Mw 6.3 February 22, 2011, Mw 6.0 June 13, 2011:  Lifeline 
Performance – Water 
 
Technical Council on Lifeline Earthquake Engineering (TCLEE). American Society of 
Civil Engineers, Monograph 40, February 2012 – Revision O (February 2012) 
 
John Eidinger and Alex Tang eds 
 
Chapter 6:  Water 
 





- Due mostly to widespread liquefaction there was sustained damage to a great 
number of buried water pipes and water wells. 
 
- Major portions of the CCC water system became depressurized very rapidly after the 
September 2010 earthquake, owing to the large number of broken pipes in the 
liquefaction zones and the loss of water supply from the wells due to power outages.  
 
- However, despite a PGA equal to 0.7g to 0.9g, HDPE pipe at Lyttelton sustained no 
damage.   During the February and June 2011 earthquakes, no damage was 
sustained to new HDPE pipes installed after the first earthquake, in an area heavily 
affected by liquefaction.  Large diameter PVC pipes also performed well. Small 
diameter PVC pipes performed poorly. 
 
- Preliminary indications suggest that HDPE water pipe installed after the first 
earthquake performed very well, while "repair-in-kind" repairs failed again. 
 
- AC pipe sustained massive damage where exposed to 2 to 4 inches of settlement or 
12 to 40 inches of lateral spreads. In many such areas, the AC pipes will need to be 
replaced entirely. Where damage was more limited, pipes were repaired using external 
clamps, new sections of PVC pipe cut into damaged pipes, etc. 
 
-  Although the main water tank for the CBD (36,000,000 litres) sustained substantial 
damage which resulted in its contents emptying, there was no inundation or life safety 
threat to nearby residences.  
 
- With only one significant fire in the CBD in the first few hours post-earthquake, loss of 
piped water supply did not result in fire spread.   
 
- Supply from some wells was impacted where mains electricity was lost and where 
generators were not in place.   





- The immediate earthquake response was focused on restoring potable water. The 
secondary response was on the wastewater collection and treatment plants.  
 
- The distribution of potable water to customers with broken water mains was an 
important part of the post-earthquake response.  Distribution was normally required in 
areas of heavy liquefaction.  It is important that Civil Defence and others coordinating 
the response have adequate plans in place to quickly supply this potable water. 
 
- Because of Christchurch's very high water quality from the aquifers, there is normally 
no water treatment. After each earthquake health officials issued warnings requesting 
everyone to boil their water as they were worried about contamination. Portable 
chlorination stations were installed at various locations throughout the city.  
 
- Often repairs were made to be functional rather than be sustainable in the long term. 
Except in a very few cases, short repair lengths were inserted instead of replacing old 
fragile pipes with new seismic-resistant pipes (considered nice to do but not realistic in 
the immediacy of post-earthquake restoration efforts). 
 
- After the second event, tracking of the damage become much more detailed, GIS 
databases were updated with many more attributes than simply the repair location. 
This will help with long-term asset management and should help develop a more 




- Inspections and damage assessments need to be made quickly so that the level of 
effort for response can be quantified.  
 
- Emergency response plans need to be developed to reflect the likely vulnerabilities of 
the water agency, and the needs of the local community. A balance of emergency 
response and pre-earthquake mitigation will need to be considered. 
 
-  Water Tanks on hillsides need to be built to sustain landslides.  
 
- The lessons learned with repair of water pipes are that seismic upgrades can be 
especially cost effective (worthwhile) if the hazard (future earthquakes) occurs on a 
regular basis. When upgrading the network over the long-term (20-50 years) 
consideration needs to be given to both the aging of pipes due to corrosion or leaks 
and pipes that are seismically vulnerable. Further guidelines are contained in the 
Chapter on capital works programmes that address these issues.     
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3.6 Christchurch, New Zealand Earthquake Sequence of Mw 7.1 September 
04, 2010, Mw 6.3 February 22, 2011, Mw 6.0 June 13, 2011:  Lifeline 
Performance – Wastewater 
 
Technical Council on Lifeline Earthquake Engineering (TCLEE). American Society of 
Civil Engineers, Monograph 40, February 2012 – Revision O (February 2012) 
 
John Eidinger and Alex Tang eds 
 
Chapter 7:  Wastewater 
 





- The wastewater infrastructure was so badly damaged after the February 2011 
earthquake that for several months households were asked to conserve water to 
reduce the risk of the sewage ponds overloading. 
 
- Dry well lift stations and dry well pumping stations were lifted due to extensive 
liquefaction. This lift exceeded 1 meter at some stations. Inflexible connections at 
pumping stations caused breakages. 
 
- While some pumping stations suffered no damage from the seismic activity, inlet and 
outlet pipes were damaged.  One station floated when sucking sewage into trucks.   
 
- Pipes may be vulnerable where they are too rigidly supported on bridges (e.g. 
settlement of one abutment can lead to failure). 
 
- The previous use of push-on-rubber-jointed AC, PVC, vitrified clay or concrete pipe in 
liquefaction zones resulted in most of the adverse impact to buried pipes in 
Christchurch and Kaiapoi. Instead fusion butt-welded HDPE or clamped electric-
welded HDPE or ductile iron pipes with chained joints are recommended for 
consideration.  
 
- There was no damage to rod-hung cable support trays and pipes at the Bromley 
Waster Water Treatment Plant (WWTP) despite shaking with PGA = 0.5g.  
 
- The WWTP has an underground corridor (called a gallery) constructed of reinforced 
concrete, used for housing piping and conduits. The gallery was damaged and 
separated at the construction joints. Water and sand flowed into the gallery through the 
drainage pipe system and the joint separations. 
 
- The WWTP had to be able to deal with an influx of debris and sand which infiltrated 
the wastewater collection pipe system, putting pressure on the already-distressed 
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filtering tanks. Sewage can bypass the treatment plant to the ponds, but the ponds 
cannot be bypassed to send sewage directly to the outfall. 
 
- Sloshing forces were the likely cause of many aeration pipe breaks at the WWTP.   
 
Response and Advice 
 
- The extent of pipeline damage to the sewer system rivalled or exceeded that of the 
water system but takes 3 to 10 times as long to repair owing to the depth of gravity 
sewers.  Crews had to dewater the sewer, install sheet piles (or trench shields) before 
the pipe could be either repaired or replaced (this is because they were often 3 meters 
deep). 
 
- Interior inspection of sewer pipes was hampered by having so many of them clogged 
with sand. 
 
- Crew worked to flush sewer pipes with a water jetting method. This cleaned the pipes 
enabling cameras to be deployed to inspect the pipes. At locations where large sewer 
pipe breaks had occurred, the jetting process sometimes effectively mined the sand 
from the ground surrounding the pipes and resulted in sink holes in the roadway 
above. Some cars fell into the sinkholes. The process was modified to reduce the 
possibility of creating sinkholes by monitoring the rate of progress of the jetting holes, 
when the rate significantly slows the crews stop the jetting and report a location of 
potential significant damage. 
 
- The repair strategy was to first restore the larger downstream sewer mains then 
continue working upstream. In this way CCC could take as much sewage as possible 
to the WWTP and also contain as much sand as possible in the pumping station wet 
wells, thus removing a significant sand load from the WWTP. 
 
- Slow moving effluent in pipes caused the biggest headache for both the city council 
and health authorities because of leakage into backyards, rivers and the sea. 
 
- Portable toilets proved essential in providing temporary service to customers - 
generally one per two houses.  Another approach was to install small tanks on berms 
or in the front of properties without sewer service, where the sewer mains couldn’t be 
repaired. This allowed use of the household internal toilets, showers and washing 
machines.  Finally chemical toilets were deployed to some residents to replace the 
usage of portaloos.  
 
- HDPE pipe was useful in establishing temporary sewage bypasses over bridges. 
 
- It is noted that relative to other lifelines, sewer systems have often been neglected 
with regards to seismic vulnerability assessments and mitigation. Liquefaction has a 
major impact on the network's performance and had a very large impact on people's 
daily lives. 
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3.7 Damage to Potable Water Reservoirs in the Darfield Earthquake 
 
Robert A. Davey, Opus International Consultants, Wellington 
New Zealand Society for Earthquake Engineering 
Paper, December 2010 
 
(Davey, December 2010) 
 
 
- Inspections of 54 water reservoirs were undertaken. These were of concrete, steel 




- Most were robustly constructed with attention to seismic detailing, only two had 
serious damage.   
 
- One was damaged at the junction of the roof and the wall because the concrete nib 
at the top of the wall could not withstand the inertia load applied by the roof. 
 
- The other concrete tank suffered from a partial collapse of the roof due to the 
buoyancy forces from the earthquake generated convection wave. This caused the 
slabs to be lifted off supporting walls and fractured when they impacted down again. 
 
- This highlights the importance of avoiding or allowing for uplift pressures that are 
caused by such convection waves. This lesson is one that can be investigated further 
as to why these practices were not implemented prior to the earthquake and how this 




- Six were inspected, four failed at their anchor bolts.  
 
- The two that didn’t fail were smaller and had a greater number of large anchor bolts.   
 
- The failure raises a question regarding the criteria used for the design of the anchor 




- Four were inspected; one was functional, two were damaged with leaking present 
and the fourth collapsed.  Timber tanks rely on a base-isolation response which did 
occur in the earthquake, however the wall displacements caused liners to rupture and 
reservoirs to leak.  
 
- Need to examine how these were built and whether there is a significant design 
feature present which made them fail.   
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3.8 Seismic Performance of Christchurch Wastewater Treatment Plant 
Oxidation Bunds 
 
Mark Christison, Christchurch City Council 
Richard Young and Marcus Gibson, Beca Group 
 
Ingenium Conference, Rebuilding the Dream, June 2012 
 
(Christison, Young, & Gibson, 2012) 
 
 
- This paper describes the geotechnical investigations, observations and seismic 
assessment of the Wastewater Treatment Plant Oxidation bunds.  It outlines the repair 
methodologies adopted and likely performance in further seismic events. 
 
- A risk based assessment of damage to the bunds was carried out, taking into 
consideration the risks of overtopping of the bund crest, piping instability and 
deterioration of pipework and breach of the bund.  Mitigation measures were then 
developed for different bund sections to yield more homogeneous and enhanced 
resistance to earthquakes up to the proposed design level. 
 
- The preferred mitigation treatments included vibro-compaction, mechanically 
stabilised 
earth and compacted fill. It was recognised that following a design or stronger 
earthquake, the bunds may deform, although breach of the bunds should not occur. 
Such an approach balances the functional requirements of the ponds with the other 
project constraints, such as programme and budget. 
 
- To mitigate the risk of overtopping between ponds, approximately 400m of sheet 
piling was installed through the worst sections to prevent further damage in 
subsequent events. 
 
- There was damage to the piped connections between the ponds, leading to a 
reduced capability to control flows through the ponds, which under extreme 
circumstances has the potential for overtopping of the bunds. 
 
- Discharge of oxidation pond effluent over the bund crest occurred (due to subsidence 
to crest level and/or excessive lateral spreading) resulting in rapid localised erosion. 
 
- During to repair and redesign phase it was recognized that all unnecessary 
penetrations (old disused buried pipes) through bunds should be removed to mitigate 
the risk of pipe failure. 
 
- Ensure any new or existing pipes are enhanced or designed to accommodate 
potential bund movement. 
 
- For the more high / intermediate risk areas vibro-compaction with geogrids were 




- During construction there is an elevated risk of bund breach, especially if significant 
aftershocks (which were frequent) occur. Hence, for this period the pond levels were 
lowered to mitigate this risk. 
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3.9 Performance of Buried High Voltage Power Cables due to Liquefaction 
 
John M. Eidinger, President, G&E Engineering Systems Inc. 
Paper  
 
(Eidinger J. M., 2012) 
 
 
- This paper includes descriptions (including photographs) of deformed HV cables as 
they were dug out in liquefaction zones following the earthquakes.  For example, the 
impact of shear on oil-filled cables associated with thermal concrete surrounds is 
shown – high curvature as the ground moved led to strain on the aluminium cover, 
tearing it.   In another example, high reverse curvature in XLPE cables caused the 
insulation around the copper core to wrinkle outwards, tearing the outer copper sheath. 
 
- There was no lateral spreading in the six areas surveyed and the cable damage 
appears to have been due to liquefaction.  
 
- A series of non-linear structural analyses of buried cables was performed to attempt 
duplication of the field observations.  The paper offers the following possible 
explanation of the forces leading to these cable failures:   
 
 A combination of travelling waves and local differential settlements create a 
high bending moment around the horizontal axis of the unreinforced cemented 
sand / concrete thermal backfill. Before the concrete cracks, the underground 
cables are intact. When there is an increase in the bending moment there is a 
resulting induced tensile stress in the concrete. A weak spot in the concrete is 
found and this results in the concrete cracking. The two ground layers then 
“slosh” and when they come back together the high forces occur in the thermal 
concrete causing the cables to buckle sideways. This results in a crushed 
power cable. 
 
A test programme on full-scale samples is being undertaken at Berkeley, sponsored by 
Pacific Gas and Electricity.  The samples include four 150 mm PVC or HDPE ducts 
supported by spacer grids every 1.5 meters within reinforced and unreinforced 
concrete, about 0.8 to 1.0 meter in cross-section.  Initial tests show: 
 
- Unreinforced ducts: when the bending moment on the concrete duct bank exceeds 
the tensile cracking strength, a large crack forms in the concrete. The ducts maintain 
their circular cross section sufficiently, preventing crushing of the power cable. 
 
- Reinforced ducts: steel-reinforced duct banks easily absorb the cracking and there is 
no significant damage. 
 
 
Conclusions and recommendations: 
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- Avoid the use of underground cables in liquefaction zones.   
 
- Direct burial in moderately-strong thermal backfill concrete can result in cable 
failures.   
 
- When buried cables are required in liquefaction zones, a reinforced concrete thermal 
backfill can control curvatures and prevent knife-edge offsets. Reinforcement (steel or 
fibre) should be used for such burial situations.  Cemented PVC joints can be expected 
to crack under high bending action when placed in thermal concrete.  
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3.10 Pipe Performance and Experiences during Seismic Events in New 
Zealand over the Last 25 Years 
 
Frank W. O’Callaghan, Iplex Pipelines NZ Ltd 
 
Paper delivered to conference of the American Society of Civil Engineers 
August, 2012 
 
(O'Callaghan, August 2012) 
 
 
- Nothing is earthquake proof – the ground movement happens anyway, particularly in 
liquefaction and lateral spread zones - anything can and will, break at the weakest link. 
No pipeline material, survived undamaged in Christchurch where the ground 
movement exceeded the yield or break limit of the pipe material. 
 
- Pipes must be designed with flexible joints to accommodate movement or 
deliberately selected “weak” points such as at bridge and structure connections, to 
manage the location of seismic breakage. Continuously welded pipelines, without 
designed ability to accommodate compression and expansion movement, or lacking 
designed “weak” points, performed badly in severe liquefaction and lateral spread 
zones, and are difficult to repair on a large scale, if the repair system requires heat or 
electricity. 
 
- Ductile, flexible pipes with rubber ring joints generally performed well in Christchurch. 
 
- Other New Zealand councils should identify and focus limited pipe upgrade budgets 
in their liquefaction zones first. 
 
- Real risk (not estimated or perceived risk) for seismic insurance evaluation of 
pipelines is quite different in non liquefaction zones (much lower), compared with high 
liquefaction risk or lateral spread zones (much higher or extreme). 
 
- There is ample evidence that the extent of, or lack of pipeline damage is very closely 
related to where liquefaction occurred, or did not occur, respectively. 
 
- Pipe movement observed in liquefaction and lateral spread zones was consistent 
with Seismic “P” wave axial movement. The mode of pipe or joint failure in liquefaction 
and lateral spread zones was closely linked to the angular direction of the pipe asset 
with the seismic epicentre. 
 
- Do not use gravity based pipeline designs in liquefaction risk zones – the grades will 
change and disable the pipe system, regardless of pipe material, with every seismic 
event. 
 
- Design to accommodate movement, allow compression (most damaging), expansion, 
and grade changes, rotation and axial movement, and lateral spread. 
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- Use materials and designs which are easy to repair in the future. Ease of pipe repair, 
in the rain, mud and wet, with low skill installers, without electricity, roads, bridges, is a 
vital factor. 
 
- Design to avoid or manage assumed or certain pipe failure sites (fault crossings, 
liquefaction sites, lateral spread sites, ground displacement areas). 
 
- A dedicated resource is needed of technically skilled pipeline specialists, to be 
available to quickly and fully use future opportunities to research first hand information 
on actual pipe performance.   
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3.11 Earthquake Damage to Buried Pipelines 
 
John Black 






The following are the main points from the paper, which was delivered to the 
INGENIUM Conference in 2012.   
 
- Ductile pipes (e.g. modern PVC-U and others) with rubber ring joints provide an 
acceptable and cost effective option for most repairs and renewal/replacement works 
for all but the most critical of the water supply and sewage pipelines, particularly in 
areas that do not have a high risk of lateral spreading. 
 
- The older, brittle, pipe materials e.g. ceramic (earthenware), cast iron, AC and small 
diameter concrete pipes have performed poorly in areas affected by liquefaction.  
Lateral spreading and pipe stream crossings were a cause of failure. 
 
- Connections to pumping stations must be flexible and fixable. 
 
- Avoid laying infrastructure (pipes, manholes, pumping stations) in lateral spreading 
zones.  Brittle pipe with rigid joints have greatest numbers of failures.  Deeper and 
bigger pipes are less susceptible to earthquake damage. 
 
- Pipe manufacturing quality may impact performance.  Installation affects performance 
as well – e.g. insertion depths of spigot and socket pipes and angular deflection at 
joints. 
 
- Corrosion (cast and ductile iron, AC pipes) and chemical breakdown (PVC, PE) can 
reduce strength of materials. 
 
- Consider building weak links that can be easily repaired (indestructible pipe systems 
are almost impossible to build and are costly).   
 
- High vulnerability pipes include: 
 
 Ceramic pipes with mortar joints. 
 Brick and stone barrels generally with lime mortar jointing. 
 Old reinforced concrete pipes with rigid, lead joints. 
 Ceramic pipes with rubber ring joints. 
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 Cast iron (CI) pipes with rigid, run-lead joints. 
 Unreinforced concrete pipes with rubber ring joints. 
 Asbestos cement (AC) pipes of ≤ DN 150. 
 Old, small diameter reinforced concrete pipes with rubber ring joints. 
 Screwed steel pipes (generally ≤ DN 50). 
 Steel pipes with lead joints. 
 CI pipes with rubber ring joints. 
 AC pipes with rubber ring joints, ≥ DN 200. 
  
- Least vulnerable pipes: 
 
 DI pipes with locking rings e.g. Tyton-Lok. 
 PE 80B or PE 100 pipes with end-load bearing mechanical joints. 
 CLS pipes full strength welded joints. 
 DI pipes, with seismic joints. 
 PE pipes with butt or full strength electro-fusion joints (Pipes of PE 80B & PE 
100). 
  
- It is important to learn from pipe failures (e.g. investigate pipe failures as repairs are 
done). 
 
- A measured approach to priority for repair and replacement of damaged pipes needs 
to be made, e.g. taking into account the nature and location of the damage and 




C75 | P a g e  
 
3.12 Liquefaction Impacts on Pipe Networks  
 
Misko Cubrinovski, Matthew Hughes and Brendon Bradley, University of Canterbury, 
New Zealand 
Ian McCahon, Geotech Consulting, Christchurch, New Zealand 
Yvonne McDonald, Practical Consulting, Christchurch, New Zealand 
Howard Simpson, Rod Cameron, Mark Christison and Bruce Henderson, Christchurch 
City Council, New Zealand 
Rolando Orense, University of Auckland, New Zealand  
Thomas O'Rourke, Cornell University, Ithaca, United States 
 
National Hazards Research Platform, University of Canterbury 
Paper, December 2011 
 
(Cubrinovski, et al., 2011) 
 
 
The main points in this paper are:   
 
 Submains suffered a higher percentage of damage than watermains for any 
given type of material 
 Polyethelene (PE) submains suffered, on average, five to six times less 
damage than galvanised iron (GI) pipes 
 For all potable water pipe materials except PE pipes, there is a clear increase in 
the affected length (percentage of damage) with increasing liquefaction 
severity. 
 The depth of the wastewater network caused difficulties for observations and 
repairs 
 
The paper includes recommendations on seismic resistance materials and how to 
improve construction and design processes. 
 
Soil Liquefaction and Lateral Spreading 
 
- Liquefaction at a given site does not increase liquefaction resistance of soils and 
does not prevent re-liquefaction at a site in subsequent earthquakes. The types of 
soils that were most affected by liquefaction were non-plastic sands, silty sands, 
sandy silts, and silt-sand-gravel mixtures. 
 
- Starting from the Colombo Street Bridge, practically all downstream bridges on the 
Avon River were severely impacted by lateral spreading. Rotation movements of 
abutments, damage to foundation piles and subsidence of approaches to bridges and 
in some cases, structural damage were the most typical spreading-induced damage. 
 
- “When evaluating lateral spreading one should carefully consider ground elevation 
(direction of sloping), river geometry (meandering, loops, cut banks, point bar 
deposits), presence of weakened zones (old river channels, fills, etc.) and 
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geotechnical conditions, next develop lateral spreading zoning and probable range of 
spreading displacements and their distribution, and then anticipate loads and 
deformation of [pipelines] having in mind [their] particular layout relative to the 
direction of lateral spreading.” 
 
Performance of the Potable Water and Wastewater Systems 
 
-  “PE submain pipes suffered, on average, five to six times less damage than GI 
pipes.” 
 
- “Comparing the damage to watermains and submains, it appears that for each pipe 
material the damage to the submains was larger than the damage to the mains. The 
total damaged length of submains was smaller, however, because over 80% of the 
submains were comprised of the well performing PE pipes.” 
 
-  Although damage is associated to a certain pipe material, the “failures” include (and 
probably are dominated at least for the PE pipes) by failures of particular components 
(joints, connections, fire hydrant details, crossovers, laterals) rather than material 
failures. It is critically important therefore to discriminate between different types of 
failure and carry out more rigorous analysis.”   
 
- Inspections of and repairs to the wastewater network were much more difficult than 
to the potable water system because of the depth at which the pipes are installed 
(often exceeding 2.5 meters) and, once the need for repairs had been identified, 
dewatering and trench support was necessary before they could take place. 
 
-  Detailed information on damage to the wastewater system was not available at the 
time the paper was written.  Further studies and analysis are required.   
 
CCC Issues and Considerations 
 
- “A significant effect on the gravity pipe network has been the movement of pipe 
sections relative to each other, the surrounding ground and/or structures. This 
movement is evidenced by changes in grade, varying grades along a pipe length, or 
joint dislocation either within the pipe length, or at connections to structures.” The 
effects included: 
  
 Reduce capacity particularly in gravity lines,  
 
 Inconsistencies in the invert level 
 
 Partial or complete blockage of mains or laterals 
 
 Joint damage or movement allowing silt and groundwater infiltration or 
discharge of wastewater to groundwater 
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 Depressions in carriageways caused by infiltration of subgrade materials into 
the gravity system. 
 
- Portions of Christchurch’s gravity reticulation network are installed at depths 
exceeding 2.5m resulting in delays and high reinstatement costs. 
 
 
Note:  The following material (“Construction Alternatives” and “Design Alternatives”) 
summarises recommendations (applicable to all Christchurch zones) and best 
practices (applicable dependent on liquefaction resistance in the particular area as 
identified on a Liquefaction Resistance Index map in the paper).  Research is 
continuing in many of the areas listed.  Readers should refer to the full paper for 




1.  Pipe Haunching or Surround / Backfill Details 
 
- Imported gravel backfill under roads to reduce the potential for trench settlement 
also “increases resistance to liquefaction damage by forming a zone of non-liquefiable 
soil above the pipe, providing a zone of much more permeable ground to relieve 
excess pore pressures immediately under and around the pipe and higher strength 
material along the trench.” 
 
- Alternative methods and materials for pipe haunching, surround and backfill have 
been investigated.  Recommended solutions included: 
 
 Detailing a “soft ground” or “raft” foundation wrapped in geotextile with strength 
class C, installed to TNZ F/2 
 
 Continue using M/4: AP40 or AP20 as pipe haunching or surrounding 
 
 Continue using M/4 AP40 or AP65 as trench backfill 
 
 Tightening bedding or haunching compaction requirements 
 
“Best practice” solutions include, in relation to flexible gravity pipes, wrapping 
haunching or surrounds in geotextile, strength class C, installed to TNZ F/2.   
 
2.  Polyethelene Pipe Construction 
 
- Recommendations for improved seismic resistance in pressure networks using 
polyethylene material include:  
 
 Providing quality records including methodologies and weld records to support 
welder competence. 
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 Ensuring welder competence, e.g. by requiring current qualifications  
 
 Improving weld construction through amendments to construction specifications 
including equipment and processes 
 
 Providing commentaries and graphical plots of electrofusion peel de-cohesion 
test results to confirm weld competence and allow tracking of material or welder 
related performance issues. 
 
 Updating polyethylene weld test requirements ensuring testing is relevant to 
pipe size and use. 
 
3.  Material Selection 
 
- Recommendations for material selection take into account increasing pipe stiffness, 
specifying ductile materials and improving the material specifications for connections 
between pipes and for fittings.   Specific recommendations include: 
 
 For gravity applications, use of PVC-U pipe, SN16 for 100 and 150 diameter 
and SN8 for 225 and above to improve pipe resistance to becoming oval or 
buckling under seismic loading. 
 
 For wastewater pressure applications, use polyethylene pipe as it has 
experienced no known failures under seismic loading. 
 
 Increase the minimum PN for polyethylene pipe in wastewater pressure 
applications to PN10 to improve resistance to seismic loading. 
 
- Best practice solutions include use of polyethelene for potable water. 
 
4.  Joint Details 
 
-For pipe joints it is recommended to: 
 
 Wrap PVC-U gravity pipe joints, including on laterals, in geotextile with strength 
class C to prevent ingress of silt where joints open up under seismic loading. 
 
 Install long socket connectors to manholes on PVC-U gravity reticulation to 
increase the potential to accommodate longitudinal joint movement. 
 
 Improve socket lengths and so joint movement capacity on PVC-U pipes by 
specifying minimum socket lengths and marking two witness marks (one as a 




1.  Providing for Future Events 
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- “Improved resilience can be provided through increasing the capability of the 
network to withstand seismic events by allowing for future settlement, by providing a 
system that will not be as affected by liquefaction or land movement e.g. pressure 
systems, by adding redundancy into the network, by using more robust materials and 
by designing to reduce the recovery time involved in repairs or replacement.” 
 
Best practice solutions are suggested as follows: 
 
● Allow, in designing gravity line grades, for liquefaction settlement as determined 
by the LRI zone and associated settlements table 
 
● Carry out detailed geotechnical investigations of sites to determine the 
liquefaction potential and therefore likely settlement or lateral spread and 
subsequent movement. 
 
● Apply the guidelines from NTC 33 clauses 32-37, detailing what the 
geotechnical investigation for pump station sites should address. 
 
● Consider alternative depths or wastewater reticulation systems instead of large 
scale gravity networks serviced by substantial lift pump stations. 
 
2.  Differential Movement Risk Areas 
 
- “Network analysis suggests that the water reticulation experienced greater damage 
rates at the hill/plain interface by comparison to similar reticulation in other areas. This 
area may require special consideration to ensure there is sufficient ductility in the 
reticulation and the reticulation performance is still being analysed.” 
 
3.  Lateral Spread Risk Areas 
 
- Liquefaction encourages lateral spreading in those areas where the land is sloping 
or is not confined (e.g. adjacent to rivers). To counter this effect on damage to 
reticulation it is recommended that: 
 
● Designs consider ease of repair, e.g. fittings between structures and pipes 
should be placed above ground. 
 
● Flexibility in the pipes be improved through use of polyethylene and through 
designing adequate compensatory flexibility in connections to structures etc. 
 
4.  Sewer Depths and Grades 
 
- There are a number of ways to reduce the depth of gravity sewers in selected areas 
and as a larger scale solution. Recommended solutions include: 
 
 Installing collector sewers over existing deep (over 2.5m) sewers, where depth 
permits. This is to prevent future repairs on laterals and junctions. 
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 Apply depth restrictions of 3.5m to gravity sewers to prevent possibility of 
repairs at depth 
 
 Apply depth restrictions of 2.5m for the connection of laterals to gravity sewers 
to prevent the possibility of repairs to depth. 
 
5.  Material Selection 
 
- Ductility of materials within and between pipes and robust connections between 
pipes and fittings or structures are fundamental to maintaining a functioning network 
after an earthquake event. Material choices to counter the seismic load on pipes, 
which can occur in all directions, include: 
 
 Avoiding brittle piping materials; and  
 
 Detailing long socket connectors to manholes on PVC-U gravity reticulation to 
provide increased longitudinal joint movement.” 
 
6.  Foundation Treatments 
 
- “Liquefaction substantially reduces the strength of the pipe foundation materials. 
Foundation treatments designed to counter this include the use of “soft ground” or 
“raft” foundation options for pipes laid in areas where foundation bearing pressures 
are less than 50kPa.” 
 
7.  Redundant Infrastructure 
 
- Treatment options for large volumes of damaged infrastructure in the ground still 
require further consideration, however recommended solutions include: 
 
● “Removal because these pipes form voids which can undermine the 
foundations of pavements and adjacent services and can disrupt groundwater 
flows.” 
 
● “Treatment is dependent on the proximity to all services, the pipe’s position in 
the road cross-section and the size of the pipe. If grouting, ensure it is 
continuous along the pipe length. Low strength concrete (3MPa) is preferred to 
prevent future issues where the pipe may require removal.” 
 
● “Obsolete asbestos cement (AC) pipes should preferably not be left in the 
ground due to contamination problems.” 
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- “For all pipe materials except PE pipes, there is a clear increase in the affected 
length (percentage of damage) with increasing liquefaction severity.” 
 
 
- “For steel (S), asbestos cement (AC) and other material pipes, the percentage of 
damaged pipes in areas of severe liquefaction was very high, between 15% and 
22%.” 
 
- “PVC pipes suffered two to four times less damage than S, AC and other material 
pipes.” 
 
- “The level of pipe damage in no liquefaction and not inspected areas are similar 
indicating that ground displacements/performance were similar in these areas (with 
general absence of liquefaction manifestation). This fact together with the findings that 
the percentage of damage was linked to and increased with liquefaction severity 





- “GI pipes performed poorly with 17% damaged length in areas of low to moderate 
liquefaction and 26% damaged pipes in areas of severe liquefaction.” 
 
- “PE pipes suffered, on average, five to six times less damage than GI pipes.” 
 
-  “Comparing the damage of watermains and submains, it appears that for each pipe 
material the damage to the submains was larger than the damage to the mains. It is 
important to understand what features/details contributed to this outcome. The total 
damaged length of submains was smaller however because over 80% of the 
submains were comprised of the well performing PE pipes.” 
  
- “Even though in the simplest form of the analysis the damage is always associated 
with certain pipe material, the nominally defined “failures” include (and probably are 
dominated at least for the PE pipes) by failures of particular components (joints, 
connections, fire hydrant details, crossovers, laterals) rather than pipe failures.  
It is critically important therefore to discriminate between different types of failure and 
carry out a more rigorous second stage analysis, which will help us to identify key 
weaknesses and also “good design/construction details/characteristics” of the pre-
earthquake potable water system.” 
 
- “Having in mind the severity of ground shaking and failures caused by the 
earthquakes, as well as the reasonably quick restoration of potable water services 
throughout the city, one may argue that, by and large, the potable water system 
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- “By and large, the performance of the wastewater system was poor and not 
satisfactory (below desirable level/standard) despite the acknowledgement of the 
extreme severity of the earthquakes and liquefaction-induced ground failures.” 
 
-  “Detailed information on the damage to the wastewater system was still not 
available because of the extensive damage and very difficult accessibility due to the 
large embedment depth.” 
 
-  “Further studies and analyses of the wastewater network are required and strongly 
recommended.” 
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3.13 Impacts of Liquefaction on Pipe Networks in the 2010 – 2011 Christchurch 
Earthquakes - PBD Issues and Perspectives 
 
Misko Cubrinovski, Matthew Hughes, and Brendon Bradley, University of Canterbury, 
New Zealand 
Yvonne McDonald, Civil Engineering Consultant, New Zealand 
Bruce Henderson, Christchurch City Council, New Zealand 
Ian McCahon, Geotech Consultant, New Zealand 
Rolando Orense, University of Auckland, New Zealand 
Thomas O’Rourke, Cornell University, United States 
 
International Conference on Performance-Based Design in Earthquake Geotechnical 
Engineering, Taormina 
Conference Paper, May 2012 
  
(Cubrinovski, et al., 2012) 
 
 
-  The wastewater system was hard hit by earthquakes with loss of grade in the gravity 
pipes, numerous breakages of pipes/joints, and infiltration of huge amounts of liquefied 
silt into the pipes. Nearly 40% of the network pipes had limited or no service 
approximately one month after the February earthquake. 
 
-  PVC and PE pipes performed very well in the potable water system, suffering several 
times less damage than other material pipes (i.e. asbestos cement, galvanized iron 
and steel pipes).   
 
-  In both networks, there is a strong correlation of damage to liquefaction severity for 
all pipe materials (except PE in the potable watermain system). 
 
- Nearly 80% of the damaged watermains were in liquefied areas.  
 
- In comparing damage of watermains and submains, it appears that for each pipe 
material, submains experienced a higher percentage of damage.  The total damaged 
length of submains was smaller, however, because over 80 percent of the submainss 
were comprised of well-performing PE pipes.   
 
-  It is important to emphasize that even though in these preliminary analyses the 
damage is always associated with a certain pipe material, the nominally defined 
‘failures’ include (and probably are dominated at least for the PE pipes) by failures of 
particular components (joints, connections, fire hydrant details, crossovers, laterals) 
rather than actual failures of the material (pipe breaks). 
 
- The paper sets out Christchurch City Council’s performance objectives for recovery of 
both potable water and wastewater systems based on the observations and 
experiences of the 2010 – 2011 earthquakes. This criterion may be a useful 
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comparison for other water utilities which have similar risks and can be viewed in Table 
3 on page 11. 
C85 | P a g e  
 
3.14 Lateral Spreading and Its Impacts in the 2010-2011 Earthquakes 
 
M Cubrinovski, K Robinson, M Taylor, M Hughes, University of Canterbury, New 
Zealand 
R Orense, University of Auckland, New Zealand 
 
New Zealand Journal of Geology and Geophysics 
Article, September 2012 
 
(Cubrinovski, Robinson, Talyor, Hughes, & Orense, 2012) 
 
 
- This paper summarises the effects of lateral spreading following the 2010-2011 
earthquakes in the Canterbury region.  Many valuable photographs, charts and 
diagrams appear at the end of the paper.   
 
- Lateral spreading caused damage to a large number of bridges, where the results 
were induced rotational movements of abutments, damage to foundation piles, and 
subsidence of approaches to bridges. In some cases this caused structural damage.  
 
- The spreading induced lateral displacement of the banks towards the river. This was 
resisted by the stiff and strong upper structure of the bridges (girders and deck), 
causing a pinning effect and rotation of the abutments as the foundation piles could not 
resist the large lateral movement of the foundation soils.  Additional stress was 
imposed on the top of the piles because of the large abutment rotation which resulted 
in further damage. 
 
- In cases when the lateral spreading were very large, the spreading was accompanied 
with slumping of the approaches, which produced large vertical offsets between the 
road surfaces of the approaches and the bridge itself. 
 
- Preliminary GIS analyses of the performance of the potable water system show clear 
link between the damage to the network and occurrence / severity of liquefaction. 
 
- Approximately 80% of the water mains breaks (repairs) occurred in areas affected by 
liquefaction, and nearly 60% of the damage was in areas of moderate to severe 
liquefaction where lateral spreading was the key contributing factor to the damage. 
 
- The impacts of lateral spreading were even more pronounced on the wastewater 
system because its network of pipes is laid at larger depths (2.0-3.5 m), and hence is 
more susceptible to damage and also more difficult to access during 
repair/reinstatement works. 
 
- The typical types of failure to both water and wastewater networks was the loss of 
grade, breakage of brittle pipes and the failure of joints or connections (laterals). 
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3.15 Impact and Recovery of the Kaiapoi Water Supply Network following the 
September 4th 2010 Darfield Earthquake 
 
Stuart Knight, Sonia Giovinnazzi, Miao Liu, University of Canterbury, New Zealand 
 
15th World Conference on Earthquake Engineering 2012, Lisbon 
Conference Paper, 2011 
 
 (Knight, Giovinazzi, & Liu, 2012) 
 
 
- A back-up diesel generator was essential in getting the main headworks operational 
within six hours of the of the September 4th earthquake. The headworks enabled 
potable water to be circulated into the Kaiapoi Township pipe network and for the 
process of finding breakages to begin. 
 
- While damage to the water pipe network was spread throughout Kaiapoi, a 
significantly higher number of repairs were required near the Kaipaoi River. 
 
- Asbestos Cement (AC) pipes required a comparatively larger number of repairs in 
areas where no land deformation was recorded, compared to PVC and PE pipes. The 
same comparison can be found in areas of minor or severe liquefaction relative to the 
number of AC pipes in those areas. 
 
- The repair rate for AC pipes was the highest at 3.36 repairs per kilometre. 
 
- PVC pipes were more exposed to minor liquefaction comparative to major or severe 
liquefaction, but the majority of repairs were required in areas that experienced 
moderate to major liquefaction. This could suggest general good performance of PVC 
pipes when subjected to minor land deformation, with performance becoming more 
significantly affected in areas where land deformation was greater. 
 
- The repair rate for PVC was substantially better than AC pipes at 0.59 repairs per 
kilometre. 
 
- PE pipes had similar exposure to minor liquefaction but required only one repair in 
these areas, and therefore relatively, showed the best performance in Kaiapoi.  
 
- Information regarding which repairs were being made and what new breakages were 
being discovered was updated daily. This enabled the plan to be constantly updated, 
helping utility managers to understand the overall picture of the restoration, set 
intervention priorities and make decisions regarding where resources should be 
directed. 
 
- While managing the emergency, the local Council did not have an established 
procedure and/or available tool for assessing and quantifying repair needs. Therefore 
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it is recommended that improvements be made in enabling Councils to make the 
following assessments during a crisis:  
 
 The number of customers without water,  
 
 The number of customers with water reconnected after each set of repairs,  
 





C88 | P a g e  
 
3.16 Christchurch City Lifelines - Performance of Concrete Potable Water 
Reservoirs in the February 2011 Christchurch Earthquake 
 
Ian Billings and Nicholas Charman, Beca  
NZSEE Paper, December 2011, NZSEE 2012 Conference Paper  
 
(Billing & Charman, 2011) 
 
 
The following are the main points from the papers.   
 
- Of 43 Christchurch City Council reservoirs, two were declared inoperable (Hunstbury 
No.1 and McCormacks Bay No.2) in the February earthquake.  A number of others 
were also damaged requiring repair works (the extent of damage was minor in many 
cases).  The City lost 40% of its potable water supply following the earthquake.  
 
- Reinstatement works, varying from minor crack injection and patch repair through to 
reconstruction and retrofit, were developed appropriate to the extent of damage. CCC 
prioritised reservoir repair to maximise water supply available for the 2011-2012 
summer demand and this required, in some instances, staging and deferring of 
reinstatement works. 
 
- It is estimated that some reservoirs may have experienced much higher shaking than 
originally designed for.  
 
- Damage to Huntsbury No.1 reservoir is believed to have been caused by movement 
in an underlying shear zone.  This reservoir has now been replaced by two smaller 




 Roof-to-wall and wall-to-base/foundation connection vulnerabilities have been 
identified.  Roof-to-wall dowel connections performed poorly. 
 
 Leakage through wall construction joints – double protection system for water-
tightness recommended. 
 
 A potential deficiency in resistance to sliding has been identified.   
 
 Insufficient freeboard to roofs identified during seismic analyses of some 
reservoirs. 
 
 Avoid joints in floor slabs. Interconnected walls, foundations and continuous 
internal base-slabs increase overall robustness and reservoir performance. 
 
 Thin walls with single layer reinforcing are not robust  
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 Foundation competency is important 
 
 Likely that a number of reservoirs throughout New Zealand have similar roof-to-
wall and wall-to-base vulnerabilities 
 
- Repair and retrofit requirements for all reservoirs are noted in the papers.   
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3.17 Recent Earthquakes:  Implications for U.S. Water Utilities  
 
Craig Davis, Los Angeles Department of Water and Power, Los Angeles 
John Eidinger, G&E Engineering Systems Inc, Oakland 
 
Water Research Foundation  
Paper, 2012 
 
This summary not yet approved for publication 
 
(Davis & Eidinger, 2012) 
 
 
Note: The Christchurch specific appendix from the Recent Earthquakes: Implications 
for the U.S. paper includes further information on the explaining the effects on the 





- Water pipes and wells in Christchurch had not been designed for earthquakes 
although some seismic upgrades to reservoirs had been undertaken.     
 
- The bulk of the earthquake damage to water systems was due to failure of hundreds 
to thousands of smaller diameter distribution pipes in zones of infirm ground.  
Liquefaction caused water pipe breaks.  Landslides and road-fill slumps damaged 
pipes in hill areas. AC pipes were the most vulnerable to settlement or lateral 
spreading. 
 
- One water storage tank had damage to the roof in September, likely due to uplift 
forces by water sloshing.  More damage occurred to tanks in February.   
 
- Difficulties arose in water well performance after the February earthquake in 
liquefaction zones. Soil settlements due to liquefaction resulted in broken well casing 
pipes. Some wells did not have generators (for emergency response phase).  
Fortunately there were no / few fires. 
 
- For common distribution pipes and service laterals (from under 1" to 8" diameter), 
HDPE pipe (either fusion butt welded or electro-welded with clamped joints) appeared 
to have excellent earthquake performance.  
 
- Christchurch City Council had installed some HDPE pipe in its water distribution 
system after the first earthquake.  In the subsequent earthquakes, no HDPE pipe was 
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- Water was the number one restoration priority, wastewater was second. 
 
- Shallow pipe burial depths simplified immediate repair efforts (most consumers had 
water within 10 days, the last about 6 weeks). 
 
- Deep sewer pipes (9-10 feet) complicated repair.  Dewatering and shoring was 
required. 
 
- Christchurch utilised small water tankers to provide potable water in liquefied zones. 
When plans are being made for these tankers, consideration must be given to who will 
operate them, how they will obtain petrol and where / how the tankers will refill with 
potable water. 
 
- Water quality was managed through boil water alerts and mobile chlorination 
stations.  Boil water notices were removed after 14 days. 
 
- Most immediate repairs were replacing “like for like”.  Where HDPE was used instead 
of “like for like”, less damage occurred.   
 
Advice and Recommendations 
 
- The report recommends the adoption of performance goals. Goals may include the 
seismic performance of upgraded assets, how long is acceptable for customers to be 
without water after an earthquake as well as measures around mitigation and 
preparedness. This would provide a “yardstick” as to what constitutes acceptable 
water system performance.  Targets should be discussed with all involved parties.  
 
- The following two recommendations are amongst a group addressed to the US Water 
Research Foundation: 
 
 A cost-effective pipe replacement strategy should be developed that factors in 
on-going aging pipeline replacement as well as earthquakes. A seismic design 
guideline for water pipes (ALA 2005) is currently available, but it addresses 
only seismic issues. This guideline, supplemented with attention to pipe 
aging/corrosion and on-going lessons learned, should be updated.   
 
 A review of the various post-earthquake restoration targets and strategies, 
addressing forecast benefits, and actual costs, would be useful to utilities to 
help them select their own strategies. 
 
- The report also notes that: 
 
 Seismic upgrades are more likely to be cost effective if the hazard occurs on a 
regular basis.    
 
 Non-gravity sewer systems should be considered as an option.  
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 Emergency response plans should have provisions for major increase in work 
crews after an earthquake. These can be from either outside contractors and/or 
mutual aid. For practical purposes, the work crews should not increase by more 
than 100 per cent unless the utility has the ability to manage a much larger 
workforce. 
 
 Backup power generators with sufficient fuel supplies for critical well supplies 
will reduce the need for electric power restoration.  
 
 Emergency response plans need to be developed to reflect the likely 
vulnerabilities of the water agency, and the needs of the local community. A 
balance of emergency response and pre-earthquake mitigation will need to be 
considered. 
 
 Fire spread was not a problem and existing fire prediction models may need to 
be updated.  This will affect the strategy for water supply design / resilience 
levels. 
 
Detailed recommendations are made in the paper for pipe renewal, water tank design 
and water well design.  Extracts from the relevant sections follow (see the full report for 
further information):   
 
Seismic Design for Pipes 
 
Distribution pipes. Pipes (diameter 12 inch and smaller) that have leaked and been 
repaired more than 2 times (3 times in residential areas) over the past 7 years, per 1 
km length, deserve replacement in the next 5 to 10 years. The replaced pipe, if located 
in soils that are prone to liquefaction, should be designed to accommodate up to 150 
mm of movement; plus all other requirements, with suitable corrosion protection. The 
replaced pipe, if located in soils not prone to permanent ground deformations, does not 
need any special seismic design – important exception:  the author recommends that 
pipes supplying essential facilities such as hospitals and evacuation centres be able to 
be isolated from other areas where damages may be sustained.   
 
Transmission pipes. Pipes (diameter 30 inch and larger) that have leaked and been 
repaired more than 2 times over the past 7 years, per 1 km length, and are in soils 
prone to liquefaction, landslide or faulting, deserve replacement in the next 5 years. 
The replaced pipe, if located in soils that are prone to liquefaction, landslide or surface 
faulting, should be designed to accommodate the expected permanent ground 
deformations associated with earthquakes that occur once every 1,000 to 2,500 years 
or so; plus all other requirements, with suitable corrosion protection. The replaced 
pipe, if located in soils not prone to permanent ground deformations, still requires 
proper design of any slip joints in order to accommodate seismic ground shaking 
effects; or avoid the use of slip joints. 
 
Storage Tank Sites 
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For sites exposed to permanent ground deformation in the design basis earthquake, 
the following is recommended: 
 
 Avoid using the site. If this is not feasible, then consider the following mitigation 
measures: 
 
 All attached pipes must be able to absorb the estimated ground settlements or 
lateral spreads. A variety of flexible pipe hardware can be used, which will be 
most effective if the pipe is above ground (or in an underground vault) to allow 
the pipe to move without soil resistance. 
 
 Steel tanks might be able to take as much as a few inches of ground 
settlements, without rupture of the tank. 
 
 Concrete tanks (pre-stressed or reinforced) appear to be more fragile than steel 
tanks, and ground settlements of 2 to 3 inches appear to be enough to crack 
the tank. 
 
For new tank installations in high seismic zones, we recommend site-specific 
subsurface investigations to establish the potential for permanent ground movements. 
If the site is thought to have potential movements, use steel tanks (not concrete tanks) 
unless the hazard is mitigated. If the tank site requires pile foundations (for example, a 
site atop young bay muds, etc.), then the pile-pile cap detail must be designed to 
accommodate the design basis earthquake, inclusive of soil-structure interaction 
effects, with ductility demands low enough to assure no leakage in the tank. 
 
Avoid placing tanks at sites prone to surface fault offset from normal or reverse faulting 
movements, as it will be hard to design for these movements. 
 
If other mitigation schemes are impractical or not cost-effective, and if a suitable water 
drainage system is included to avoid life-threatening inundation impacts to nearby 
residents, and if the tank is sacrificial (not needed) post-earthquake, then a tank can 




Where possible wells should be situated outside of zones subject to seismically 
induced permanent ground deformation. These can include areas prone to 
liquefaction, landsides or fault crossing etc. 
 
For wells located in zones prone to liquefaction, a prudent design approach would be 
to design the casing pipe (top 40 feet) to be able to resist all imposed loads due to 
liquefaction. The geotechnical parameters needed for this type of design can be 
adopted from ALA (2005), but specific geotechnical site investigations are 
recommended. If the well casing can survive the effects of liquefaction (including 
seismically induced settlements), and if the attached discharge pipes are provided with 
suitable flexible connections, most such wells should remain functional once power is 
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restored. Backup power generators with sufficient fuel supplies for critical well supplies 
will eliminate the need for electric power restoration. 
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3.18 Liquefaction impacts in Residential Areas in the 2010-2011 Christchurch 
Earthquakes 
 
Misko Cubrinovski, Duncan Henderson and Brendon Bradley, University of Canterbury, 
New Zealand 
 
Natural Hazard Research Platform, New Zealand 
Paper, 2012 
 
(Cubrinovski, Henderson, & Bradley, Liquefaction Impacts in Residential Areas in the 
2010-2011 Christchurch Earthquakes, 2012) 
 
 
- Typical damage to the wastewater network included loss of grade in gravity pipes, 
breakage of pipes/joints and infiltration of liquefied silt into pipes (often accompanied 
by depression of carriageways, undulation of road surface and relative movement of 
manholes), and failure of joints and connections (particularly numerous failures of 
laterals). 
 
- The potable water system was proven to be much more resilient than the wastewater 
network.   
 
- Preliminary GIS analyses using the pipe network damage data and liquefaction 
observation maps show a clear link between the damage to the pipe network and 
liquefaction severity. 
 
- The GIS analyses also revealed that PE pipes and PVC pipes suffered significantly 
less damage (three to five times less on average) than AC, steel, GI and other material 
pipes. 
 
- There is a clear link between the severity of liquefaction and observed damage to the 
potable water network with nearly 80% of the damaged pipes being in liquefied areas, 
and 50% in areas of moderate to severe liquefaction. 
 
- The Christchurch experience clearly shows that special considerations should be 
given to an improved design of the waste water system, which is more vulnerable to 
liquefaction and more difficult to recover/repair due its large depth of embedment. 
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4 Transportation 
4.1 NZTA Highways - Christchurch Earthquakes 
 
Barry Stratton, New Zealand Transport Agency 






- The primary source of damage to bridges in Christchurch was liquefaction induced 
subsidence and lateral spreading.   
 
- Seismic retrofit undertaken prevented more critical damage.  Seventeen bridges had 
been retrofitted at a cost of $2 million.   
 
- NZTA’s previous bridge screening program assisted in identifying which inspections 
were a priority. Key bridges inspected within 5 hours.  Forty-five bridges were 
inspected over 6 days.  
 
- Unstable rock on Port Hills affected transport routes.  Netting deployed from 
helicopters was useful in securing unstable rocks above critical roads. Where site 
access was possible, fences were used to capture falling rocks.  Shipping containers 
were also used.   
 
- Reliable communication was vitally important to the recovery operations. 
 
- Current design standards for structures seem to be appropriate and there are no 
current plans to deviate from these standards as a result of the Christchurch 
earthquakes. 
 
- There needs to be a coordinated approach when reinstating utilities as roading often 
forms the top layer.  
 
- After an earthquake traffic patterns may change.  Constant monitoring is required to 
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4.2 Performance of Highway Structures during the Darfield and Christchurch 
Earthquakes of 4 September 2010 and 22 February 2011 
 
Report by Opus to the New Zealand Transport Agency, February 2012 
 
(Wood, Chapman, & Brabharharan, 2010) 
 
 
- The authors were asked by the New Zealand Transport Agency to visit bridges in the 
area affected by the earthquakes to identify how the bridges had been impacted.  
Twenty-seven bridges were inspected, and simple static analyses were carried out.   
Statistic analyses were carried out to assess the strength and performance of the 
critical components of each of the bridges.  The report contains considerable, bridge-
specific, performance information.    
 
- Liquefaction and lateral spreading were the principal causes of damage to bridges.  
Bridges with abutments in liquefaction prone soils and with slender piles were 
particularly vulnerable. 
 
- Soil/structure interaction is likely to have dissipated energy. 
 
- It seems certain that the retrofitted Chaneys Road, Port Hills Road and Hortane 
Valley Overpass bridges benefitted from the linkage bars and shear keys that were 
installed between 2003 and 2004.   
 
- There are no indications that current design standards need to be revised except for 
reinforcing the importance of considering liquefaction and lateral spreading.   
 
- Quality detailing and maintenance are critical to bridge performance. 
 
- Consideration needs to be given to providing robust inter-span linkages on some 
bridges.  
 
- Detailed monitoring and investigation into the bridges to detect existing and on-going 
damage would be beneficial. 
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4.3 February 22nd 2011 Earthquake State Highway Bridges Preliminary 
Condition Report, Regions 11&12 – Christchurch 
 
Report by Opus to the New Zealand Transport Agency 
 
(Opus New Zealand) 
 
 
- Contractors commenced drive-over inspections of the State Highway network (in 
accordance with pre-arranged contingency plan) immediately after the earthquake.   
 
- Most of the damage was along SH 74.   
 
- Cell phone reception intermittent immediately – most of the information was 
conveyed via radio. 
 
Three bridges were identified for closure or restricted use:   
 
Anzac Drive Bridge  
- The bridge sustained considerable damage. There was significant rotation of the 
abutments and minor rotation of the piers due to the lateral spreading of the 
approaches. Capping / spalling of the pier capping beams and pier columns was also 
observed. 
 
Horotane Valley Overpasses 
- Differential settlement of the twin structures that form the substructure. Both 
structures are supported by pad-footings. 
 
SH73 Heathcote River (Opawa) Bridge  
- The extent of damage not clear in this preliminary review.  Speed restriction and 
monitoring recommended.   
 
- Bridges were also identified for further investigation and analysis: 
 
 SH1S - Chaneys Road Overpass: Liquefaction could result in possible 
displacement and tilting of the piers. 
 
 SH74 - Styx Railway Overbridge No. 1:  Shear failure of pier columns. 
 
 SH74 - Heathcote River Bridge:  Pier column base plastic hinging/shear failure 
 
 SH74 - Railway Overbridge:  Pier base and top plastic hinging/shear failure 
 
 SH74 - Port Hills Road Underpass 1 & 2:  Pier base/footing plastic 
hinging/shear failure.  Excavation to top of selected pier bases will be required.   
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 SH74 - Horotane Valley Overpass 1 & 2:  Pier base/footing plastic 
hinging/shear failure.  Excavation to top of selected pier bases will be required.   
 
 SH74 - Tunnel Admin Bridge.  Unseating of spans/shear failure of pier 
columns.   
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4.4 Performance of Bridges during the 2010 Darfield Earthquake 
 
L. M. Wotherspoon and L.S.Hogan, University of Auckland, New Zealand 
A.Palermo, University of Canterbury, New Zealand 
M. Le Heux, Rose School, Pavia, Italy 
M. Brunea and, M. Anagnostopoulou, University of Buffalo, United States 
 
Bridge Maintenance, Safety Management, Resilience and Sustainability, Biondini & 
Frangopol, 2012 
 
(Wotherspoon, Palermo, Heux, Brunea, & Anagnostopoulou, 2012) 
 
 
- “Highway bridges generally performed well, with only one case of closure for more than 
a day where the approach subsided and cracked” 
 
- Pedestrian bridges suffered higher rates of severe structural damage due to their lower 
design requirements. The lateral spreading that was induced close to riverbanks resulted 
in many of the damage resulting in replacement rather than repairs. 
 
- Bridges near the epicentre suffered no damage at locations where no liquefaction was 
observed. 
 
- The majority of damage took place near the coast where the water table is higher and 
the soil is more susceptible to liquefaction. All of the pedestrian bridges that were 
damaged were in this area. 
 
- A short unreinforced masonry bridge failed due to large longitudinal compression force 
from the spreading of the river banks. As it was unable to resist the pressures from the 
riverbanks, the arch failed in a three hinge mechanism. 
 
- Both approaches to the Bridge St Bridge located in South Brighton, a three span 
superstructure constructed from precast concrete I-beams, with elastomeric bearing and 
single column bents with hammerhead bent caps, suffered from severe lateral spreading 
forcing the bottom of the abutment to back-rotate 5 degrees towards the midstream. 
Despite this, much of the rotation was accommodated by the elastomeric bearing pad, 
which deformed to a stream of approximately 30%, resulting in very little rotation to the 
superstructure and very minor damage (only damage was at the south end expansion 
joint). The pier columns did also exhibit flexural cracking just below the low tide mark, 
which do not indicate any severe damage but not provide an opportunity for erosion 
during high tide.  
 
- It would appear NZTA retrofit programme since Risks and Realities has been very 
successful. One of the first steps was to install inter-span linkages and shear keys to 
prevent unseating. These brackets worked well on the Port Hills overpass on SH 74 and 
Horotane Valley overpass, 150m from the Port Hills Bridge. 
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- One of the key Christchurch lifeline bridges on Ferrymead Road was expected to suffer 
from liquefaction and lateral spreading after September, but the new retrofitted 
abutments accommodated the lateral spreading and the bridge performed well. 
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4.5 Overview of Bridge Performance during the 2011 Christchurch 
Earthquake 
 
A. Palermo and A. Kivell, University of Canterbury 
L. Wotherspoon and L. Hogan, University of Auckland 
M. Yashinsky, CALTRANS, Earthquake Engineering Office, Sacramento, US 
M. Bruneau, University of Buffalo, Buffalo, US 
E. Camnasio, Politecnico di Milano, Milan, Italy 
 
Bridge Maintenance, Safety, Resilience and Sustainability, Biondini & Fragopol 
Paper, 2012 
 
(Palermo, et al., 2012) 
 
 
- Monolithic construction and axial strength of older designed bridges meant that they 
were able to resist axial demands placed on them. 
 
Antigua Street footbridge:   
- Cross bracing members on the Antigua Street footbridge failed due to the hogging 
used.   
 
- The shear failure of the concrete wingwalls caused the supports to the timber 
footbridge beams to fail. These supports had very little anchorage into the concrete 
wingwalls and would not have required much momentum to fail. 
 
Bridge of Remembrance:  
- Damage was due to settlement of the approach fill, lateral spreading soil pressures 
resulting in deflection and rotation of the wingwalls and possibly the abutments. 
 
Moorhouse Overbridge:  
- Insertion of steel rod linkages in the deck at the expansion joint at only one side of 
the bridge reduced irregularity in the structures transverse response. 
 
- This structure also had widely space transverse reinforcement, making it susceptible 
to shear failure. 
 
Ferrymead Bridge:  
- The bridge sustained damage due to lateral spreading. 
 
Bridge Street Bridge:  
- The flow of soil (from liquefaction) against the wingwall, abutment and through the 
piles resulted in abutment back-rotation due to the restraint provided at the top of the 
abutments by the superstructure. 
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- The crack patterns observed on the piles indicate that the piles subjected to bi-
directional bending during the earthquake due to the rotation of the abutments and the 
transverse translation. 
 
Gayhurst Bridge:  
- Lateral spreading exerted a lateral force on the pier base, causing a large moment at 
the stiff pier deck interface, inducing cracking of the pier.  
 
Pages Road Bridge:  





- Few state highway bridges were severely damaged during either the Darfield or 
Christchurch events. This is because of the recent seismic retrofit programme which 
aimed to reduce the seismic risk.  Of the more successful of these was the installation 
of tie-rods and steel brackets acting as the transverse shear key between pier to deck 
and deck to abutments.  
 
- Integral cast in place bridge method appeared to work well on both the Port Hills 
Overbridge and the Horotane Overbridge. 
 
- On these bridges 60% of the bolts that attached the soffit of the precast concrete 
beams to the abutment shear extension had sheared off. If these pans had not been 
tied together and the seats not extended it is quite likely the spans would have 
collapsed. 
 
- Pipes were damaged due to different settlements between the bridges and the 
surrounding soil. This indicated the pipe connections were not appropriately designed 
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4.6 Lateral Spreading Interaction with Bridges during the Canterbury 
Earthquakes 
 
E. Camnasio, Politecnico di Milano, Milan, Italy 
M. Le Heux, Rose School of Pavia, Italy 
A. Palermo, University of Canterbury, New Zealand 
L. Wotherspoon, University of Auckland, New Zealand 
 
Bridge Maintenance, Safety, Management, Resilience and Sustainability – Biondini & 
Frangopol, 2012 
 
(Camnasio, Heux, Palermo, & Wotherspoon, 2012) 
 
 
- Liquefaction was most severe in residential areas located to the east of the CBD 
as a result of the stronger ground shaking due to the proximity to the causative 
fault. 
 
- The significant liquefaction observed in the Eastern suburbs of the city and the 
absence in the West can be attributed to three factors: 
 
I. A reduction in the amplitude of ground shaking moving from east to west 
 
II. A gradual change in surficial soil characteristics 
 
III. An increase in water table depth 
 
- Most of the bridge damage (majority are reinforced concrete, symmetric, small to 
moderate spans) was located in the central and eastern parts of the city, where 
ground shaking was the strongest and soil conditions weakest. 
 
- In most cases the bridge decks restrained the movement of the top of the 
abutment, resulting in their back rotation 
 
- Of the 14 bridges along the Heathcote river only one had major damage. This 
lack of damage is inferred as a result of soils in this region having larger resistance 
to liquefaction and lateral spreading than those in the vicinity of the Avon River. 
 
- Stop banks are typically comprised of gravel and silt. The majority of the damage 
to stop banks during the Christchurch earthquake was a consequence of 
liquefaction in the foundation soils that resulted in lateral spreading, slumping, 
and/or settlement. 
 
- Transverse and Longitudinal cracks were observed in the stop banks. Transverse 
cracks pose the biggest risk and these were often associated with sharp bends in 
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the stopbank and / or slumping of the embankments.Settlement of stop bank 
sections resulted from both post-liquefaction consolidation in the foundation soils 
and bearing capacity failures due to the reduced strength of the liquefied 
foundation soil. 
 
- Potable water: 4.6 % of the pipes (pipe segments) were damaged, or about 78 
km out of 1676 km total pipe length. About 80% of the damaged pipes were in 
areas that manifested either moderate-to-severe or low-to-moderate liquefaction. 
 
- Similar observations (to those stated above) were seen in the sub-mains system 
which is dominated by polyethylene (PE) pipes. 
 
- The Wastewater system was hit hard in areas with severe liquefaction and lateral 
spreading. Of the 1766 km long waste water network, 142 km (8%) were out of 
service; and 542 km (31%) with limited service on 16 March 2011 
 
- Loss of grade, joint failures, cracks in pipes and failure of laterals were the most 
commonly observed types of failures in the wastewater system. Loss of critical 
facilities such as pump stations also contributed to the overall poor performance of 
the system. 
 
- Buoyancy of concrete vaults at potable water and wastewater pump stations, 
compounded by liquefaction-induced settlement, caused pipeline breaks at their 
connections with the vaults. 
 
- Silt and sand from liquefaction washed into the Bromley sewage treatment plant 
from broken wastewater pipelines, causing damage in the primary settling tanks. 
Nearly all facilities at the Bromley sewerage treatment plant were affected by 
liquefaction, which caused differential settlement of the clarifiers, impairing 
secondary treatment capabilities.  
 
- For both potable water and waste water (pipes of concrete, ceramic, cast iron and 
plastic - PVC and PE) systems, the most severe damage was inflicted by lateral 
spreading. 
 
- Serious damage to the underground electric power system, with failure of all 
major 66 kV underground cables supplying the Dallington and Brighton areas 
caused by liquefaction-induced ground movements. Over 50% of all 66 kV cables 
suffered damage at multiple locations. 
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4.7 Seismic Performance of Concrete Bridges during Canterbury 
Earthquakes 
 
A. Palermo, University of Canterbury, New Zealand 
L. Wotherspoon and L. Hogan, University of Auckland, New Zealand 
E. Camnasio, Politecnico di Milano, Milan, Italy 
M. Le Heux, Rose School of Pavia, Italy  
 
Structural Concrete, April 2011 
 
(Palermo, Wotherspoon, Hogan, Heux, & Camnasio, 2011) 
 
 
- Large demands on pile foundations of bridges 
 
- Settlement and lateral spreading of approaches caused serviceability and operation 
issues. 
 
- Monolithic structures are stiff and sturdy and performed well. 
 
- No significant damage at retrofitted bridges where tie rods and steel brackets acting 
as the transverse shear keys at the pier–deck and deck–abutment junctions 
respectively had been installed. 
 
- Pipe connections were not appropriately designed to accommodate deck-to-pipe, or 
abutment-to-pipe relative displacements. 
 
- The main issues arose with stiff pipes, such as sewage and water pipes, as they are 
fully fixed to the deck and usually run through the abutments. On the other hand, the 
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4.8 Preliminary Findings on Performance of Bridges in the 2010 Darfield 
Earthquake 
 
Alessandro Palermo, University of Canterbury, New Zealand 
Michel Le Heux, Rose School, Italy 
Michel Bruneau and Myrto Anagnostopoulou, University of Buffalo, United States 
Liam Wotherspoon and Lucas Hogan, University of Auckland, New Zealand 
 
 
Bulletin of New Zealand Society for Earthquake Engineering, Vol 43, No.4 
December 2010 
 
(Palermo, Heux, Bruneau, Anagnostopoulou, Wotherspoon, & Hogan, 2010) 
 
 
- Bridges had good overall performance because: 
 
 They are small to moderate spans; such spans are recognised to generally 
exhibit a more sturdy seismic response, due largely to their symmetry and 
limited reactive mass. 
 
 Bridges were generally designed to resist forces substantially larger than the 
demands imparted by this particular earthquake. 
 
- Pedestrian bridges were affected because they could not resist the high demands 
induced by lateral spreading of the riverbanks due to soil liquefaction.  
 
- Fourteen of the fifteen bridges that were damaged were in liquefaction affected 
areas. There is a strong correlation between these two factors. 
 
- Lateral spreading is the primary action on bridges leading to damage. 
 
- Bearing damage: a different damage type was the deformation of rubber isolation 
bearing pads due to large lateral movement between the deck and the abutment/pier, 
e.g. South Brighton Bridge. 
 
- External piers on the flood zone suffered more cracks than those in the current 
normal river flow. This is caused by the river scouring increasing the height and 
therefore reducing the stiffness of the central piers, inducing more load on the shorter 
and stiffer external piers. 
 
- The current design of abutments reduced failure significantly. Those that failed were 
due to being created under the old design codes. In lateral spreading banks abutments 
are to be made with a shallow beam with a small number of deep piles. Those that 
failed had deep abutments or closely spaced abutment piles. 
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- Many new bridges are built with tie-rods between the deck and the abutment. In two 
cases these failed significantly. The first was due to the tension activated response on 
the bridge that caused the coupling beam to experience significant concrete spalling. 
In this case the tie rods were fully activated. In the second instance the tie rods were 
activated by the longitudinal push action of the soil. This caused a five degree rotation 
of the abutment and a gap to form between the tie-rod bearing plate and the coupling 
beam. 
 
- Seven out of eight road bridges were closed due to damage. This was due to lateral 
spreading which caused the slope to move across and downwards towards the river. 
 
- In some cases the bridge approach spans partially or totally failed. There were 
examples where the liquefaction of the site surrounding the bridge settled by a few 
inches.  
 
- Global lateral torsional buckling, plastic hinging at mid-span, longitudinal rocking of 
towers (and consequential opening-up of existing hinges that consisted of in-contact 
horizontal wood splices) and plastic hinging near abutments all occurred on pedestrian 
bridges because of lateral spreading. The horizontal inward movement of riverbanks 
induced an additional and unexpected longitudinal compressive force through the 
super-structure, resulting in the above events. 
 
- Pedestrian bridges that were near collapse did not have any form of lateral isolation 
between the superstructure and the abutments / piers, resulting in major damage 
between these and the bridge deck.  
 
- Significant lateral spreading occurred on two pedestrian bridges damaging the 
abutments. Of all the pedestrian bridges these were the only two with a concrete main 
superstructure element.  
 
- Porritt Park pedestrian bridge experienced large rotation and translation on the south 
abutment. This abutment sits on six small piles and it is likely that these piles did not 
extend very deep. As such, they provided minimal lateral stiffness to the system and 
exacerbated the problem through increasing the surface area the soil wedge interacted 
with - making the problem worse.  
 
- When the riverbanks suffered from lateral spreading the bridge structure itself acted 
as a prop across the river. This compressive strut in effect provided resistance to these 
lateral spreading and altered the soil cracking pattern. In some cases the longitudinal 
compressive force transferring through the bridge was greater than the axial capacity 
of the deck or other structural components and lead to failure of the bridge structures. 
 
- The effect of the above on the soil was that the spreading of the slope around the 
abutment lead to soil gapping from differential movement, passive soil wedge failure, 
and large cracks forming on the approach running parallel to the longitudinal bridge 
axis.  
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- No bridge that was retrofitted under the Transfund NZ seismic retrofitting program 
was structurally damaged.  
 
- Retrofitting was carried out on the Dallington pedestrian bridge by Orion as it carried 
a cable across the Avon River. Raked wing piles were placed on the abutment and 
driven down into the stronger soil. Retrofitting was also carried out on the approach to 
the bridge to reduce the level of deformation that the 66kV cables would be placed 
under during an earthquake. 
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4.9 Lessons learnt from 2011 Christchurch Earthquakes: Analysis and 
Assessment of Bridges 
 
Alessandro Palermo, Allan Scott, Anton Kivell, University of Canterbury, New Zealand 
Liam Wotherspoon, Lucas Hogan, Nawawi Chouw, University of Auckland, New 
Zealand 
John Wood, John Wood Consulting, New Zealand 
Howard Chapman, New Zealand Transport Agency, New Zealand 
Elena Camnasio, Technical University of Milan, Italy 
Mark Yashinsky, CALTRANS, United States 
Michael Bruneau, University of Buffalo, United States 
 
Bulletin of the New Zealand Society for Earthquake Engineering 
December 2011 
 
(Palermo, et al., 2011) 
 
 
- Pipelines crossing bridges were damaged predominantly where there was soil-bridge 
interaction in areas of lateral spreading.  Pipe connections were not appropriately 
designed to accommodate deck-to-pipe, or abutment-to-pipe relative displacements.  
Design guidelines for abutment/pile liquefaction/lateral spreading should be more 
widely implemented in order to reduce this type of damage. 
 
- Several pipes were damaged due to a differential settlement between the bridge and 
the surrounding soil. 
 
- The monolithic construction and axial strength of bridges meant older designs were 
able to resist the axial demands placed on the structure due to lateral spreading, even 
though they were not specifically designed for these loads. 
 
- Even modest structures (like the Dallington pedestrian bridge) can have strategic 
importance if they carry lifeline utility services, therefore consideration must be given to 
the priority of these structures and how they may be designed appropriately.  
 
- There was extensive damage to services at bridge abutments where stiff service 
assets existed (e.g. like wastewater pipes).  Flexible services like telecommunications 
were less susceptible (but still sustained damage in some cases). 
 
- Broken pipelines at bridges caused secondary damage (e.g. discharging raw sewage 
into waterways). 
 
- Bridge damage caused significant traffic disruption; therefore emergency 
management plans must include contingencies for these scenarios. 
 
- Previous works to seismically strengthen bridges had been largely successful.  
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- The seismic strengthening work that started in 2000 was effective in reducing the 
scale of the damage. At the time of the earthquakes strengthening had been 
completed on seven bridges. 
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4.10 Performance of Bridges in Liquefied Deposits during the 2010-2011 
Christchurch (New Zealand) Earthquakes 
 
Misko Cubrinovski, Anna Winkley and Kelly Robinson, University of Canterbury, New 
Zealand 
Liam Wotherspoon, University of Auckland, New Zealand 
Jennifer Haskell, University of Cambridge, United Kingdom 
 
ASCE Journal of Performance of Constructed Facilities, Special Issue 2013 
 
(Cubrinovski, Haskell, Winkley, Robinson, & Wotherspoon, 2013) 
 
 
- Short span bridges on pile foundations have very stiff superstructure (deck) which 
led to a characteristic deformation mechanism for all bridges involving lateral 
spreading - deck pinning - abutment back rotation with consequent damage to the 
abutment piles and slumping of the approaches.  
 
- Despite experiencing higher ground force acceleration and being closer to the fault 
than many other bridges which sustained significant damage during the February 
earthquake, bridges along the Heathcote River sustained less damage in comparison.  
This may be for two reasons. First the lateral spreading displacements along the 
Heathcote River were smaller than other rivers and secondly the bridges on the 
Heathcote River have shorter spans/lengths.  
 
South Brighton Bridge  
 
- The South Brighton Bridge is a three span design, constructed from reinforced 
concrete. The superstructure consists of cast in situ reinforced concrete deck on 
precast “I” beams. The bridge is supported through elastomeric bearing on two 
octagonal ‘hammerhead’ RC piers and seat-type RC abutments. The bridge sits on 44 
precast concrete piles, ten beneath each abutment and twelve beneath each pier. The 
bridge is situated in the wetlands area where thickness of recent soil is around 40m. 
Each approach sits on uncontrolled fill material. The bridge has been built on a 25 
degree skew to the river bank. 
 
- Substantial lateral spreading was experienced at the site during both September and 
February earthquakes. Large ground distortion and slumping was evident at both of 
the bridges approaches, with large vertical offset between the pile supported deck and 
embankment approaches. In conjunction with the stiffness of the superstructure, the 
skewed design of the bridge constrained the movement of the approaches resulting in 
permanent horizontal of the approaches in opposite directions and lateral offsetting 
between the deck and approaches of approximately 20cm. The significant offsets 
between the approaches and bridge deck caused the water main pipes running 
beneath the deck to rupture.  
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- The damage observed at the South Brighton Bridge was typical for all other bridges 
that were affected by lateral spreading. The rigid beam deck superstructure practically 
prevented any displacement in the longitudinal direction of the bridge which resulted 
in deck-pinning and consequent back-rotation of the abutments about the beam-
abutment point of collision, because the foundation piles could not resist the 
spreading movement of the foundation soils towards the river.  
 
- The back-rotation motion of abutments on the South Brighton Bridge caused 
damage to the top of the abutment piles and as a result these piles have been 
laterally displaced towards the river. The displacement of these piles in conjunction 
with the rotation constraints imposed by the rigid pile-abutment connection caused the 
bending of the piles which resulted in tensile cracks on the river side and the concrete 
crushing / spalling on the land side of the piles. 
 
- As there was no serious damage to the South Brighton Bridge superstructure (aside 
from some dislocated bearings), temporary repairs were able to be made to the 
approaches offsets between the deck and approaches were able to be refilled and the 




- The Anzac Bridge is a 48 meter three span bridge with a roundabout located at the 
northern approach. The superstructure is a precast concrete hollow-core (double) 
deck with precast concrete beams and is supported by situ concrete piers and 
abutments. The piers sit on reinforced concrete piles, 1.5m diameter and 20m long 
with 8 mm permanent steel casing. Each abutment is supported by 16 “H” piles with 
1.5m spacing. The soil at the south end is about 2m sandy soil, uniform fine to 
medium dense sand up to 12m and slightly coarser / denser sand thereafter.  
 
- Massive liquefaction ejecta and substantial lateral spreading was evident in the area 
of the Anzac Bridge during the February earthquake. Complex lateral spreading was 
observed at the roundabout on the northern approach. 
 
- The substantial lateral spreading at the site caused deck-pinning and back-rotation 
of the abutments on the Anzac Bridge. The effect had permanent lateral displacement 
of three elements: 
 
1. Lateral displacement at the bottom of the abutment (top of the H-piles) due to 
the back-rotation of the abutment. 
 
2. Lateral offset of the precast concrete underpass 
 
3. Lateral offset of the surrounding soil at the interface between the paved track 
and reinforced concrete underpass. 
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- The pedestrian underpass at the Anzac Bridge site is built on independent 1.2 m in 
diameter reinforced 6 meter piles. Due to their limited length the piles “practically 
floated in the liquefied soil”. 
 
- The spreading-induced damage at the Anzac bridge caused a large offset between 
the deck and the approaches (infill was completed in the repairs). The compression 
deformation of the pavement at the approach / deck interface was also spreading 
induced, resulting in the back-rotation of the abutments. There was visible cracking of 
the interior beam-pier connection and concrete spalling due to excessive compression 
on the exterior beam-pier connection. Despite the damage the bridge remained in 
service after each earthquake and was a vital link (including being used by heavy 
vehicles). 
 
Dallington (Gayhurst) Bridge 
 
- This bridge has a continuous reinforced concrete deck, reinforced concrete piers and 
reinforced concrete abutment walls with wing walls. The bridge is 26.8 meters long 
with three spans without any expansion joints. The piers and abutments are supported 
on reinforced 350 mm x 10.4m piles. Seven piles at 4D spacing are used beneath the 
piers, while six piles at 6D spacing support each abutment. The north approach has 
2.5m of brown sandy silt and silt with peat, a grey fine sand reaches up to a depth of 
15m, sandy silt is found between 15 and 20 meters, and from then onwards is fine 
sand. The bearing stratum for the piles is in the underlying dense sand between 13 
and 16 meters deep. 
 
- The north approach to the Dallington Bridge shows substantial damage, as that side 
of the river experienced much higher lateral spreading displacement (between 0.6 and 
0.75m). The large settlement and slumping of the northern approach resulted in 
subsidence reaching about 1 meter. Conversely the southern approach showed 
neither significant damage nor vertical offset at the bridges interface where spreading 
displacement of the cut bank was less than 5cm. 
 
- The stiff deck of the Dallington Bridge resisted the spreading of the banks resulting 
in back-rotation of the abutment walls. An effect of the lateral movement of the 
abutment wall towards the river was the buckling of the water pipes running beneath 
the deck. 
 
- Much higher penetration resistance at 13-16 meters deep was measured at the 
south side of the bridge, which is consistent with the observed absence of any 
significant land damage or signs of lateral spreading at the south approach of the 
bridge. 
 
Summary and Conclusion 
 
- Except for a relatively thin crust (1-2m thickness) the foundation soils at the three 
bridge sites completely liquefied up to 8-9 m or even 12 m. The liquefaction was 
accompanied with substantial lateral spreading that resulted in permanent horizontal 
displacements of the unconstrained river banks. The bridges experienced extreme 
seismic activity including substantial liquefaction in the foundations soils accompanied 
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by very large kinematic loads due to spreading and inertial loads due to strong ground 
shaking. 
 
- The key factor in the development of the characteristic deformation mechanism of 
the bridges was the stiff and strong superstructure in the longitudinal direction.  
 
- Pronounced slumping of the approaches occurred due to liquefaction in the 
underlying soil that resulted in large settlement and vertical offsets between the 
approaches and the pile-supported deck of the bridge. 
 
- There was limited, but no serious damage to the bridge superstructures. After 
temporary repair and infill at the approaches, all three bridges were back in service 
and operational immediately after every earthquake event. Overall, the performance 
of more recently constructed bridges allowing movement of the superstructure relative 
to the piers/abutments and older integral (jointless) bridges was similar. The same 
deformation pattern developed for both types of bridges though the differences in the 
kinematic constraints were reflected in the amount of permanent tilt of the abutments 
and consequent superstructure damage. The skew in the bridge geometry also 
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4.11 Forced Vibration Testing of Bridge Damaged in the 2010 Darfield 
Earthquake 
 
L.S. Hogan, L.M. Wotherspoon, S. Beskhyroun, J.M. Ingam, University of Auckland, 
New Zealand 
 
Bridge Maintenance, Safety, Management, Resilience and Sustainability – Biondini & 
Frangopol, 2012 
 
(Hogan, Wotherspoon, Beskhyroun, & Ingham, 2012) 
 
 
Davis Road Bridge: A single span bridge consisting of six double hollow core precast 
concrete beams with six square precast concrete piles and a 2.0 meter long friction 
slab at each abutment. 
 
- During the earthquake, lateral spreading caused the western approach to the Davis 
Road Bridge to subside approximately 0.5 m. The subsidence of the approach 
effectively removed the stiffness provided by the abutment and provided a unique 
opportunity to directly measure the influence of this resistance on the system. 
 
- The span was subjected to shaking along both axes from a large eccentric mass 
shaker and a benchmark system identification was made of the bridge in the damaged 
state. Soil was then recompacted, and the road repaved. Once the approach was 
reinstated, another round of shaking was performed, and differences in mode shapes 
and natural periods were compared between the damaged and reinstated states. 
 
- Comparing mode shapes from the two different approach states, both exhibit similar 
responses. The mode shape of the bridge with both approaches intact is slightly more 
dominated by the translation response as can be seen by the larger modal amplitude a 
mid-span and the small difference in modal amplitude between the two abutments. 
The natural period of the bridge with both approaches intact is 4% lower than the 
bridge with approach soil removed.  
 
- The piles supporting the north-western abutment have a longer unsupported length 
due to lateral spreading and therefore exhibit a more flexible response. While this 
flexibility would be reduced with the addition of the approach soil due to the 
contribution of the friction slab, this additional stiffness was counteracted by the 
increase in gap depth due to shaking from the Christchurch earthquake. 
 
- Comparing mode shapes from both the bridge with and without the north-western 
approach, the modal response of the bridge with the approach fill is much more 
uniform. This is as a result of the passive resistance of the abutment and frictional 
resistance of friction slab providing the dominant stiffness contribution in this direction. 
 
- The change in transverse response was relatively small due to the increase in 
unsupported pile length during testing of the bridge with both approaches intact. This 
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increased pile length was due to further lateral spreading from the Christchurch 
earthquake and subsequent aftershocks which occurred between tests. 
 
- Overall the longitudinal response was altered by 15% between the approach free and 
both approaches intact states. Mode shapes were altered based upon the level of 
passive resistance engaged at the abutment. 
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4.12 Christchurch, New Zealand Earthquake Sequence of Mw 7.1 September 
04, 2010, Mw 6.3 February 22, 2011, Mw 6.0 June 13, 2011:  Lifeline 
Performance – Roads and Bridges 
 
Technical Council on Lifeline Earthquake Engineering (TCLEE). American Society of 
Civil Engineers, Monograph 40, February 2012 – Revision O (February 2012) 
 
John Eidinger and Alex Tang eds 
 
Chapter 11:  Roads and Bridges 
 
(Eidinger & Tang, 2012) 
 
 
- Many of the approximately 800 bridges in Christchurch were subject to ground 
shaking higher than design level in the February 2011 earthquake, but only a small 
number were significantly damaged.  
 
- Most damage to bridges occurred at the abutments due to liquefaction and lateral 
spreading.  Liquefaction significantly contributed to the damage observed by the 
majority of bridges that failed near rivers. 
 
- At almost all damaged bridges with pipes attached, the pipes were broken. 
 
- Liquefaction and other forms of ground deformation caused widespread damage to 
roads.   
 
- After the earthquake, traffic patterns on the city road and highway systems in the 
Christchurch and vicinity areas changed significantly with more congestion observed. 
 
- Tunnels serving Lyttleton suffered little damage.   
 
- Usage restrictions were imposed on some bridges and the road tunnel.   
 
- Temporary tie-back measures were used in at least one instance to arrest further 
lateral movement of bridge piles. 
 
Moorhouse Overbridge:  
 
- The columns have a hexagonal cross-section and are slightly tapered and flare at the 
top. The column has 1-1/8 in diameter smooth longitudinal rebars and smooth 5/8 in 
transverse ties at 12 in spacing. The Moorhouse Avenue Bridge suffered significant 
damage. The bridge has expansion joints at column bents 4 and 7 from the west 
abutment of the bridge. The presence of the expansion joint reduces the depth of the 
column cross-section to half of that in the other columns. Thus, the columns at the 
expansion joint locations have a significantly smaller stiffness as compared to the 
other columns of the bridge. During the February 2011 earthquake, the columns at the 
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expansion joint locations suffered significant damage of shear failure at the column 
base and buckling of the longitudinal rebar. Evidence of liquefaction failure of the 
foundation soil was observed at the bridge site. After the earthquake, temporary repair 
measure of bracing of the damaged column bents at the expansion joints taken. 
 
Boathouse Bridge:  
 
- This single span pedestrian bridge had damage to the abutments at both ends 
(severe shear cracks due to lateral spreading movement of the river bank). The 
approaching pavement buckled due to pounding movement of the bridge's deck 
superstructure. 
 
Fitzgerald Avenue Bridge:   
 
- A 2-span girder on wall pier bridge that had been retrofitted with steel seat width 
extender brackets at the abutments and wall piers suffered severe damage due to 
lateral spread movement of the river embankment soil. 
 
Port Hills Overbridge SH 74:   
 
- This 6-span slab voided single column  bent concrete bridge had been retrofitted with 
span tie-links and seat width extension brackets, lateral restrainers and short column 
collars to mitigate the short column effect for the columns next to the abutments.  The 
bridge suffered sustained flexural crack and spalling of concrete on the middle column 
as well as buckling of the longitudinal rebar at the base. 
 
Horotane Velly Road Overbridge SH 74:   
 
- This 3-span T-girder concrete bridge with retrofitted span tie-links and shear keys 
with seat width extension suffered from cracks at the abutments and many bolts of the 
seat width extension brackets were sheared off. 
 
 
The above is a sample.  The full Chapter includes comments on other Christchurch 
bridges.   
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4.13 Observed and Predicted Bridge Damage Following the Recent Canterbury 
Earthquakes: Toward the Calibration and Refinement of Damage and 
Loss Estimation Tools 
 
M. Brando, Politecnico di Milano, Milan, Italy 
S.L. Lin, S. Giovinazzi, A.Palermo, University of Canterbury, New Zealand 
 




(Brando, Lin, Giovinazii, & Palermo, 2012) 
 
 
- “In spite of the expected damage threshold level being much lower than the 
estimated bridge response accelerations of the earthquakes, only a few bridges 
suffered significant visible structural damage as a result of ground shaking.” 
 
- As a result of the damage sustained to bridges throughout Christchurch there was 
significant economic loss and social impacts which occurred as a result of temporary 
or medium term closures. Given the size of the event the performance of the bridges 
was satisfactory in terms of the magnitude of the damage sustained, but this must be 
weighed against the loss sustained in the community. This is where the use of tools 
such as earthquake loss estimation can be effectively used in the emergency response 
and planning.   
 
- As a result of lessons learnt from the Canterbury earthquakes, it is essential that the 
use of available ELE tools and platforms (such as RiskScape Platform in NZ and 
MAEviz in the US) become part of normal practice for mitigating and managing 
earthquake risk. 
 
- “The preliminary study of the loss assessment on Christchurch bridges using the 
22nd February 2011 Christchurch earthquake scenario, confirms the viability of 
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4.14 The Response of the NZ Transport Sector to the Canterbury Earthquakes 
 
Dave Brunsdon, National Engineering Lifelines Co-ordinator 
Presentation to TISN Transport Sector Group Forum 
November 2011 
 




The following are the main points and learnings from the presentation.   
 
- Transport Response Plan sets out national operational arrangements to aid the rapid, 
coordinated and effective response of transport to significant emergencies. The 
Transport Response Team, chaired by the Ministry of Transport, facilitates information 
flows and provides advice on response matters.   
 
- A good level of co-operation was noted within the petroleum industry.  It was helpful 
that fuel stocks were high in Lyttelton and Timaru.   
 
-  Interdependencies:  Telecommunications need electricity.  Many generators used, 
requiring continuous fuel supply.  Road access required for fuel delivery.   
 
- Many key facilities were within the CBD red zone which caused issues. These 
included the electricity distribution control room, Telecom’s main facility, broadcasting 
hub building and there were many rooftops where cell sites were located. 
 
- The port was significantly damaged but was able to continue operation. 
 
- The main highways were largely unaffected. However local roads were extensively 
damaged. 
 
Key Learnings:   
 
 Criticality of access and power: 
 
-  Fortunate that there was only limited disruption to regional access (this 
would not be the case for most other parts of NZ) 
 
-   Electricity transmission and distribution providers maintained supply to 
most areas 
 
 The importance of progressive mitigation programmes 
 
-   Network-wide planning for redundancy 
  
-   Specific asset restraint 
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  The importance of relationships and connectedness:  
 
- Regionally: through engineering lifelines groups and civil defence 
emergency management groups. 
 
-  Nationally: via the national engineering lifelines committee and the 
transport emergency management cluster, and government’s Domestic 
and External Security Coordination arrangements 
 
  The value of having a strong resilience culture within key organisations: 
 
-  Technical / Management: looking for mitigation and preparedness 
opportunities 
 
-   Governance: supporting resilience investments 
 
-   Balancing planned and adaptive capabilities 
 
 
Three Aspects of Infrastructure Resilience:   
 
 Robust physical assets with key network routes and facilities having 
appropriate redundancy. 
 
 Effective co-ordination arrangements (pre- and post-event); and 
 
 Realistic end-user expectations and appropriate measures of back-up 
arrangements. 
 
The Resilient Organisations Research Programme has identified crucial factors for 
both resilience and recovery. These are:  
 
 Integrative and alert situation awareness 
 
 Grounded and inspiring leadership 
 
 Structured and responsive decision making 
 
 Disciplined and innovative culture. 
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4.15 Christchurch Pavement Resilience Investigation 
 
Bryan Pidwerbesky and Jeff Waters, Fulton Hogan 
 
Paper presented to INGENIUM Conference, Rotorua, 
 June, 2012 
 
(Pidwerbesky & Waters, 2012) 
 
 
The following are the main points from the paper.   
 
- Most pavements performed well.  Most damage was due to subsurface movement. 
 
- The most resilient pavements in seismic events, considering factors such as level of 
service after the event(s), survivability of the pavement and economics of repair, are 
thin-surfaced unbound granular and foamed bitumen stabilized pavements. 
 
- The aggregate in unbound granular pavements could be contaminated with up to 
30% liquefaction material without adversely affecting its performance.    
 
- A thicker, stiff structural asphalt and concrete pavement could, in theory, constrain 
the upward movement of liquefaction material but there is no evidence that thickness 
makes a difference in practice, and would be more expensive to repair.  Such 
pavements would not withstand lateral movement.  Roads constructed in this way 
would be expensive to repair. 
 
- The only means of repairing asphalt bulges (due to liquefaction) is to remove the 
asphalt and the underlying material, and replace with new construction. 
 
- The selected surfacing treatment should be as per normal using normal surfacing 
treatment selection criteria, but the rebuild designs need better adhesion of the 
surfacing to the pavement. 
 
- Pavements designs must be sustainable, maximising the utilisation of recycled 
materials in the pavement construction including the pavement materials themselves. 
Preventing contamination of subsurface layers (e.g. by geotextile) would reduce cost 
of repair (as materials could be reused). 
 
- Where possible contaminated materials should be modified in situ (to avoid trucking 
of large volumes of aggregate causing further damage to roads).  Coal tar materials 
should be relaid on the top of pavement fabric where full reconstruction is undertaken. 
 
- A life cycle cost analysis should be carried out to ensure that the lowest cost 
engineering solution is used. The residual lives and expected lives will be critical 
components of these calculations and must be based on the tables developed for the 
purpose. 
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This summary is from an internal review conducted by KiwiRail following the February 
2011 earthquake.  It focuses on recommendations noted in the review document.   
 





- Establish relationships with helicopter services.  Immediately post-event helicopters 
are potentially helpful to determine the status of trains if  cell phone and radio network 
coverage is lost.  It would be useful to have seismic sensors automatically notify 
KiwiRail Train Control of the size of the event. 
 
- Need to have in place procedures for sending staff to remote locations, protocols for 
complete loss of communication (where to meet etc) and control centre bringing 
together different KiwiRail groups (would have been useful to have a combined control 
centre with KiwiRail Network, Freight, Mechanical and Passenger Services to 
coordinate activities). 
 
- Administration support should be resourced separately from those managing the 
emergency.  Water, food and Civil Defence equipment should be stored at the control 
centre. 
 
- Need to establish relationships with Civil Defence before an emergency occurs. A 
designated rail representative should be included in local CDEM once activated. 
 
- Direct contact with Environment Canterbury facilitated resource consent issues 
relating to emergency sourcing of gravel and ballast.   
 
- Establish a list of approved building inspection consultants in locations close to KR 
buildings and depots who could be called upon to carry out certified building 
inspections. 
 
- Fuel is crucial in the response and recovery.  Consider planning for emergency fuel 
(diesel and petrol) in event of emergency. 
 
- Diary all major discussions, decision and milestones at the local level to provide audit 
trail and evidence of actions taken. 
 
- Emergency contact lists need to be kept up to date and made available both locally 
and to HR. 
 
- Coordination of resources is critical to determine the best outcome and manage 
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fatigue (although there were many offers of assistance, they were not immediately 
required). 
 
- There was a perception that outsiders did not understand what was going on, and as 
life had changed for many this created high on-going stress levels for some.  
 
- There was a perception that people had become more “tunnel visioned” (as a coping 
mechanism) and perhaps were not so aware of peripheral issues – hence an increase 
in risk. 
 
- Some performance indicators showed a decline in performance in the second quarter 
after the main quake (between 1 and 4 months after). Provision of external resources 
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4.17 Business Continuity Christchurch Earthquakes - Christchurch Airport  
 
Ford Robertson  






- Constant training is necessary to ensure an adequate response. 
 
- Recommend “Go Bag” with emergency resources, equipment designated to the 
position not the person, backups for each position 
 
- Constantly update the contact key (for key personnel in particular). 
 
- Debrief soon after the event so the important points are still at the forefront of 
people's minds. 
 
- Even when the airport is open and operating, do not rush to declare the crisis state 
over. 
 
- Do not underestimate the effect of trauma on staff. 
 
- Set priorities early in the response. 
 
- Develop categories for different levels of response for future events. 
 
- The 4 R’s (Readiness, Response, Recovery, and Review) were an essential 
framework. 
 
- Expect the unexpected.   
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4.18 Christchurch, New Zealand Earthquake Sequence of Mw 7.1 September 
04, 2010, Mw 6.3 February 22, 2011, Mw 6.0 June 13, 2011:  Lifeline 
Performance – Lyttelton Port 
 
Technical Council on Lifeline Earthquake Engineering (TCLEE). American Society of 
Civil Engineers, Monograph 40, February 2012 – Revision O (February 2012) 
 
John Eidinger and Alex Tang eds 
 
Chapter 9:  Lyttelton Port 
 





- The Port suffered significant damage in the earthquakes but critical services resumed 
very quickly, reflecting preparatory mitigation measures and quick remediation.     
 
- Damage resulted primarily from deep seated slides in loose hydraulic or dumped fills 
overlying silty bay muds. The slide movements damaged the wharf structures. 
 
- Despite the earthquake damage, the port has experienced a significant increase in 
container volumes. This is partly due to local industries growing (e.g. dairy), but also to 
additional goods being brought in to help rebuild Christchurch. 
 
- The loss of Z Berth and the cool storage has had a significant impact on the local 
fishing industry.  This has resulted in loss of business for the Port and for other local 
businesses.  Replacement facilities are planned at the Port.   
 
- Oil piping and tanks were undamaged in the earthquakes.  Most of the pipes were 
above ground, had little or no anchorage and had been designed so that there was 
flexibility in the bends. 
 
Response and Advice 
 
- Pre-planning after the first event for port improvements facilitated access to 
machinery including large cranes for use in restoration after the second earthquake.   
 
- Having a process for emergency consents allowed the Port to move quickly in 
applying for consent to reclaim land to restore the ports functionality. Hard debris from 
damage within Christchurch city has proved useful in achieving this. 
 
- Ballasted shipping containers proved useful in protecting against rockfall. 
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4.19 Christchurch, New Zealand Earthquake Sequence of Mw 7.1 September 
04, 2010, Mw 6.3 February 22, 2011, Mw 6.0 June 13, 2011:  Lifeline 
Performance – Railway System 
 
Technical Council on Lifeline Earthquake Engineering (TCLEE). American Society of 
Civil Engineers, Monograph 40, February 2012 – Revision O (February 2012) 
 
John Eidinger and Alex Tang eds 
 
Chapter 12:  Railway System 
 
(Eidinger & Tang, 2012) 
 
 
- The driver of a locomotive at the time that the earthquake took place said that the 
front wheels “seemed to lose traction”.  He applied the emergency brake which 
brought the locomotive to a stop. 
 
- Wrinkles in the tracks occurred after being repaired, suggesting the effects of post-
earthquake fault creep.  Considerable track re-ballasting was needed following after-
shocks.   
 
- Six bridges were extensively damaged.  Most of the damage was due to settlement 
and lateral spreading of liquefied ground.   
 
- No derailments occurred.   
 
- The location of aftershocks was monitored to assess possible risks to bridges.  This 
facilitated quick deployment of bridge inspectors and repair crews. 
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5 Liquid Fuels & Gas 
5.1 LPG Infrastructure in the Christchurch Earthquakes 
 
Rowan Smith, RockGas – Contact Energy Limited  





Rockgas supplies LPG in Christchurch, by cylinders, bulk tanks and a reticulated 
network.  This summary relates mainly to the February 2011 earthquake.   
 
- Main feeder plant had minor gas leak and was therefore isolated.  PE pipe performed 
very well.  Tank installations also performed well.   
 
- CDEM requested that supply to CBD be discontinued.  Decision taken to shut down 
entire reticulated network.   
 
- Cellular phones and electricity supply failed.  Back-up communications with 
contractor didn’t work well (previous testing not thorough enough)   
 
- Assistance obtained from out-of-town company sources.    
 
- No standard arrangements appear to exist for relaxation of HSNO certification for 
temporary cylinder supplies in emergency conditions.   
 
- Building demolitions proceeded without gas isolations, reflecting a lack of awareness 
of presence of piped gas in South Island.  Last minute isolation requests were 
problematic - demolition crews become aware of presence of LPG only once work had 
begun or immediately prior in more than one occasion. These requests need to 
happen in a timelier manner. 
 
- Critical customer list developed immediately after the earthquake.   
 
- HSE issues with staff and contractors required management. 
 
 - Gas demand dropped off – not yet fully recovered.     
 
- Re-livening plan drawn up and risk analysis completed.  Re-livening commenced from 
north-west side of the city.   
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5.2 Mobil Oil New Zealand Ltd - Christchurch Earthquake Response 
 
Julie Rea, Mobil Oil New Zealand Limited 






This presentation covers learnings from the February 2011 earthquake.   
 
- Response is based around the PEAR principle;  People, Environment, Assets and 
Reputation.   
 
- Key issues include allocating petroleum supply to meet key user needs (in 
cooperation with CDEM), managing public expectations (queuing can raise difficult 
situations in forecourts) and containing petroleum to eliminate environmental hazards.   
 
- Commitment to fibreglass service station tanks worked out as all assets retained 
integrity despite the severe and continuing earthquake activity. 
 
- There is a need to ensure effective and robust back up for essential supplies - power, 
water, gas and road infrastructure. 
 
- Consideration needed to liquefaction effect on equipment in future design work.   
 
- Continuous improvement should feature prompt sharing of lessons both within the 
organisation and between lifeline utilities, assignment of responsibilities for 
improvement actions, regular follow-up on processes with improvement actions, and 
regular tests for Business Continuity Planning and Enterprise Resource Planning. 
 
- Good relationships with regulators, MCDEM, lifeline utilities and other critical 
contractors proved useful. 
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5.3 Observations by BP after Canterbury Quakes 
 
Keith Harrison, BP NZ 
Personal correspondence (email, 13 July 2012) 
 
 (Harrison, 2012) 
 
 
This is a summary of observations and lessons arising from the Canterbury 
earthquakes, from BP’s perspective.   
 
- All parts of the supply chain need to be restored for sustainable return to normal 
operations. Restoration of supply chain components may occur out of sequence or be 
held up due to any part of the supply chain being broken or unavailable. 
 
- Building relationships with key infrastructure providers and Civil Defence facilitates 
effective response.  CDEM needs to be proactive in granting access to roading routes 
where dangerous goods vehicles are normally restricted or prohibited. 
 
- Expect panic buying of fuel after a natural disaster and expect fuel shortages if the 
supply chain relies on supply from other ports for any length of time. 
 
- Don't underestimate that people will put in heroic efforts during a response at their own 
risk.  Fresh personnel need to be deployed as soon as possible to allow staff to deal 
with personal circumstances (this also goes for incident response teams). Provide on-
going support to staff, provide opportunities for breaks. 
 
- Personal preparation at home and work needs greater emphasis. 
 
- The little things count, e.g. providing coffee before fuel was a morale booster in 
eastern suburbs.  Coffee was made available where possible at service stations where 
fuel systems were out of commission.  This was appreciated by communities which had 
no other access to hot food and drink. 
  
- The downstream components of the oil industry did not operate as an entity, although 
this did not seem to impede communications or restoration of services.  The previous 
conversations about the need for an oil sector coordinating entity need to be reviewed to 
see if this is really required. 
 
- Consideration into how to translate these lessons to other more geographically 
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5.4 Christchurch, New Zealand Earthquake Sequence of Mw 7.1 September 
04, 2010, Mw 6.3 February 22, 2011, Mw 6.0 June 13, 2011:  Lifeline 
Performance – Gas and Liquid Fuels 
 
Technical Council on Lifeline Earthquake Engineering (TCLEE). American Society of 
Civil Engineers, Monograph 40, February 2012 – Revision O (February 2012) 
 
John Eidinger and Alex Tang eds 
 
Chapter 8:  Gas and Liquid Fuels 
 







- Durable pipelines and gas services, coupled with careful preparations served 
Christchurch well.  Features included diesel generators at feeders and dispersion of 
feeders throughout the system.  Planning for rapid shut down and restoration of 
services included arrangements with independent contractors for emergencies.   
 
- Gas to the CBD was completely shut-off after the February earthquake.  This had to 
be done manually. Because traffic was a hindrance, bicycles were used in many 
instances to negotiate traffic and gain access to valve locations. 
 
- There was no damage to any of the MDPE mains in the system, including in areas 
where liquefaction was experienced.   
 
- The Christchurch gas network illustrates several interdependencies among lifeline 
systems, such as water to operate the gas vaporizers and for fire suppression, 
electricity for water heating, and cell phone service to enhance communication among 
crews restoring the system. 
 
- Difficulties were experienced with hand held radios. There was topographical 
interference with some radio transmissions. Most cell phone service was restored by 
the following day, and cell phone communication was used extensively among the 
crews during restoration of service. 
 
Response and Advice 
 
- To protect against gas leakage, all Rockgas pipelines supplying damaged portions of 
the CBD were cut and capped. 
 
- No services were energized until the customers were contacted. 
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- When re-pressurization for the gas lines commenced, a 1 hour test was run to ensure 
the pressure could be held. The process worked as follows: 
 
 Isolate pipeline sections 
 Shut all customer services 
 Put a gauge on one service  
 Ensure the system is holding pressure before accepting. 
The process was repeated across the entire network 
 
- Loss of water interrupted operation of the hot water vaporizers, but residual pressure 
was available in storage tanks enabling gas to flow.  Refuelling storage tanks was 
suspended until water was restored to operate the sprinkler system for fire 
suppression. 
 
- One of the risks identified as part of the post-earthquake recovery of the area was the 
potential for damage to gas meters due to demolition of buildings. Procedures should 
be set up to handle this risk. 
 




- There was no damage at any of the 8 liquid fuel tanks, which are at-grade steel and 
all have seismic designs. They all have steel roofs (i.e. no floating roofs) and most 
tanks were near empty (under 20%) at the time of the largest earthquake. 
 
- The 4 inch pipeline over the Port Hills was dented by rockfall but did not leak. 
 
- Canopies at several service stations were badly damaged.   
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6 Hospitals 
6.1 Assessing the Post-Earthquake Functionality of the Hospital System 
Following the Canterbury Earthquake Sequence in NZ   
 
Dr. Sonia Giovinazzi, Jason McIntosh, Dr. Thomas Wilson, University of Canterbury, 
New Zealand 
Dr. Judith Mitrani-Reiser, Dr. Thomas Kirsch, Caitlin Jacques, John Hopkins 
University, United States 
 
Hospital Functional and Services – National Hazard Research Platform  
Paper, 2012 
 
(Giovinazzi, Mitrani-Reiser, Kirsch, Jacques, McIntosh, & Wilson, 2012) 
 
 
- The preliminary results of the project show how non-structural damage to health 
facilities and loss/reduced functionality of the city lifelines was far more disruptive to 
the provision of healthcare than the minor structural damage to buildings. The 
earthquake-induced impacts on health facilities and the loss of functionality of city 
lifelines reduced the capacity of the healthcare network to operate and further strained 
a health care system already under pressure. However, the Canterbury healthcare 
system has exhibited high adaptive capacity and the strong integration with the wider 
New Zealand healthcare system has guaranteed that a high standard of healthcare 
continues for the Canterbury region. 
 
- The ability to cope with the damage was down to the ingenuity and hard work of 
maintenance and clinical staff. 
 
- The Canterbury healthcare system has exhibited high adaptive capacity and the 
strong integration with the wider New Zealand healthcare system and this enabled a 
high standard of healthcare to be maintained. 
 
- Hospital planning activities should focus on identifying non-structural and functional 
vulnerabilities within all critical service areas and mitigating their possible impact with 
engineering interventions, redundancy systems or alternative resources. 
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6.2 Impact of the 22nd February 2011 Earthquake on Christchurch Hospital 
 
Jason McIntosh, Sonia Giovinazzi and Tom Wilson, University of Canterbury, New 
Zealand 
C Jacques, J Mitrani-Reiser, T.D. Kirsch, John Hopkins University, United States 
 
New Zealand Society of Earthquake Engineering 2012 Conference  
Conference Paper, 2012 
 
(McIntosh, Jacques, Mitrani-Reiser, Kirsch, Giovinazzi, & Wilson, 2012) 
 
 
- Minimal disruption due to structural damage at Christchurch Hospital buildings.  
Damage was minimized through: regular shapes (with no abrupt discontinuities or 
large overhangs), separation joints, CWH base isolation, and seismic upgrade of older 
buildings. 
 
- the effects of damage to non-structural building components and equipment, as well 
as breakdowns in public services (lifelines), transportation, re-supply, and other 
organizational aspects, were far more disruptive to the functioning of Christchurch 
Hospital than the minor structural damage observed in buildings and facilities. The 
non-structural damage included the failures of many components: windows, non-load 
bearing ceilings, partition walls, floor coverings, medical equipment, and building 
contents. 
 
- Suspended ceiling tiles (particularly plaster tiles with tongue and groove joints) 
caused falling hazard.  Tiles were originally diagonally braced to the wall but at some 
stage bracing was replaced by less effective vertical tiles. 
 
- Non-structural components such as wallboard partitions suffered damage. This 
caused disruption during repair (no loss of functionality). 
 
- Minor disruption due to elevator shut-down (seismic trip switches). 
 
- Pumps and chillers jumped off their mounts (despite being installed in accordance 
with seismic mounting standards NZS4219:2007).  Chiller piping collapsed. 
 
- Damage to internal and external roof coverings and roof top water tanks on Riverside 
building.  This caused water ingress and subsequent evacuation of 2 floors.  
Evacuation took 35 minutes due to lack of horizontal egress. 
 
- Loss of power was a major obstacle.  Some back-up generators were damaged or 
malfunctioned.  In addition, shortages to the main low-voltage switchboard caused 
small fires, damaging the main electrical panel and further complicating the power 
restoration efforts. 
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- Damage to water systems was a major problem.  Fire sprinklers could not be 
pressurised for up to a week and emergency water supplies were insufficient and not 
potable (silt in boreholes).  To prevent this situation from occurring in any future 
disasters, a half million-litre capacity tank system was installed to provide emergency 
water for crucial systems, including the fire sprinklers. 
 
- Building suction was damaged but repaired within 30 minutes. 
 
- Laundry was done off-site. 
 
- Pharmacy had adequate supplies.  
 
- There was no loss or shortage of lab supplies, radiological supplies, or other 
diagnostic supplies. 
 
- Due to the lack of horizontal egress and the presence of only a single stairwell, the 
decision was made to permanently change the use of those floors from clinical wards 
to administrative space. 
 
- All the regional hospitals participated in the redistribution of capacity from damaged 
healthcare facilities in Christchurch in the form of accepting transferred elderly care 
and/or maternity patients in the days after the earthquake. 
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6.3 Response of Regional Health Care System to the 22nd February, 2011, 
Christchurch Earthquake, NZ 
 
C Jacques, T.D. Kirsch, John Hopkins University, United States  
Jason McIntosh, J Mitrani-Reiser, Sonia Giovinazzi and Tom Wilson, University of 




(Mitrani-Reiser, Kirsch, Jacques, Giovinazzi, McIntosh, & Wilson, 2012) 
 
 
- Predominantly rectangular buildings with no L- or T- shaped structures, no abrupt 
discontinuities along the height of the buildings, and no large overhangs along with the 
presence of separation joints in most buildings, and the base isolation of the CWH 
likely mitigated structural damage.  
 
- Older buildings seismically upgraded only suffered cosmetic damage.  
 
- Many other factors affect hospital functionality, such as lifelines, transportation and 
support agencies. Damaged non-structural components of a hospital system are 
typically the most disruptive factor following an earthquake as well as organisational 
issues. 
 
- The failures of suspended ceilings, particularly the plaster tiles constructed with 
tongue-and-groove joints, proved to be one of the most disruptive non-structural 
failures.  Removal of original diagonal ties on tiles also contributed to the damage. 
 
- Non-load bearing wallboard partitions were also heavily damaged throughout the 
hospital. 
 
- Most disruption caused during repair. 
 
- Staircase damage (due to rigid connections to floors) caused disruption. 
 
- Seismic switches on elevators meant they were out of action for a while. 
 
- Rooftop pumps and chillers fell off their mounts.  Water tank failure caused 
evacuation of two floors with no horizontal egress - evacuation was via damaged 
stairwells with no lights. 
 
- Despite regular testing, some backup generators failed or were damaged. Some 
filters clogged because of silt in tanks (disturbed by earthquake). 
 
- Emergency water supply was tested - wells had silt in them (from earthquake) and 
initially could not be pumped easily.  Well water was also not potable. The fire system 
could not be pressurised either. 
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-  Supplies and non-clinical services were mostly undamaged. The kitchen, laundry, 
pharmacy, lab all remained functional (some services transferred to other sites as 
required - e.g. laundry due to lack of water).  
 
- Hospitals around New Zealand assisted by taking patients and providing staff.  
 
- Hospital planning activities should focus on identifying non-structural and functional 
vulnerabilities within all critical service areas and mitigating their possible impact with 
engineering interventions, redundancy systems or alternative resources. 
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7 Solid Waste 
7.1 Christchurch, New Zealand Earthquake Sequence of Mw 7.1 September 
04, 2010, Mw 6.3 February 22, 2011, Mw 6.0 June 13, 2011:  Lifeline 
Performance – Debris Management 
 
Technical Council on Lifeline Earthquake Engineering (TCLEE). American Society of 
Civil Engineers, Monograph 40, February 2012 – Revision O (February 2012) 
 
John Eidinger and Alex Tang eds 
 
Chapter 18:  Debris Management  
 
(Eidinger & Tang, 2012) 
 
 
- Rubbish normally includes hazardous material and therefore normally requires 
special disposal processes. 
 
- Some materials can be reused after a natural disaster.   It is therefore important to 
have procedures in place to maximize the efficient reuse of resources. 
 
- Sensitive procedures are needed relating to handling material, buildings and vehicles 
where fatalities have occurred. 
 
- Heritage items need to be identified and protected - this means also having 
somewhere to store them. 
 
- Contractors were screened and approved by the National CDEM Controller prior to 
performing demolition and removal of debris.  Only contractors approved to handle 
hazardous materials were allowed to remove and dispose of such materials.  All 
contractors were required to operate in accordance with legal requirements and 
industry standards. 
 
- Waste and debris management in a post-disaster situation is critical in terms of 
supporting lifeline and general recovery.  A coordinated effort is required to ensure 
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7.2 Disaster Waste Management: A Systems Approach 
 
Charlotte Brown, University of Canterbury 
Thesis, April 2012 
 
(Brown, Disaster Waste Management: A System Approach, 2012) 
 
 
- Waste needs to be included in Civil Defence and Emergency Planning.  In particular, 
it is recommended that waste management utility operators are included as Lifeline 
Utilities under the CDEM Act. 
 
- Urban Search and Rescue should consider training construction personnel to assist 
in search and rescue activities. 
 
- More pro-active public consultation regarding waste related issues would be 
beneficial. 
 
- The majority of waste management activities during the response and recovery have 
been privately funded.  Consideration of the opportunity for public funding of waste 
management works during the response phases should be considered - particularly 
where waste is blocking access ways, posing a public health hazard or a social 
nuisance. 
 
- Greater clarification is needed in terms of cost share for demolition works between 
EQC and private insurers (and the Crown where land areas have been purchased by 
the Crown). 
 
- Under the current private funding mechanism for demolition, opportunities for 
resource efficiency and prioritised planning were not fully utilised.  The central city 
demolition programme managed by CERA allowed for some planning, however, 
private property owners commanded most of the resources and thus dictated the 
programme of works, arguably slowing the opening of the central city.  Centralised 
coordination of such a large number of projects in such a confined area was needed, 
at the very least, to manage traffic and health and safety issues. 
 
- If a centralised management approach to demolition is taken then consideration into 
appropriate procurement strategies for contractors and debris disposal facility services 
is needed.  The author recommends time and cost contracts in a resource constrained 
environment.  Also, consideration needs to be made into when contracts let during the 
response phase need to be renegotiated. 
 
- Where additional waste management facilities are required to handle the increased 
volumes of waste, the author recommends that these be run publically or, at the very 
least, as a private-public partnership.  This is so that the risk can be appropriately 
shared in this highly uncertain environment. 
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- Authorities should carefully consider whether new disposal / waste management 
facilities are required before consenting new operations (particularly privately run 
operations).  Bonds under the RMA should be considered to protect against potential 
environmental damage. 
 
- Guidance needs to be provided on how the RMA (given the discretionary nature of 
the legislation) should be applied in a disaster situation.  A decision-making framework 
is recommended to protect the environment (physical, economic and social) and the 
decision-makers. 
 
- The feasibility of recycling post-disaster should be considered.  This particularly 
relates to whether on-site or off-site separation is preferable.  (It is suspected off-site 
separate is more cost effective given the increased time for demolition with on-site 
separation and the health and safety risks associated with on-going aftershocks). 
 
- Asbestos was a major health and safety concern for the public.  Better consultation 
should be carried out in the future regarding the risks and mitigation measures. 
 
- Currently there are very few regulatory mechanisms by which demolition and debris 
management activities can be monitored.  This makes management of risks difficult.  
Consideration into this is required. 
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7.3 Canterbury Earthquakes - Waste Sector Response 
 
Charlotte Brown, University of Canterbury, New Zealand 
National Lifelines Conference 
Presentation, 2011 
 
(Brown, [Presentation] Canterbury Earthquakes Waste Sector Response, 2011) 
 
 
- Municipal waste service providers should be included as a Lifeline Utilities under the 
CDEM Act. 
 
- Need to have plans in place for managing bottlenecks (one waste site in particular 
became critical to the operation). 
 
- Need to have plans in place to store material that may relate to investigations after 
the event. 
 
- To be aware that putrescibles will rot when forgotten (there were putrescible wastes 
rotting in the city centre while the cordon was up). 
 
- If it is likely that liquefaction silt could exist after an earthquake, need to have 
adequate plans for a disposal site. 
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8 Multi-Sector Reports 
8.1 Learning from Earthquakes:  The Mw 7.1 Darfield (Canterbury), New 
Zealand Earthquake of September 4 2010 
 
Earthquake Engineering Research Institute (EERI) Special Earthquake Report 
November 2010 
 
(Earthquake Engineering Research Institute, 2010) 
 
 
- Because Christchurch was not considered a high-risk area it had a passive retrofit 
policy for its unreinforced masonry buildings. The damage to these non-retrofitted 
URM buildings from moderate shaking is an important lesson for other regions with 
large inventories of URM buildings. 
 
- Overall, bridges suffered little damage. This was due to a complex set of 
circumstances.  Most have small to moderate spans, which are recognized to exhibit a 
more sturdy seismic response because of their symmetry and limited reactive mass 
and most were designed to resist forces substantially larger than the demands 
imparted by this particular earthquake.  They also shared a number of common design 
features that gave them high seismic resistance, including a sturdy monolithic 
structure, wide wall piers and continuity of the superstructure from abutment to 
abutment. 
 
- The biggest wastewater problems were to the deep gravity mains, in many cases 3-4 
m below the ground surface.  With ground water only 2 m deep, trenching was difficult. 
When wastewater mains were located in the backyards of private residences, access 
and subsequent repairs were more difficult. 
 
- Gas lines (including the few in liquefaction zones) were unaffected.  The system has 
170 km of 65 - 315 mm medium density polyethylene pipelines with thermal fusion 
welds. 
 
- Damage to industrial storage racks was observed at many locations.  Such damage, 
especially with respect to the food supply, illustrates the importance of non-structural 
mitigation for secondary building systems and contents. 
 
- A curfew was useful in controlling the CBD which had large amounts of unreinforced 
masonry damage and debris in the street. 
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8.2 The Value of Lifeline Seismic Risk Mitigation in Christchurch 
 
Tony Fenwick 
New Zealand Lifelines Committee 
Report, 2012 
 
(Fenwick, The Value of Lifleines Seismic Risk Mitigation in Christchurch, 2012) 
 
 
The main points are: 
 
 Work following Risks and Realities4 served Christchurch well - losses were 
reduced and response / recovery facilitated 
 Many of the elements that contributed to the benefits are not costly 
 Inter-corporate and inter-personal relationships proved very valuable in 
aiding responses 
 A range of other studies have found substantial benefits from  seismic and 
other risk management  
 The costs of seismic risk management in Christchurch have been repaid 
many times over 
 
 
The purpose of the report is to crystallize the experience and learnings from the recent 
earthquakes to foster further, well-targeted, seismic mitigation in New Zealand.  
Accordingly, the report: 
 
 comments on the value of pre-earthquake Christchurch lifeline engineering 
work to both the participating organisations and to the wider community 
 suggests the elements that contributed most strongly to the benefits and that 
should therefore feature within the core activities of other lifeline utilities and 
groups in earthquake-prone areas.  
 
The main elements that contributed most strongly to the benefits, and that should 
therefore feature in work programmes, are: 
 Asset awareness and risk reduction: identifying points of particular 
vulnerability. Issues likely to arise include: 
o surveying for site-specific risks, for example buildings that do not meet 
AS/NZS1170 loading standards (including where assets are placed on 
top of existing structures), and where liquefaction is possible  
                                               
4
   Risks and Realities was the major 1990s Christchurch infrastructure hazard vulnerability study.   
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o identifying likely fracture points (for example where cables and pipes 
enter structures such as buildings and bridges) 
o identifying cases where restraints to restrict movement of sensitive 
equipment are needed. 
 
 Readiness: taking steps to improve organisational performance in 
emergencies, such as: 
o ensuring fit-for-purpose operating frameworks for business continuity 
o working collaboratively with other lifelines and relevant agencies on 
common issues such as looking for key interdependencies, examining 
generator sufficiency and planning for petroleum outages, and 
establishing lifeline utility coordination arrangements to facilitate 
emergency response 
o ensuring that engineers and contractors are available quickly to meet 
emergency needs 
o managing spare parts to promote availability when unexpected pressures 
arise. 
 
 Perseverance: maintaining the effort over time while communicating 
realistic expectations. 
o Lifeline utilities that have retained a consistent focus on seismic mitigation 
have benefitted most significantly (asset management planning and 
similar annual-cycle processes provide an appropriate setting for much of 
the required work). 
o Improving end-user knowledge of infrastructure reliability and 
encouraging users (particularly organisations with emergency response 
roles such as hospitals) to plan for a level of infrastructure outage in the 
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8.3 Review of the Civil Defence Emergency Management Response to the 22 
February Christchurch Earthquake 
 
Ian McLean, David Oughton, Stuart Ellis, Basil Wakelin, Claire B Rubin 
June 2012 
 
This document is a summary of Chapter 4 of the Review report (chapter 4 deals with 
Lifelines).   
 
(McLean, Oughton, Ellis, Wakelin, & Rubin, 2012) 
 
 
- Many organizations showed significant improvement in responses to the February 
2011 earthquake compared with September 2010.   
 
- Restoration of lifelines is more difficult where organizations use contractors vis-à-vis 
own staff.  The management and tasking of contractors and own staff on emergency 
response must be embedded and practiced.   
 
Water and Wastewater:  
 
- It was learnt in the September earthquake that it was beneficial to zone the city in 
terms of water supply so that responses could be targeted to probable areas of need.  
 
- Having established relationships with contractors and industry bodies meant that 
there was a network of support that could be relied on following the February 
earthquake. These relationships developed prior to the event, although often informal 
(and not through CDEM channels), helped to establish water and wastewater services. 
 
- It was learnt that there were disadvantages to using portaloo waste disposal systems 
due to possible health risks, lack of security and reluctance to use them at night.  
Chemical toilets were preferred.   
 
- There is a need to develop shut-down and containment procedures for sites 
containing dangerous chemicals as part of CDEM planning.  
-  Chlorination of potable water was required.  This task was undertaken by a team 
from a local authority from another part of New Zealand.   
 
- In order to maximise effective use of the repair gangs the delivery of equipment and 
materials was reversed in that suppliers delivered these directly to the requirements of 
the gangs on site. This was possible due to the pre-developed relationships between 
the City Council and contractors. 
 
- The ability to generate damage maps (amongst others) is important for 
communication to the EOC and the public and needs to be an embedded capability for 
EOCs. 
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The Review notes the following issues that could have been done better: 
 
 More business continuity planning could have been done in advance. 
 
 Communications with households where supplies were disrupted were 
inadequate.  
 
 Better damage maps could have been prepared. 
 
 Aspects of the provision of alternative sanitation could have been improved. 
This includes providing adequate advice on alternative sanitation while 
portaloos or chemical toilets are being obtained. 
 
 Better communication with the CRC through the Lifelines Utility Coordinator 
was needed.  
 
 Consideration should be given to establishing reconnaissance teams with their 
own communications to gather data for multiple lifelines in the same visit, for 
example, road, water and waste water. 
 
Solid Waste:  
 
- There must be pre-planning undertaken for the disposal of non-toxic solid waste, 
putrescent waste from rotting food, liquefaction silt, demolition material and solid waste 




- Orion is a commercial company that has integrated risk management in its normal 
operations.   
 
- Orion had carried out analysis of weak points on the network prior to the 4 
September 2010 earthquake and again before the 22 February 2011 event.  Mitigation 
measures costing $6 million are expected to have saved them around $60 million.  
 
- Flexible supply design with extensive interconnections assisted restoration by 
providing routing options.  
 
- Orion had the internal organisation and emergency procedures as well as the in-
house capability to respond effectively.  
 
- Orion had the relationships with outside organisations and suppliers to be able to 
obtain additional staff and resources quickly, including through mutual aid agreements.  
 
- Organisational culture and leadership are important. Ascertaining staff status after 
the earthquake, feeding staff and contractors, seeing to medical care needs, 
management of the staff workload and ensuring timely relief were important factors.  
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- The main Orion Operation centre was inside the cordon. Cordon management was 
inconsistent and inflexible for staff who had to work within the cordon with frequent 
changes to access arrangements.  
 
- Contact with the relevant decision makers within Orion and the CRC was somewhat 
confusing with difficulty in contacting the correct person to address issues.  
 
- Overall demolition management could be improved.  Protociols need to recognize 
electricity safety and supply issues.   
 
- The key to the resilience of Orion’s services was that it understood its assets and 




- Telecom had a recovery and priority plan that helped them respond to the February 
earthquake. This included establishing an alternative operating centre in Linwood to 
provide an alternative to the main exchange that was inside the cordon.  
 
- There was no pre-plan for access through the cordon, providing difficulty to Telecom 
since ongoing access to their main building was required.  This emphasises the need 
for pre-planning for cordon access in emergencies.  
 
- There is a need for a well thought out and controlled demolition plan and a 
willingness to share information on buildings to be demolished, since they often had 




- Principal roading routes were cleared quickly due to the relationships that were in 
place between CCC and two major contractors; Fulton Hogan and City Care. 
Maintenance contracts also included a clause requiring assistance in the event of an 
emergency and a schedule of payment rates for the work. This enabled work to 




- Learnt the need to carefully manage systems after an emergency. Personnel may be 
shocked or have personal / family issues and may not be operating with the same level 
of productivity, alertness and judgment.  
 
- The importance of communication; there was a need to contact other control centres 
around the country however the cellphone network was overloaded / inoperable during 
the critical phase. To mitigate this satellite phones have since been purchased.  
 
- A mistake from September was to resume BAU too early with consequent staff 
overload. In February the crisis management team was kept in place until a formal 
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planned handover was appropriate.  
 
- The airport had a well developed and fully practiced emergency management plan 
which worked well.  
 
- The National CDEM plan should include provision for priority transport of ATC staff 
from Christchurch to Auckland to service the alternative airways traffic control centre. 
(New Zealand’s main centre is located in Christchurch.)  
 
- In airport emergency planning consideration could be given to rapid evaluation of 




- KiwiRail had in place a well defined crisis management response for emergencies 
that allowed BAU and worked due to well-established communication channels.  
 
- An additional rail control centre is needed outside of Wellington as there is almost no 
local control in the remainder of the country. This would reduce the vulnerability to loss 
of this centre if a disaster were to occur in Wellington. 
 
- KiwiRail should be urged to take part in local CDEM exercises as well as those at a 
national level and through lifeline links. 
 
- The relationship between KiwiRail and Fonterra proved beneficial in September 
2010, when rail milk tankers were utilized to take water to Christchurch. 
 
- There was a lack of communication between KiwiRail and the Lifeline Utility 





- The Lyttleton Port Company (LPC) undertook extensive pre-planning and modelling 
of their infrastructure. The actual behaviour of the wharves in the earthquake was 
close to predicted giving confidence in the structures and the planning.  
 
- There is a need for closer cooperation and better communications between LPC and 
CRC in emergency planning.   
 
- There is also a need for open, pre-planning and practiced emergency management 
communications and knowledge of responsibilities, particularly between the Port and 
NZTA. 
 
- LPC should join in local CDEM planning. 
 
Fuel Supplies:  
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- A water supply is needed at the tank farm as a fire-fighting precaution (oil is supplied 
via pipeline) and there was none. Now there is a stand-by fire water supply and pumps 
in case of further event.  
 
- The ongoing investment in the management of risk and emergencies by the oil 
industry and their emergency response teams helped in the response to the 
earthquake. 
 
- There is a need at fuel stations to have standby electricity. 
 
- The issue of fuel distribution and management and the procedures to be used during 
any restrictions should be addressed at a national level. 
 
- The integrity of tanks and piping at service stations has to be checked prior to fuel 
delivery. This means there is a need in lifelines response planning to identify the 
location of priority stations.  
 
Lifelines Coordination:  
 
- The LUC team in Christchurch was formed mainly by personnel from one consulting 
engineering company, who lost access to their offices. This formation has its 
advantages in terms of cohesion, but also risks such as the loss of the LUC team in 
the event of a building collapse.  
 
- Pre-established sector coordination responses worked well such as the relationship 
between the Telecommunications Emergency Forum and the Transport Response 
team.  
 
- The Lifelines companies that performed the best were those that already had 
embedded operational and maintenance relationships that were transferred smoothly 
into emergency mode.  
 
- The contribution by LUC’s from other regions in both the CRC and NCMC was of 
significant benefit.  Established personal relationships also assisted.   
 
- The lack of initial documentation (such as the availability of contact lists) impeded the 
initial setup and it took some time to establish the necessary document and 
information management and recording systems.  
 
- The principles and practices surrounding lifeline relationships with EOCs should be 
reviewed and publicised with a view to clarifying the roles of LUC and individual 
lifelines. This should include relationships between individual lifeline companies and 
EOCs, TLA-owned lifelines and EOCs, national lifeline companies and the NCMC. 
 
- Nationally based (nationally consistent) training of LUCs should be undertaken. 
 
- National policies should be developed and promulgated in respect of fuel allocation 
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and distribution in an emergency. 
 
- The resilience of infrastructure providers in the main centres in New Zealand should 
be evaluated to provide a national picture of vulnerabilities and a basis for 
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8.4 Lessons from Liquefaction in the Canterbury Earthquakes for Enhancing 
the Resilience of the Built Environment 
 
P Brabhaharan, Opus International Consultants, Wellington 
 





The main points in this paper are: 
 
- Liquefaction and consequential ejection of sand, ground subsidence, flooding and 
lateral spreading caused widespread damage to infrastructure, commercial and 
residential properties. Those most damaged were located close to rivers or on 
reclaimed low lying land and this was due to lateral spreading. 
 
- Some of the liquefaction effects could have been avoided if there had been adequate 
consideration of liquefaction as a hazard in more recent times - more knowledge has 
come to light since the days when Christchurch was built. 
 
- The importance of hazard assessments is noted; e.g. publication of maps that identify 
ground damage (lateral spreading from liquefaction for example), the active promotion 
of these maps, use and community education. 
 
- Attention to land use planning is needed to avoid zoning areas for urban 
development when the land is prone to extensive natural hazards. 
 
- Leaving land use planning to developers has proven ineffective in Christchurch and it 
would be more effective to have town planners with interaction from geotechnical 
engineers decide on land use and hazard mitigation in order to promote consistency. 
 
- Liquefaction caused significant damage to a number of bridges in the liquefied areas, 
although as a whole, bridge structures performed very well outside these areas. The 
resilience of bridges and other transport infrastructure can be enhanced through 
appropriate design. 
 
- Lifeline networks including underground utilities are vulnerable to liquefaction and 
ground damage. The resilience of these networks can be assessed, and enhanced 
through long term planning, consideration of resilience in the development of lifeline 
network upgrades, and through selection of appropriate forms. 
 
- It is important to foster early co-operation between professionals who are involved in 
the development of the built environment, such as planners, architects, structural 
engineers and geotechnical engineers. 
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- Early integrated focus on resilience by building professionals in the development of 
projects will help conceive concepts and forms that are more resilient to earthquakes, 
and achieve resilience without significant additional cost. 
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8.5 Recovery of Lifelines Following the 22nd February 2011 Christchurch 
Earthquake: Successes and Issues 
 
Sonia Giovinazzi and Tom Wilson, University of Canterbury, New Zealand 
 
New Zealand Society of Earthquake Engineering Conference 2012  
Conference Paper, 2012 
 
(Giovianazzi & Wilson, 2012) 
 
 




- Analysis of seismic performance of underground cables and identification of the 
multiple causes of the damage to the underground network. 
 
- Assessment of the residual/future functionality of affected power underground cables 
seismic scenario analysis for assessing and comprising alternative solutions to build 
permanent capacity in the eastern suburbs of Christchurch.  
 
- Assessing earthquake risk to underground lines versus wind and snow-storm risk to 
overhead lines.   
 





- Assessing residual/future functionality of stretched copper cabling. 
 
- Existing standard procedures to straighten the cellular network towers out of plumb 
due to liquefaction. 
 
- Scenario analysis for assessing and comparing alternatives solutions for replace 
damaged exchanges. 
 
Highway and Urban Road:  
 
- Assessing and accounting, within repair/rebuilding designing procedures, for the 
increased risk of flooding induced by the subsidence phenomena observed following 
the earthquakes. 
 
- Assessing and mitigating the rock-fall risk on roads induced by the earthquakes and 
following aftershocks. 
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Water and wastewater:  
 
- Documenting and analysing the seismic performance of different buried pipes 
typologies (material/age) to identify the less vulnerable solutions for repairing and 
rebuilding. 
 
- Identifying techniques and tools to support the of repairing/reconstruction activities 
and to justify costs of earthquake resistant solutions. 
 
- Defining a method and tool for automatically mapping and assessing earthquake 




- Gas system was highly resilient due to lessons learnt from Kobe earthquake and 
participation in Canterbury Lifelines group (including robust and redundant hardware).   
 
- Existing standards/procedures to seismically design Liquefied Petroleum Gas feed 
plant. 
 
- Buried infrastructure not well designed and behaved more poorly than above-ground 
infrastructure. 
 
-  Good level of coordination and communication between lifelines. 
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8.6 Lifelines Performance and Management Following the 22 February 2011 
Christchurch Earthquake, New Zealand - Highlights of Resilience 
 
Sonia Giovinazzi, Thomas Wilson, Daniel Bristow, Max Gallagher, Alistair Schofield 
and Marlene Villemur, University of Canterbury, New Zealand 
Craig Davis, Los Angeles Department of Water and Power, United States 
John Eidinger, G&E Engineering Systems Inc, United States 
 Alex Tan, L&T Consultants, Canada 
 
Bulletin of the New Zealand Society for Earthquake Engineering, Vol 44, No. 4 
December 2011 
 
(Giovinazzi, et al., 2011) 
 
 
- The strong lifeline culture in NZ promoted by Local Lifelines groups, National 
Engineering Lifelines Committee. Earthquake Commission, Civil Defence and 
Emergency Management reduced the physical and functional impact of the 
earthquakes on lifelines systems. 
 
- In urban locations further analysis needs to take place on hills that support resident 
communities, including investigations into rock falls, boulder rolls and loess soil failure 
due to earthquake movement. Previously these risks had not been seriously 




- The national grid was unaffected due to resilience measures used implemented by 
Transpower. Local power in Christchurch was affected for around 4.5 hours while 
safety checks were performed.  
 
- Transmission towers situated in extreme liquefaction zones remained operational.   
 
- The Christchurch earthquake highlighted the need to implement previously learnt 
lessons. For example Transpower learnt in the 1987 Edgecumbe earthquake the need 
to seismically restrain heavy equipment in substations, and as a result of undertaking 
this before February 22nd in all of their substations there was very little damage to the 
national transmission grid. 
 
- Following the 22nd February earthquake all instruments with insulators held by 
“finger clamps” will be replaced as this type of clamping performed poorly during the 
earthquakes. 
 
- There is a very strong correlation between line cable failure and liquefaction / lateral 
spreading. As part of the maintenance plan there needs to be a priority to install 
liquefaction resilient cables in areas where extremely liquefaction are expected. Long 
cables, such as the one between the Lancaster and Armagh substations are also 
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extremely vulnerable to damage, given their length, and should be monitored more 
closely than others. 
 
- Orion’s resilient maintenance programme significantly improved the performance of 
their substations, in some cases outlasting all other neighbouring buildings. It is worth 
noting that it may be unnecessary to upgrade a substation to a performance in an 
extreme earthquake where none of the surroundings will survive, and therefore no 
demand for power. A substation should be upgraded to the point where they are only 
slightly stronger than the neighbouring properties. 
 
- Temporary overhead lines can be used to quickly re-establish service while proper 
design and consultation procedures are undertaken to build a permanent supply.  
 
- While the majority of all major emergency repairs to the local power supply network 
were completed in 6 months, it is expected to take years before the network will be 
back to pre-earthquake resilient levels. This demonstrates that while a network may be 
fully operational quickly, it takes a long time to restore the network to the same 
functionality levels. 
 
- The local power network is needed to work closely with demolition and restoration 
crews to ensure that buildings are safely disconnected from the power network before 
demolition or repair activities start. 
 
- Without the earthquake strengthening work completed by Orion after ‘Risks and 
Realities’ it is expected the repair bill would have been double and the loss of power 
would have been much worse, lasting several more weeks, if not several months for 
many customers throughout the network. “Even so, the power cuts that did result have 




- Congestion remained a problem for months following the earthquakes despite traffic 




- The availability of back-up resources was crucial to relieve lifelines interdependency 
issues and to maintain the system functionality despite the reduced functionality of the 
electric and water networks. Diesel engine back-up generators guaranteed the supply 
of electric power to the feeder plants. Buried storage tanks (500 t) provided several 
weeks supply for the network in case of any on-going disruption to the business-as-





- Christchurch relied heavily on temporary sewage treatment services which were 
facilitated by portable chemical toilets to supplement the wastewater system. 




- HDPE pipes are now being used extensively for pressure mains as they were found 
to perform well following all three earthquakes. 
 
- Health issues were used during hot and windy conditions, as silt was mobilised by 
the wind because of fairs raw sewage had contaminated much of the liquefaction 
ejecta which would create respiratory health issues and provide a long-term health risk 




- “The value of resilient design, interdependency planning, mutual assistance 
agreements, extensive insurance cover and highly trained and adaptable human 
resources are the successful stories that this paper aims to highlight.” 
 
- Mutual aid agreements and contingency measures by lifeline utilities helped them 
ensure prompt availability of resources, materials and technical expertise during 
operational repairs.  
 
- There are significant challenges in managing aging infrastructure, as highlighted by 
the events. These components are known to be vulnerable, but often too expensive to 
upgrade / replace in the short-term. These components such as weak buried pipes / 
cables played a significant role in the lifelines performance during the earthquakes. 
 
- The management of the cordon caused frustration, as strict access protocols made it 
difficult for lifelines utilities and their contractors to service key sites. A police escort for 
utilities was provided sporadically upon request. 
 
- Extended closure of the Christchurch CBD exposed difficulties in re-optimising 
infrastructure use.  
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8.7 Christchurch, New Zealand Earthquake Sequence of Mw 7.1 September 
04, 2010, Mw 6.3 February 22, 2011, Mw 6.0 June 13, 2011:  Lifeline 
Performance – Lifeline Interdependence 
 
Technical Council on Lifeline Earthquake Engineering (TCLEE). American Society of 
Civil Engineers, Monograph 40, February 2012 – Revision O (February 2012) 
 
John Eidinger and Alex Tang eds 
 
Chapter 15:  Lifeline Interdependence 
 
(Eidinger & Tang, 2012) 
 
 
- The loss of Orion power to cell phone sites, for up to 12 hours in many cases, led to 
loss of cell phone service once the batteries at these sites ran down. While cell phone 
providers had implemented seismic anchoring or battery racks and equipment and 
used portable generators, neither could mobilize a sufficient number of generators fast 
enough to prevent phone outages. Cell phone sites were fully functional once mains 
power was restored.   
 
- Much of the water system was de-pressurized in the first day after the September 
2010 earthquake, due to water pipe damage and broken wells in several cases.  The 
loss of mains power to the wells likely had limited impact on the overall performance of 
the water system.   
 
- Because road, telecommunications and electricity were largely functional quite 
quickly, the main hindrance to restoration of water and other services was the time 
needed to make inspections and repairs. 
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8.8 Geotechnical Reconnaissance of the 2010 Darfield (Canterbury) 
Earthquake 
 
Misko Cubrinovski, University of Canterbury, New Zealand 
Russell A. Green, Virginia Tech, United States 
Editors, many other authors contributed. 
 
Bulletin of the New Zealand Society for Earthquake Engineering, Vol 43, No. 4  
December 2010 
  
(Cubrinovski M. G., 2010) 
 
 
This paper contains much information on the nature of the September 2010 
earthquake and its impacts on the building stock.  It also contains information on 




-  Overall, the stopbanks along the Waimakariri River performed well during the 
earthquake, with only ~4 km out of ~17 km of stopbanks requiring repair.  Longitudinal 
cracks were very quickly repaired.   
 
-  The stopbanks confining the Kaiapoi River suffered damage at various locations.  
These embankments, measuring about 2.5 m high and 2.7 m wide, have slopes of 
approximately 2H:1V on the riverside and 3H:1V on the landside at the point where the 
reconnaissance was undertaken, remained serviceable despite incipient liquefaction in 
the abutments and settlement and cracking of the approach on the eastern side.   
 
-  The stopbank along the south bank of the Kaiapoi River also experienced extensive 
lateral cracking. 
 
Bromley Sewage Treatment Plant: 
 
- The middle third of the Pond 1/2 A embankment sustained the most severe failure 
throughout the pond system over a length of around 45 cm. At this location there were 
multiple deep longitudinal cracks along the embankment. 
 
- Each of the three pipelines became dislocated in the gap between a weir structure 
extending into an oxidation pond and the embankment, allowing water to flow directly 
into the pipelines at the gaps formed in the pipe separations. Furthermore, sink-holes 
were formed on the embankment berms and in the middle of Dyers Road indicating 
that the pipes had separated beneath the embankment fill.   
 
- The distortion of the embankment is indicative of bearing failure of the embankment 
as it has settled and spread into the liquefied sub-soils, with large tension cracks 
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forming through the fill used to form the embankments and pulling apart of concrete 
pipelines as the fill has spread. 
 
- Because of the slumping of the pond banks, engineers decided to drop the pond 
water levels and reduce the hydraulic pressures on the embankments. Sheet piles 




- At road bridge locations where lateral spreading, or incipient lateral spreading, was 
observed in the abutments, the tendency for the abutments to converge (move inwards 
towards the centre of the span) appears to have been resisted by bridge decks, though 
there were typically signs of lateral spreading of the approach embankments 
perpendicular to the roadway. 
 
- South Brighton (Bridge Street) Bridge: This bridge has an approximately 70 m span 
with a centre pier and seat type abutments and a slight skew. The bridge was 
damaged and closed due to differential settlement at the east abutment.  
 
- The abutment wall is supported by several rows of 14 inch octagonal precast, pre-
stressed concrete piles including a row of batter piles. Incipient lateral spreading of the 
bridge abutment, lateral spreading along the banks of the river and closure of the gap 
at the bridge seat were observed at the west abutment. The west abutment also 
appeared to have back-rotated slightly, possibly due to the liquefaction induced 
settlement of the approach fill and tilting of the approach slab at the wing wall.  
 
- Avon River bridges (Swanns Road, Gayhurst Road, Pedestrian Bridge): These are 
approximately 30m simple span bridges with integral abutments. Both road bridges 
had cracking in the roadway on the approaches, and at Swanns Road there was lateral 
spreading of the approach fill, incipient lateral spreading at the abutments and cracking 
at the abutment and retaining wall.  
 
- Kaiapoi River bridges: Damage was similar to the Avon Rover bridges.  Buckling 
occurred of the lightweight deck of this pedestrian bridge as a result of lateral 
spreading. 
 
- Waimakariri River Bridges (Chaneys Overpass, Highway 1 River Crossings): 
Chaneys is a three span bridge of 80m with what appeared to be seat-type abutments 
retrofitted with cable restrainers. Cracking and incipient lateral spreading was observed 
at the northern transition between the approach embankment and the abutment at 
Chaneys overpass. There was no apparent damage to the bridge structure or its 
foundation despite ample evidence of liquefaction beneath the bridge.  
 
- Kainga Road Bridge: mixed girder-slab reinforced concrete bridge. Movement of the 
northeast abutment wing wall resulted in damage to an 18cm diameter sewage pipe 
that was rigidly connected along the bridge span. The ruptured pipe continued to 
discharge untreated sewage into the river for at least 12 days after the earthquake.   
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Directly below the bridge a pipe of similar diameter suffered no damage, and it was 
concluded that its support to the abutment wall was filled with a flexible foam.  
 
- Railroad bridges are primarily of steel construction. One railroad bridge was damaged 
and service was impacted from bent rails at the fault trace and as a result of slumping 




-  Port facilities were operational within hours after the earthquake and no scheduled 
shipments were missed. The two main piers and a portion of the coal terminal were 
operational bt 4 September. 
 
- The Port has three container cranes that were still performing following the 
earthquake. The crane rails are closely enough spaced that both rails fit on the wharf 
deck. Having both rails on the deck appears to have avoided differential movement of 
the rails and contributed to this good performance. 
 
- As a result of liquefaction and lateral spreading, four tanks at the bitumen plant (at the 
oil berth) and some supporting piping suffered movement and damage.  Tanks three 
and four were experienced movement that resulted in pullout of nearly all perimeter 
anchor bolts at their base. No structural damage was observed.  Flexible connections 
survived the strong shaking with only minor leakage.  
 
Water and Wastewater: 
 
- Damage to the CCC’s system was predominantly to the water and wastewater mains, 
as a result of ground movement and floating of manholes. 
 
- A major problem with sewer lines was influx of liquefied sand and water through 
breaks in the line. 
 
- All new pump stations are designed to have flexible joints and performed well. At 
older stations, one pipe with a rigid connection was sheared (at Halswell) and one 
water pump was lost. 
 
- WDC officials wondered if they could have restored water service sooner by using 





- Christchurch City Council opened up a cell at the closed Burwood Landfill facility to 
accommodate the increased volume of waste generated by earthquake response and 
recovery efforts. 
 
- The Kate Valley landfill is located approximately 85 kilometres from the epicentre. 
The landfill is a valley fill with 2.5:1 slide slopes. The lining configuration consists of an 
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encapsulated membrane back geosynthetic clay line / geomembrane system 
composed of a 0.4 mm high density polyethylene (HDPE) geomembrane with 6 mm of 
dry bentonite adhered to it, overlain by a 1 mm HDPE liner. No slipping of the waste 
body or damage to the lining system was reported by the operator. No other lined 
structures such as dairy milking barn wastewater ponds or lined reservoirs had 
reported damage. 
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8.9 Geotechnical Aspects of the 22nd February 2011 Christchurch Earthquake 
 
Misko Cubrinovski, Brendon Bradley, Merrick Taylor, Kelly Robinson, Duncan 
Henderson, Simona Giorgini, Kun Ma, Anna Winkley, University of Canterbury, New 
Zealand 
Liam Wotherspoon, Michael Pender, University of Auckland, New Zealand 
Russell Green, Virginia Tech, United States 
Jonathan Bray, Josh Zupan, University of California Berkeley, United States 
Clint Wood, University of Arkansas, United States 
John Allen, TRI Environmental Inc, United States 
Aaron Bradshaw, University of Rhode Island, United States 
Glenn Rix, Georgia Institute of Technology, United States 
Thomas O’Rourke, Cornell University, United States 
Greg DePascale, Furgo/William Lettis and Associates, United States 
Donnald Wells, AMEC Geomatrix, United States 
 
Bulletin of the New Zealand Society for Earthquake Engineering, Vol 44, No. 4 
December 2011 
 
(Cubrinovski M. B., 2011) 
 
 
While much of this paper describes issues relating to the building stock, it also contains 
some material on infrastructure (summarised below).   
   
Bridges: 
 
- Settlement and lateral spreading of bridge approaches particularly relating to bridges 
on the Avon River downstream from the CBD.  . 
 




- Damage to stopbanks was mainly due to liquefaction of underlying soils causing 
lateral spreading, slumping, and settlement. 
 
- Longitudinal cracks were more common than transverse cracks.  While not desirable, 
longitudinal cracks are less problematic than transverse cracks which can cause 




- Large ground movements and deformation (in extension, compression, shear, and 
combined modes) including ground distortion, cracks, fissures and venting sink-holes, 
resulted from the severe liquefaction and lateral spreading.  These caused severe 
damage to underground potable water, wastewater and stormwater systems. 
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- Potable water pipes are shallow and pressurized.  4.6% of the pipe segments were 
damaged, 80% of those in areas of moderate-severe, or low-moderate liquefaction. 
 
 
- The sewerage network was harder hit.  8% of the system length was out of service 
and 31% was operating with limited service three weeks after the earthquake.   
 
- Loss of grade, joint failures, cracks in pipes and failure of laterals were the most 
commonly observed types of failures. 
 
- Loss of critical facilities such as pump stations also contributed to the overall poor 
performance of the system. 
 
- Buoyancy of concrete vaults at potable water and wastewater pump stations, 
compounded by liquefaction-induced settlement, caused pipeline breaks at their 
connections with the vaults. 
 
- Silt and sand from liquefaction washed into the Bromley sewage treatment plant from 
broken wastewater pipelines, causing damage in the primary settling tanks. Nearly all 
facilities at the sewage treatment plant were affected by liquefaction, which caused 
differential settlement of the clarifiers, thereby seriously impairing secondary treatment 
capabilities. 
 




- Serious damage occurred to underground electrical cables due to liquefaction 
induced ground movements. 
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8.10 Infrastructure Recovery Following the Canterbury Earthquakes 
 
Gerard Cleary, Manager Utilities and Roading 






- “It’s about the community, not the Council’s assets”.  Public were most interested in 
the provision of services to their properties; when their water would be working, and 
whether or not they could flush their toilets.  
 
- The primary focus of the public in the recovery phase was on rebuilding their houses. 
They were not concerned with the reestablishment of roading or pipe networks, but 
wanted to know how to deal with insurers and commencing work on their houses.  
 
- Having a good understanding of the current capacity of the existing assets and the 
future capacity that would be expected due to growth allowed the council to make 
more informed decisions. 
 
- The Council had developed, in collaboration with business owners and the 
community, a Rangiora and Kaiapoi Town Centre strategies. This gave the Council a 
base plan to work on, facilitating progress toward normality faster than would usually 
be anticipated.  
 
- Modern materials such as plastic piping stood up well during the earthquakes, even 
in areas where the pipes were used as trunk mains in liquefaction affected areas. It 
can be concluded here that the more modern technology has been effective in 
achieving a more robust infrastructure in the Waimakariri District. 
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8.11 The Canterbury Earthquake - The Impact on Farming Organisations  
 
Zach Whitman, Erica Seville, Thomas Wilson, John Vargo 
Resilient Organisations Research Programme 
Report, May 2012 
 
(Withman, Seville, Wilson, & Vargo, 2012) 
 
 
- The most disruptive impact on farmers (particularly dairy farmers), following the 
Darfield earthquake, was the loss of power (e.g. can’t milk dairy cows which has a 
potential health impact on the cows).   
 
- Other disruptions (particularly to mixed and arable farmers) caused by interrupted 
water supply (e.g. damage to wells or breaks in water lines).  Economic impact of this 
disruption is time dependent (i.e. whether or not the water loss occurs during times of 
high irrigation or not). 
 
- Turbidity of water in wells affected irrigation. 
 
- Some of the lifelines impacts were mitigated by good neighbour relationships (ability 
to share resources and help each other get resources needed). 
 
  
C169 | P a g e  
 
8.12 Observed Performance of Industrial Pallet Rack Storage Systems in the 
Canterbury Earthquakes 
 
S.R. Uma (GNS Science), Graeme Beattie (BRANZ) 
 
Bulletin of the New Zealand Society for Earthquake Engineering, Vol 44, No. 4 
December 2011 
 
(Uma & Beattie, 2011) 
 
 
- Investigations by the authors draw attention to an apparent lack of consistent national 
control over the design and construction of racking systems.  
 
- The collapse of pallet and racking systems lead to significant loss of shop stock and 
other goods. 
 
- The failure of pallet and racking systems can be attributed to various reasons 
including inadequate design, inappropriate operational conditions, improper installation 
and lack of maintenance. 
 
- National control over design and construction of racking systems would be beneficial.  
Also clarity over what systems requires a building consent. 
 
- The revised seismicity factor in Christchurch will have an effect on the suitability of 
racking systems.  Racking owners need to check their systems and either strengthen 
or reduce loadings if required. 
 
- Second hand racking systems should be considered scrap metal due to the 
uncertainty of the residual capacity of the system. 
 
- Regular detailed inspection of racking systems is highly recommended to reduce life 
and economic losses in the event of an earthquake. 
 
- Professional training programmes are recommended for users and installers of 
racking systems. 
 
- Progress towards the publication of a revised and extended design guide is also 
described in the paper.   
 
  
C170 | P a g e  
 
8.13 Bank of New Zealand: Response in Christchurch 
 
Craig Beaumont, Bank of New Zealand 









- Staff welfare: staff contacted through a variety of media, cash grants given and 
EAP services offered 
 
-  Returning to business as usual has helped psychological healing of staff. 
 
- Customers: customers welcomed contact about their well being and financial 
assistance packages  
 
- Properties: some disruption due to building damage, ATM inaccessibility.  
 
- Critical functions: critical functions were moved to Auckland and Wellington 
temporarily. 
 
- No long term key supplier issues. 
 
 Keys to a Successful Recovery: 
 
1. Business Continuity Planning: contingency planning is important but equally, 
flexibility to adapt leads to quick and innovative solutions. 
 
2. Test Plans: testing increases the skills and proficiency of staff to cope during a 
business interruption event. 
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8.14 Impacts and Emergency Response to 12th June 2006 South Island 
Snowstorm 
 
T.M. Wilson, D. M. Johnston, D. Paton, R. Houghton 
GNS Science 
Report 2008/40, April 2009 
 
(Wilson, Johnston, Paton, & Houghton, 2009) 
 
 
- Urban and rural communities across the region suffered widespread disruption of 
lifeline services, in some cases for extended periods.  
 
- Widespread and severe damage to electrical distribution networks due to the heavy 
weight of the dense, wet snowfall.    
 
- Telecommunication services failed as batteries in exchanges were unable to sustain 
services once mains power was lost. 
 
- Disruption of transportation networks by the snow for periods of a few hours to 
several days hindered the emergency response.  
 
- The rural sector in particular was heavily impacted by loss of electrical power 
services and telecommunications.  
 
- Power Company - Excellent liaison & cooperation however lacked ability to provide 
restoration times.   
 
- Back-up power was a problem for telecommunications (cell sites, other key 
telecommunication sites). 
 
- Weather warnings monitored by utilities, used warning to prepare contractors and 
subcontractors. 
 
- Access to sites for repairs was a problem. 
 
- Shortage of staff was a problem 
 
- Disruption to water supply 
 
- Contracts for road clearing should be based on locality not price.  
 
- Diesel tanks should be topped up more regularly.  
 
- Training paid off.  
 
- Keep reporting simple and focussed. Allow operational people to perform their normal 
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role. Inform the public and others especially with respect to restoration times (don't 
over promise and under-deliver). 
 
- Changing weather patterns may see a review of engineering design in areas that 
were historically non alpine regions. 
 
- The need to coordinate communication. That key managers/staff may not be 
available because of breakdown in communication services to read a co-ordinated 
response. 
 
- The need for strong interagency cooperation. Gathering and actions on relevant 
information to make sound decision. 
 
- Preparation for future snow events:  
 
A. Construction standards reviewed by international consultants.  
 
B. Some operational improvements made.  
 
C. Centralised control and restoration planning ensures optimal decisions.  
 
D. Major outage communications plan developed.  
 
E. Mature contractor management and systems in place.  
 
F. A system that spares holdings regularly reviewed and seismically restrained.  
 
G. Robust radio communications in place.  
 
H. Mutual aid agreement in place and working with other South Island line 
companies; 
 
- ‘Owning’ contractors creates loyalty 
 
- Power preparedness measures: Increased distribution of satellite phones to key staff. 
Regularly top up of back-up diesel supplies. Increased 33kv pole maintenance.   
 
-Agreements & understandings with local roading contractors. 
 
- Ensure subcontractor contracts / arrangements are ready. 
 
- Increased backup diesel generators at rural water supply. 
 
- Encourage tree owners to clear trees near lines. 
 
- More robust data systems and remote information and control. 
 
- Communication improvements internally (control centres to field operations etc). 
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- Replacement of weak conductors with stronger types.  
 
- Use of stronger poles; 
 
- Intelligence gathering and/or impact assessment was generally poor, especially with 
telecommunications disrupted; 
 
- Lack of resources to cope with widespread damage. 
 
- Lifeline utilities not fully integrated into emergency response in this region. 
 
- Health and safety issues with snow and ice present - affected restoration times. 
 
- Lifeline utilities desire improved impact assessment - perhaps poor communication 
contributed to this lack of understanding of impact. 
 
- A lot of damage information was from community (e.g. telephone calls reporting 
damage). 
 
- There is a strong desire for a more detailed and accurate meteorological warning of 
what impacts snowstorms will cause spatially and temporally, and the characteristics 
of the snow itself. The analysis of response plan highlights the importance of accurate 
and timely hazard warnings or impact assessments for response plan activation. 
 
- The value of effective and efficient impact assessment was highlighted during and 
following this event. It is important information on impacted communities and damaged 
infrastructure networks is gathered as soon as possible. Aside from obvious benefits of 
being able to repair damage and quickly respond to problems, this also has important 
implications for relieving a concerned community and informing central government so 
aid can be approved. 
 
- Widespread electrical power failure is largely inevitable in a large South Island 
snowstorm. Organisations and communities need to adequately prepare for this reality. 
 
- The failure of communications systems for many organisations (and households) 
during the snow caused significant problems. 
 
- Organisations should diversify their communications systems to mitigate this 
problem, i.e. adopt radiotelephones or satellite phones. 
 
- Disrupted transport networks made it important for emergency responders (i.e. repair 
crews) to be equipped with vehicles capable of dealing with these severe conditions 
(i.e. 4WD and chains). 
 
- Experienced staff, staff training and continuously updated emergency response plans 
proved they were highly effective in increasing an organisation’s performance. 
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- Coordination of information and communications at intra-organisational and inter- 
organisational levels appeared to be lacking in some areas during the response to the 
snowstorm event. Future planning should focus on more effective co-ordination of 
dissemination of hazard, impact and resource availability information during the 
response phase. 
 
- The snowstorm highlights the value of inter-organisational planning, i.e. intimately 
understanding how other organisations operate, their abilities and attributes, and the 
appropriate people to contact. 
 
-  Rural communities will generally be without essential services for much greater 
periods than urban areas and may suffer isolation for extended periods. They should 
plan to adequately deal with this reality. 
 
Key Lessons:  
 
1. Communicated information on our network to civil defence and Engineering 
Lifelines Groups.  
 
2. All cabinets involved in the event have had battery replacement; and 
 
3. Installed external generator connection plugs on 26 rural cabinets.  
 
4. Determined restoration procedures for plug equipped cabinets. 5. Involving 
farmers in emergency powering arrangements for cabinets;  
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8.15 Analysis of the 2008 flooding in the Hurunui District 
 
D. Alexander, G. Crawford, B. Dixon, K. England, D. Falcon, D. Farrell, K. Franklin, J. 
Idle, Z. Whitman, G. Wilson 
Students from Tom Wilsons University of Canterbury Class 
 
Research Draft Paper, October 2009 
 
(Alexander, et al., 2009) 
 
 
- Strengths of the flooding response were the effective CDEM group lead evacuation and 
strong informal rural networks. 
 
- Weaknesses were the warnings and warning systems, community awareness of media 
warning outlets, CDEM log records and the hindrance to response caused by RMA 
(1991) constraints. 
 
- The key recommendations to improve CDEM processes, warning systems, 
infrastructural resilience, and insurance policy development are: 
 
1. Continue to develop and work with the community in improving the flood warning 
system (including weather prediction, rain/river gauges, modelling) and awareness of 
how the system operates, including developing informal communication networks 
(i.e. gathering observation data from locals).  In particular, limited information / 
modelling exist for flood prediction on rural properties.  
 
2. Streamline legislation that focuses on sustainability within a hazard management 
paradigm, specifically in relation to updating the RMA (1991) to include 
consequence-based decision making processes (e.g. taking aggregate from river 
without consent for road repair).   
 
3. Improve the flood modelling capability in the Hurunui District. This requires upgrading 
and expanding the existing river flow and level gauge stations, as well as modelling 
inundation in the lowland and coastal areas. 
 
4. Submit an updated application to the NZ Transport Agency (NZTA) to request the 
Inland route (Route 70) from Waiau to Kaikoura to be designated a State Highway. 
 
5. Create a simple pro-forma template that could be distributed to those taking calls, 
with prompts to write down date, time, contact details and the body of the notification 
which would create a more robust master record. 
 
- CDEM outpost communication could have been improved.  Posts sometimes 
unmanned due to volunteers tending their own properties. 
 
- Previous lifelines studies concentrated on vulnerability of road networks.  
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- Flood damage to water supply networks – mostly where pipes located under stream 
beds that were scoured out. 
 
- Flood had little or no impact on telecoms and electricity.  Partly due to location of poles 
(i.e. no scour around poles and no damage to culverts carrying services) 
 
- Damage to transportation network by floods had biggest impact on community. 
 
- Overall flooding had limited infrastructure impact compared with the 2006 Canterbury 
snow storm, where the electricity and telecommunications networks were non-
operational for extended periods (up to three weeks in some cases). 
 
- Economic impact from loss of transportation routes and costs to repair damaged roads 
and water supply networks. 
 
- Further hazard modelling and analysis of flooding impact on critical infrastructure in 
Hurunui is recommended. 
 
- Limited funding availability for critical infrastructure maintenance and emergency works 
due to a low population density across a large geographic area. A major concern for the 
District is that the economic impacts sustained were from a relatively low magnitude 
event that did not result in widespread disruption to critical infrastructure and yet, the 
impacts have left the District very vulnerable to future events of any magnitude. 
 
- Social impacts during the flooding events were primarily a result of damage to the 
transportation network, with 64% of the questionnaire respondents reporting their day-to-
day activities were affected by road access. These social impacts could have been more 
extreme if the telecommunication and electricity supply networks were also impacted, as 
would be the likely case during an earthquake. 
  




9.1 Canterbury Earthquake – Lifeline Utility Coordination Review 
 
Tony Fenwick and Dave Brunsdon 
Report for the Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management  
February 2012 
 
(Fenwick & Brunsdon, Canterbury Earthquake - Lifeline Utility Coordination, 2012) 
 
 
The main points in the report are listed below.   
 
- More trained Lifeline Utility Coordinators (LUCs) are needed to staff the function in 
EOCs and ECCs, and to support inexperienced personnel called in to help. 
 
- Existing relationships developed pre-event considerably helped LUC work in the 
response.   
 
- Sector coordination worked well (e.g. in telecommunications and transport).  Existing 
“business as usual” coordination arrangements in the petroleum sector also worked 
well.   
 
- EOC coordination and LUC role clarity needs to be improved.  Promotion and 
awareness of the LUC role needs to be fostered. 
 
- TLAs communicated on issues relating to lifelines that they own (roads, water) direct 
to Christchurch Response Centre (CRC) using existing intra-corporate communication 
lines, bypassing the LUC who therefore had an incomplete view of lifeline response 
issues.   
 
- A lot of time was spent compiling Sitreps including understanding technical 
information.  Local geographic-specific information challenged LUCs who came from 
other parts of New Zealand to assist.   
 
- LUC systems (e.g. email management) and handovers need to be improved. 
 
The following recommendations are included:   
 
- Work on expanding the number of LUCs nationally, and training, needs to be 
resumed urgently. The training needs to be nationally-based, or at least nationally 
consistent. Useful modules exist in several regions and are proliferating. A basis for 
engagement of LUCs at regional level is also needed (pre-event / on-going). 
 
- The principles and practices surrounding lifeline relationships with EOCs should be 
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reviewed and publicised with a view to clarifying LUC, SCE and individual lifelines’ 
roles. This to include relationships between: 
 
 Individual lifeline companies and EOCs 
 
 TLA-owned lifelines and EOCs, and 
 
 National lifeline companies’ and the NCMC. 
  
- Consideration needs to be given to reporting arrangements from and to lifeline 
companies with simplification, standardisation and accuracy of summaries in mind. 
Consideration also needs be given to tailoring the new Emergency Management 
Information System to meet utility-specific needs. 
 
- Management and administrative practices in EOCs should be reconsidered. Issues 
include confirming and promulgating the LUC role at the commencement of EOC 
activities, optimising LUC periods of duty (especially for the more experienced LUCs), 
and setting up effective LUC desk operating systems. 
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9.2 Capturing the Learning Points from the Christchurch Earthquakes 2010-
2011 - Accomplishments, Suggested Improvements and Transferable 
Knowledge 
 






This document describes Christchurch City Council activities arising from the 
earthquakes, focussing on the Emergency Operations Centre immediately following 
the February 2012 earthquake.  The issues raised relate to all sectors, but the 





- The need for quick but coordinated response in the Emergency Operation Centre 
(EOC) and between agencies is the most important learning. 
 
- Further training for Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM) staff is 
warranted. 
 
- Effective shift handover information and briefing information is critical to effective 
coordination within and between functional areas. 
 
- A standardised handover template was developed by some units and worked well. It 
identified personnel welfare / availability, key messages, handover tasks to be 
completed and anticipated issues of the next shift. 
 
- During shift handover it is advantageous for teams to be brought together for a quick 
debrief session. This avoids duplication of tasks, ensures the strategy is set for the 
next shift and provides emotional and motivational support for those going off-duty and 
those about to start. 
 
-Staff known to need EOC access prior to an emergency should have a pictured civil 
defence identification card that is unequivocally recognised by all agencies involved. 
 
- All agencies involved should meet immediately after the event to coordinate efforts. 
 
- Planning, Intelligence and operations should be in close physical proximity and have 
regular information sharing debriefs at a management level. 
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EOC Structure and Delegations:  
 
- Align EOC roles more closely with business as usual roles to minimise confusion 
amongst Council staff and maintain normal reporting lines and delegations during an 
emergency. 
 




- Sharing of information (between agencies) is critically important and is one of the key 
learning points from the earthquakes. 
 
- Agencies involved in emergency management need to proactively collaborate in 
order to document arrangements as to how to work together during an emergency 
situation. 
 
- The importance of an up to date contact list is noted. 
 
- Pre-planning was helpful as staff had pre-assigned emergency roles and 
responsibilities. 
 
- When a national state of emergency is declared, but the emergency is localised, the 
National Controller should consider using the Council's own delegations systems.  
 
- Local council legal services should be brought into the pre-planning stage of 
emergency operations so that documentation, templates, protocols and processes can 
adhere to both council protocols and CDEM legislation. This reduced the need to 
“break and bend” the rules and minimises legal risk to the council. 
 
Utilising Human Resourcing and Rostering: 
 
- Memoranda of understanding need to be established with other metropolitan cities to 
ensure the local council is supported in a major emergency (e.g. water services, 
building inspectors). 
 
- Environmental Health Officers offer critical intelligence during an emergency situation 
and should be embedded into EOC to assist with water and waste management and 
subsequent public health issues. 
 
- There should be just one report per functional area and this should be electronically 
filed in a consistent location. 
 
Standard Operating Procedures: 
 
- SOP documents should be developed.  These should outline basic operational 
information, methods and systems, standardised naming conventions for electronic 
documents and contact information for each function.  




Procurement / Finance: 
 
- Robust processes and procedures should be put in place for procurement of 
resources. 
 
- Document all expenditure e.g. asset registers and tracking for Christchurch City 
Council (CCC) resources and unsolicited donations, delegation limits, authorisations. 
 
- Establish an asset register template that can be used in an emergency so that 
resources and donated goods can be inventoried, tracked and recalled as necessary. 
 
Information Communication technology: 
 
- Cell-phones should be allocated to roles not people and should stay in the EOC to 
ensure “on-duty” personnel can be contacted. 
 
- Any future EOC site should be equipped with wireless technology, fibre distribution 
and additional networking. 
 
- The SIM cards used by these phones should guarantee mobile network access. 
  
- The call center needs to be located with the EOC; its facility and experienced 
personnel need to be incorporated into emergency pre-planning. 
 
- It is important to have an up-to-date accessible Geographic Information System (GIS) 
to provide infrastructure maps on the first day of an emergency operation. 
 
Civil Defence Training & Planning: 
 
- Key staff who will be involved in civil defence responses should have role-specific 
civil defence training. 
 
- Need for an up to date disaster plan for all Units across the Council. 
 
Physical Layout of EOC: 
 
- Having a centralised map/floor plan of the EOC locating functional areas (e.g. 
Planning and Intelligence, Operations etc) and key liaison personnel is important. 
 
 
- Evacuation procedures should be clearly identified. 
 
- A list on the wall should explain each functional area identifying tasks.   
 
- Security guards must be on-site early on and need to secure the EOC 24 hours a 
day. 





- It is important to identify an experienced individual who can actively front the media, 
has media training and standing within the local community. 
 
- Do not let media into EOC as they can potentially misuse sensitive information. 
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9.3 Observations, Lessons and Experiences from the Inside 
 
George JasonSmith, AECOM (NZ) Ltd, Lifeline Utilities Coordinator  
Presentation to National Lifelines Forum November 2011 
 
(JasonSmith, 2011)  
 
 
This PowerPoint describes on-the-ground experience of the lead Lifeline Utility 
Controller (LUC) in the Christchurch Response Centre following the February 2011 
earthquake.   
 
- It is apparent that a large scale event requires more than one person to perform LUC 
roles because of the volume of calls being received, the time taken to resolve issues 
and time taken attending briefings etc. 
 
- Telcos provided additional local cell capacity at ECC – made a huge difference 
including ability to use mobile internet. 
 
- Unconventional shift times worked for us, they allowed LUCs to meet the workload 
and provide time at home for people to attend their families.   
 
- Organisation within the ECC was dynamic and difficult to comprehend.  New 
functions were being added continuously, and others removed or relocated.  More 
strategic direction was necessary. 
 
- Night shifts within the ECC were problematic.  Directions, goals and systems often 
seemed to change overnight. This resulted in lost hours the following morning 
attending to system needs. 
 
- Some of the ad-hoc parts of the ECC were difficult work with - this may have been 
because the lack of planning for new functions. 
 
- There is a need for a Demolitions and Site Clearance Coordinator in each ECC, with 
documented roles and role limitations, and training.   
 
- It was important to keep track of requests that staff were considering “too hard” to 
ensure they didn’t fall through the cracks. 
 
- The CCC IT system was used as the base.  It seemed not to be a very good solution.   
 
- A more reliable central email system is necessary.  The normal fixed Lifelines ECC 
email addresses could not be used during the response, instead multiple email 
addresses were actually utilised.  
 
- It was often very difficult to contact people in other sections.  There was too much 
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reliance on “who you know” and having their personal cell phone number.  It was often 
difficult for the phone owners to get a break when off shift. 
 
- We did not develop a good hand-over system within the LUC section. Too much 
reliance was put on staff continuity, there was insufficient time to prepare detailed 
written hand-over notes.. 
 
- At the end of the response phase there was no formal hand-over to the recovery 
organisation. 
 
- LUC-prepared status reports and updates were duplicating those received in 
SITREPS so they were discontinued.  However, LUCs maintained an overview of the 
situation.   
 
- LUCs expected involvement in the “what about next week” part of the process but 
this was virtually zero. Lifelines rapidly became embroiled in detail especially building 
demolition.  
 
- The only way to reliably contact people to resolve issues was to “visit” them 
frequently – but first you had to find out who they were and where to find them. 
 
- The procedures around cordon management were never satisfactorily resolved once 
the army took over from the police. 
 
- Much of the detailed information in SITREPS could be transmitted via standard GIS 
layers rather than transcribed from text to map at each level. SITREPS could then 
become a true summary of the situation. 
 
- Contact numbers should relate to the position, not the name. This makes contacting 
the person on shift much easier. 
 
- The responsibilities and duties of ECC quiet time / night shift staff need to be 
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9.4 Lifeline Utility Coordinator Experiences and Learnings 
 
Lisa Roberts, Lifeline Utility Coordinator 





This PowerPoint describes on-the-ground experience of a Lifeline Utility Controller 
(LUC) in the Christchurch Response Centre (CRC) and the National Crisis 
Management Centre (NCMC, Wellington) following the February 2011 earthquake.   
 
- Established relationships with national utilities enabled the provision of good 
information which was collated in the NCMC.  CRC LUCs were primarily involved in 
problem solving for local utilities.     
 
- National utility arrangements generally worked well.  The local (Christchurch) to 
national (Wellington) Lifeline Utility Coordination relationship also worked well. 
 
- There was a great amount of general goodwill between utilities which was very 
helpful. 
 
- Because planned communication links and roles were not always followed, the LUC 
role becomes reactive rather than strategic.  A need arises to clarify LUC’s role with 
the overall EOC response machinery.  Improved training for GECC staff in lifeline utility 
coordination and expected interactions with LUC is required.   
 
- Improved / standardised process improvements are needed.  Specific points noted 
include: 
 
- Lack of standardised forms and procedures (for handovers, monitoring of 
actions/requests, priority utility sites, critical fuel customers etc).    
 
- Difficulties in handling and processing information (there was large amount of 
information churn).  
 
- Improved spatial reporting from utilities (and an improved ability to handle such 
information when received) would help.   
 
- Plans and procedures for cordon management and building assessment need 
preparation, and sector coordination arrangements and response plans (e.g. fuel / 
power/ transport) need development.   
 
- Need to take a more coordinated approach within EOCs to assessing / responding to 
infrastructure damage.  
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- There could be an improved use of electronic information management and 
provisions on status key elements, e.g. building status.  
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9.5 Liquefaction Ejecta Clean-up in Christchurch during the 2010-2011 
Earthquake Sequence 
 
M. Villemure, T.M Wilson, D. Bristow, M Gallagher, S. Giovinnazzi and C. Brown, 
University of Canterbury, New Zealand 
  
New Zealand Society for Earthquake Engineering 2012 Conference 
Conference Paper, 2012 
 
(Villemure, Wilson, Bristow, Gallagher, Giovinazzi, & Brown, 2012) 
 
 
- Liquefaction ejecta caused significant damage / disruption (by blockage) to storm 
water and wastewater infrastructure.  Liquefaction ejecta also disrupted road networks.  
Liquefaction ejecta were also a potential health hazard due to mild wastewater 
contamination and from dust nuisance.  Liquefaction ejecta, in general, was disruptive 
to people living in affected areas.  Thus, speedy removal was essential. 
 
- Planning for community collection of natural disaster debris needs to be carried out. 
 
- Strategies for managing large numbers of volunteers (food, H&S, equipment, works 
allocations etc.) need to be developed.  It was noted that the volunteer set-up could 
have been more rapid and efficient if there had been better provisions for managing 
volunteers in CDEM plans. 
 
- Strategies for integrating contracting and volunteer services (including 
reconnaissance and work planning) need to be developed. 
 
- Clean-up managers noted the importance of a clear strategy which was underpinned 
at all times by clear and concise communication and coordination between council, 
contractors, volunteers, the public and other stakeholders, such as Civil Defence and 
other lifeline organisations who might require access to specific sites (e.g. for repairs). 
 
- All organisations stated that local knowledge, trust, contacts and existing informal 
relationships significantly enhanced the effectiveness of the clean-up management 
(notable improvement between September 2010 and February 2011). 
 
- Coordination was significantly enhanced when a job dispatch and mobile workforce 
management system were in place. 
 
- CIMS was used effectively to communicate between the different clean-up 
organisations and with the public.  Social media (in particular Facebook) was also very 
effective. 
 
- Project managers were needed to coordinate volunteers. 
 
- Public communication is key. 
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- Pre-selected disposal sites facilitate effective debris removal. 
 
- Fine sediment is ideally collected when slightly moist. 
 
- Volunteerism lifts community spirits and should be encouraged. 
 
- Light and heavy earth moving equipment is essential for large scale removal of 
deposits (liquefaction, volcanic ash, landslip material, snow, flood silt etc.). 
 
- The lessons from liquefaction may be applicable to other events where clean-up is 
required, such as volcanic ash.   
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9.6 The Recovery of Canterbury’s Organisations: A Comparative Analysis of 
the 4 September 2010, 22 February and 13 June 2011 Earthquakes 
 
Joanne Stevenson, John Vargo, Erica Seville, Hlekiwe Kachali, Amy McNaughton, 
Felicity Powell 
Resilient Organisations Research Programme 
Research Report, April 2011 
 
(Stevenson, Vargo, Seville, Kachali, NcNaughton, & Powell, 2011) 
 
 
This document describes a range of learnings arising from the earthquakes.  The 
summary below focuses on infrastructure-related issues.   
 
- Organisations should improve the resilience of their supply chain to disruption 
through measures such as identifying alternate suppliers or suppliers that are outside 
of the region and therefore unlikely to be affected in a regional disaster.    
 
- Organisation should consider setting up mutual agreements or collaborations with 
other organisation to ensure critical supplies can be accessed if disruptions occur.    
 
- Supplier issues were more problematic following the February 2011 earthquake 
compared to the September 2010 earthquake. This suggests that many organisations 
may not have adequate contingency plans in place. 
 
- Very few business indicated having alternatives or backups to electricity prior to 
September 2010.  Twenty-nine per cent of organisations surveyed indicated that they 
felt they had not done enough planning for electricity supply disruption.  
 
- Organisations did not feel they had done sufficient planning for sewerage and road 
network disruptions, and some of these indicated they were unsure of how to plan for 
these kinds of disruptions. 
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9.7 Business Continuity Earthquake Response  
 
MainPower  





This brief internal email reflects the outcome of a debrief on immediate staff 
management issues.  The main points are:   
 
- The use of the E-Text system would have been useful in being able to text multiple 
staff cell phones from one email to check on families. For this to be effective it is 
necessary to keep contact details of staff and families up to date and training provided 
to staff to use the system. 
 
- Provide families of staff with a ‘back door’ number to contact the control room 
directly. This would allow the call to be diverted to someone else if the person they are 
attempting to contact is too busy. 
 
- Regular updates of staff locations is important to monitor who is at work, whether 
fatigue issues are possible and whether breaks are being taken. Self-monitoring of 
hours is better in the first instance. 
 
- Need to stockpile water at easily accessible locations pre-event. 
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9.8 Building Issues for Lifeline Utilities Following Major Earthquakes 
 
Dave Brunsdon, Engineering Advisory Group, Department of Building and Housing  
Presentation to Auckland Engineering Lifelines Group 
November, 2011 
 
(Brunsdon, Building Issues for Lifeline Utilities Following Major Earthquakes, 2011) 
 
 
-  Many key facilities were behind the CBD cordon.   
 
-  Questions that utilities should ask themselves include: 
 
 What is the likely seismic performance of your premises? 
 Has an engineering assessment been undertaken? 
 Have the premises been designed to meet the appropriate Importance Level, 
e.g. Level 3 or 4 (in terms of Table 3.2 AS/NZS 1170 Part O:2002)? 


















The report that follows is the final draft of the analysis for the Lifeline Lesson Learnt Project. It was 
submitted for peer review on the 16th of November 2012. At the time of this MEM Project 
submission, the feedback had yet to be received; therefore the following material should be treated 
with care. 
Several parties are involved in writing this report, where the responsibilities outlined in Appendix I. I 
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This report has been compiled from available documented information provided in response to 
enquiries made to lifeline utilities and other parties who seemed likely to have learnt from direct 
experience of natural hazards in Canterbury.   
Effort has been taken to summarise the source documents accurately.  However, the summary 
material in this report is not a substitute for the source documents.  Readers should review the 
source documents, consider other authoritative best-practice information, and take professional 
advice, before decisions are made.   The parties involved in preparing this report do not accept 
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The Centre for Advanced Engineering New Zealand (CAENZ) has assembled infrastructure-related 
“lessons learnt” from the recent Canterbury earthquakes and other natural hazard events over the 
last 15 years.  The work was undertaken for the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority (CERA) 
and findings are to be shared with the Canterbury Lifeline Utilities Group. 
The objective is to capture, consolidate and enable information sharing by providing a single source 
of infrastructure learnings for use by CERA, the Lifelines community and others with interests in 
infrastructure recovery.  The project involved 
 Consolidation of locatable lessons material 
 Review and extraction of key performance themes 
 Identification of areas where further work would add benefit 
 Resolving where and how to store project material.   
Around 100 documents have been provided and summarised.   
Themes relevant to infrastructure performance following hazard events, identified during the 
summarisation process, are 
 Learnings about pre-event resilience decision-making.  Reviewed documents draw 
attention to the value of consistently applied learning and risk mitigation programmes.   
 Asset performance.  Many documents from utilities and others address technical / asset-
related issues such as the impact of liquefaction and lateral spreading, asset installation 
practices, equipment handling and performance, and post-event data gathering.  Key points: 
o Avoid placing surface and under-ground assets in liquefiable areas where possible. 
o Alternative supply routes are very valuable after earthquakes and other events. 
o Ductile pipes, flexible pipe joints and good quality welding are most important. 
o Stresses arising at transition points in surrounding / supporting materials need to be 
managed carefully. 
 
 Organisational performance.  Many documents were submitted on organisational 
preparedness, early response management, the value of good inter-organisational 
relationships and post-event reviews.  Key points 
o While comprehensive detailed planning for hazard events is not likely to be 
effective, there is a need for preparation in specific areas such as access to stores 
and records and supply chain management.   
o Building assessments, both pre-event and post-event, need priority consideration.   
o Staff management needs to support personal and household needs.  
o Inter-organisational collaboration is valuable and arrangements need to be in place 
before the events strike.   
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 Regulatory environment.  The use of emergency powers and debris management are 
mentioned in the few documents that address this topic. 
 Outage consequences.  Many lifeline services require continued performance by other 
lifelines.  Papers note that a failure by any can have cascading impacts on the ability of 
others to meet community needs.   
Learnings about outage consequences should inform resilience-enhancing decision-making, 
illustrating the learning process as a cycle.   
A range of limitations is noted.  The evidence base may not be complete – there is no reliable way to 
judge the extent to which lessons in available documents describe total learnings from experience.  
And the lessons have not been evaluated – the lessons have been summarised as they have been 
reported by the authors (differences of view have not been reconciled). 
Recommendations address areas where further work is justified.  Storage of the documents and 
summaries on CAENZ’s website and maintaining the material as a live resource as further documents 
become available, are also recommended.    
Recommendations   
This report contains the following recommendations addressed to CERA. 
 A review be commissioned of overseas and New Zealand literature on resilience-enhancing 
decision-making as a process, to develop user-friendly material amenable to decision-
making.   
 This report and the source documents that touch on data gathering be forwarded to LINZ 
with a view to informing work programme planning.     
 The documents on waste management experience be developed with a view to firm 
recommendations to government on amendments to regulations and the establishment of 
national guidelines on disaster demolition and debris management.     
 The agencies working on Christchurch coastal issues be approached with establishment of 
an overarching consultative group in mind, to take a lead in coordinating the next phases of 
work on establishing the short and long term changes in exposure to coastal hazards. 
 An RFP be developed for a scoping document aimed to improve infrastructure resilience 
planning by distinguishing the different infrastructure services that communities need 
following disasters.       
 CAENZ be approached with a view to use of its web site to meet storage and access 
requirements relating to source documents and summaries arising from this project.   
 CERA and the Canterbury Lifeline Utilities Group continue to liaise to capture and enable 
future sharing of lessons.   




The Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority (CERA) asked the Centre for Advanced Engineering 
New Zealand (CAENZ) to assemble infrastructure-related lessons from the recent Canterbury 
earthquakes and other natural hazard events over the last 15 years, since publication of Risks and 
Realities.1  Findings are to be shared with the Canterbury Lifeline Utilities Group. 
Many natural hazard events have occurred over the 15 year period.  The earthquakes have had the 
largest impacts but six prior events have had sizeable effects2 
 
 Snow storm August 1992  
 Wind storm October 2000 
 Snow storm June 2002 
 Wind storm April 2005 
 Snow storm September 2005 
 Snow storm June 2006 
 
Lifeline utilities and other parties were invited to forward existing documents containing lessons 
relating to these events so that they could be summarised and the lessons shared.     
 
The term “lessons”, needs explanation.  The learning process arising from hazard experience 
involves several steps, from collecting field and other raw data, through analysis, culminating in 
applied improvements.   Documents containing lessons can arise at each stage other than the first.     
 
Further, lifeline utilities learn in many ways other than from direct experience.  Examples 
  
 Attendance at workshops and conferences on industry experience on resilience issues 
 Participation in reconnaissance missions following overseas earthquakes and other events 
 Commissioning research focussing on issues where knowledge is incomplete 
 Drawing on wider industry knowledge, e.g. through industry associations 
 Insurance audits  
 In-house debriefs following near misses  
 
This report on lessons from hazards is structured as follows 
 
 The next section, entitled Assembling the Lessons outlines the process.  It includes a section 
on issues relating to the Stronger Christchurch Infrastructure Rebuild Team (SCIRT).   
                                                          
1
   Lifeline vulnerability to natural hazards including earthquakes had been given prominence in a 
comprehensive project undertaken by the Christchurch Engineering Lifelines Group in the first half of the 
1990s.  The project report Risks and Realities records the processes, findings and mitigation steps (risk 
reduction and readiness) identified at the time.   
2
   Orion is the source of this information.  Enquiries from ECAN confirm that these were the main hazard 
events.  ECAN also drew attention to a number of localised flooding events in the period.   
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 The main section, Findings, contains high-level summaries of the lessons organised against 
five themes.  Each theme concludes with an Assessment and Gaps Analysis including 
recommendations.   
 The report ends with a brief section titled Conclusion – Storing Lessons and Adding New 
Material.   
Most of the value from this project is in the source documents and summaries.  Thanks are due to 
David White, Courteney Johnston and Charlotte Brown for their outstanding work in preparing the 
summaries.   
 
TERMS OF REFERENCE 
The following is an extract from the terms of reference. 
The objective is to capture, consolidate and enable sharing of learnings by providing a single 
source of information on infrastructure learnings, prepared in a way that helps information 
sharing within the Lifelines community and with CERA.     
 
In more detail, the work will involve 
 Consolidation of locatable lessons material 
 Review and extraction of key performance themes 
 Identification of gaps in documented material, including perishable data that would be 
valuable for future use 
 Identification of areas where further work would add benefit 
 
A short report will contain 
 A high-level summary of learnings 
 Recommendations for further work to address gaps  
 
Subjects to be covered include 
 Asset-related learnings 
 Learnings related to organisational performance: 
o intra-organisational performance 
o inter-organisational performance including relationships with CDEM.   
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2 Assembling the Lessons  
 
Lifeline utilities with Christchurch operations and a range of other parties were invited to forward 
documents containing lessons so that they could be summarised and shared.  The invited parties 
included 
 Members of the Canterbury Lifeline Utilities Group.  Twenty-seven members from the 
energy, telecommunication, transport and water sectors were approached, as were 
representatives from district health boards, banking, solid waste and the fast-moving 
consumer goods sector (supermarkets).     
The nature of the contributions from members varied widely.  They included formal review 
material intended as a permanent record, informal “warts-‘n-all” notes intended for internal 
audiences and PowerPoint presentations delivered to outside audiences including Lifeline 
Groups.   
 University of Canterbury:  Contacts were made with 16 academic staff and 3 senior 
students.  Documents were made available on issues ranging from geotechnical 
characteristics impacting infrastructure to treatment of solid waste.  A full description of the 
enquiries made at the University is attached.     
 Other entities likely to be able to provide a contribution:  the Institution of Professional 
Engineers (IPENZ), INGENIUM3, the New Zealand Society for Earthquake Engineering, The 
New Zealand Lifelines Committee, Lifeline Group Project Managers in other main centres, a 
small number of large infrastructure providers not having operations in Christchurch4, GNS 
Science as leaders of the Natural Hazards Research Programme and in New Zealand research 
generally, the Telecommunications Emergency Forum, the Ministry of Civil Defence & 
Emergency Management (MCDEM) and the Ministry of Business, Innovation and 
Employment (MBIE).   
From international sources the landmark study by the Technical Council on Lifeline Earthquake 
Engineering (TCLEE), a body under the auspices of the American Society of Civil Engineers, was 
included.5  Reports on electricity cable performance and water assets prepared by TCLEE team 
members were included.   
 
                                                          
3
   INGENIUM aims to improve management of local government infrastructure.      
4
   Watercare, Water New Zealand, Vector.   
5
   Technical Council on Lifeline Earthquake Engineering. (2011). Christchurch, New Zealand Earthquake 
Sequence of Mw 7.1 September 04, 2010, Mw 6.3 February 22, 2011, Mw 6.0 June 13, 2011: Lifeline 
Performance. Reston, Virginia: Technical Council on Lifeline Earthquake Engineering (“TCLEE Report”).  
Presently available in draft.   
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The table summarises the sources.   
 
Documents from Utilities  
 Formal review material from utilities, e.g. board reports and 
other documents intended as a permanent record  
8 documents 
 Informal internal “warts-‘n-all” documents, including from 
prominent organisations 
10 documents  
 PowerPoint presentations delivered to audiences including 
Lifeline Groups 
23 documents 
Documents from Other Sources  
 Academic reports 29 documents 
 Documents from other professional sources including consultants  9 documents 
 Documents from international commentators6 15 documents 
 Documents arising from government-commissioned reviews 16 documents 
 
Most of the documents relate to the earthquakes but 12 are on non-earthquake hazards (flooding, 
snowstorm). 
 
Each document was reviewed to identify and summarise lessons-related material.  The summaries 
provided information for the Findings section of this report.  
Documents from certain sources (e.g. some telecommunication companies and a supermarket 
chain) were provided on a basis that included access restrictions.  Summaries of these have been 
taken into the Findings with origins generalised (e.g. “a telecommunications provider”, “a 
supermarket chain”).  Source documents with access restrictions will be excluded from the 
accessible set arising from the project.       
2.1 A Note on the Stronger Christchurch Infrastructure Rebuild Team (SCIRT) 
The Stronger Christchurch Infrastructure Rebuild Team (SCIRT) is undertaking the repair and 
reinstatement of publically owned roads, bridges, retaining walls, water supply, wastewater and 
stormwater drainage.  This note describes the way SCIRT operates, notes that much of SCIRT’s 
experiences are works in progress and suggests that further steps be taken to document SCIRT-
related lessons.     
 
SCIRT is an alliance between three owner participants and five non-owner participants.  
 The owner participants are Christchurch City Council (CCC), the Canterbury Earthquake 
Recovery Authority (CERA) and the New Zealand Transport Agency (NZTA).  These parties are 
responsible for funding the work. 
 
                                                          
6
   The TCLEE Report was treated on a chapter by chapter basis, accounting for 11 of the 15.   
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 The non-owner participants are City Care, Downers, Fletchers, Fulton Hogan and McConnell 
Dowell. 
 
SCIRT utilises many local, regional and national consultants, suppliers and contract firms.  As part of 
the alliance agreement, a minimum of 40 per cent of the delivery of the work (by cost) is to be 
subcontracted to parties outside of the alliance.  
 
The owner participants have set up governance arrangements to facilitate consistent decision-




The primary objective for the infrastructure rebuild is  
To return the infrastructure networks to a condition that meets the levels of service prior to 
the 4 September earthquake within the timing constraints of the rebuild. 
A second objective is 
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Where restoration work is undertaken, and where reasonably possible and economically 
viable, greater resilience is to be incorporated into the network.7   
BUILT ENVIRONMENT RECOVERY 
The primary and secondary objectives contribute to CERA’s vision and goals for recovery of the built 
environment set out in the Recovery Strategy for Greater Christchurch.   
The following are the vision and goals relating to the built environment.     
Develop resilient, cost effective, accessible and integrated infrastructure, buildings, housing 
and transport networks - by: 
1.  coordinating and prioritising infrastructure investment that effectively 
contributes to the economy and community during recovery and into the future; 
2.  supporting innovative urban design, buildings, technology and infrastructure to 
redefine greater Christchurch as a safe place built for the future; 
3  rebuilding infrastructure and buildings in a resilient, cost-effective and energy-
efficient manner; 
4  developing a transport system that meets the changed needs of people and 
businesses and enables accessible, sustainable, affordable and safe travel choices; 
5  zoning sufficient land for recovery needs within settlement patterns consistent 
with an urban form that provides for the future development of greater 
Christchurch; 
6  having a range of affordable housing options connected to community and 
strategic infrastructure that provides for residents participation in social, cultural 
and economic activities; and 
7  drawing on sound information about ongoing seismic activity and environmental 
constraints, including other natural hazards and climate change. 
 
A “Scope and Standards Committee”, comprising personnel from the owner participants, considers 
specific approaches for rebuilding where proposals depart from SCIRT’s primary objective.  
SCOPE AND STANDARDS COMMITTEE  
The Scope and Standards Committee has adopted the following purpose statement. 
Purpose:  To sign off Infrastructure Recovery Technical Standards and Guidelines, ensure they are 
applied consistently, and review as required.   
For this to be achieved the Committee will 
 Establish an approved mechanism that allows scope, standards and betterment decisions to 
be approached on a generic or exception basis, for application across an asset class (e.g. 
                                                          
7
   These quotes are from the Infrastructure Rebuild Technical Standards and Guidelines prepared by 
Christchurch City, New Zealand Transport Agency and CERA (page 2).   
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retaining walls). 
 Review and approve or recommend all betterment opportunities and ensure they align with 
the wider client objectives of delivering value for money, improving resilience and reducing 
whole of life costs. 
 Review and approve or recommend all standards were they result in a material change to 
Infrastructure Design Standards and Construction Standard Specification.   
 Process requests in a timely fashion within agreed delegations of authority as determined by 
the Client Governance Group (CGG).   
 Escalate unresolved issues or decisions to the CGG.   
 
 
A set of standing documents and methodologies supports the arrangements.   
 Infrastructure Design Standards (IDSs) and Construction Standard Specifications (CSSs):  
These are the pre-earthquake reference documents for design and construction of local 
government assets.  Post-earthquake supplements have been prepared in both cases.  The 
IDSs require that whole-of-life costs be taken into account.  These documents will be revised 
in due course to bring in new approaches in the IRTSGs.    
 Infrastructure Rebuild Technical Standards and Guidelines (IRTSGs): The IRTSGs were 
prepared following the earthquakes by a City Council-led team involving university 
personnel, geotechnical experts and CERA.  The document contains specifications and 
drawings for rebuilding local government assets.   
 Net Present Value Methodology:  Submissions on alternative rebuild options referred to the 
Scope and Standards Committee are prepared using a net present value framework that 
takes account of whole-of-life operational and maintenance costs and resilience benefits.   
 Infrastructure Resilience:  This document, prepared by CERA, sets a background context and 
forward-looking service restoration targets to be taken into account in addressing the 
practical issues described in the other documents above.   
These documents are subject to continuous improvement as more information on asset condition 
and owner requirements comes to hand.   
SCIRT has broadly drawn on the parties (e.g. academics, overseas experts and infrastructure owners) 
that have also contributed to the resources used in this present “lessons learnt” document.  The 
scale of the work programme and the technical and physical challenges has led SCIRT to develop 
innovative responses and methods.  Much of SCIRT’s experiences are works in progress.  Steps 
should be taken over time to document final positions reached together with supporting analysis in 
a manner accessible to asset owners and other interested parties in New Zealand and overseas.   
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3 Findings  
3.1 Theme Identification  
 
What has been learnt from the earthquakes and other natural hazard events?  Are there significant 
areas where learnings are incomplete? 
 
This section describes the learnings in terms of broad thematic headings common across 
infrastructure.   Some gaps are identified recommendations made to address them.     
 
The following themes are used.     
 Pre-Event Resilience Decision-Making 
What has been learnt about how lifelines approach pre-event resilience decisions?  What 
factors are taken into account and can the decision processes be improved? 
 
 Asset Performance 
What learnings arise from what happened to assets when hazards strike?  Were assets 
physically robust to earthquakes?  Can improved design and installation practices assist?   
 
 Organisational Performance 
What learnings arise from how lifeline utilities performed?  The questions divide into pre-
event preparation and post-event response.    
 
 Regulatory Environment 
What rules appear to impede utilities from doing better? 
 Outage Consequences 
What learnings arise about the economic, social and environmental impacts of infrastructure 
outages? 
 
The last of these themes should prompt efforts to  
 promote realistic end-user expectations, e.g. through better (more realistic) information to 
corporate and household consumers that continued availability of lifeline services cannot be 
expected in all circumstances, and  
 improve resilience-related decision-making by utilities.  In turn, this leads back to the first 
theme, pre-event resilience-enhancement decision-making, illustrating the learning process 
as a cycle.   
The following pages describe lessons under each of these themes, together with a brief assessment.     
3.2 Limitations  
The material in the following pages should be read with the following in mind.   
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 Hazards other than Earthquakes:  Relatively few documents describe learnings on events 
other than the 2010 and 2011 earthquakes.  This should not be taken to imply that little 
learnings have occurred from non-earthquake events.  Opportunities should however be 
taken to capture learnings from all future outages when they occur.  The Conclusion 
contains a recommendation on this matter.      
 
 Nature and Extent of the Evidence Base:   
o While the number of documents reviewed is substantial, the set is unlikely to be 
complete.  A small number of entities that declined to contribute will have learnings 
in their records.   
o Entities learn from outage experience in many ways.  Not all of these learnings lend 
themselves to documentation (much learning takes the form of tacit knowledge8).   
o The lessons have been summarised as they have been reported by the authors.  
Differences of view have not been reconciled.     
 
 Perspective:  Authors may interpret experience differently, or may have different views as 
to what is important in their particular organisational setting – a lesson to one author / 
utility may not be considered a lesson to another.   
 
 Works in progress:  Many learnings are yet to crystallise and be documented.     
 
 DISCLAIMER 
This material has been compiled from available documented information provided in response to 
enquiries made to lifeline utilities and other parties who seemed likely to have learnt from direct 
experience of natural hazards in Canterbury.   
Effort has been taken to summarise the source documents accurately.  However, this summary 
material is not a substitute for the source documents.  Readers should review the source 
documents, consider other authoritative best-practice information, and take professional advice, 
before decisions are made.   The parties involved in preparing this report do not accept liability for 
losses arising from use of, or gaps in, the information it contains.  
 
3.3 Pre-Event Resilience Decision-Making 
Infrastructure resilience is for the most part delivered through asset-related and other pre-event 
decisions made by lifelines.  While contingency arrangements are required by users of infrastructure 
                                                          
8
   Tacit knowledge (in contrast with formal or explicit knowledge) is difficult to communicate through written 
or spoken language.  It is often acquired only through experience.    
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services, lifelines have the key roles in promoting continuity of energy, telecommunication, 
transport and water-related services to households and other consumers.   
Many of the documents covered in this review draw attention to the value of consistently applied 
learning and risk mitigation programmes.  Orion’s seismic mitigation programme featured 
progressive strengthening of their many masonry distribution sub-stations between 1996 up to the 
time of the earthquakes.  The programme resulted in continued serviceability at all but one site (that 
site was hit by a major landslide).  It was also cost-effective, costing $6 million and is estimated to 
have saved $60 to $65 million in direct asset replacement and repairs.9   
Transpower’s learnings from previous earthquakes including the 1987 Edgecumbe earthquake are 
another good example.  In the transport sector, NZTA has pursued a bridge screening programme 
since 2000 to inform its mitigation programme – the knowledge gained also helped prioritise 
inspections following the earthquakes.   
It seems very likely that exposure to Christchurch’s hazards and other events has prompted 
reconsideration of pre-event resilience decisions by utilities.  This will have included attention to 
factors to be taken into account in decision processes.  Issues such as how to balance commercial 
with wider societal outcomes are likely to have been recognised (the commercial issues include 
immediate bottom-line impacts along with longer-term financial considerations associated with 
brand reputation).  Similarly, a post-earthquake paper published by the United States Water 
Research Foundation notes that a need arises to balance resilience enhancement costs against 
benefits and suggests that a review of the strategies adopted in the United States would be most 
useful to help water utilities select appropriate strategies. 
Assessment and gap analysis  
Many documents taken into this review reveal meaningful lessons relating to damage and recovery, 
covered in the following pages.  Examples include post-event reviews and other informal and formal 
steps to capture in-house learnings.  The Canterbury Lifeline Utilities Group has also facilitated 
collective learning activity.  These steps point to a very healthy learning culture within the 
Christchurch lifelines community.  Many members add that learnings from the September 2010 
earthquake facilitated responses in February 2011.     
Relatively little work has been done, however, to address improvements in resilience-enhancement 
decision-making as a process.  One prominent exception:  the Stronger Canterbury Infrastructure 
Rebuild Team (SCIRT) has developed a net present value methodology to support decisions about 
rebuilding options in City-owned infrastructure.  The approach takes account of whole-of-life 
operational and maintenance costs and resilience benefits, and is applied where rebuilding on other 
than a “like for like” basis is proposed.10   
                                                          
9   The publication notes that this savings estimate is not risk-weighted (it is appropriate to take the likelihood 
of future hazards into account in assessing the case for pre-event mitigation).   
10
   “Like for like” refers to rebuilding including adoption of modern standards and materials.  The term 
contrasts with “resilience”; resilience enhancements comprise, for example, using better materials, adopting 
higher construction standards, increasing redundancy etc.    
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The recovery effort has left little or no time for documentation in this area so it is not surprising that 
there is little available.  There is also an understandable reticence about revealing information on 
intra-company reviews relating to investment and management practices, which, in any case, are 
often incompletely documented.   
There would be benefit in further focussed work in this area.  A comprehensive review of overseas 
and New Zealand literature could identify the main methods and variables.  The objective would be 
to develop a user-friendly spreadsheet / check list amenable to pre-event decision-making.   
Recommendation:  That CERA commission a review of overseas and New Zealand literature on pre-
event resilience-enhancing decision-making as a process, to develop user-friendly material amenable 
to decision-making by lifeline utilities.   
There is also scope for improved integration of economic and other analysis in infrastructure 
decisions so that outage consequences are better recognised, a matter addressed later in this report 
in the theme on outage consequences. 
3.4 Asset Performance 
The performance of infrastructure assets (notably pipes, cables and bridges) has been a particular 
area of focus by asset-owners, overseas commentators, academics and manufacturers.  Many asset-
related documents describe the nature of damage, in detail in many cases, valuable as a record and 
also noting or implying specific lessons.     
Liquefaction and lateral spreading 
A high proportion of the asset documents broadly relate to the challenges arising from liquefaction 
and lateral spreading.   
Lessons include the desirability of avoiding placement of surface and under-ground assets in 
liquefiable areas.  For example, in concluding his paper on electricity cable performance, John 
Eidinger suggests that liquefaction zones be avoided or overhead lines considered as an alternative.  
In a paper comparing the performance of a range of pipe materials, Opus makes a similar point in 
relation to areas subject to lateral spreading.   
Several papers draw attention to the value of alternative routes and other forms of asset duplication 
to enhance supply security, for example where vulnerability to liquefaction exists.  Asset duplication 
is common in telecommunications (mentioned in papers from Chorus).  Orion has, over many years, 
featured alternative supply links for key parts of Christchurch in its inter-connected high-voltage 
cable layout.  Similarly, a post-earthquake review paper contributed by Waimakariri District Council 
(WDC) notes the value of having alternative water sources.   
The performance of bridges along river banks and in other locations has received considerable 
attention.  For example, Professor Misko Cubrinovski notes that damage to many bridges occurred 
at abutments due to lateral spreading.  The value of quality bridge detailing ongoing bridge 
maintenance is noted by Opus.  Dr Alessandro Palermo and others comment on the value of NZTA’s 
bridge seismic strengthening programme.  
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Much is also documented on water and gas pipes and other water-related assets.  Many of these 
papers address asset material issues, especially pipes.  Opus notes that ductile pipes (e.g. modern 
PVC-U and others), using rubber ring joints, are generally suitable for repairs and replacement.  Craig 
Davis and John Eidinger comment on the relatively favourable performance of PE pipes, noting that 
HDPE pipe installed following the September 2010 earthquake was undamaged in the February 2011 
event.  In the gas sector, Contact (Rockgas) also record that PE pipe performed well.  The Technical 
Council on Lifeline Earthquake Engineering (TCLEE) and WDC note that PVC and PE both have 
potentially valuable roles.  IPLEX, a pipe manufacturer, emphasises the inevitability of ground 
movement in liquefaction areas, the need for flexible materials and joints, and the need to consider 
ease of repair when pipes are laid.  Asbestos-cement pipes in liquefaction zones are very likely to be 
damaged in earthquakes, a point made by many including Opus.  The case for flexible joints and the 
need for good quality welding are mentioned in several papers including from TCLEE and WDC.   
Attention is also given to understanding earthquake impacts on surface-mounted assets.  Issues in 
this area are addressed by Transpower, noting for example the need for seismic testing of new 
equipment against Transpower’s seismic policy.  Transpower also notes vulnerability to aged 
equipment for which spare parts may be difficult to locate.  Documents from TCLEE, Beca 
Infrastructure and others contain good material on seismic design and performance of reservoirs, 
and Opus comments on risks arising from joints in reservoir floor slabs.  Christchurch City Council 
(CCC) notes the need to ensure that pipes connecting ponds in the sewerage treatment plant are 
designed to accommodate bund movement.  A paper from Fulton Hogan notes the performance of 
road pavements and the need for improved adhesion of surfacing to pavements in liquefaction 
zones.       
A need also arises for care when placing assets on other structures.  TCLEE notes that high-rise 
buildings do not always offer secure locations for telecommunication equipment (at least one 
telecommunication provider, in a post-earthquake review, notes the same point).  
Telecommunication equipment located on the TVNZ Building in Gloucester Street needed much 
attention including relocation following the February 2011 earthquake when the building was 
severely damaged.    
Asset installation practices 
Waimakariri District Council’s post-earthquake review contains much detailed advice on water and 
waste-water restoration based on practical experience, noting for example the value of temporary 
overland pipes.  In electricity, Transpower mentions the need to ensure that flexible conductors 
between sub-station equipment are not too tight, Mainpower notes the need for sufficient slack to 
allow for movement between equipment and Massie and Watson draw attention to the need for 
flexible cables rather than solid conductors to connect busbars with other substation equipment.   
Materials can be placed under pressure at transition points in surrounding / supporting materials, or 
from co-location with other assets.  Such transitions therefore need to be managed carefully in 
planning and installation work.  Many commentators mention the damage to buried pipes and other 
services in approaches to bridges (see e.g. papers by Cubrinovski  and Palermo).  Bridges, even those 
with limited traffic functions (including footbridges), can be important if they carry other 
infrastructure, a point noted by several authors.  Palermo notes that pipes appear more vulnerable 
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than electricity and telecommunication cables.  In electricity, Eidinger notes that unreinforced 
thermal concrete should not be used for direct burial or duct-bank-type burial of high-voltage cables 
in liquefaction zones, and Massie and Watson note the advantages of ducting using materials other 
than concrete.  Opus comments on the need to ensure flexible and fixable connections to pumping 
stations.  Chorus notes that, while their buildings were not greatly affected by the earthquakes, 
damage tended to occur at points where building additions were joined to existing structures [AC].     
Equipment handling and performance 
Comment on the value of seismically restraining equipment, including spare components held in 
reserve, is contained in several of the TCLEE chapters.  Dr Sonia Giovinazzi notes that hospital 
services were impacted by damage to rooftop equipment and other non-structural building 
components.  Uma and Beattie draw attention the need for care with design and installation of 
pallet racking storage systems. 
Telecommunication companies have learnt a lot from the earthquakes about performance of 
batteries at cell sites, cabinets and other locations.  One telecommunication provider notes that 
batteries did not perform to expectations, adding that this impacted performance including the need 
to temporarily exclude data services.  TCLEE reports that battery capacity was degraded by the 
September 2010 earthquake and that this impacted February 2011 performance.  Chorus notes that 
gel batteries performed relatively well in roadside cabinets but that the resilience of AGM batteries 
in the mobile network has yet to be determined.   
Records and post-event data gathering 
A need arises for good repair record-keeping practices including use of GIS.  Waimakariri District 
Council and Giovinazzi recognise needs and possible improvements in this area.   
Several documents, including by Cubrinovski, demonstrate good early reconnaissance by university 
personnel and others.  However, a number of commentators including Opus and IPLEX draw 
attention to the need for improved data gathering and sharing practices in the initial post-
earthquake period.  The issues to be addressed include researcher coordination in the field, data 
repositories including maintenance and access and treatment of perishable data.  There is also a 
need to phase collections including development of pre-event records.   
Assessment and gap analysis  
Restoration by SCIRT and other utilities is proceeding apace.  Steps have been taken to draw on 
existing and new knowledge available from Christchurch and international sources.  TCLEE personnel 
have been amongst the most active in this area, and the New Zealand Government has also 
facilitated knowledge transfer through the Natural Hazards Research Platform.  More investigation 
of this type is desirable – there is much to learn and Christchurch’s experiences offer many 
opportunities.   
OPUS RESEARCH:  SEISMIC RESPONSE OF UNDERGROUND SERVICES 
The Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment has recently granted funding to Opus ($2.5 million over 4 years) to 
improve understandings of performance of underground pipes and other infrastructure assets under seismic loading within 
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Christchurch and with national application in mind.  Recommendations and guidelines will be developed to minimise 
disruption and increase the pace of recovery.    
A feature of the research will be to enhance the ability to predict asset remaining lives.  This will allow more informed 
decisions regarding positioning of underground assets within Christchurch.    
 
Recent Christchurch experience draws attention to the desirability of improvements in the way field 
data is gathered, assembled and made available11 following hazard events.  Observations on pipe 
damage, for example, are made by numerous parties including asset owners, researchers and 
manufacturers.  There are advantages in coordination and a common data-base.   
A paper by Giovinazzi12 draws attention to issues in this area as described by the Earthquake 
Engineering Research Institute (California).  The paper also draws attention to development work in 
the area by others in New Zealand and overseas, and options for consideration.   
Land Information New Zealand (LINZ) is soon to consider possibilities for a work programme that 
could cover this area.   
Recommendation:  That CERA refer this report and the source documents that touch on data 
gathering to LINZ with a view to informing their work programme planning.     
3.5 Organisational Performance 
Much has been written about organisational preparedness and response issues following the 
earthquakes and other events.   
Preparation     
Several documents record the need for good planning for emergencies.  There appears to be a 
consensus on the value of high-level preparation and that detailed planning is likely to be helpful 
only in a limited number of areas.  Many papers by utilities and the BNZ say that flexibility is 
invaluable in emergencies.  Some of these papers add that Institutional knowledge facilitates good 
judgements.     
While detailed planning is not recommended across the spectrum of issues, there are some specific 
areas where authors thought preparation is needed.  These include 
 Planning for access to stores of existing equipment and supplies likely to be required 
following a disaster.  This point is mentioned by many including TCLEE, Orion and 
telecommunication companies.  Examples included generators, four wheel drive vehicles, 
fuel, radio communication equipment and satellite phones.  It is important to be sure where 
the equipment is stored and that, where relevant, it has been regularly tested.   
                                                          
11
   Or protected, where data is sensitive for commercial or other reasons.   
12
   See Recovery of Lifelines Following the 22
nd
 February 2011 Christchurch Earthquake:  Successes and Issues.   
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 The need to ensure access to maps, plans and other records in emergency conditions, 
including when offices are inaccessible, is mentioned in the papers including by Transpower, 
JasonSmith, WDC, KiwiRail and CCC.   
 A number of papers, e.g. Massie and Watson in relation to electricity, advise that supply 
chains are most important in very large events where holding sufficient spares would be 
unrealistically expensive.   
 The value of considering options for acquiring new equipment that may be needed for 
alternative ways to deliver services is also mentioned in the papers, especially for assets that 
could be difficult to obtain at short notice.  This could include emergency toilets and 
portable disinfection plants for wastewater.  Alternative emergency premises where there is 
a risk that a facility may not be available is also mentioned (Orion, for example, benefitted 
from prior planning for an alternative control room site).    
Many authors from utilities and a supermarket chain find that training and exercising are very 
valuable.   Christchurch International Airport Ltd (CIAL) is amongst the organisations that have 
undertaken extensive preparations for snowfall, including attention to staff training and associated 
systems.   
Emergency contact lists should be prepared and maintained.  These may need to cover a wide range 
of stakeholders, e.g. the owners and managers of commercial premises such as malls (a point made 
by a supermarket chain).  Consideration needs to be given to alternative forms of communication.  A 
succession plan for roles rather than people is highlighted as a vulnerability.   
Dave Brunsdon draws attention to the need for pre-event building assessments.  Similarly, a number 
of authors, including CCC, TCLEE, KiwiRail and NZTA, note the value of contracts with consultants and 
contractors to ensure that services are available immediately following emergencies (e.g. engineers 
for building inspections).   
Authors also mention the advantages in having a “Plan B” for needs that can be anticipated, such as 
debris and silt management (Dr Charlotte Brown, TCLEE) and fuel availability (TCLEE, Dr Thomas 
Wilson et al).   
In the more immediate pre-event environment, several Orion papers mention the value of weather 
forecasting to help preparation for major snow falls, which tend to impact rural consumers most.   
Immediate response 
Much has been written on management of early response work. 
 A number of authors comment on the merit of reconnaissance planning so that resources 
can be efficiently prioritised.  These include TCLEE, WDC, KiwiRail and Orion.  Helicopters are 
often mentioned as ideal for reconnaissance; Orion commented (in relation the 2006 
snowstorm) that helicopters may be helpful for initial damage assessments but need to be 
followed by on-the-ground assessment for restoration planning.   
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 Authors including CCC, CIAL, Orion and WDC, comment on the importance of taking time to 
adopt a strategic approach before undertaking detailed response activity.   
 The value of supportive staff management is also a common theme, mentioned for example 
by TCLEE, CIAL, Chorus and other telecommunication companies, WDC, KiwiRail, Transpower 
and BNZ.  Employees and others need time to attend to domestic pressures as a priority, and 
opportunity must be allowed to enable these needs to be addressed before good work 
performance can be expected.  A key issue is maintenance of supportive communication 
with staff, a point mentioned by WDC and Orion.  Similarly, KiwiRail and others record the 
risk of reduced performance as people tire over the days following a large event.  Staff may 
themselves be traumatised, and some may also attempt unrealistically long periods of duty.   
 Efforts to maintain good Health and Safety in Employment (HSE) standards in new / 
challenging circumstances need to be maintained, a point mentioned by many utilities 
including Orion.   
The documents also comment on the need for sensible official arrangements to avoid unnecessary 
impediments to response and recovery activities.    
 Comments on cordon management describe unduly restrictive post-earthquake practices 
that impeded resumption of utility services (e.g. Orion, TCLEE, Lisa Roberts, Chorus and 
other telecommunication companies).  Recognised means of identification will be part of the 
solution.   
 Comments on building demolition describe the need for coordination between utilities and 
authorities to promote continuity of utility services since much infrastructure may be 
housed in buildings to be demolished (e.g. Orion, TCLEE, Contact (Rockgas) and Roberts).   
There are also comments on challenges arising in working with, and within, CDEM Emergency 
Operations Centres (EOCs) and Emergency Coordination Centres (ECCs) (e.g. Mobil, Chorus, Orion, 
Roberts, WDC, CCC, and KiwiRail).  Many of these mention difficulties that arose in progressing 
utility-related matters within the centres in the very challenging post-earthquake response 
environment.  Examples are the need for 
 organisational and resource improvements including improved communication / internet 
connections in EOCs and ECCs (e.g. CCC, Roberts, JasonSmith, Fenwick and Brunsdon).   
 more and better performing Sector Coordinating Entities (SCEs)13 (e.g. Roberts, Chorus). 
The need for good communications with all stakeholders as part of the emergency responses is 
prominent in the papers, including by WDC and CIAL.  Communication should be pro-active and 
expectations that cannot be fulfilled should be avoided.  Orion note the issue in relation to the 2006 
                                                          
13
   Sector Coordinating Entities bring together sector representatives for mutual support and to facilitate 
CDEM engagement on common issues, in emergency responses.  The Telecommunications Emergency Forum 
is a  good example.   
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snowstorm response, and Orion also comment on the reduced phone enquiries when damage / 
repair maps were provided on the internet following the earthquakes.   
Inter-organisational relationships 
A key point is the advantages that can arise from good inter-organisational relationships, including 
with CDEM.  This matter is mentioned in many of the papers, including by Mobil, Chorus, Orion, 
KiwiRail, a supermarket chain, and BP.  Alexander et al make the same point in relation to the CDEM-
led evacuation during the 2008 flood in the Hurunui.   
The value of other good relationships with utilities in the same sector is also mentioned.  
Longstanding collaborative arrangements in the petroleum sector and more recent arrangements in 
transport are noted by Brunsdon.  Similar arrangements in telecommunications are mentioned by 
Fenwick and a telecommunications provider.    
Further, there are many favourable comments relating to mutual aid within sectors under which  
resources may be called up from non-impacted utilities in other parts of New Zealand.  
Arrangements are well-developed in electricity, and, while improvable, may offer a model for 
adoption in other sectors (Orion and Mainpower benefitted following the earthquakes and Orion 
also say that mutual aid worked well following the 2006 snowstorm).  Hospitals also provided 
support to CDHB by taking elderly patients and maternity cases, a point made by Giovinazzi.  Davis 
notes that planning is required for major increases in work crews (up to a 100 percent increase in 
personnel numbers is suggested).          
Other documents mention challenges such as provision of accommodation and other day to day 
necessities arising from the need to manage a large influx of crews when mutual aid swings into 
action (TCLEE, Orion, Transpower and CCC are amongst the authors who commented on this).  Orion 
mention, in relation to the 2006 snowstorm, that adding large numbers of new people initially slows 
the response.  A telecommunications provider notes the importance of clear role assignment to 
incoming personnel.  Some utilities turned down or deferred offers of assistance for these reasons.     
The value of good inter-organisational relationships with other utilities in other sectors, is also 
prominent.  These relationships recognise and (where possible) address a range of interdependency 
vulnerabilities.  Papers by CCC, Mobil, Chorus, Orion, TCLEE, WDC, KiwiRail, Giovinazzi, Transpower 
BP and others address this issue.  The role of Lifeline Groups in preparing for emergency responses is 
noted by Orion and in a report by the New Zealand Lifelines Committee.     
Post-event reviews 
Many documents record the value of post-event reviews and the need for an ongoing learning 
process (a supermarket chain, BP and KiwiRail are amongst those who provided internal review 
material for this project).  The value of post-event reviews is mentioned by CIAL and Mobil.  
Similarly, the need for ongoing learnings is mentioned by Transpower and in an independent 
commentary on Orion (Orion is amongst the utilities whose performance improved in the February 
2011 earthquake compared with September 2010).  Post-event reviews should be conducted early 
after the event.  
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Assessment and gap analysis  
Organisational performance has been relatively comprehensively addressed, notably by the utilities 
themselves.  Many learnings are covered on staff management, communication, collaboration and 
related matters.   
Since 2004, the Christchurch-based Resilient Organisations Research Programme has undertaken 
much public good research on organisational resilience.  Post-earthquake documents prepared 
under the Programme are included in this review.  Pre-earthquake research findings are also 
mentioned in other documents – for example Brunsdon, in a presentation on transport response in 
the earthquakes, notes the four factors identified by the Research Programme as pre-conditions for 
resilience:  situation awareness, inspiring leadership, structured and responsive decision-making and 
innovative culture.   
The Programme has received recent funding from the Ministry of Business, Innovation and 
Employment to support new three-year research on Resilient Infrastructure through Effective 
Organisations.  
Resilient Infrastructure through Effective Organisations 
The Resilient Organisations Research Programme’s research proposal notes that the capability of 
infrastructure organisations to respond to disasters is a critical determinant of the security, wellbeing and 
recovery of communities, and adds that there is a need to learn from Christchurch to improve resilience of 
New Zealand organisations including infrastructure services. 
The research will identify best practices for dealing with disasters.  Studies will define positive and negative 
lessons by infrastructure organisations responding to seismic events between September 2010 and April 2012.  
Data will be drawn from in-depth studies of 12 organisations in areas including water and waste, roading, 
energy supplies, and freight and passenger access-points.  The research will identify the most effective ways to 
mobilise and utilise resources, to work with inter-organisational alliances, to create effective leadership, and to 
understand the factors needed for managing and supporting staff under disaster conditions. 
 
In view of the present level of documented learnings and the further work scheduled, no 
recommendation is made in this area.   
 
3.6 Regulatory Environment 
Several papers draw attention to the use of the emergency provisions in the Canterbury Earthquake 
Recovery Act 2011.  The provisions 
 assisted restoration of reliable electricity supply by enabling Orion to quickly construct a 
new overhead line (Orion). 
 enabled approval of demolition contractors to undertake demolition activity and 
establishment of temporary storage facilities for waste and building materials and Burwood 
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Resource Recovery facility for storing and processing of mixed waste materials (TCLEE, 
Brown). 
 enabled a 10 hectare reclamation at the Port using demolition debris, easing land 
constraints on longer term port development and acting as a waste disposal facility (TCLEE).   
Some papers call for improvements in regulations and planning relating to management of debris 
and liquefaction ejecta (e.g Villemure et al, and TCLEE).14  Brown draws attention to the cases for 
care with putrescibles, planning for storage of materials that may be needed for forensic purposes, 
and planning for disposal of ejecta.  Papers on these matters include calls for the definition of 
lifelines in the Civil Defence and Emergency Management Act 2002 to be extended to cover waste 
management, a suggestion that has also been picked up in the recent Review of the Civil Defence 
Emergency Management Response to the 22 February Christchurch Earthquake.15   
On other regulatory matters, Opus notes the need for improved land use planning, particularly with 
liquefaction risks in mind.  Similarly, a recent paper by Engineers New Zealand (IPENZ) addressing 
New Zealand-wide issues notes that current regulatory frameworks for hazard management are 
inconsistent and incomplete, citing liquefaction as a case in point.   
Mitigating the Risks of Natural Hazards  
A recent paper by Engineers New Zealand (IPENZ) notes that current regulatory frameworks are inconsistent 
and incomplete.  The author considers that the Building Act 2004, the Civil Defence Emergency Management 
Act 2002 and the Resource Management Act 1991 define natural hazards differently and that inconsistencies 
exist in the regulatory regimes set up under each Act.  The treatment of liquefaction as a hazard is an example.     
The paper suggests that New Zealand needs an explicit national policy and regulatory framework that is 
consistent across all the relevant legislation.  It adds that the regulatory framework would need to recognise 
that: 
 Weighing up increased regulation and costs against improved life safety, reduced economic losses 
and improved post-event serviceability will be an iterative process. 
 The process should be informed by risk based cost benefit analysis to achieve economically efficient 
outcomes. 
 National guidance with clear decision-making delegation to local government is necessary to 
recognise that risks vary by region. 
 Regulatory goal posts are dynamic. The optimal policy setting can be changed by improving 
technology. 
The paper notes that developing such a framework needs to be undertaken jointly across the key regulatory 
government agencies, and will require collaboration with regional councils, territorial authorities, building 
                                                          
14
   Improvements relating to ejecta may also be relevant for handling of volcanic ash in those parts of New 
Zealand where volcanic hazards exist.   
15
   Lifeline utilities as presently defined in the Civil Defence and Emergency Management Act 2002 broadly 
cover companies and publicly owned entities delivering infrastructure services in energy, telecommunications, 
transport and water / sewerage. 
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owners, lifeline utilities and communities. 
 
Several papers call for improved infrastructure design guidelines.  Davis suggests that existing 
international seismic guidelines for water pipes be revisited to recognise the need for replacement 
of aging assets.  Transpower notes the need to continue to use and support the development of 
international seismic design standards for high-voltage equipment.  A recently awarded research 
study aiming to develop recommendations and guidelines on performance of underground utilities 
under seismic loading is mentioned earlier in this report.  Other researchers call for improved 
application of guidelines – wider implementation of guidelines for abutment / pile liquefaction and 
lateral spreading is for example advocated in a paper by Palermo et al.       
Other specific regulatory issues mentioned include the need to comply with the Health and Safety in 
Employment Act 1992 - lifelines need to plan to meet requirements in normal conditions and during 
hazard responses (mentioned by Orion) but the question of flexibility for unusual circumstances also 
arises (mentioned by Contact (RockGas) and others).     
Coastal impacts arising from the earthquakes is a topic not addressed in the documents.    
Government agencies have published New Zealand-wide guidelines relating to rising sea levels and 
storm surge, more frequent extreme weather events such as droughts and a change in rainfall 
patterns.16  Christchurch however faces some particular coastal issues following the earthquakes, 
including understanding the 
 liquefaction hazard relating to the coastal plain - the attention given to liquefaction around 
rivers has not been matched by work on equivalent coastal issues.   
 altered coastal and river flood risks – changes in estuary bed levels, hydraulic capacity and 
low-lying ground levels may imply increased flooding risks from storm surges and tsunamis. 
 changes in the shape of the coast – the established equilibrium arising from the current 
reverse eddy in the lee of Banks Peninsula and other near-shore current circulations, as well 
as the stability of the New Brighton spit and estuary inlet configuration may have been 
disturbed by differential coastline changes with longer term implications for coastal 
development.   
Storm-Tide Hazards in Estuaries 
The Natural Hazards Research Platform has recently agreed to fund a project on storm-tide hazards 
in three or four estuaries including the Avon / Heathcoat river estuary.    
                                                          
16
   For example, the Ministry for the Environment’s Coastal Hazards and Climate Change provides information 
on the effects of coastal hazards together with a decision-making framework to assess risks and guidance on 
appropriate response options. 
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The 3 key outputs from the storm-tide project will be 
 improved understanding of how tidal changes up rivers and estuaries, offshore storm-surge 
and river flooding combine to produce extreme water levels  
 possible development of a tool for estimating  extreme joint-probability return periods  
 improved forecasting of extreme water levels 2-3 days ahead. 
Issues that have suggested the research include subsidence of the northern part of the estuary.    
Christchurch City and Environment Canterbury are providing in-kind support.   
 
Coastal issues are addressed further in the following assessment and gap analysis.   
Assessment and gap analysis  
A relatively small number of documents reflected learnings about regulatory and related matters.     
Waste management appears to deserve greater attention nationally and is an area where CERA may 
play a helpful role given Christchurch experience.    
Recommendation:  That CERA take the lead in developing the documents on waste management 
experience with a view to firm recommendations to government on amendments to regulations and 
the establishment of national guidelines on disaster demolition and debris management.17     
The earthquakes have exacerbated existing coastal hazards in ways that are not yet understood.  
Christchurch infrastructure in coastal regions that may be impacted by coastal hazards includes the 
waste-water treatment plant, the port and several bridges, in addition to local roads, pipes and 
cables.   
Existing advice from the Ministry for the Environment relating to sea level rise may need post-
earthquake reconsideration for Christchurch.  The entities with expertise / mandate include the 
Crown Research Institutes, the Ministry for the Environment, Christchurch local government 
(particularly ECAN) and the University of Canterbury.  Overarching coordination may assist 
cohesiveness of the next phases of the work programmes required.   
Recommendation:  That CERA approach the agencies working on Christchurch coastal issues with 
establishment of an overarching consultative group in mind, to take a lead in coordinating the next 
phases of work on establishing the short and long term changes in exposure to coastal hazards. 
3.7 Outage Consequences 
                                                          
17
   Dr Charlotte Brown has drafted some Christchurch guidelines.  ECAN’s current review of these could help 
inform national application.   
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This section addresses learnings about economic, social and environmental impacts of infrastructure 
outages.  Good understandings will inform decision-making to minimise future outage impacts, the 
first of the five themes in this report. 
A recent publication by New Zealand Lifelines Committee (commissioned by the Earthquake 
Commission) records the value of seismic mitigation undertaken since Risks and Realities, the major 
Christchurch infrastructure hazard vulnerability study, was prepared in the 1990s.   
THE VALUE OF LIFELINE SEISMIC RISK MITIGATION IN CHRISTCHURCH 
A recent New Zealand Lifelines Committee publication, The Value of Lifeline Seismic Risk Mitigation in Christchurch, 
concluded that  
 Work in electricity and in many other infrastructure sectors following Risks and Realities served 
Christchurch well - losses were reduced and response / recovery facilitated. 
 Many of the elements that contributed to the benefits are not costly. 
 Inter-corporate and inter-personal relationships proved very valuable in aiding responses. 
 A range of other studies have found substantial benefits from  seismic and other risk management.  
 The costs of seismic risk management in Christchurch have been repaid many times over – the 
benefits of risk mitigation are particularly clear when the direct and indirect losses that arise from 
infrastructure outages following earthquakes are taken into account.   
 
The importance of electricity and water to the farming sector (particularly dairying) is mentioned in 
the papers, although there is also a suggestion that rural households generally manage 
infrastructure outages better that urban counterparts (Whitman et al).     
Lifelines are interdependent.  Many lifeline services require continued performance by other 
lifelines, and a serious failure of any can have cascading impacts on the ability of others to meet 
customer needs.   
The documents reviewed contain many examples of lifeline interdependencies.  Two illustrations   
 Telecommunication service providers needed electricity at the numerous cabinets and cell 
sites around Christchurch.  At the many sites where mains electricity was interrupted, good 
road access and continued petroleum supply was needed to maintain the approximately 200 
generators that were deployed.  Telecommunications also relies on water for air 
conditioning although needs in this area were met through alternative arrangements, 
reflecting good foresight and preparation (see for example the paper by the 
Telecommunications Emergency Forum).      
 The papers contain many examples of reliance on cell phones and petroleum to support 
lifeline restoration (e.g. TCLEE, Orion, KiwiRail) including following snow falls (Orion).    
Other, perhaps less obvious examples include reliance of the petroleum tank farm at 
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Woolston on mains water for fire fighting (TCLEE).  A need for special arrangements for 
access by lifeline to petroleum in emergencies is mentioned by WDC and KiwiRail.18  
Documents on hospitals also record extensive reliance on lifelines (Giovinazzi). 
The responsibility for continued lifeline services does not rest solely on utilities.  Occasional service 
outages are inevitable (the costs to utilities of fully secure services would be prohibitive).  A report 
by the Resilient Organisations Research Programme advises that users of lifeline services need to 
plan for disruptions to lifeline services.  Similarly, ensuring realistic end-user expectations is one of 
three resilience themes advocated by the New Zealand Lifelines Committee to guide the work of 
Lifeline Groups around the country (Brunsdon).     
Assessment and gap analysis  
The reviewed documentation on outage consequences reveals some insights but there is relatively 
little in this area.  It is perhaps not surprising that more has not been written – utilities appropriately 
focus on meeting needs of immediate consumers rather than second and subsequent round effects, 
important though they are in infrastructure.    
A full analysis would require improved modelling capacity.  The Ministry of Business, Innovation and 
Employment has recently funded a research programme by a GNS Science-led consortium that may 
help fill this gap.  The research will develop a model for estimating the economic impacts of 
infrastructure failure as a consequence of major hazard events and infrastructure-only outages, 
enabling users to value improvements in infrastructure resilience and to assess the economic 
implications of infrastructure recovery decisions. 
Improvements may also be possible in the way individual lifelines approach resilience.  A recent 
paper by Davis notes that to assess a water systems’ resilience, it is desirable to distinguish the 
services the system needs to provide after an event occurs.19   The paper describes how to quantify 
five categories of water services: water delivery, quality, quantity, fire protection, and 
functionality.20  With this information, it is easier to develop methods to target resilience 
improvements to meet priority post-disaster needs.  The information can also assist development of 
service restoration targets with key consumers.  The methods have been applied in a case study of 
the Los Angeles water system.  The paper describes strategies for improving post-earthquake 
services in the five service categories.   
                                                          
18
   The Ministry of Civil Defence & Emergency Management has recently released its contingency plan for 
petroleum outages.   
19
   See Quantifying Post-Earthquake Potable Water System Services, Craig A. Davis.   
20
   Two of these five terms warrant explanation:  Delivery:  System delivers some water enabling survival but 
short of normal quality and quantity.  Functionality:  System restored to meet or exceed pre-disaster 
functionality and reliability (operational constraints resulting from the disaster have been removed / resolved) 
including pressures. 
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There is likely to be value in considering this approach in New Zealand (the present is a good time 
given the amount of nation-wide water asset renewal due in the coming years).  There may also be 
value in considering the applicability of the approach to other infrastructure sectors.    
Recommendation:  That CERA develop an RFP for a scoping document aimed to apply the principles 
in Dr Davis’s paper to New Zealand infrastructure, with a view to better targeted resilience planning.     
 
4 Conclusion – Storing Lessons and Adding New Material 
 
Many parties have willingly provided documents containing learnings in the interests of knowledge 
sharing.   Source documents (PDFs and / or links to the source documents) and summaries should be 
retained as a permanent resource.   
Storage and access requirements are 
 
 Accessibility by wide range of parties (preferably unrestricted) 
 Security – limits on rights to upload papers and summaries 
 Administrative ease – user-friendly administrative arrangements 
 Set up and ongoing administrative cost – to be minimal / zero 
Arrangements using the Centre for Advanced Engineering’s existing website 
(http://www.caenz.com/index.php) will meet the requirements.   The following is envisaged 
 an auto-expanding list where initially, document titles only could be seen.  Each title would 
be expandable to show the entire summary, author, publisher and date etc. At the bottom 
(or top) of the summary there would be a link to the actual source document or a message 
saying the document is unavailable due to confidentiality.  
 each summary could have associated keywords, so enquirers could find relevant summaries 
based on themes, authors, publishers, organisations, industries, dates etc. 
Procedures would be required for authentication and quality control of new summaries when 
added.  Responsibility for site maintenance would need to be assigned.  The costs are likely to be 
very small (the task could be assigned to a student under contract).   
Storage requirements will be quite modest (about 300 MB).  Usage depends on user decisions and is 
therefore difficult to control, but it is unlikely that usage costs will be material.  Storage and usage 
costs can be reduced further by use of links to other sites, albeit with the disadvantage that links can 
be lost when other sites are changed.   
Recommendation:  That CAENZ be approached with a view to using its web site to meet storage and 
access requirements relating to source documents and summaries.   
Utilities are still identifying new earthquake damage as underground and other assets are uncovered 
and inspected and as further outages occur.  For example, a recent Electricity Networks Association 
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Newsletter notes that “more damage on the [Orion] network has recently been uncovered, and a 
more complete understanding of what type of assets will be required is emerging.  There is a lot of 
rethinking on the architecture of the network …..”.21  In water, many detailed issues / options relating 
to pipe restoration are unresolved.  There is much yet to be learnt about best engineering design 
and decision-making practices in the areas covered by SCIRT’s activities.  University research and 
student studies will be ongoing for some time.   
 
International and New Zealand researchers and others have strong interests in pursuing work in the 
areas covered by this reprort.  There will be benefits to Christchurch from this.  But, in the same way 
that Transpower learnt a lot from the Edgecumbe and other earthquakes, the full lessons from 
Christchurch are likely to mostly benefit future earthquake recoveries elsewhere in New Zealand and 
overseas.   
The main long-term challenge is to translate the learnings into usable guidelines and standards so 
that asset performance improves.  The gestation and synthesis process necessarily takes time – 
many players and agencies are involved, including some offshore.  Christchurch has a key role to 
play, and, to the extent that resources permit, opportunities should be taken to contribute to 
national and international development work.   
Recommendation:  That CERA and the Canterbury Lifeline Utilities Group continue to liaise to 





                                                          
21
   See Electricity Network, Issue 312, August 2012.   





UNIVERSITY OF CANTERBURY AND LIFELINES 
 
This page describes parties, workstreams and related activities within the University of Canterbury relevant to the project.   
 
DEPARTMENTS OF CIVIL AND NATURAL RESOURCES ENGINEERING and GEOLOGICAL SCIENCES 
NAME 
NATURE OF THE WORKSTREAM / 
ACTIVITY 
COMMENT 
Prof Misko Cubrinovski Has undertaken and has extensive ongoing 
involvement in Lifelines research.  
Linkages with CCC / SCIRT.  Geotechnical 
perspective.   
Documents obtained and included.   
Dr Matthew Hughes Actively involved with CCC / SCIRT, 
working with Misko.  Geospatial expertise.   
Documents obtained and included.   
Dr Sonia Giovinazzi Has undertaken and has extensive ongoing 
involvement in Lifelines research across 
several infrastructure types (including 
hospital).   
Supervises three students with relevant 
projects:   
Melanie Lui:  Seismic Resilience of 
Wastewater Rebuild Options 
Emily Craigie and Kate Brooks:  Seismic 
Vulnerability Analysis of Buried Pipes 
Documents obtained and included. 
 
 
Students contacted.  Work is at an early 
stage.   
Dr Tom Wilson Active researcher Documents obtained and included. 
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Dr Alessandro Palermo Active researcher, President of the New 
Zealand Society for Earthquake 
Engineering (NZSEE) 
Documents obtained and included. 
Dr Bruce Deam Links to NZSEE Two special editions of the NZSEE Bulletin 
obtained.  Many relevant documents 
included from this source.   
Dr Mark Milke and Dr Charlotte Brown Have undertaken / been involved in 
relevant research (notably waste 
management) 
Documents obtained and included. 
 
OTHER UNIVERSITY EARTHQUAKE RESEARCH  
A University of Canterbury log describing proposed research is available.22    Contacts with academic staff identified with relevant 
projects have revealed a number of relevant projects.   The majority of these were already included (e.g. by direct contact with 
relevant academics, the New Zealand Society for Earthquake Engineering and the Resilient Organisations Research Programme 
(ResOrgs)).  Four additional items identified through the log are listed below.   
NAME PROJECT TITLE COMMENT 
Prof Bryan Jenkins Water Management Recovery after the 
Christchurch Earthquake:   
 
This study, which will deal with 
environmental and sustainability issues, is 
at the “research proposal stage”.   
Geoff Chase Low Damage Bridges Email exchange to be completed.   
Andrew Butler A City/Quake ‘Becoming’:  The Metrics of 
Movement and Visibility in Post-
Earthquake Christchurch, New Zealand 
MA thesis, at an early stage.  No lessons-
type outputs available at this point.   
                                                          
22
   See http://www.research.canterbury.ac.nz/earthquakeresearch/index.shtml.   
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Chris Gomez / Deidre Hunt EQC:  Estimating Tsunami hazards and 
Risks in Earthquake-Impacted Cities; 
Combining the Revolutionary AMS Method 
and Lessons from the Canterbury 
Earthquake 
Email exchange to be completed.   
 
MISCELLANEOUS UNIVERSITY CONTACTS 
NAME ACTIVITY COMMENT 
Dr Erica Seville and Dr John Vargo Leading the Resilient Organisations 
Research Programme (ResOrgs) 
Documents obtained and included. 
Dr Roger Nokes Dr Nokes is setting up Quake Centre (to be 
launched 4 Sept).   
Not a document source at this stage.   
Dr Christopher Thomson and Dr James 
Smithies 
CEISMIC digital archive under 
development.   
Relevant documents requested (some 
contextual material obtained – not 
included in the project).   
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Appendix V - Disaster Mitigation Guideline Topics 
Suggested Topic Description Comment 
Cordon 
Coordination 
Many organisations including lifelines had 
difficulties in dealing with the cordon due 
to its unexpected nature. A guide could 
help assist with readiness preparations. 
Too complex with the 




Finding and access skills in an emergency 
can be difficult. Guidelines on how to 
make such a database could be 
beneficial. 
Quite generic. Involved 
more of an 
implementation aspect 





The Canterbury Lifeline Utilities Group 
was extremely beneficial in facilitating 
preparedness investigations. Information 
on how to establish such groups overseas 
could be beneficial. 
Too basic. Could be easily 
researched. 
How to Determine 
Appropriate levels 
of Resilience 
Investigation potential metrics and 
measures to facilitate decisions-making 
for resilience infrastructure 
Very complex. 
Managing a 
Disruption to the 
Supply Chain 
Guidelines on how to procure equipment 
and other resources – i.e. avoiding 
bottlenecks etc. 
Not really suitable. 
Emergency Potable 
Water 
Guideline how to temporarily provide 
potable water provisions to the region 
while the water infrastructure is repaired. 
Missing gap? Valuable 
learnings in Canterbury. 
Emergency Water 
for Fighting Fires 
Guidelines on how to source water to 
fight fires during a larger scale natural 
disaster. 
Missing gap? Not that 
many lessons in 





Guidelines on how to provide toilets and 
other sanitation provisions to the 
community while the wastewater 
infrastructure is repaired. 
Missing gap? Valuable 




A practical guide on what risks certain 
kinds of pipes face in difficult conditions 
and how they can be avoided. 
Needed! But too complex 




H&S is normally forgotten in an 
emergency – guidelines on special 
provisions during an emergency response 
could be beneficial 




How to deal with the influx of new staff 
and crews that are foreign to the region. 
Enough information for a 




How to remove debris and provide for 
special provisions for additional sites in a 
disaster. 
Very beneficial, but 
maybe too large for an 
MEM project. 
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Coordinating Mass 
Clean-ups 
How mass clean-ups can be best 
coordinated and volunteers can be 
utilised in the aftermath of a disaster. 




Procedures for communicating the day’s 
events between shifts, ensuring valuable 
information is not lost. 
Beneficial but a lot of 
work already exists. 
EOC Planning Practical advice on what equipment and 
supplies are needed in an Emergency 
Operation Center. 
Beneficial but a lot of 
work already exists. 
Standardised 
Request Forms 
Develop standard forms for fuel requests, 
priority utility sites, handovers and other 
common emergency requests. 
Beneficial but a lot of 




Plans to provide necessary supplies and 
how to educate the public to avoid panic 
purchasing. 
Beneficial, but potentially 
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Experts and emergency responders within the Canterbury 
region of New Zealand have kindly given up their time to be 
in interviewed on emergency potable water. These same 
have also supplied additional material and been involved in 
peer review process of the booklets content. 
I would gratefully like to thank: 
 George JasonSmith – a Lifeline’s coordinator in 
Canterbury, New Zealand 
 Denise Tully – Drinking Water Assessor / Technical 
Manager with Community and Public Health – 
Canterbury District Health Board public health authority 
 James Thompson – Team Leader with the Canterbury 
Civil Deference Emergency Management Group 
 Jan Gregor – Science Leader of the Water Programme 
with the Institute of Environmental Science and 
Research Ltd 
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 Warren Ladbrook – Technical Infrastructure Manager 
with the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority 
 Steve Clarke – Interim CEO of the New Zealand Centre 
for Advanced Engineering 
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         Foreword 
 
In the hours and days immediately following a disaster, 
residents often focus on the immediate safety of family and 
friends.  Very quickly, this focus expands to include essential 
infrastructure services such as potable water, sanitation 
service, and electrical power. The importance of adequate 
preparation cannot be understated in areas where there is a 
high probability or consequence of disastrous events. 
Following most natural disasters, after the vital emergency 
response, following the scramble to restore broken services, 
it is common to consider the performance of our systems, 
both physical infrastructure and organisations.  Thereafter, 
the challenge exists to implement the required changes to 
ensure better performance in a future event. 
This Disaster Mitigation Guideline is a result of a Lifelines 
Lessons Learned exercise which followed the seismic events 
of 2010-2011 in Canterbury, New Zealand.  While many 
broad documents exist on the subject of emergency 
response, this booklet is focused on the specific topic of 
provision of temporary potable water. 
While some information in this document may be old-news 
to some in the industry, other aspects of this could be 
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extremely relevant to your preparation.  Consider these 
guidelines as an earnest attempt to pass along the 
information that we have learned in Canterbury, augmented 
by additional research into this one specific topic. 
 
Warren Ladbrook 
Technical Manager – Infrastructure 
Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority 
 
Steve Clarke 
Interim Chief Executive Officer 
Centre for Advanced Engineering, New Zealand 
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 Key Topics 
When the water infrastructure breaks or a disaster renders it 
in operable, it is beneficial to know how to quickly respond to 
the crisis, ensuring the community has sufficient potable 
water in a timely manner. 
This guide covers suggestions, solutions and advice on how 
safe, drinkable water can be supplied while the broken water 
system is repaired. 
It is no substitution for your own local emergency response 
plans! Use this booklet as a guideline when considering how 
to respond in your own local region. 
Readiness Emergency 
Preparations for responding to a water crisis should include: 
1. Who are the relevant agencies, how will they work together, 
and are there suitable training exercises that can be done? 
2. What aspects of the water system are the most vulnerable? 
What can be done to reduce these vulnerabilities? 
3. Who are the critical customers on the network? What help 
can be given to ensure they have reliable potable water? 
4. What are the alternative potable water solutions available in 
the region? 
a. How will the water be treated? 
b. How will the water be distributed? 
5. What equipment is needed in an emergency? 
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6. What assistance can be provided by neighbouring water 
utilities in an emergency? 
7. How can the public be educated to ensure they are ready to 
provide for themselves when the water network is disrupted? 
a. What special provisions can be made for the elderly 
and infirm population? 
8. What are the appropriate methods to communicate with the 
public in an emergency? 
In general, it’s virtually impossible to have a 100% secure 
water supply. Having realistic answers to the questions above 
is essential in preparing for a potable water emergency. But 
how will your team respond when a disruption occurs? 
The Response 
Understanding an emergency response timeline can assist 
responders in understanding how their role fits into the 
entire emergency situation. These guidelines provide four 
phases to restoring water services for everyday use. The top 
priority is potable drinking water for the entire community; 
secondary goals expand to supplying sufficient potable water 
for cooking, cleaning and personal hygiene. 
The longer-term focus is on reconnecting all properties to the 
reticulated water system; even if it is through temporary 
measures such as overland pipes and hoses. 
When every property in the region is connected to the water 
network with suitable potable water, the emergency is over. 
This should be closely followed by an in-depth review of the 
response with all of the personnel involved.  
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1  Introduction 
This guideline follows a series of earthquakes in Canterbury, 
New Zealand which occurred in 2010 / 2011. The water 
network suffered significant damage, and as was highlighted 
in the disasters aftermath, access potable water is a 
mandatory requirement for the local communities.. 
Providing and distributing emergency potable water includes 
several agencies such as municipal water utilities, public 
health agencies, civil defence responders and local 
government. All of these parties need to be involved in the 
planning process.  
This guide is for temporary emergency water provisions; 
NOT on how to make the physical water infrastructure 
resilient or how to repair it after a disaster has occurred.  
1.1 Why Plan? 
Safe drinking water is essential to maintenance of life and 
health. Absence of water supplies after an adverse event can 
lead to dehydration and even death. People’s needs for 
water are such that circumstances can rapidly lead to them 
drinking and using unsafe supplies with consequences rapid 
deterioration in individual and community health.  
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To preserve public health, planning and training should be 
undertaken to minimize the loss of reticulated potable water 
supplies during an adverse event. 
Predicting the size and impact of a disaster can be difficult; 
but sufficient planning can help mitigate the risk to your local 
water supply. 
1.2 Relevant Disasters 
These guidelines are applicable to any situation where 
emergency potable water provisions may be required. 












 Chemical Poisoning 
There are undoubtedly other circumstances, such as war or 
terrorism, where similar preparation would also be desirable. 
1.3 Using these Guidelines 
This guide does not replace existing plans. Its purpose is to: 
 Complement existing preparation. 
 Inform interested parties of lessons that can be learnt from 
the Canterbury Earthquake sequence. 
 Provide a timely reminder of the importance of preparation. 
Use this guide as a reference to support the local emergency 
potable water planning efforts.  
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Caution: This is a guide on potable water only and does not 
provide any guidance for sourcing water to fight fires. 
2 Background 
2.1 Importance of Water 
Water is necessary to sustain life. As the human body cannot 
store water for very long, it must be continuously replaced. 
Fluid studies show the average male needs upwards of 2.5L 
of fluid daily; some can come from food but most will need to 
be drunk in some form or other (milk, fruit-juice, teat coffee, 
water etc.). Water is needed not only to keep people alive, 
but to keep them healthy and maintain their dignities. In 
extreme circumstances it is possible to survive longer than 3 
days without water, but to ensure people remain healthy, 
this should be considered the upper limit. 
Ideally water should be supplied free of biological hazards 
and chemical which exceed acceptable levels. Otherwise, 
diarrhoea and / or dehydration can occur which may result in 
people dying. Clean water is essential for drinking, washing, 
brushing teeth, cooking, and personal hygiene. 
2.2 Water System Vulnerabilities 
A water system can be vulnerable in many areas: 
1. Distribution pipes can break causing contamination. 
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2. Treatment facilities can be damaged, rendering the water 
unsafe for human consumption. 
3. Storage facilities or wells can be damaged, leaving no water to 
use, even if it could be treated and distributed. 
2.2.1 Natural Disasters  
There is a tendency to think natural disasters relatively 
common, but although we have some understanding of the 
probabilities around their occurrence, their precise timings 
are yet understood, their occurrence is therefore often 
unexpected, potentially causing serious damage to the water 
network, costing millions to fix. Efforts can be made to make 
systems resilient, but this can be a near impossible achieve 
affordably, given the magnitude of potential damage. Steps 
can be taken to build up resilience, but these measures are 
expensive with no guarantee of success. 
2.2.2 An Example from Canterbury 
Christchurch (the main city in Canterbury) has a series wells, 
which extract water from a deep high-yield aquifer. The 
water is not normally treated, and the reticulation uses 
pumped- pressure with balance-tanks on the nearby hills.. 
The region experienced several major earthquakes in 2010 
and 2011, which caused significant damage to the 
underground piped system, primarily due to liquefaction and 
lateral spreading. Several balance-tanks tanks were emptied, 
and because of the broken pipes, there were fears of 
waterborne diseases in the reticulated water network. 
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Responders immediately dispatched bottled water, followed 
by water tankers and plastic bladders, into areas without 
potable running water. 
Health authorities issued a boil-water advisory notice, 
informing people to boil or disinfect all water before 
consuming unless using pre-packaged water bottles (but 
there was little consideration of the lack of means to boil the 
water as most residences has no ready sources of heat). 
Within first three weeks of the most serious earthquake 
(February 22nd 2011), 22 chlorinators had been installed in 
the municipal water supply to ensure the water entering the 
system was safe to drink provide a degree of residual 
sterilisation. 
The public health organization successfully used the media to 
educate people on the importance of hygiene and washing 
hands their regularly. 
Following the first earthquake (4 Sep 2010) the Christchurch 
City Council and the Waimakariri District Council (responsible 
for the badly-affected town, Kaiapoi) rapidly designed and 
installed temporary piping to reconnect parts of the network 
that had sustained significant damage.  After the February 
2011 event, which had the greatest effects, everyone had 
running water to their properties within six weeks (excluding 
the CBD which was under a cordon). 
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Providing temporary water in an emergency involves the 
coordination of many different organizations which must 
balance the needs of their individual customers. 
For example, the public initially needs safe drinking water, 
and then rapidly requires more water to cook and wash etc. 
Although fire-fighting requires ready access to water; it does 
not need to be potable. 
Fortunately preparation and training can take place before a 
disaster strikes; providing the community, critical customers 
and emergency services with reliable access to temporary 
potable water immediately after an event. 
3.1 Managing Vulnerabilities 
Understanding the vulnerabilities in a water system enables 
the prioritisation of planning mitigation measures for areas 
that likely require temporary emergency water supplies. 
Vulnerability assessments should give consideration to: 
 The physical asset. 
 The terrain, which includes the difficulty of access, potential 
damage (e.g. liquefaction from an earthquake) and how 
isolated the area is from other water sources. 
 The size, culture and density of the communities / customers. 
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3.1.1 Hazard Types 
While the need for emergency water may be caused by many 
different events, each event will have a different effect on 
the water infrastructure. 
Each hazard an area faces needs a separate vulnerability 
study. These will help formulate plans that can be used as 
part of the initial response. 
Tip: Use a risk matrix to determine the priority of different 
hazard vulnerable investigations. Estimate the 
 Probability of the event occurring 
 Consequences to the water infrastructure 
Score each characteristic 1 to 5. The product of the 
probability and consequence provides an indicative priority 
for mitigation measures. Single items with very high 
consequence scores are likely to be critical items that require 
particular attention regardless of their likelihood. 
3.1.2 Critical Customers 
Building a hierarchy of water customers allows prioritisations 
to be made as part of the vulnerability assessments. Some 
customers are more essential to the functionality of a region 
immediately after a disaster occurs – e.g. hospitals. 
Tip: Distinguish critical customers by tiers. Grouping the level 
of importance together enables consistent decision making. 
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Establish relationships with the highest priority customers 
(e.g. Hospitals, fuel distribution pipelines, schools and 
retirement villages etc.) to ensure they have their own 
emergency water plans. These could include: 
 Certified private wells with standalone pumps and generators 
(there’s no guarantee of power in an emergency) 
 On-site water tanks  
 Water tankers (need a pre-fitted connection with back-flow 
protection, so water can be pumped into their local system) 
3.1.3 Asset Assessment 
When planning how to provide emergency potable water, 
understanding what parts of the system are most likely to 
break is particularly beneficial. 
The networks vulnerability depends on whether it is a 
centralized system (i.e. the water sourced from a bulk 
supplier(s)) or decentralised (water is available from various 
wells / sources throughout the region). A centralized system 
is likely to have fewer redundancies. 
Consideration must be given to what parts of the water 
infrastructure could be damaged by a natural disaster:  
 Will the reservoirs and storage facilities remain operational? If 
not, water may need to be sourced from outside of the region. 
 Will pumps and treatment plants work immediately after an 
event? Can alternative arrangements be made? For example, 
chlorinators, mobile treatment plants and power generators. 
 Is the reticulated piped network vulnerable to damage? 
 Can the water-pressure be maintained in a crisis? 
 Are the back-up water supplies / wells secure? 
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If there is no water due to leaking reservoirs, the reticulated 
network is less critical to an immediate response as there 
would be no water to distribute. Assets that can have the 
largest impact and provide for the highest number of 
customers need to be considered first.   
The vulnerability planning should consider the entire system; 
individual parts cannot be considered in isolation. 
3.1.4 Area Zoning 
The vulnerability assessments will highlight suburbs that face 
the highest risk of losing access to the reticulated water 
network in a disaster. 
Tip: The areas zoned the most vulnerable should be first to 
receive initial impact assessments in an emergency response. 
For these areas, planners can start designing distribution 
sites, educating the public and sorting through logistics and 
transportation issues – which are all explained in this guide. 
3.2 Agency Coordination 
During a water emergency, there will be several parties 
involved.  The local and national civil defence responders, 
water utilities, lifeline coordinators, and health authorities 
will all likely be part of providing emergency potable water. It 
is imperative they all understand how to work together. 
A structured and coordinated inter-agency response is the 
only effective mechanism. 
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New Zealand uses the Coordinated Incident Management 
System; the name itself is not relevant, but one needs to 
exist! Ensuring all agencies are part of the preparations builds 
a mutual understanding of how the plan works, where the 
vulnerable areas are and the logistical considerations. 
Note, while a coordinated response is essential, having skilled 
network operators accessible to consult on repairs, not just 
temporary solutions, is paramount to a timely recovery. 
3.3 Mutual Aid Agreements 
Receiving support in an emergency from neighbouring 
utilities can have a dramatic effect on the speed of the 
recovery. Agreements can be made before an event; 
reducing confusion & potential resourcing issues. 
When providing temporary emergency water, neighbouring 
utilities may be able to provide bulk potable supply and 
potentially may have access to additional water tankers. 
Assistance can be provided in the form of expertise and relief 
responders. In some cases adjacent utilities are within a short 
distance of the affected network, and plans can be made to 
temporarily connect the networks together. 
A successful example is the ‘Water Agency Response 
Network’ in California, where once a member, water utilities 
are automatically linked with other members. Resources and 
expertise are available from the members in an emergency, 
where the water utility seeking assistance will meet the 
additional costs.  
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3.4 Alternative Potable Water Plans  
The vulnerability assessments provide guidance on priorities. 
Planning for temporary water solutions to supplement a 
broken network is a related but separate exercise. 
These plans should consider:  
 Where water can be obtained in large quantities. 
 How the water can be treated  
 How the water will be distributed. 
Tip: Investigate a portfolio of solutions. Each will have 
different characteristics including cost, complexity and 
capacity. It also may not be possible to implement one or 
more solutions in some disaster scenarios.  
3.4.1 Packaged Water 
Bottled water is likely to be the first source available in an 
emergency. The faster suppliers can start producing bottles, 
the sooner it can be distributed to those in need. 
Tip: Ask the National / State Emergency Management or Civil 
Defence agency to establish regional pre-event contracts 
with bottling companies such as: 
- Soft-drink manufacturers 
-  Water bottled distributors 
-  Breweries and milk producers 
As part of the planning process, each region should know 
how quickly the producers can start. Consideration should 
also go to the containers used. 5L containers are easier to 
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distribute than 1L or 750ml. It may also be possible to ask 
these producers to fill bags (small bladders) which can be 
sealed. Bags are lighter, easier to transport and reduce the 
amount of plastic required. 
The advantage of providing the public with large (e.g. 5 liter) 
containers is they can be reused at distribution points once 
water tankers and/or large bladders start to be utilized.  
Some regions may be located near storage warehouses for 
bottled water. Establishing relationships (and preferably 
contracts) with these operators before a disaster will 
facilitate instant access to bottled water while the production 
plants become operational. 
3.4.2 Water Tankers 
Water tankers can be used to transport potable water into 
communities, but a few things must be considered: 
 Under current health regulations all tankers used for potable 
water distribution must be certified. 
 Is there a readily available access to certified water tankers  
 Where will the tankers be filled? 
 How can we get more certified tankers / tankers certified 
quickly? 
Tip: Investigate whether the local laws and regulations allow 
for emergency registration of appropriate tankers – if not 
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Tip: Establish regional contracts with organizations such as 
milk processors and breweries that may be able to supply 
and fill tankers. 
Develop back-ups for plans to use commercial tankers as 
they could be in use when a disaster occurs (e.g. by dairy 
farmers during their season peak). 
Water can be disinfected as tankers are filled. The delivery 
journey may be a sufficient period for the disinfectant to act 
– however this needs to be checked and monitored. 
If the tankers are to be filled locally, then there needs to be 
reasonable confidence that: 
 There will be access to sufficient of potable water after the 
disaster.  
 There are facilities that can fill the tankers in a timely / 
efficient manner. If not, a facility may need to be constructed. 
If uncertainty exists regarding local supply, steps need to be 
taken to find alternative sources; these may include using 
neighbouring or private water supplies (if available and not 
likely to be suffering the same fate) and exploring local 
sources (listed in Appendix I – Natural Water Sources). 
Alternative sources may need to be certified by the health 
authorities and treated before being pumped into tankers. 
This may require additional time and equipment. 
Tip: If appropriate, investigate mutual aid agreements with 
neighbouring suppliers.  
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Plans need to include where water distribution tankers / 
trucks will access fuel and allocation of a re-fuelling priority in 
the event of fuel rationing. 
3.4.3 Water Bladders & Portable Tanks 
Water Bladders are large flexible tanks that can be filled and 
transported on the back of utilities (Utes) or trucks. 
Alternatively, they can be placed at fixed distribution points 
where they are refilled by water tankers. 
Note: If the region has reasonable water-access, boats can 
also be utilised for transport. 
Tanks are more readily available than tankers, but do not 
offer the same flexibility.  
Tanks also need to be certified as safe for potable water, but 
this is likely to be less of an issue than with tankers due to 
the tanks being purpose built for storing potable water. 
There are examples of purchasing bladders in advance; but 
they can be expensive and this approach is only 
recommended when these kind of tanks or bladders are not 
readily available within the region. 
Tip:  Establish pre-disaster relationships with local suppliers 
of water tanks & bladders. 
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3.4.4 Pre-Installed Water Tanks 
Depending on the risks an area faces, it may be beneficial to 
construct water tanks in communities that are most likely to 
need potable water in a crisis.  
The sites need to be accessible to the public, and to a source 
of water, which may be a road, and include a distribution 
mechanism (potentially hoses) which can deliver water 
without the use of power. Such a provision would make an 
area temporarily self-sufficient in the initial aftermath, 
reducing the immediate pressure on responders. However, 
the need to replenish the supply in the tank should not be 
overlooked 
Depending on the size of the tank and scale of the 
emergency, water tankers could resupply the tanks, reducing 
the need to establish additional distribution points. 
Ideal locations include schools and community hubs. Be 
aware that not all areas are likely to be able to justify the 
expenditure. 
3.4.5 Desalination 
 Desalination units can be used to convert sea water into 
potable water. It is an expensive process for the yield 
obtained. 
 Units may need to be brought in from outside the disaster zone 
or even from other countries. 
 The devices rely on other lifelines such as power. If not 
available generators and fuel will need to be located. 
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 They are not normally mobile. The units convert raw water at a 
fixed location.  
Many planners consider desalination a last resort for a 
temporary potable water option. Its use depends on the 
availability, accessibility and the capacity of available fresh 
water sources.  
The largest benefit of desalination is that it can often serve 
an isolated coastal location more easily and cheaply than 
other options.  
Consideration needs to be given to how the devices are used. 
Are they for bulk supply in water tankers to other distribution 
points or to be used as an individual distribution point? If for 
bulk supply, transportation options need to be arranged. 
The Army may have access to some of this equipment 
3.4.6 Temporary Reticulation 
Temporary overland pipes can be laid after an event to 
bypass damaged areas or connect to alternate sources of 
supply. Preplanning can identify alternative sources of supply 
and rough estimates of materials, skill, equipment and time 
to effect temporary by-passes. 
Tip: Foster relationships with suppliers before an event, this 
enables better coordination and increases the speed at which 
materials can be deployed.  
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3.5 Potable Water Treatment 
When an alternative water source is located, it may not be 
immediately safe for public supply. Treatment is likely to be 
required before the water is consumed. 
Consult a Qualified Professional on the water’s suitability. 
Households may have their own treatment equipment 
installed (e.g. Point of Use, Point on Entry or Pour-through 
devices), but it should be assumed that these are not in use. 
When the public is asked to boil or disinfect their water, it 
should include all alternative water sources (expect pre-
packaged bottles) to keep the message consistent. 
Consideration must be given as to how to boil waters. If there 
is no electricity, no reticulated gas and it is a “smoke free 
zone” (and therefore no fire-places or “log-burners” to cook 
on) this may be problematic. In Christchurch gas barbeques 
were often used, but few people had access to them.  
3.5.1 Pre-Treatment Methods 
A strategy on treating water in an emergency is necessary as 
there are no guarantees the existing treatment facilities will 
be operational or the planned alternatives will be available. . 
Staff who will be asked to use the equipment should be 
familiar with its operating procedures, including being 
provided with pre-emergency training. 
Without planning, procurement could take several weeks; it 
is necessary to know the treatment capacity required, where 
to find the equipment and any ancillary parts needed. 
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 Tip: Establishing relationships with vendors will improve the 
procurement process in a disaster situation. 
Depending on the available resources, there is a range of 
clarification options. Here is a brief list, however further 
research should be done before being included as a solution: 
 Storage & Sedimentation: Storing water for a number of hours improves 
its quality as solid particles drop to the bottom of the tank, and clear 
water can be skimmed off the top for disinfecting. The treatment 
effectiveness depends on the quality of the raw water. 
 Coagulation and Flocculation: The process introduces a non-toxic 
chemical (aluminium sulphate) that encourages colloidal particles (e.g. 
clay) to combine to form heavier particles that will settle to the bottom 
of a. The level of chemical required depends on the nature of the raw 
water.  The water’s pH level strongly influences the effectiveness of this 
process. 
 Roughing Filtration: A process to reduce the turbidity in water carrying 
large amounts of suspended solids. Coarse media are used as filters (5 to 
25 mm in diameter). Additional filtration may be required to ensure the 
water is potable. 
 Rapid Sand Filtration: Rapid sand filters are common in modern urban 
water-treatment systems. It may need to be refined if there are changes 
in the raw water quality. The process is not recommended as the only 
procedure in an emergency. Further disinfection may be required. 
 Slow Sand Filtration: If done correctly, this process can produce safe 
drinking water without disinfectant. The process is slow and would 
probably require a very large installation to generate sufficient yield in 
an emergency. 
 Diatomaceous earth filtration: This process uses a very fine filter-media 
that is held by cloth or metallic filter-cores. The process is widely used in 
swimming pools and can produce reasonable volumes of potable water. 
 Reverse Osmosis: membrane-based demineralization method to 
separate dissolved solids, such of ions. Industry scale plants can provide 
ample yield in a crisis with high levels efficiently. 
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3.5.2 Disinfection 
The WHO endorses the use of disinfection for drinking water. 
Disinfection should be done in all emergency situations, to 
lessen the probability of waterborne diseases. 
The sterilising agent can be added either by water supplier or 
household consumers; however the general public should 
only be provided with water that can be made safe.  
Boiling: Boiling water can treat some raw water before 
consumption. Water should be held at a rolling-boil for 1 
minutes (jugs with an automatic cut-offs are unsuitable) 
Effectiveness depends on the level of contamination; in some 
situations just bringing to the boil is sufficient.  
Health Authorities may prefer the boiling water options for 
the public because of how easy it is compared with mixing 
and measuring the correct dosage of chemicals (e.g. bleach). 
However, in some cases, power or gas will not be available 
due to the simultaneous disruption of other lifelines. 
Chlorination: Chlorine is a common disinfection method. It is 
usually done by the water supplier, but the public can be 
asked to treat their own water. The chlorination leaves a 
residual dose in the water, safeguarding it from 
contamination “down-stream” of the treatment source, but 
when done properly it is usually tasteless. The process must 
be carefully controlled and closely observed by those 
overseeing it. Portable equipment needs to be available to 
monitor the chlorine levels.  
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 Tip: Locate suppliers of chlorinators; ensure accessibility to 
both the machines and operating expertise in an emergency 
for city wide chlorination. Ensure access to monitoring kits. 
Chlorine is less effective in turbid water. Clarification is 
required if water has NTU over 20 (it should be less than 5). 
Treatment at point of consumption: Methods include 
chlorine tablets / de-tasting tablets (commonly used by the 
military) and non-perfumed household chlorine bleach. The 
public need to be educated on the type of bleach and the 
amount of bleach to added per litre of water. 
Tip: Education programmes can be run with retailers, where 
flyers are attached under bleach products that are suitable 
for disinfecting water in an emergency. 
3.5.3 Mobile Treatment Facilities 
It is possible to procure mobile treatment facilities that are 
capable of treating nearly any raw water at various rates. The 
plants can be difficult to obtain in an emergency without any 
pre-planning. The advantage of a mobile facility is they can 
move between several water sources. The Army may have 
some of this equipment. 
Tip: Investigate whether mobile treatment facilities need to 
be certified for producing potable water. 
Additional expertise will likely be required to operate the 
mobile facilities.  
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3.6 Distribution of Potable Water  
Once alternative water has been sourced and treated, it 
needs to be distributed. Plans should be made as to how the 
sites will operate and the resources needed, and preliminary 
assessments made of site locations, to the actual location of 
distributions the sites will be determined by the disruption. 
3.6.1 Location of Distribution Sites  
Developing a pre-defined criteria for distribution sites will 
reduce the possibly of future (and unexpected) problems. 
The suggested criteria should include: 
 Maximum distance of 300m for those who will be collecting the 
water on foot (600m circumference) or 1.5km in rural areas. 
o Consider 100m – 150m in hilly terrain 
 A large surface of at least 50m x 20m 
 Paved surface with good drainage 
 Accessible by truck and an area that can be secured 
 Ease of access for the community 
 Central to other temporary emergency facilities 
 Not outside emergency departments such as police or fire 
stations 
 Not in the same immediate precinct as open commercial 
suppliers, (e.g. supermarkets) reducing potential redundancies. 
 Safe environment for staff (e.g. safe from the traffic). 
Preliminary level planning can be done to identify potential 
sites which may be appropriate. The initial impact 
assessments will be the primary basis for determining the 
site locations. 
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3.6.2 Distribution of packaged Water  
The level of planning needed to distribute packaged (bottled 
or bagged water) depends on the scale of packaged water 
used. With a large response, a staging area is required for 
unloading bulk supplies and for the bulk-break into parcels 
suitable for delivery to the distribution sites. This will 
improve efficiency and reduce the need to duplicate 
resources for handling large pallets. 
A staging area needs: 
 Sufficient area for storage and for manoeuvring of truck-and-
trailer units and with good access. Do not overlook the 
potential use of rail deliveries. In the Christchurch events rail 
was remarkably resilient and had short repair times. 
 A supervisor / coordinator. 
 Pallet-handling equipment (forklift/s plus driver/s and pallet 
jacks etc.) 
 Distribution coordinator – ensuring each individual site has 
sufficient supplies.  
 Labour, delivery trucks / vans, with drivers. 
How a packaged water distribution site should operate: 
 Use a clearing separate for delivery-vehicle to park. 
 Vehicles are unloaded on arrival 
 Move the bulk-supply to individual cartons where people can 
follow passed. 
3.6.3 Distribution from Tanks & Tankers  
Bladders and tanks generally require an apparatus to pump 
water to the distribution points unless gravity flow can be 
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arranged (e.g. on a sloping site) Tankers can deliver by 
gravity, but it is usually more efficient if pumped-pressure 
can be used.  
Equipment will be required to decant the water into the 
public’s containers. Ideally, a number of hoses-and-taps will 
be available allowing a more of people to fill their containers 
at once. Hoses allow a range of container heights, and taps 
reduce spillage. Benches can be helpful when people have 
small containers be used; however some people may have 
difficulty in lifting filled large water containers from tables, 
(as they are unaware of the amounts they can carry). 
Tip: Pre-engineer appropriate water delivery apparatuses 
that can be deployed immediately with tanks / tankers. 
Sites can be either fixed or mobile. 
Mobile Sites: If using only tankers, they will need to refilled, 
and it is unlikely there will be sufficient tankers for a rotation. 
Bladders on the back of Utes or trucks can be used in a 
similar way, but they will normally have a lower capacity. 
Mobile sites must be consistent, run to schedule and have 
sufficient water to last the promised duration. Simple 
calculations can be done on how many people one tank can 
serve based on the average volume collected per person, and 
if necessary deliveries should be rationed accordingly. 
The Emergency Operational Centre should be informed from 
when field when tanks are emptying quicker than expected. 
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 Tip: Do not simply add up the people in the queue. People 
will collect water for the entire household. Averages will 
quickly appear on how much each person is taking. 
Fixed Location Sites: Storage should be placed at fixed water 
distribution sites so that they can be safely easily, and quickly 
refilled by tankers (or bladders on trucks). Gravity will 
generally be too slow for refilling the bladders / tanks.  
Water delivery from fixed sites need to be monitored on how 
quickly tanks are empting; so that they have water available 
during their opening hours (daylight hours). 
Disinfection of containers: Although the water supplied to 
the public should be safe to drink there is no guarantee that 
containers being used by the public are clean. Appropriate 
levels of residual chlorine should be able to manage most of 
the risk, but profession advice should be obtained. 
Caution: It is essential to consider the entire supply chain 
from the raw water source to the consumers’ mouths, not 
only how to get the water to them in a potable condition. 
It is likely to be near impossible to provide on-site 
disinfection because of the difficultly in judging the volume of 
water in a variety of containers. It is better to ask people to 
use sterilised containers, boil their water or explain how 
much bleach they will need to add.  
Containers: People may struggle to access food grade 
containers, let alone clean ones. This was partially observed 
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after the Canterbury earthquakes with questionable 
containers sometimes used. It could create larger health 
issues in the region if the practice is widespread. 
Potential solutions include:  
 Establish relationships with plastic retailers to provide special 
facilities for selling containers in an emergency. 
 Have suitable containers available at distribution points or use 
small bladders (bags) that can be sealed. 
Tip: Providing bottled water in large containers, with 
education to reuse them afterwards, could be a solution. 
3.6.4 Site Design 
Water distribution sites should be designed to cater for fast 
flowing queues. People do not mind long queues in an 
emergency, providing they move at a reasonable pace. 
An ideal distribution site should include: 
 The ability to process or serve 4 to 6 people simultaneously.  
Tip: Do not limit the amount of water per person; there is no 
way to determine how many people they are catering for. 
 People flowing in one direction 
 Stages in order. For example if providing containers, they need 
to be available before the water distribution begins.  
 Sufficient distance between other temporary provisions 
including food & toilets. 
o For hygienic purposes, toilets and waste disposal should 
be at least 30 to 40 metres away from the potable water. 
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 A design to take advantage of gravity – this can be artificially 
engineered through a raised mound if necessary. 
 Security from contamination for open water sources (e.g. 
tankers& bladders). 
 Toilets, shade, shelter from wind, 
 safety from traffic and other hazards 
3.6.5 Promotion of Hygiene  
First-class hygiene practises are needed at all potable water 
distribution points. The work done in reducing the risk of 
waterborne disease lessens the burden on other stressed 
services such as hospitals and First-Aid tents. 
Anti-microbial hand gel can be provided at locations where 
members of the public will congregate (including water 
distribution sites), with encouragement to clean their hands 
before collecting potable water. 
Tip: The all-agency emergency plans MUST include provisions 
for hand sanitizer at all distribution points and community 
support locations with similar promotional material. 
The public need to be educated on how to keep the water 
clean, including not dipping their hands into the containers. 
3.6.6 Distribution Personnel 
The personnel needed, will be dependent on the water-
point; however any plan for temporary distribution of 
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Most emergency responses may not require all of the 
following positions but all will need some of them. Positions 
include: 
 Managers and logistics personnel within the EOC. 
 Staging staff (see bottled water in 5.4.2). 
 Truck drivers. 
 Bulk water treatment specialists. 
 Distribution site operators (to prevent water contamination, 
racketeering and theft). 
 Security when permanent sites have equipment unattended. 
 Staff from other government departments, e.g. Park Rangers 
 Health advisors ensuring the water is and remains potable. 
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 3.7 Equipment, Supplies & Services 
Much of the equipment and supplementary services needed 
(excluding equipment explained within the potable water 
solutions, treatment and distribution), is generic and most 
likely similar to existing emergency management plans. 
While incorporating emergency water readiness into the 
existing plans, it is timely to ensure common supplies, 
services and facilities are also in place. 
 Sufficient of 2-way radios; both handheld and vehicles with 
radios fitted are extremely useful. 
o Ensure equipment is in place so that the radio network 
range is sufficient for the entire region. 
 GIS and GPS equipment. Preferably with mobile units fitted to 
the vehicle fleet and with live access to maps for repair crews. 
 Electronic services to generate maps of infrastructure damage 
from GIS information. 
 Paper (laminated) and electronic copies of maps, contact 
information and operational plans for your water network, 
stored in several locations (including the EOC). 
 Accurate (up-to-date) road maps for the entire infrastructure 
network in vehicles. 
 4WDs can be extremely useful, especially with flooding or 
liquefaction. 
 Adequate local water testing laboratories. 
Tip: Establish relationships with other laboratories in the 
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Continued:  
 Cellphones with back-up batteries and with SIM cards for 
multiple cellphone networks. 
o Have credit cards to top-up SIM cards. 
 Water purification equipment. 
 First-Aid kits with emergency chlorine tablets for staff use. 
 Batteries for all electronic devices. 
 An up-to-date inventory of all equipment, their location and 
maintenance schedule. 
 Cables to connect cellphones to laptops for use as modems for 
internet access. 
 Relationships with suppliers to obtain portable chlorinators.  
 Emergency contact lists with details of all staff needed during 
an emergency response. 
 A database with the skills of various employees, contractors 
and specialists in the region. 
 Regularly test emergency generators, ensure sufficient 
machines are available and design plans for accessing fuel. 
 Various tools such as whiteboards, markers, pens & pencils, 
flashlights, printers, paper and megaphones. 
 An online system for network tagging (in and out procedures) 
for valves and other parts of the network (ensure all 
contractors receive induction on network tagging procedures). 
 Ensure specialist parts are available of unusual sizes that exist 
in the network. Regularly communicate with the pipe supplier 
on their availability. 
 An appropriate number of SCADA sensors spread across the 
network can provide real-time data on its functionality. 
 Cleaning equipment for tankers and plastic water tanks.  
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 3.8 Public Education and Involvement 
Educating the general public on how to prepare for a disaster 
can be one of the most effective mechanisms of achieving a 
successful response. In Japan, Kameda showed in a study that 
when a community that is aware a disaster may occur, it can 
tolerate up to 4-weeks without normal services, however, 
long-sustained periods without access to pressurized water 
start to become unacceptable. The public may feel more 
accepting if they are included in the planning process (i.e. 
community consultation). 
3.8.1 Water Storage 
Households need to be educated on how to prepare for at 
least 3-days without support. They should keep water in 
clean strong plastic bottles that are dated and stored an 
accessible, dark, low place (but not on the ground) with 5-
drops of non-perfumed household bleach per litre. The 
bottles should be checked every 12 months and refilled if 
cloudy. Another option for households is to freeze water (e.g. 
in milk bottles - with the tops off until the water is frozen). 
3.8.2 Rainwater Catchments 
Rainwater catchments are a common (and successful) 
household preparation mechanism, but there is a perception 
the water is always safe to drink without any treatment. 
Studies by several researchers in New Zealand, Australia and 
elsewhere (Ministry of Health – 2005) have shown high levels 
of coliforms and the presence of E. coli in rainwater gathered 
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from roofs. The source of this contamination is generally 
bird-droppings, but cats and other animals can also 
contribute where roofs are flat.  
The studies suggest regular rainwater consumers can build 
up a resistance to the contamination; however the majority 
consuming rainwater in an emergency will have limited 
resistance and could become ill if water from rainwater 
catchments is not boiled or disinfected. The public need to be 
educated on the importance of boiling or disinfecting water 
before consumption in an emergency. 
3.8.3 Hygiene Promotion 
In Christchurch one of the most effective programmes after 
the earthquakes was the hygiene promotion programme. 
Much of the work came out of the health pandemic planning. 
This meant the public was aware of the benefits of washing 
their hands regularly (and properly) and maintaining good 
hygiene habits. 
Providing the community with sanitation facilities (e.g. anti-
micro hand gel at water distribution sites) is an essential part 
of the keeping the general population healthy. 
3.8.4 Volunteers 
In an emergency, there are likely to be staff shortages. 
Volunteers will only be effective if they have had training.  
Tip: Work with the community to educate them on how to 
assist in an emergency. Groups like scout troops or school 
clubs could be ideal initial targets.  
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 3.9 The Elderly & Infirm Groups 
 
The elderly, disabled and other infirm people require special 
consideration when developing a temporary emergency 
water plan. Many have difficulty in moving medium distances 
and would struggle to carry water from distribution points. 
Vulnerabilities include: 
 A high prevalence to conditions adversely affected by 
chlorination of water. 
 Shock from a massive disruption or disaster. 
 Impaired eyesight and a high risk of trauma. 
Often these groups (especially the elderly) resist asking for 
help and can be difficult to track down but are grateful when 
it is provided. 
Tip: Work with relevant NGOs and homecare providers. 
Many of these people are cared for on a regular or daily 
basis. Volunteers could be trained to assist these 
organisations during an emergency. 
By working with those who provide for the elderly and the 
immobile, it reduces the need to track individuals. The focus 
can be on tracking and training the providers. 
Plans can be made for delivering water supplies directly to 
their home or enabling it to be taken out by people visiting 
them. More resources may be needed than the normal 
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available staff; volunteers could be trained to deliver 
emergency provisions such as water during an emergency 
response. 
Some people will not be provided for by these arrangements. 
Also consider: 
 Establishing hotlines for people to call that need assistance. 
 Making arrangements with the national welfare provider. Ask 
them to contact their clients in an emergency to ensure they 
are OK. If not, pass their details onto someone who can help. 
3.9.1 Dialysis Patients & Transplant Patients 
Special plans must be developed for patients on home 
dialysis or recent transplant patients if they are on a non-
chlorinated water supply. Options include: 
 Sourcing additional equipment to process the chlorinated 
water. This could be added in an emergency. 
 Transporting the patients out of the affected region. 
3.9.2 Communicating with the Elderly  
Emergency education material should be made available in a 
variety of formats, catering for those either visually or 
audibly impaired. 
Tailoring education advice to the elderly could be beneficial 
in informing how they fit into the emergency plan and how 
they can prepare for a disaster. These pamphlets could be 
provided to them through their healthcare provider 
.  
 
Disaster Mitigation Guideline  
 
   
 Page 34 
 
 3.10 Training 
There is a variety of emergency training exercises that can be 
used. The effectiveness of any training or exercise depends 
on the participation of the people involved in the training / 
exercise and the emergency response. A successful training 
exercise utilises ‘What If?” questions to encourage 
participant to think “outside the box”. 
All training exercises should be followed by a review of what 
worked and what can be done better (or differently). 
3.10.1 Training methods 
 Orientation: The basic procedures of the emergency plan. 
 Table-top: The participants verbally describe their tasks in the 
response of the emergency scenario. The methods 
effectiveness is limited, given that a small number of people 
are usually involved. 
 Functional Exercises: This method is an effective tool in 
simulating a real response. Multiple parties would participate; 
each at a different tables (or rooms). The parties are forced to 
communicate as if the disaster is actually occurring. Runners 
can be used, and a facilitator will inject new material as the 
scenario progresses. Each hour (or day) can be represented 
(e.g. each hour equals 5 minutes). The parties must follow the 
emergency response plan and carry out their designated roles. 
 Full Scale Drills: All of the personnel who would respond to a 
real emergency must respond and mobilize for the scenario. 
Each person would respond as directed by the emergency 
response plan. New material is injected into the scenario by a 
  
 
  Emergency Potable Water 
 Page 35 
 
facilitator as necessary. This is the most expensive and time 
consuming method; therefore often impractical. 
Training exercises are the only real method to test an 
emergency response plan outside of a real scenario. They 
need to be done regularly (the definition of which depends 
on the risks and complexities involved), with on-going 
education provided. New employees should be trained as 
they join the relevant organisations. 
Training exercises are fundamental for learning: 
 What does and does not work. 
 What new unexpected resources will be required during an 
emergency response. 
 How to solve problem quickly. 
 How to work with people that they do not generally work with 
on a daily basis. 
In a scenario where the water supply infrastructure is 
disrupted, the participants should be required to: 
 Decide how they will establish distribution sites and how the 
on-going operation will play out. 
 Contact the pre-planned resources. 
 Issue public health advisories. 
 Replicate how they would inform the public. 
 Sources potable water for distribution, given the scenario 
.  
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 3.11 Public Communication 
Readiness 
A Communication Plan for temporary potable water supplies 
should be prepared. It should be designed for both 
incorporation into an organisation-wide communication plan 
or use as a stand-alone document. 
3.11.1 Basic Principles of Communication Planning 
 Anticipate, Prepare and Practice.  
 Rule of 3.In high-stress situations, people can at best process 
three messages at once. 
 Reinforce the fundamental facts first and last. 
 Keep it Simple. Avoid complicated details where possible. 
Pictures and maps can be more valuable than words. 
 Use a Positive Tone. Mix negative messages with positivity and 
use solution-oriented messages. Avoid being defensive. 
 Cite Credible Third Parties. These build trust and enhance the 
credibility of your message. 
 
3.11.2 Message Mapping Techniques 
 Provide quick references for leaders and spokespeople to 
respond quickly. 
 Enable the same message to be rapidly communicated across a 
wide spectrum of mediums. 
 Can be used to predict potential questions. 
Tip: Pre-prepare a template with blank spaces for the 
incident’s specific details. 
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The 7-Steps for messaging mapping are: 
1. Identify the stakeholders. 
2. Identify probable questions. 
3. Analyse the questions to identify the underlying concerns. 
4. Develop key messages. 
5. Include supporting facts in the messages. 
6. Test and practice the messages. 
7. Deliver message maps to range of information channels. 
3.11.3 Messages about Temporary Water Supplies 
Work with the health authorities to develop messages for: 
 How to boil water (e.g. 5 minutes in a pot, not in a jug,  no 
automatic cut-off),  
 Alternative household disinfectants such as non-perfumed 
bleach  
 What kind of activities must be done using clean drinking water 
(e.g. washing fruit and brushing teeth). 
3.11.4 Resources 
Additional resources may be needed to compose and 
distribute messages, develop maps, distribute printed 
information and design fliers. Posters should be prepared for 
use at distribution points. 
Tip: Consider the use of non-essential staff or other 
government departments (e.g. Tax Department) to assist 
in the communication effort, such as distributing flyers.  
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 3.12 Post-warning Preparation 
Activities 
There are warnings of some events such as hurricanes and 
tsunamis before they arrive. Most pre-disaster tasks focus on 
securing the infrastructure; but there are also activities that 
can be done to improve temporary potable water availability: 
1. Redistribute the emergency plans to all staff before the 
event, to refresh their memory of their responsibilities. 
2. Over-chlorinate the water supply, to protect it against 
pathogens. 
3. Ensure all water storage tanks are full. 
4. Gather maps, radios, GIS devices and other equipment 
used in surveying. Stock up on batteries and charge 
appropriate devices. 
5. Contact logistics staff, ensure health authorities are on 
standby and work with other authorities as appropriate. 
6. Contact those providing alternative potable water solutions 
e.g. water tanker companies and bottle water producers. 
7. Prepare public information based on the expected 
outcomes of the disaster. 
8. Pre-warn the public that all or some people may be 
without access to the reticulated water network and 
advising everyone to ensure they have sufficient household 
water supplies. 
9. Ensure access to fuel and power generators as required. 
10. Contact critical customers to ensure they have enough 
provisions to survive the event’s immediate aftermath. 
If there is time, allow staff expected to be involved in the 
emergency to take care of their own personal business.  
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3.13 Readiness Programme 
 
Using this guide, the main activities with the readiness 




4.1 Identify the vulnerabilities to the local water 
infrastructure. 
High 
4.1.4 - Identify which regions are the most 
vulnerable. 
High 
4.2 Identify & work with the agencies that will be 
part of an emergency water response. 
High 
4.3 Evaluate alternative potable water solutions. High 
4.7 Ensure the equipment and supplies needed 
during an emergency will be available and are 
in a good condition. 
High 
 
4.8 Commence education programmes with the 
community: 
- Their part in the emergency. 
- Household emergency supplies that 
should be stored. 
How to boil & disinfect water. 
High 
4.10 Conduct training exercises to test the 
emergency response plan; ensure all of the 
relevant agencies and personnel are 
comfortable with their roles. 
High 
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 Distributing up-to-date emergency response 
plans to everyone involved. 
High 
 Regularly review the existing readiness 
measures and update as necessary. 
High 
4.4 Develop contingency plans for emergency 
water treatment. 
Med 
4.5 Plan and design how water distribution sites 
will operate. 
Med 
4.9 Form relationships with NGOs who care for 
the elderly and the disabled in their homes. 
Med 
4.11 Develop public communication protocols and 
templates. 
Med 
4.12 Develop pre-event procedures where there is 
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4 Response 
4.1 Response Approach 
Many parties and organizations will need to work together 
for emergency potable water to be successfully deployed.  
It is insufficient to know only your own role in an emergency 
response, there must also be an understanding of the 
expectations of others. To help in achieving this, the concept 
of a restoration timeline has been adopted. This concept was 
developed in a New Zealand paper on Infrastructure 
Resilience – called a ‘Targeted Service Restoration Standard’. 
Within the timeline, there are defined stages to facilitate 
planning for the relevant organisations and personnel. The 
timeline assists in prioritising resources and personnel. The 
concept also helps to improve the knowledge of when certain 
agencies are involved. 
The estimates used in this booklet are for a large scale 
disruption, but need to be developed for each hazard. The 
estimates should to be tailored to your own local situation.  
The estimates of the emergency response used are: 
 Critical Services - The first 24 hours. 
 Essential Services – 1 to 4 days. 
 Important Services – 4 to 10 days. 
 Standard Services – Up to 4 weeks. 
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These estimations translate into a restoration curve: 
Potable Water Infrastructure  
Days Weeks Months 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 2 3 4 2 3 4 
Temporary Critical Services                           
Temporary Essential Services                           
Temporary Important Services                           
Temporary Standard Services                           
Permanent Critical Services                           
Permanent Essential Services                           
Permanent Important Services                6 months to 2 years 
Permanent Standard Services                1 to 5 years  
Concept adapted from the Infrastructure Resilience Paper 
Each disaster will require its own restoration curve. 
Agreement should be reached by the local agencies on the 
definitions for each stage. Generic definitions are stated for 
the four phases in the top of each section (6.2 to 6.5). 
4.2 Temporary Critical Services 
 
Critical Services: These ensure everyone in the area has 
access to some form of potable water (minimum is water for 
drinking) 
The initial water requirements depend on the alternative 
water supplies available. 
If local emergency potable water tanks exist in the region, 
the community may be able to provide for itself in the 
immediate aftermath, and the logistics of providing potable 
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water is less critical; if not, the logistics of getting drinking 
water into the community becomes very important. 
In most circumstances, there are at least four main functions 
needed in the first 24 hours: 
 Initial Impact Assessments. 
 Communication about water supplies (plus shelter and 
sanitation) 
 Logistics and distribution. 
 Health Advice. 
4.2.1 Initial Impact Assessment 
If available, use the pre-evaluated high risk zones to first 
identify which areas are likely to have sustained damage 
during the event. 
When the impact assessments are done dispatch temporary 
provisions such as potable water in a timely manner. 
The Aim: the EOC (Emergency operations centre) should 
produce an accurate map of what is working, what is partially 
functional, and what communities have no access to potable 
water and what is available from its sources of bulk supply. 
Tip: Use several teams, each focusing on different aspects. 
i.e. water storage, the treatment plants and the distribution 
network in pre-established vulnerable zones. 
4.2.2 Critical Logistics 
Utilize the alternative potable water solutions from the 
readiness preparations.  The first is most likely to be bottled 
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water; however your region may have pre-installed 
emergency water tanks which the community can access. 
If your solution is not community based water tanks: 
 Review the pre-planning, 
 Amend the pre-plans as appropriate and implement them. This 
should include: 
o Contacting the emergency suppliers ASAP. 
o Determining the location, planning for and developing the 
water-distribution points. 
o Arranging transportation of the water supplies. 
o Obtaining personnel from operations as needed. 
o Informing the spokesperson of timeframes and locations of 
the first emergency supplies. 
o If the event is expected to last several days, preparations 
should start on the distribution of the secondary supplies (e.g. 
water tankers). 
o Monitor how effectively the distribution points are reaching 
the communities without water.  
o Managing spontaneous supplies of water. 
4.2.3 Initial Potable Water Requirements 
The recommended minimum requirements for potable water 
during an emergency by international humanitarian 
guidelines (e.g. PAHO), the Ministry of Health and other 
governmental agencies is 15 to 20 litres of water per person 
per day. However, in the first 24 hours of the response, it is 
vital everyone has access to potable water for drinking, not 
necessarily for other activities. An absolute minimum by the 
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recommended by the Sphere Project is 3 to 5 litres of potable 
water per person, which will grow as the response advances. 
In the essential services phase (6.3) emergency potable water 
levels should be sufficient to cater for at least 20 litres per 
person per day and 40 – 60 litres per person per day for 
those in hospitals and First-Aid stations. 
4.2.4 Public Communication  
Using the communication arrangements (4.10) rapid provide 
the public with information on: 
 Boiling Water (if necessary) 
 
 Location and availability of alternative water supplies 
 
 Expected outage – timeframes. 
Include information of the expected timeline for the 
restoration, the progress being made to restore services and 
maps of affected locations when available. As the response 
advances charts/graphs may be a better way of presenting 
this information. 
It may be necessary to make a distinction between potable 
and non-potable water; including what non-potable water 
can be used for, e.g. laundry (if care is taken).  
Consider websites, Twitter, TV, Facebook, radio, newspapers, 
flyers & door-knocking. If personnel have been prepared, e.g. 
for distributing flyers etc., utilize them. Otherwise if the 
outage is expected to be significant, start gathering people 
who can communicate the message directly into the 
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communities (If there's no power, then they are unlikely to 
have TV!).  
4.2.5 Health Authorities& Hygiene Promotion 
Most countries have drinking water standards that must be 
met – the public health authorities have an advisory and 
monitoring role to ensure everyone has access to water, and 
can be make it potable. Their tasks include: 
 Assisting the utilities when requested with monitoring the 
levels of contamination. 
 Ensuring all temporary solutions (except packaged water) have 
adequate signage around disinfection and boiling of water. 
 Issuing boil-water notices and disinfection guidelines. 
 Contacting all small water suppliers in the region, ensure they 
know how to monitor and treat their own systems. 
 Providing primary water utilities with advice on their water 
treatment options. 
 Consistent and comprehensive coverage of the public health 
message. 
Health authorities also play vital roles in ensuring all 
community support locations and water distribution points 
have suitable sanitation. Health authorities should help to 
educate people about the importance of clean hands before 
going near potable water. Close monitoring and appropriate 
signage is strongly recommended. 
Provision of hand-sanitizer is especially critical. 
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Public education should take place through media and other 
outlets on the importance of washing hands, using clean / 
suitable containers and treating their water sufficiently.  
4.3 Temporary Essential Services 
Temporary Services: Expand the availability of potable water 
to ensure sufficient water for cleaning, cooking and personal 
hygiene; and service critical customers where possible. 
Multiple sources of temporary potable water will probably be 
needed during this stage of the response. The situation will 
require close and consistent monitoring. This will be the most 
visible part of the temporary response while the water 
utilities repair the reticulation network(s). 
The communication and health advice remains similar to the 
initial phase (but with more resources) while the logistics will 
become the heart of the temporary water response. 
Impact assessments will continue, but they will become 
focused on the damage to specific critical assets. 
4.3.1 Essential Logistics 
Pre-planning, converted into actual plans should provide 
details of required logistics. Water tankers and bladders are 
the likely high-demand items during this phase, with 
supplementary bottled water still being available (ideally in 
5L containers or small bladders). 
Bladders can be used at permanent distribution locations and 
filled by tankers – allowing tankers to be used more 
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efficiently. Tanks that are pre-installed within the community 
can be refilled, allowing existing infrastructure to be reused.  
Work with the health authorities to ensure adequate signage 
on all tankers and bladders.  
If mobile distribution points are utilised, it is vital they are 
consistent – “Same Time, Same Place. Do not be late”. 
If provisions are made to provide the public with containers, 
ensure these too are consistent. People get frustrated when 
told one thing, yet observe another.  
If necessary, work with the critical customers in the region to 
provide them with bulk water (e.g. water tankers) until their 
permanent services are operational. 
If bottled water is still the primary source of potable water, 
establishing a staging area will probably be necessary.  
If staff are asked to disinfect public containers at distribution 
points, ensure this happens in the first 48 hours and 
consistently thereafter. 
Section 5.4 of this booklet describes recommendations on 
how to establish potable water distribution points. 
4.3.2 Back-Office Support 
By this stage of the response, it is important back-office 
support services are operational including, payroll, financing 
and administrative tasks. When the business returns to 
normal, there will be a need for the emergency paperwork.  
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Emergency responders are taking on a very difficult job, it is 
essential that they continue to be paid in an emergency. 
They need to be able to support their families without 
anxiety, allowing them to focus on the task at hand. 
4.3.3 Spontaneous Community Water Supplies 
Depending on the scale of the disaster, it is likely that 
(unauthorised) community based water distribution sites 
become established. Health authorities should closely 
monitor them, and there are several options on how to deal 
with them: 
 Allow the sites to continue, following provision of advice and 
guidance to the operators and supplying appropriate leaflets 
they must give to everyone they distribute water to. This is 
the preferred option. 
 Shut them down – however in a crisis, water that is probably 
safe is better than none! 
Monitor the containers being used, e.g. the origin and 
previous use of farm containers may be unknown versus 
household containers which are likely to have contained 
other (drinkable) liquids in them previously. The bulk-
transport tanks may require certification/approval under the 
Drinking Water Regulations 
Health agencies need to ensure their messages are clear on 
how to boil or disinfect water, and how to treat water from 
rain water catchments. Their advice should depend on the 
level of contamination (or potential contamination) in the 
region. 
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 4.4 Temporary Important Services 
 
Important Services: All properties in the region have access 
to pressurized water (the quality may be below par),  with all 
critical customers fully operational (water wise). 
The focus of this phase is temporarily restoring the 
reticulated water system, using a mixture of permanent and 
temporary repairs. Water restrictions may be imposed to 
conserve stored water and to allow the damaged network to 
cope.  
Some limited temporary water potable provisions may still be 
needed as the system recovers. 
4.4.1 Temporary Piping  
Repairing the water system will likely involve a band aid 
approach as well as semi-permanent repairs. This booklet 
does not cover permanent repairs of solutions. 
Pipes and lightweight hoses can be run on top of the ground, 
reducing the time and effort it takes it make repairs – 
bypassing the pre-existing broken pipes beneath. A range of 
sizes will be needed and connections will be required to the 
existing network and consumers serviced by the “bypass-
pipe. 
Temporary pipes should not be considered a long-term 
solution. Overland pipes need to be buried when it is 
practical to do so. If they are left above ground for long 
periods they are vulnerable to leaks and ultimately ultra-
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violet deterioration will affect plastic pipes designed for 
underground use. 
Consideration should be given to the movement of 
population when repairing the reticulated network. Potential 
problems include: 
1. People temporarily moving out of the region and look like they 
have abandoned their house, whereas in reality they just 
needed a break for the disruption. 
2. Movement towards part of the city that haven’t been as badly 
affected, putting more pressure on those services. 
Tip: Beware of initial assumptions, ensure communication 
channels are open and the information obtained is accurate 
before deploying temporary or permanent solutions. 
4.4.2 Remaining Potable Water Services 
Whether temporary potable water solutions will still be 
necessary in this phase of the response depends on: 
 The quantity and pressure of water available, 
 Whether there are any water restrictions in place. 
 Whether other lifelines are fully operational.  
 If people are still unable to boil water due to a lack of heat 
sources, temporary potable solutions may still be necessary. 
Ultimately, the timing of cessation of emergency potable 
water services depends on when the population no longer 
needs it. This will be evident by the number of people who 
continue to attend water distribution points.  
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 4.5 Temporary Standard Services 
 
Standard Services: The entire region has access to potable 
pressurized water within their homes and businesses. 
By the end of this stage everyone should have some access to 
suitable potable water in their home or business. 
The service can include the use of additional disinfection 
treatments such as chlorinators, but as long as the water is 
safe to consume without the use of point-of-use disinfection, 
then the standard service definition has been met (for 
quality). 
It is imperative that accurate health advice be given on 
whether the reticulated water system is “clean” and can 
revert to normal supply arrangements. It is usual for “three 
consecutive clear tests” to be required before a previously 
contaminated system is regarded as clean. All temporary 
piped solutions must also be secure, with no risk of 
breakages. 
4.6 Returning to Normal 
Once the region has sufficient access to potable water at an 
acceptable level of quality, the response becomes a recovery 
and the agencies involved are able to return to normal 
operating conditions. 
Factors for returning to normal may include:  
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 The water has passed an appropriate number of coliform 
tests, enabling health authorities to lift advisory notices. 
 The system can reliably meet the region’s water demand. 
 There are no back-up generators in use. 
 There is no need for alternative water solutions such as 
bladders and tankers. 
 The system has been flushed, disinfected and can consistently 
pass pressure tests. 
Immediately after returning to normal, staff should be 
involved in debriefs which have minutes taken for 
subsequent emergency plans amendments. 
4.7 Response Programme 




5.2 Ensure that all of the agencies that will be part 
of the initial response understand their 
responsibilities. 
High 
5.6 When the emergency response is over, ensure 
debriefings take place on what worked and 
what could be done better or difficultly. 
High 
5.1 Develop restoration curves and acceptable 
outages for the expected emergencies that 
may occur. 
Med 
5.1 Within the training programme, practice 
meeting the goals for each phase. Ask the 
participants to undertake their role in the 
emergency plan for each stage. 
Med 
 
Disaster Mitigation Guideline  
 
   




Tying together readiness and response planning will enable a 
coordinated approach. Matching how the agencies involved 
have prepared, to how they intend to respond will mean the 
right resources are available at the right time. 
Some of the more vital aspects highlighted within these 
guidelines are: 
1. Plan to plan 
2. Plan on how to coordinate with other agencies expected to be 
involved. 
3. Ensure all of the temporary water distribution sites are 
matched simultaneously with a clear heath message. 
Real value can be achieved by using this guideline to match 
the readiness preparations with the stages of the response.  
These guidelines cannot be implemented in isolation and 
plans must be developed by both the local region as well as 
in line with other emergency preparations. 
5.1 Next Steps 
Understanding the existing water system is the next practical 
step. Without an appreciation of the local environment, a 
temporary emergency water plan will be too generic to be 
effective. Knowing what resources are locally available and 
what additional supplies need to be procured is essential for 
an effective response.  
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7 Appendix – Natural Water Sources 
Source Treatment Extraction Distribution Remarks 
Rain Unnecessary if catchment 






at the household 
or institutional 
level – first-flush 
diversion. 
Useful as a 
supplementary 
source of safe water 




Depends of the source 
and its protection. 
Shallow springs will 
generally require 
protection. Unnecessary if 









storage tanks or 
gravity-fed 
possibly linked to 
distribution 
systems 
Source must be 







Unnecessary if properly 





than 60m deep 
and output 
required is low, 
otherwise use 
motor pump  
Individually 
pumped by hand 
/ windmill or 
motor pumped to 
storage tanks, 
possibly linked to 
distribution 
systems 
Yield unlikely to vary 

















maintained may be OK 









Yield may vary 
seasonally; can be 
bug/drilled by local 
skilled labour. Care 






Not always necessary in 
NZ by this is changing 
with spread of 
cryptosporidium. Risks 
associated with 
“mountain streams” are 
generally low.; 
Clarification and/or 











Yield may vary 
seasonally; access to 





Generally necessary, as 
above. Wildlife 
populations can impose 
significant bacterial load 











Yield may vary 
seasonally; access to 
source should be 
controlled 
Figure 1: Adapted for NZ from Environmental Health in Emergencies and Disasters 
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4R’s Reduction, Readiness, Reponses and Recovery 
Civil Defence 
Agency 
Government agency responsible for overseeing and 
coordination of an emergency response 
Disaster An event that causes widespread destruction 
Emergency A serious, unexpected circumstance that requires urgent 
attention. 
EOC Emergency Optional Centre 
GIS Geographic Information System 
Mitigation Activities to limit a disasters negative consequences. 
NGO Non-Government Organisation 
NTU Nephelometric Turbidity Unit 
Potable Water Water that is safe for humans to consume 
Reduction Activities are done to mitigate the effect of a crisis. 
Readiness Activities that can be done to prepare for an emergency 
response 
Recovery An emergency management phase where systems are return 
to normal or better 
Response The initial phase after an emergency or disaster to minimize 
secondary damage and increase the speed of the recovery. 
SCADA Supervisory control and data acquisition 
Turbid Water Cloudy or hazy water; caused by solid particles 
Water Utilities Operator (and potential asset owner) of the local reticulated 
potable water system 
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Appendix VII - Background Research - Emergency Potable Water 
 Page G1 of 11     David White 
Appendix VII - Background Research  
Emergency Potable Water 
 
The research for the booklet on Emergency Potable Water came from multiple sources, including 
interviews, books, academic papers, journal articles and conference proceedings. Highlighted here 
are the major pieces of literature reviewed, which contributed to the majority of findings on 
emergency potable water. 
The literature is from a wide range of sources, including local, national and international experts. The 
preference was to use literature that had been peer reviewed, and when this was not possible - be 
supported by other independent, credible sources. 
As the research evolved several key questions were answered: 
1. What advice for planning to provide emergency potable water is currently freely available? 
2. How are temporary potable water provisions currently incorporated into existing  plans and 
regional strategies?  
3. Who is the target audience of the current advice? 
4. What were the key lessons that occurred in Canterbury as a result of the earthquake series 
in 2010 / 2011? 
5. What other guides would be suitable for emergency responders when planning for a potable 
water emergency? 
1.1 Advice on Water Potable Emergency 
There are hundreds of different articles and papers which discuss aspects of planning for a water 
emergency. The majority of articles focus on specific topics, whereas larger papers normally covered 
more than just emergency water planning.  
Because of the volume of advice available, here is a highlight of some of the most interesting pieces 
of literature found:  
Adams and Patterson highlighted the benefit of emergency response planning to reduce the 
consequences of a contaminated water supply (Patterson & Adam, 2011). Their focus was on using 
"What If" scenarios when designing the emergency response plan, to ensure it was tailored towards 
the local environment. There was an emphasis placed on risk management and long-term planning 
considerations. The study highlighted the use of mobile treatment plants and whether they were 
compliant with the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Unfortunately, meeting the statement 
of compliance requirements by the EPA means little to any country other than the United States. 
An article on contingency planning in California (Putnam, 2002), focused on resilience mitigation 
measures and the benefits of mutual aid agreements between the various water utilities in the 
State. The article followed the 1994 Northridge earthquake and highlighted the successes of such 
agreements. 
Since the early 2000s, the focus on terrorism vulnerabilities has dramatically increased - especially in 
the United States. An article by Clarke and Deininger focuses on protecting the critical water 
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infrastructure through increased security and monitoring controls; including increasing the 
awareness of how easily waterborne diseases can propagated through the system (Clarke & 
Deininger, 2000). Amar took a slightly different approach, instead focusing on what supplies would 
be necessary if a terrorist attacked the local water supply (Amar, 2010). Amar's preference was for 
pre-packaged containers with the guarantee of them being safe for drinking. The article is one of the 
only pieces of literature that provided guidance on the resources required for a distribution site, 
how such a site could be laid out, and control mechanisms. 
A study by Bruin's focused on water (infrastructure) security; however he made several valuable 
points which contribute to emergency water planning (Bruins, 2002). Bruin highlighted how many 
litres of water an average healthy, 80 kg person can afford to lose (about 14.4L) before dying, but 
emphasised that with this level of water loss, there would be serious health side effects. Therefore, 
while a person of such description may be able to survive for up to 18 days in average temperatures 
(16 to 21 degrees Celsius), 3 days should be considered the maximum period someone should be left 
without water if they are to remain in a healthy, stable condition. 
The Environmental Protection Agency of the United States (EPA) has documented several valuable 
lessons regarding emergency water following Hurricane Katrina in 2005 (United States 
Environmental Protection Agency - Office of Inspector General, 2006). The primary learning was a 
lack of coordination between the EPA, State and local officials as well as with the US Army Corp 
Engineers. The another key learning included the substandard monitoring of water tankers, with 
many deemed unsuitable for transporting potable water after the fact; but they were used heavily 
during the event. Complications arose as each State had separate guidelines for certifying tankers, 
and when a water crisis occurred over several States, no one was sure which guidelines they were 
required to follow; instead, following none. 
The EPA has other advice dedicated to how to disinfect water to make it safe to consume (United 
States Envrionmental Protection Agency, 2012). This advice is applicable to both small scale water 
supply providers and household consumers. They have also provided comprehensive advice on 
activities that can be done before a disaster strikes (if a warning is received) (United States 
Environmental Protection Agency, 2011). This is particularly relevant to the United States because of 
their risk of destructive hurricanes. 
Dr Craig Davis presented a conference paper on practices to improve the resilience of water systems 
(Davis, Seismic Practices to Improve Water System Resilience, 2008). This paper contained several 
recommendations for emergency management practices and preparation considerations. To achieve 
a rapid respond, Davis considered well trained crews and forecasting crew requirements in an 
emergency to be the top priorities. He also emphasised the need for strong mutual aid agreements 
across the various agency groups in each the region at risk.  
Based on a ShakeOut scenario in San Andreas, Davis along with O’Rourke followed on from their 
previous studies, focusing on the consequences of a 7.8 magnitude earthquake in the region (Davis 
& O'Rourke, ShakeOut Scenario: Water System Impacts from a Mw 7.8 San Andreas Earthquake, 
2011). While the report focuses on what will be disrupted in the local region, there are a few 
practical ideas for temporary emergency water solutions. These include utilising mutual aid 
agreements, accessing water tankers and working with the fire service to distribute temporary 
potable water supplies. 
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Earlier, O'Rourke and his colleagues had looked at what could be learnt from the 1906 San Francisco 
Earthquake and Great Fire (Scawthorn, O'Rourke, & Blackburn, 2006). The focus was on fire 
preparations and securing the water supply; however, there were a few tips on providing emergency 
potable water. It is necessary that resources are priorities - not all of the available resources can be 
dedicated to fighting the fires, and in contrast not all of the emergency efforts can be concentrated 
on supplying potable water. Computer simulations can help model the outcomes of a disaster, 
highlighting where more planning and preparations may be necessary; and finally that modern day 
fire appliances can be used as intermediary pumping stations. This can help deliver water into areas 
that were originally cut-off from the reticulated water network. 
An article by Jalbaa and his associates investigated the individual components of a sound inter-
agency relationship (Daniel I. Jalbaa, January 2010). Based on their findings, preparation was found 
to be the key tool in reducing the consequences of an event that disrupts the water supply when 
multiple agencies are involved. They found that when there was a trusted relationship developed 
before the crisis, the operators were more inclined to respect the judgment of their colleagues, 
increasing the effectiveness of the emergency response. 
David Travers highlights the need for emergency response plans to be written from a multi-hazard 
perspective (Travers, 2007). An emergency response plan must consider all of the risks an area faces 
whether they are earthquakes, hurricanes or tsunamis. Travers also highlighted the need to establish 
multi-aid agreements in the region to increase the effectiveness of a response. Several other authors 
also gave attention to the importance of preparation, but being in an article format, were precluded 
from covering the many subsets within emergency potable water preparation. (Shimoda, 1994) gave 
a brief outline of the steps to prepare an emergency response plan, and developing plans for multi-
hazard events, which include aspects specific to each of the recognized plausible hazard. Shimoda 
also highlighted the importance of a comprehensive training regime. Pickett and his colleagues 
suggest access to a range of portable equipment and advised that having an inventory of the existing 
equipment can be extremely beneficial (Pickett, Laverty, Abu-Yasein, & Lay, 1991). Whereas 
Whelton and his co-authors focused on the various methods of training agencies involved in a multi-
agency water response (Whelton A. J., 2006). These included a roundtable, functional exercise and 
full-scale drills. Whelton compares the benefits of each technique, with a focus on the outcomes and 
participants involved.  
The Seattle Public Utilities has purchased six emergency water trucks which can transport and 
deliver water, and then seal 2 to 4 litre bladders (small bags) on site (O’Brien, 2006). The trucks can 
be located anywhere in the region that is experiencing a disruption to the local reticulated water 
network, ensuring the community has continued access to safe and clean water for drinking and 
other related activities. 
There have been a few studies on the effectiveness of ‘boil water’ notices - including a study in 
Christchurch following the February 22nd, 2011 earthquake. A study in the United Kingdom, 
concluded a high proportion of people (especially the elderly), never received the official notices, 
and when they did - did not associate common tasks such as brushing their teeth with boiled or 
bottled water. (Communication, perception and behaviour during a natural disaster involving a 'Do 
Not Drink' and a subsequent 'Boil Water' notice: a postal questionnaire study, 2010). Another UK 
study in North Thames had similar statistics (Willocks LJ, 2000). Additionally, this time people were 
asked how they cleaned their fruit - 20% said they used raw, untreated water. 
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The majority of lessons for emergency potable water following the March 2011 Tokoku, Japan 
earthquake are still yet to come to light. At a recent conference proceeding Kuwata and Ohinshi, 
presented a paper on some of the lessons thus far (Kuwata & Ohnishi, 2012). The authors focused on 
the lessons learnt from having to supply water to such a large region. The dispatch operation 
brought tankers in from all over Japan with different branches taking charge of a specific prefecture. 
This ensured an efficient use of resources and tankers had no doubt as to what region they were to 
serve.  
1.2 Current Emergency Response Plans 
Kansas State has developed quite a comprehensive guide for the public water supply systems in the 
State regarding emergency situations (Bureau of Water - Kansas Department of Health and 
Environment, 2005). The guide covers both the emergency response and readiness measures, with 
an outline of an action plan and reinforces how critical a vulnerability assessment is, in order to 
identify the biggest risks to the local water infrastructure network. The Kansas guide provides 
guidance on the stages of recovery from providing potable water, to creating survival conditions for 
the general population as well as sufficient water pressure for fire protection and providing the 
entire region with sufficient potable water, with recommended volumes at each stage. 
In Washington D.C., the Council of Government has devised a regional template for providing water 
to a community in an emergency  specific to the region (O'Brien & Gere, 2007). The template focuses 
on the emergency operation, with a strong preference for bottled water over the use of tankers, as 
well as how to work with critical customers such as hospitals. The plan includes how to ensure 
providers, such as hospitals, are able to be connected to alternative sources and the benefit of 
having comprehensive mutual aid agreements in the region. 
In comparison, Florida does not have a guide specifically on providing emergency potable water. 
Their 'Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan' is terribly generic (Florida State Emergency 
Response Team, 2012), describing the powers of the Governor, the various authorities involved in an 
emergency response and how the local emergency plans should be developed. Given the risks to the 
area via Hurricanes, this seemed quite surprising. 
In 2002, Dave Brunsdon wrote an exploratory paper on how Wellington would respond to a potable 
water crisis (Brundson, 2002). He examined potential vulnerabilities to the water system and the 
interconnected nature of the 4 cities within the Wellington region. If a major disruption occurred, all 
four could be equally affected. Brunsdon recommended investigations start into what kinds of 
alternative water sources can be quickly brought into the region, and that an efficient delivery 
mechanism needed to be designed to distribute the water. 
The background paper by Brundson was followed by a report by the Wellington Lifeline Group in 
2003 (Wellington Metropolitan Emergency Water Supply Planning Group, 2003). They developed an 
action plan and noted which agency would be responsible for investigating a specific step in the 
solution, along with an overarching strategy. The plan developed an outline for the first 24 hours, 
next 2-3 days, 4 to 20 days and 3 weeks onwards - which included the regions goals, and what 
agencies would be responsible for doing what at which stage.  
In a conference paper in 2004, Brundson along with Morrison presented a multi-agency emergency 
water supply strategy (Brunsdon & Morrison, 2004). Using Wellington's unique topology as a 
backdrop, the paper describes the challenges of getting water into an isolated area and the risks the 
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region faces by relying on bulk supply of water, rather than having access to multiple wells 
throughout the region. It shows that drinking water must be the first priority and that households 
need to have at least 3 days supply, given the challenging terrain. The remainder of the conference 
paper reinforced the previous literature (Wellington Metropolitan Emergency Water Supply Planning 
Group, 2003). 
Using the lessons from the Canterbury region, the Wellington Lifelines group updated their 
restoration times and planning procedures following a serious earthquake (Wellington Lifelines 
Group, 2012). The report provides some useful advice for planning for a water emergency including 
how the local agencies will co-ordinate their planning and the risks to the water storage facilities. 
The report highlights the risks to the city if there is a loss of reservoirs, which given the regions 
isolated location, could result in severe problems.  
1.3 Target Audience of Existing Advice 
Although primarily applicable to California, the State has produced a document which lists the 
various stakeholders in an emergency response - from law enforcement to private health 
laboratories (Governor's Office of Emergency Services (California), 2007). Given the generic nature of 
the list, it is possible to rationalise what kinds of agencies would be required to respond to a potable 
water crisis virtually anywhere in the world. 
The EPA produced a guide in 2011 with a very clear target audience - it was intended for use by 
emergency responders and water utilities (US EPA - Office of Research and Development, 2011). 
Disinfection advice by the EPA is directed at household consumers (United States Envrionmental 
Protection Agency, 2012) - expecting that water utilities will have in-house experts who know how to 
safely treat the water supply. 
The Los Angeles Fire Department has one of the more comprehensive guides for households in 
regard to preparing for an emergency (Los Angeles Fire Department, 2008). The guide covers how to 
boil and disinfect water and is useful advice for local authorities to pass onto their residents. The 
audience may be the general public, but since it is the local public health units responsibility to 
design the promotional material for educating the public, this guide could help ensure critical pieces 
of information are not forgotten. 
The templates / strategies being provided by the various states or cities, such as Kansas and 
Washington D.C., were focused on providing advice for the utility providers in the region, rather than 
health officials and emergency responders. This shows that there may be other communication 
mechanisms  to inform these agencies, which may not necessarily be publically available. 
1.4 Learnings from the Canterbury Earthquakes 
Similarly to the Tokoku, Japan earthquake, many of the lessons from Canterbury for emergency 
potable water are yet to be formally documented. 
Community and Public Health (the local public health unit of the Canterbury District Health Board) 
and the Institute of Environmental Science and Research have made progress in documenting the 
health related outcomes from the 2010 / 2011 earthquake series. 
A progress report by Community and Public Health (Dell & Williams, 2011), analyse the situation 
reports to show what happened during the response. It highlights the small number of waterborne 
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disease outbreaks in the region, the strong focus on hygiene practices and how the existing water 
infrastructure was monitored for contamination. 
A second study, commissioned by the Ministry of Health, surveyed the community's response to the 
earthquake from a health perspective (Panie & Bissielo, 2011). It found only a small increase in water 
related diseases following the series of earthquakes, with nearly 90% of the affected population 
boiling their water. However, some tasks such as brushing teeth and washing fruit, had a lower level 
of compliance than say drinking water. The newspaper was shown to be the number one 
communication medium, closely followed by the television and radio. 
In an appendix from the annual New Zealand Drinking-Water Quality report, the action steps taken 
following the February 2011 earthquake in Christchurch, New Zealand are mapped out (Institute of 
Environmental Science and Research Limited, 2012). Emphasis is placed on the success of rapidly 
issuing 'boil water notices', a prominent hygiene promotion programme and a consistent / blanket 
coverage of the public health message. Heath officials believe this is what contributed to the low 
levels of waterborne diseases in the earthquake's immediate aftermath.  
The Waimakariri District Council has documented many of their internal lessons (Waimakariri District 
Council, 2011). In regards to emergency potable water, they found leaflet drops to be an effective 
mechanism of communicating with the public and that access to radios was critical. Some problems 
existed in getting water tankers certified to transport potable water, and it was found that GIS gave 
emergency responders, exceptionally good quick, feedback.  
The Christchurch City Council highlighted that good information was rare to obtain in an emergency 
situation and that responders had to make do with what they had (Christchurch City Council, 2011). 
A decision was better than no decision. Long-term plans for the water system had to be developed 
from day one of the disruption. There was also a need for more comprehensive pre-planning on 
alternative potable water supplies . 
Gibson recognised the need for alternative management tools and back-up power supplies (Gibson 
T. , 2011). This included phones, computers and maps. Not being able to access information on the 
geographical make-up of the region, can result in less than competent decision making, slowing 
down the emergency response. Gibson highlighted that staff are the key to any emergency 
response, and their welfare must be considered at all times. Developing additional support staff 
throughout the country through multi-aid agreements may be immensely beneficial. 
The Technical Council on Lifeline Earthquake Engineering recommended the need for additional 
planning when the water in the reticulated water network is not normally treated (Eidinger & Tang, 
2012). Expertise may be required for operating portable chlorinators and plans should be 
established on how such equipment will be procured. They also highlighted the need for detailed 
tracking of the water infrastructure, so that alternative sources can be quickly deployed to the 
locations most in need. Emergency plans also need to be developed on the likely vulnerabilities of 
the water infrastructure network. A balance of the emergency response and pre-earthquake 
mitigation will need to be considered. 
From a review by the Civil Defence Emergency Management following the earthquakes (McLean, 
Oughton, Ellis, Wakelin, & Rubin, 2012), several lessons were documented. Zoning the city was 
considered particularly beneficial, enabling alternative potable water supplies to be quickly targeted 
to the communities most in need. They highlighted the need for pre-planning on where to obtain 
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portable chlorinators. Generating maps from GIS information were also quite beneficial in informing 
the public and assessing what resources were needed. The review found more could have been done 
to prepare critical customers in advance, ensuring they were able to continue operating in an 
earthquakes immediate aftermath. 
1.5 Guides on Emergency Potable Water 
The California State Government has produced advice relating to emergency response planning for 
the public drinking water supply (Governor's Office of Emergency Services (California), 2007). There 
is a heavy focus on California's laws and regulations, as well as how to communicate between the 
various agency levels. The guide explains what kinds of natural disaster scenarios are the most 
relevant to the region, including earthquakes, floods and droughts. There is very little practical 
information, with most of the detail focus on the paperwork required in California.  
The majority of the relevant complete guides with either authored / sponsored by the World Health 
Organisation (WHO) or the EPA. 
Pan American Health Organisation (PAHO) - a regional WHO office published a guideline in 1998 on 
mitigating the effects of a natural disaster to the drinking water and sewerage systems (Pan 
American Health Organisation, 1998). The guide’s focus was on vulnerability assessment for the 
different kinds of natural disasters. This is an extremely important topic in preparing for an 
emergency response, but it is not the only consideration, which is what this guide makes it out to be. 
Second PAHO guide - published in 2002 (Pan American Health Organization, 2002), was more 
comprehensive, but still had a very dominate focus on vulnerability assessments. This guide goes 
into more depth on communication and essential services, and has practical advice on sourcing 
alternative water supplies, distributing it to the communities affected and other aspects of planning 
for an emergency water response. 
The WHO itself has published a exceptionally good guide on health related issues in emergency 
situations and natural disasters. A chapter was dedicated to emergency potable water planning, but 
the guide also contains 15 other chapters and is nearly 300 pages long (Adam & Wisner, 2002). In 
the water supply chapter itself, the authors work through sourcing the water, treating the water and 
protecting it from pathogens once treated, and then establishing distribution sites. The guide covers 
assessment tools for calculating the water required and strongly recommends a prominent hygiene 
message (which similar to the findings from health officials in Canterbury after the 2010 / 2011 
earthquakes). 
Other WHO guides were more generic such as 'Risk reduction and emergency preparedness' (World 
Health Organisaton, 2007), and would not really be applicable to those planning to response to a 
disruption to the water infrastructure. 
The EPA has produced several guides over the past decade that are relevant to emergency potable 
water planning, but all of their guides have a distinct 'United States' feel, and therefore, not as useful 
outside of their own country. In 2002 - 2004 a spate of guides were published by the EPA on 
Bioterrorism threat to the water supply, (United States Environmental Protection Agency, 2004). 
Here, the focus is to identify threats and communicate fluidly with the respective agencies involved. 
However, unlike some other US based guides, they cover how to source alternative water supplies, 
the role of the US Army Corp as well as long-term and short-term considerations. 
Appendix VII - Background Research - Emergency Potable Water 
 Page G8 of 11     David White 
In 2011, the EPA published a water emergency guide that explained how utilities and emergency 
responders should measure their performance during a disaster, and therefore how to plan to meet 
those requirements (US EPA - Office of Research and Development, 2011). This included the level of 
water needed per capita and scale of the disaster compared to the size of the outage. The guide 
spells out the major building blocks for an emergency response plan, covering sourcing the water, 
treatment options and distribution techniques. There are designs for potential distribution sites, 
resourcing requirements and other essential pieces of equipment. This guide was found to be the 
most informative of any of the guides produced in the United States 
John Hopkins and the International Red Cross have produced a extremely large guide on public 
health considerations in emergency situations (Adballah & Burnham). The guide gives some insight 
into preparing for a water emergency, but it is not expressly covered - rather the focus is on 
epidemic planning, food security and providing health services. This was rather surprising given the 
importance of water in an emergency for keeping the general population healthy.  
A guide on emergency water, written by House and Reed, was limited (House & Reed, 1997). It gave 
a lot of theory behind water treatment and securing a long-term supply, but practically no real 
advice. Far too many pages were dedicated to 'how to plan', rather than what to consider when 
planning. 
2 Conclusion 
There is a lot of good advice available on planning for a disruption to the potable water network, but 
none of the advice thoroughly covered the entire spectrum of providing temporary solutions of 
alternative potable water to the general public. The majority of the advice is tailored towards water 
agencies and emergency responders, but whether they will have the time to read all of the advice is 
seriously doubted. 
It is therefore reasonable to expect that the advice would be wrapped up into one single guide. The 
only one that comes close is by WHO on health related issues in emergencies and disasters, but 
unfortunately, it covers over a dozen topics - therefore the guide is not targeted to one specific 
audience. 
Individual, local, emergency response plans and regional strategies seem to be on the right track. 
However, these plans included details quite specific to the local region, therefore are less applicable 
to responders in other situations.  
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Lessons Learnt Status Report #1 
28th of September 2012 




27-09-12 September 2012 
Warren Ladbrook (Sponsor) 
Piet Beukman (Supervisor) 
1. Current Project Status  
Overall the project has tracked very well over the last five months. We have managed to maintain our 
commitments to the project and have had good progress while still keeping up with course work.  
1.1. Lifeline Lesson Learnt Project 
We have currently completed 112/117 summaries on the information provided by the Lifelines 
Community. An initial interim report was prepared utilizing this data and key themes from the lessons 
have been acknowledged. Feedback has been provided by the steering committee. Our next step is to 
complete the remaining summaries and begin shaping the final report for publication. 
1.2. Mitigation Disaster Guidelines 
The key themes identified in the Lifeline learning project will help us to acknowledge where the gaps lie, 
and these will be our areas of focus. We have begun identifying these and have an idea of potential 
“How-To” guides that would be beneficial to create. 
2. Risk Update 
Currently risks have been managed according to the project plan. No additional risks have become 
apparent. The project is expected to be complete to the original time and quality requirements. 
3. Tracking 
Currently the project is tracking slightly behind the initial programme, due to unforeseen other 
commitments, but with a new refined scheduled for the completion of the content in phase one by the 
26th of October 2012, it is reasonable to expect that the project will be back on track shortly. 
4. Upcoming Work 
During the next period we expect to: 
 Finish drafting all of the summaries 
 Assist with drafting the final analysis report 
 Develop a list of potential How-To guides 
 Start contacting authors to review the summaries of their work 
Appendix VIII - MEM Project Status Reports 
 Page H2 of 18     David White 
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Lessons Learnt Status Report #2 
12th of October 2012 







Warren Ladbrook (Sponsor) 
Piet Beukman (Supervisor) 
5.  Current Project Status  
1.3. Lifeline Lesson Learnt Project 
The past two weeks have seen the summaries completed, edited and ready for clearance by the original 
authors. Progress has been made on the CERA Report and a decision was made to produce a separate 
report that can be used for publication based on the themes within the CERA report. Therefore a new 
deliverable has arisen for the Lifeline lesson Learnt Project, but the timeliness of the analysis peer 
review will determine whether it is within the scope of this MEM project. 
1.4. Disaster Mitigation Guidelines 
All of the 17 topics for the How-To Guides have been given to Warren for consideration and there is a 
meeting at CERA on the 15th of October to discuss where to next. 
6. Risk Update 
Complications have arisen in how the themes / findings should be written with several stakeholders 
having differing opinions. The section needs to be lively and exciting to read, yet uses the lens of the 
documents as its basis. 
7. Tracking 
We haven’t tracked as well as we would have liked over the past 2 weeks, but once the topics for the 
How-To guides get decided we expect to easily get the hours back on track. 
8. Upcoming Work 
During the next period we expect to: 
 Complete the internal report for peer review by the CAENZ 
 Start research of the selected topics 
 Review the suggested topics for the Disaster Mitigation Guideline series 
 Continue contacting the authors to seek their permission to publish summaries of their work. 
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Figure 2: Gantt Chart as at 28th of September 
Appendix VIII - MEM Project Status Reports 
 Page H5 of 18     David White 
Lessons Learnt Status Report #3 
26th of October 2012 








Warren Ladbrook (Sponsor) 
Piet Beukman (Supervisor) 
9.  Project Status  
The focus of the last two weeks has been on doing background research for the How-To guides as Tony 
Fenwick is completing the analysis report for phase one.  It was agreed that the first two guide will be: 
 Emergency Water Provisions for Lifeline Utility Providers 
 Emergency Sanitation Provisions for Lifeline Utility Providers 
A list of potential topics have been produced which needs to be formalized before being made available 
to other researchers. There is also the potential that two more guides will be produced, but this will be 
decided by the end of the next status report. The two guides that we may also develop are:  
 Preparation for Solid Waste and Liquefaction Ejacta Clean-up 
 How to Develop an Emergency Core Competence Database 
Other tasks that have been undertaken during this period include a rudimentary website design for the 
Lesson Learnt Project and seeking approval from the authors who produced the original documents as 
part of the lesson Learnt project. 
10.  Risk Update 
The completion date for phase one is now unknown due to the analysis report taking longer to complete 
than expected. Unfortunately we currently cannot control this and are awaiting the final draft from 
Tony. Once we receive the report we will push for a faster peer review turnaround than originally 
anticipated.  As a consequence though it is unlikely the report will be ready in time for the national 
lifeline forum. 
11. Tracking 
Time wise we are on track to each surpass the 700 hour estimate in the middle of January. 
12. Upcoming Work 
During the next two weeks the background research for the How-To guides will be completed, the a 
draft analysis report for phase one should be finished and peer reviewed, with the revisions being 
implemented and we expect all authors to have given their approval to use our summary of their 
document. We expect to have started to identified potential interview targets and have prepare 
questions for them, which will be taken further after the next status report.
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Lessons Learnt Status Report #4 
9th of November 2012 







Warren Ladbrook (Sponsor) 
Piet Beukman (Supervisor) 
1.  Project Status  
Decisions have been made on the final format and context make-up of the analysis report between 
Steve and Tony. Feedback has been received from Tony on the mock-up website and further discussions 
are necessary with Warren, Steve, Tony and Canterbury Engineering Lifelines Group. Almost all of the 
authors have given their approval now. There was a problem with some of Misko’s summaries and 
involved 2-3 days in the first week of this period amending the work. 
Two meetings that were setup for phase two (with Baden and Mark) were postponed. The meeting with 
Mark Christison has been rescheduled for Tuesday the 12th, whereas a date is yet to be decided with 
Baden. Over 150 documents have now been read for the water and waste provision booklets. 
Finally a series name has been agreed on for these guides – ‘Disaster Mitigation Guidelines’. 
2.  Risk Update 
The completion date for phase one is still unknown due to the analysis report taking longer to complete 
than expected.  We planned to commence interviews during the last two weeks, but due to the delays 
mentioned above they have not yet taken place. Internal assignments are now nearly completed 
3. Tracking 
120 hours were completed during this period. This is slightly less than the intended 140 hours which will 
be made up during the current period. The actual time completed is still close to the budgeted amount. 
4. Upcoming Work 
In the upcoming time period we expect to 
 Conduct interviews with those involved in the immediate earthquake response 
 Start drafting parts of the mitigation guidelines 
 Continue finding relevant research to fill out the existing gaps 
 Discussion how the website will be used and what material will be included 
 Provide Tony with feedback on the analysis report if we receive it during this period 
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Figure 4: Gantt Chart as at 9
th
 of November 2012 
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Lessons Learnt Status Report #5 
23rd of November 2012 







Warren Ladbrook (Sponsor) 
Piet Beukman (Supervisor) 
1.  Project Status  
1.5. Lifeline Lesson Learnt Project 
The final analysis report was sent for peer review on the 16th of November. Steve has organized for 
those who published Risk and Realities and a writer from the Prime Minister’s office to review the 
analysis. 
Progress has been made on most of the authors, but there are still few outstanding. We have decided to 
order the summarized by sector, rather than by technical level as was done in the interim report. 
1.6. Mitigation Disaster Guidelines 
Research has continued on both topics. A layout for the booklet has been mocked up which seems to 
meet the project needs. Writing has started on the Emergency Water Provisions booklet. 
2.  Risk Update 
With the content of the analysis report now complete (peer review pending), the biggest risk is getting 
the final approval from the outstanding authors. Interviews for the Mitigation Disaster Guidelines have 
been difficult to get locked down, but progress has been made. 
3. Tracking 
Tracking is slower than expected due to unforeseen circumstances that those involved in the project are 
aware of. Despite this progress continues to be made. 
4. Upcoming Work 
In the upcoming time period we expect to 
 Conduct more interviews with those involved in the immediate earthquake response 
 Continue drafting parts of the mitigation guidelines 
 Prepare the final companion document, now nearly all of the summaries have been approved. 
There is a substantial amount of data management needed here to ensure nothing is left out 
and the correct versions are used. 
Figure 5: Gantt Chart as at 9
th
 of November 2012 
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 Project presentations will be held on the 30th of November. 
4.1. Updated Milestones 
Table 1: Milestone Summary 
Estimated Date Milestone 
30th May 2012 Initial Scoping Workshop 
11th of July 2012 Progress Report at University of Canterbury Lifelines Week 
20th of August 2012 Interim Analysis Report and Observations Document 
12th of October 2012 Suggested How-To Guides for Phase Two 
26th of October 2012 Sponsor and Student agreement on first initial How-Tos 
5th of November 2012 Mock-up Website for Lifeline Lessons is presented to NZ CAE 
10th of November 2012 Sponsor and Student agreement on number of How-To Guides 
16th of November 2012 Final Content for Analysis Report  
30th of November 2012 MEM Industry Presentation 
14th of December 2012 Companion Document ready for Publication 
20th of December 2012 Lifeline Lessons Analysis Report and Observations published 
21th of December 2012 Draft for Emergency Water Provision Guidelines 
11th of January 2012 Draft for Emergency Wastewater Provision Guidelines 
18th of January 2012 Short Glossy Publication of Key Themes (Phase One) 
21st of January 2012 Draft MEM Report for Sponsor 
1st of January 2012 Disaster Mitigation Guidelines ready for Publication. 
4th of February 2012 Amended MEM Report for Supervisor 
15th of February 2012 Project Completion with revisions incorporated  
 
 Note an updated Gantt chart will be provided later today. Microsoft Project was not available at 
the time this report was written. 
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Figure 6: Gantt Chart as at 23
rd
 of November 2012 
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Lessons Learnt Status Report #6 
10th of December 2012 
Version Author(s) Date Reporting Period Distribution 
1.0 David White  10-12-2012 24/11/2012 to 7/12/2012 
Warren Ladbrook (Sponsor) 
Piet Beukman (Supervisor) 
1.  Project Status  
1.1. Lifeline Lessons Project 
I believe the analysis report is still in the final Peer Review stage. Steve has assured me we are making 
progress. I have spent this period building the final version of the companion document using the author 
approved version of the summaries and making a complete bibliography. I am only waiting on two 
documents now from a certain telecommunication provider before this document will be complete. 
1.2. Disaster Mitigation Guidelines – Emergency Water Provisions 
The international research for this booklet is nearly complete. After initially finding over 400 journal 
articles, papers, reports and websites that I thought had a high probably of being relevant, I have less 
than 50 to read and interpret. I had a meeting with Baden who was very helpful in providing an 
overview of how CDEM works and their initial response. I have also spoken to Mark Christison at the 
Christchurch City Council who has offered me access to their raw data in exchange for inputting the 
same data into a model. I made contact with James Thompson at Canterbury Group and the Fire service. 
2.  Risk Update 
No real new risks to mention, however I have suddenly become reliant on getting access to Mark’s 
water data. This is expected to take place this week. 
3. Tracking 
I am tracking on schedule and expect to have the first draft of my MEM report to Warren by the 17th of 
January. 
4. Upcoming Work 
In the upcoming time period I expect to 
 Conduct more interviews with those involved in the immediate earthquake response 
 Draft section of my Disaster Mitigation Guidelines 
 Work on the CCC on mining their water response data immediately after the earthquakes.
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Figure 7: Gantt chart for 10th December 2012 
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Lessons Learnt Status Report #7 
21st of December 2012 
Version Author(s) Date Reporting Period Distribution 
1.0 David White  21-12-2012 8/12/2012 to 21/12/2012 
Warren Ladbrook (Sponsor) 
Piet Beukman (Supervisor) 
5.  Project Status  
1.1. Lifeline Lessons Project 
The analysis report is still in the final Peer Review stage. The content in the compendium document is 
now 100% finished; with the final copyright approval only needed from the U.S. Water Research 
Foundation (the original authors have given their approval). A professionally designed cover page is 
needed for the document, but this is CAENZ’s responsibility. A draft of the methodology and outcomes 
for this project (MEM Report, Chapter One) has been written and is now in the peer review stage. 
1.2. Disaster Mitigation Guidelines – Emergency Water Provisions 
International research for the booklet is now at a level that would be considered comprehensive, 
additional material may needed to fill specific gaps, but these will become obvious during the writing 
process. The writing has started with several sections already drafted. In the past two weeks I have had 
very interesting discussions with Jan Gregor from ESR, George JasonSmith (Lifeline Coordinator), CCC 
Wastewater and Water Manager Mark Christison and James Thompson (Canterbury CDEM Group 
Leader). The two main other groups that I still have left to talk is the NZ Fire Service and Community and 
Public Health. Contact has been established with both and discussions are very likely early next year.  
6. Risk Update 
It is now unlikely that I will get access to the City Council’s raw data. The discussion I had with Mark was 
shorter than preferred as he had other urgent meetings. He does not return until the 21st of January. 
However I am optimistic that I will have enough information to provide a well-rounded guide. 
7. Tracking 
I am on schedule to have the final draft of my MEM report to Warren by the 17th of January. The 
Disaster Mitigation Guidelines – Emergency Water Provisions will be in peer review by the same date. 
8. Upcoming Work 
In the upcoming time period (ending 11th of January) I expect to 
 Conduct more interviews with those involved in the immediate earthquake response 
 Writing most of the draft for the booklet and relevant MEM report sections (Chapter Two). 
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Figure 8: Gantt chart for 21st December 2012 
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Dave’s Lessons Learnt Status Report #8 
18th of January 2013 
Version Author(s) Date Reporting Period Distribution 
1.0 David White  18-1-2012 22/12/2012 to 18/1/2013 
Warren Ladbrook (Sponsor) 
Piet Beukman (Supervisor) 
1.  Project Status  
1.1. Lifeline Lessons Project 
No new progress to report on this project. 
1.2. Disaster Mitigation Guidelines – Emergency Potable Water  
The draft of the Emergency Potable Water booklet is effectively complete and will go out for peer 
review by CDEM, Community and Public Health, ESR and George JasonSmith on Monday. The content 
has been briefly looked at by Warren, plus Carl Hodder (from 2012 MEM) has given the booklet an in-
depth review, with the changes now being incorporated. I receive internal CCC debrief documents, and 
also tried several more employees to no avail. Mark is back next week, so I will try him one more time. 
1.3. MEM Report 
The entire MEM report is written and is now sitting on Warren’s desk awaiting feedback. The report has 
been peer reviewed by Carl Hodder before being sent. Depending on when the Emergency Potable 
Water feedback is received will depend on when I can submit the entire project to the MEM Supervisor. 
I see no reason why this won’t happen before the 1st of February 2012.  
2. Risk Update 
I am now effectively waiting on peer reviews. Depending on how long they take, depends on how 
quickly I can submit the MEM report. 
3. Tracking 
I am effectively finished, with two weeks spare for peer reviews. 
4. Upcoming Work 
Incorporate peer review changes into both the MEM report and Emergency Potable Water booklet 
before submitting the final version.  
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5. Updated Milestones 
 
Table 2: Milestone Summary 
Estimated Date Milestone 
30th May 2012 Initial Scoping Workshop 
11th of July 2012 Progress Report at University of Canterbury Lifelines Week 
20th of August 2012 Interim Analysis Report and Observations Document 
12th of October 2012 Suggested How-To Guides for Phase Two 
26th of October 2012 Sponsor and Student agreement on first initial How-Tos 
5th of November 2012 Mock-up Website for Lifeline Lessons is presented to NZ CAE 
10th of November 2012 Sponsor and Student agreement on number of How-To Guides 
16th of November 2012 Final Content for Analysis Report  
30th of November 2012 MEM Industry Presentation 
14th of December 2012 Companion Document ready for Publication 
20th of December 2012 Lifeline Lessons Analysis Report and Observations published 
10th of January 2013 Draft for Emergency Water Provision Guidelines 
18th of January 2013 MEM Report for Sponsor 
21st of January 2013 Peer review by industry for Emergency Water Provision Guidelines 
1st of February 2012 Amended MEM Report for Supervisor 
8th of February 2012 Project Completion with revisions incorporated  
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Figure 9: Gantt chart for 18
th
 of January 2012 
